State of Tennessee v. Tom Moore
The defendant, Tom Moore, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to set aside his 1991 convictions of aggravated rape. Because the defendant has failed to present a cognizable claim for relief under Rule 36.1, we affirm the order of summary dismissal. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mark Brooks v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Mark Brooks, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2013 Shelby County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of possession of cocaine with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver, possession of marijuana with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, for which he received an effective sentence of 12 years. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Vernon Campbell v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, John Vernon Campbell, appeals as of right from the Johnson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends (1) that the trial court lacked jurisdiction for his premeditated first degree murder conviction because the offense was committed in the Cherokee National Forest; and (2) that the indictment charging the Petitioner was invalid due to the State’s dismissal of a charge of felony first degree murder. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Maurice McAllister
In 2012, a Giles County jury convicted the Defendant, Maurice McAllister, of rape, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years of confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his motion to suppress his statements to police; (2) admitted evidence seized from his vehicle; and (3) imposed a twelve-year sentence to be served in confinement. The Defendant lastly contends that the cumulative effect of the errors at trial require a reversal of his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roderick Quatel Bates and Emmett Jones
In this consolidated case, the defendants, Roderick Quatel Bates and Emmett Jones, appeal their convictions of aggravated burglary and first degree murder. Mr. Jones challenges the trial court's admission of a photograph of him provided by the Department of Correction and the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the out-of-court identification of him as a perpetrator. Both defendants challenge the admission of the audio-recorded statements of two witnesses, the admission of the audio recording of a 9-1-1 call made by a State's witness, and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. A.D. Smith, III - Dissenting
I respectfully disagree with the conclusions of the majority opinion for two reasons. First, the implied consent law does not satisfy the consent exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Second, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings that the defendant did not freely and voluntarily, and without duress or coercion, consent to the blood test. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Quincy Howze
Appellant, Quincy Howze, stands convicted of one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to serve twenty years at 100% release eligibility based on his two prior convictions of the same. Appealing his conviction and sentence, appellant raises three issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in omitting a special jury instruction on identity; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; and (3) whether the trial court erred in sentencing him to the maximum term allowed by law. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the criminal court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carlos Gonzalez
Appellant, Carlos Gonzalez, stands convicted of one count of second degree murder, three counts of attempted second degree murder, one count of misdemeanor reckless endangerment (a lesser-included offense of attempted second degree murder), three counts of aggravated assault, and three counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. He was acquitted of one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of fifty-two years. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in its admission and exclusion of evidence, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder, and that the trial court erred in its sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for correction of the judgment documents. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bruce Anton Parks v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Bruce Anton Parks, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, claiming he received ineffective assistance of counsel on several bases. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Noah Keith Tipton
A Monroe County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Noah Keith Tipton, for one count of initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine (“the methamphetamine charge”) and fourteen counts of aggravated cruelty to animals. Pursuant to a negotiated plea, the Defendant pleaded guilty to the methamphetamine charge and two counts of aggravated cruelty to animals and was sentenced to eight years with the manner of service to be determined at a sentencing hearing. Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court found that the Defendant was “not eligible for punishment in the community” under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-36-106(a)(1) but took under advisement the Defendant’s claim that his “special needs” were treatable and could best be served in the community as provided by subsection -106(c). Following a second hearing in which no additional proof was taken, the trial court found that the Defendant’s special needs could be best served in the Department of Correction rather than in the community corrections program for Monroe County. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his placement in the community corrections program. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy W. Patrick
The Defendant, Timothy W. Patrick, appeals the DeKalb County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for his convictions for three counts of selling hydromorphone and ordering him to serve the remainder of his effective nine-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
DeKalb | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Janette Ebony Robinson
The Defendant, Janette Ebony Robinson, pleaded guilty in the Criminal Court for Davidson County to two counts of aggravated child abuse and received two concurrent twenty-five-year sentences. See T.C.A. § 39-15-402 (2014). The Defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Beau C. Vaughan
The Appellant, Beau C. Vaughan, appeals as of right from the Maury County Circuit Court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Appellant contends (1) that the trial court erred in ruling that his sentence for a felony conviction which occurred while he was released on bond for another offense was not statutorily required to be served consecutively to the sentence for the underlying offense because the underlying offense was a misdemeanor; and (2) that the trial court erred by ruling, in the alternative, that Rule 36.1 was not applicable because the convictions occurred before Rule 36.1 was enacted in 2013. The State concedes that the trial court erred with respect to both of the Appellant’s issues. However, contrary to the State’s concession, the Appellant’s sentence expired long ago; therefore, his motion failed to state a colorable claim for relief. As such, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the Appellant’s Rule 36.1 motion. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Shaun Steven Kidd v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Shaun Steven Kidd, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terry Lee Adams
The defendant, Terry Lee Adams, filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, complaining because concurrent, rather than consecutive, sentences were imposed on him in 1996 and 1998. The trial court denied relief, concluding that since he was on probation for the first conviction when the second sentence was imposed, consecutive sentencing was not required. Based upon our review, we affirm the denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. A.D. Smith, III
Defendant, A.D. Smith III, was arrested for driving under the influence (“DUI”) in Shelby County. Based on his prior conviction for DUI, Defendant was informed that he was subject to a mandatory blood draw under Tennessee's implied consent law. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that his consent was not freely and voluntarily given. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, and the State filed for an interlocutory appeal. Upon our review of the record, arguments, and authorities, we conclude that the trial court erred in finding that Defendant's consent was not voluntary. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Noah Keith Tipton - dissenting
I respectfully disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority in this case. For the reasons that follow, I would remand this matter to the trial court for Tipton to be placed in the community corrections program. In this appeal, Tipton contends that the trial court relied upon an erroneous interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-36-106 in finding him statutorily ineligible for placement in the community correction program. He argues that the prior convictions relied upon by the court do not constitute a pattern of prior violent offenses pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-36-102(11).1 Specifically, he contends that (1) reckless endangerment does not meet the definition of a violent offense; (2) aggravated animal cruelty, as codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-212, is classified as a property offense and not a crime of violence; and (3) the trial court improperly relied on Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-113(f)(1)-(3) (2006), rather than section 39-13-113 (2001), in finding that his 2001 charge for violating an order of a protection was a violent offense. Excluding the convictions that the trial court improperly classified as crimes of violence, Tipton claims the sole basis for the trial court‟s denial of his placement in the community correction program was charges reflected in his presentence report that did not result in convictions, which is likewise an improper basis to deny placement. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony H. Dean
The Defendant, Anthony H. Dean, was convicted in 2000 of aggravated rape of a ninety-two-year-old victim and received a forty-year sentence as a violent offender. In 2015, the Defendant allegedly filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting the correction of the judgment. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion for failure to state a colorable claim. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by dismissing the motion. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronald Bennett
Defendant, Ronald Bennett, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Because Defendant's sentences have long since expired, he has not asserted a colorable claim for relief. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's decision to summarily dismiss the motion. However, we remand the matter to the trial court for the entry of corrected judgments pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronald Bennett - concurring
JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., J., concurring. I concur in the majority opinion in this case but write separately to pose the question: How may the term “at any time” mean one thing in the text of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 and yet mean an entirely different thing in the text of Rule 36.1? Compare State v. Adrian R. Brown, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___, No. E2014-00673-SC-R11-CD, slip op. at 12-13 (Tenn. Dec. 2, 2015) (construing the term “at any time” in Rule 36.1 and holding that a Rule 36.1 motion may not be used to attack an expired sentence) with State v. James D. Wooden, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___, No. E2014-01069-SC-R11-CD, slip op. at 11 (Tenn. Dec. 2, 2015) (referencing the use in Rule 36 of the term “at any time” with respect to the correction of clerical errors). In the present case, the court utilizes Rule 36 to correct errors in judgments that imposed sentences which have expired. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Victor McMiller v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Victor McMiller, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2009 Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convictions of the sale and delivery of a Schedule III controlled substance, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Walter H. Webb
Defendant, Walter H. Webb, was convicted by a Wilson County jury of one count of aggravated burglary, one count of aggravated assault, four counts of aggravated domestic assault, one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and one count of aggravated cruelty to animals. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a total effective sentence of twenty years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the charge of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony on the ground that it violated the protection against double jeopardy, that the State failed to prove the requisite mens rea for aggravated assault, and that the trial court erred in determining the length of Defendant’s sentences and ordering that some of the sentences run consecutively. Upon our review of the record, we conclude that Defendant’s convictions do not violate double jeopardy principles, that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Defendant’s convictions, and that the trial court did not err in determining the length of Defendant’s sentences. After de novo review of Defendant’s consecutive sentences, we affirm the alignment of the sentences imposed by the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Wilson and Deangelo Taylor
Both of the appellants, Anthony Wilson and Deangelo Taylor, stand convicted of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. The trial court sentenced them to life for the first degree murder conviction and to twenty years for the attempted first degree murder conviction. The trial court aligned appellant Taylor‘s sentences consecutively and appellant Wilson‘s sentences concurrently. On appeal, appellant Taylor argues that: (1) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on criminal responsibility for the conduct of another; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support appellant‘s convictions; (3) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on self-defense and defense of others; (4) the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial after the State told the jury that appellant was in jail; (5) the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a close-up autopsy photograph of the victim‘s face; (6) the trial court erred in admitting Chris Williams‘ statement as substantive evidence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(26); (7) there was cumulative error that requires reversal; and (8) the trial court erred in aligning appellant‘s sentences consecutively. Appellant Wilson argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant his Motion for Acquittal because the proof at trial was inconsistent and insufficient and also erred in admitting into evidence Jarquez McKinley‘s police statement as substantive evidence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(26). Following our thorough review of the arguments, record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for correction of appellant Taylor‘s attempted murder judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Larry Prewitt v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Larry Prewitt, appeals the summary denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, which the trial court also considered as a petition for post-conviction relief and as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because Petitioner has not made an allegation of newly discovered evidence, he is not entitled to coram nobis relief. Because Petitioner is no longer restrained of liberty by the underlying convictions, he is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Because Petitioner's filing is beyond the one-year post-conviction statute of limitations and because he has alleged no grounds for due process tolling of the statute of limitations, he is not entitled to post-conviction relief. Therefore, the trial court's summary dismissal of the petition is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Emmanuel Bibb Houston
Following a jury trial, the Defendant-Appellant, Emmanuel Bibb Houston, was convicted as charged in count 1 of possession of a Schedule VI drug with intent to sell, a Class E felony; in count 2 of possession of a Schedule VI drug with intent to deliver, a Class E felony; in count 3 of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, a Class D felony; and in count 4 of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a), -1324(a), -425(a)(1). The trial court merged count 2 with count 1 and imposed an effective sentence of six years. Houston’s sole issue on appeal is that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his felony convictions. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals |
