State of Tennessee v. Ricky J. Jones and Shane Eugene McClanahan
The Defendant-Appellee, Shane Eugene McClanahan, was indicted in Case No. 2012-CR-150 for possession of not less than one-half ounce nor more than ten pounds of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, driving while under the influence of marijuana while accompanied by a child under thirteen years of age, and possession of drug paraphernalia. McClanahan was later indicted in Case No. 2012-CR-193 for driving a motor vehicle on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license and driving a motor vehicle on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license, second or subsequent offense. McClanahan’s charges stemmed from evidence obtained during a warrantless search of his vehicle. In a separate case, the Defendant-Appellee, Ricky J. Jones, was indicted in Case No. 2012-CR-147 for the manufacture of marijuana consisting of not less than 100 marijuana plants nor more than 499 marijuana plants, possession of not less than ten pounds, one gram nor more than seventy pounds of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Jones was later indicted in Case No. 2012-CR-268 for money laundering. Jones’s charges stemmed from evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant that substantially relied on the evidence recovered during the warrantless search of McClanahan’s vehicle. McClanahan and Jones filed motions to suppress the physical evidence recovered in their cases. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted McClanahan’s and Jones’s motions to suppress and dismissed their indictments. In this appeal as of right, the State argues that the trial court erred in granting McClanahan’s suppression motions and in dismissing his cases. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments |
Smith | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky J. Jones and Shane Eugene McClanahan - Concurring in Results
I write separately because my review and interpretation of the record leads me to a different conclusion that those reached by my colleagues in their reasoned and well-written opinions. While I do concur with the results reached by Judge McMullen, I do so based upon different reasoning as herein expressed. Because I do agree with her conclusion, Judge McMullen writes as the majority. |
Smith | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky J. Jones and Shane Eugene McClanahan - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the trial court’s orders granting the suppression motions filed by Defendant Jones and Defendant McClanahan, reverse the orders of dismissal of the cases, and reinstate the charges for further proceedings. Since the search of Defendant McClanahan was a different search than the one challenged by Defendant Jones, I will discuss each Defendant separately. Initially though it is necessary for me to specifically address a portion of Judge McMullen’s lead opinion. The State filed separate Notices of Appeal for Defendant Jones and Defendant McClanahan, so the issue of the trial court’s order suppressing all evidence seized pursuant to execution of the search warrant at Defendant Jones’ home was preserved for appeal. I acknowledge that the State, for reasons I do not know, in its brief declined to specifically address the issue of the suppression of evidence in Defendant Jones’ case. The trial court’s decision in Defendant Jones’ case rested solely upon the conclusion that the evidence seized as a result of the stop of Defendant McClanahan was illegally seized and therefore could not be used to support probable cause to search Defendant Jones’ home. Perhaps the State assumed that arguing only the facts of Defendant McClanahan’s stop would suffice to address Defendant Jones’ case. Both defendants were represented by the same counsel and both defendants’ cases were included in one brief in this appeal. Despite the fact the State omitted any specific argument about suppression of evidence in Defendant Jones’ case, counsel for Defendants made the following argument in their brief: “All fruits of the stop as initiated by Officer Agee were of the poisonous tree as it pertains to the search of the residence of Ricky Jones. [citations omitted].” Under the circumstances I have no problem procedurally addressing the issue concerning the search warrant for Defendant Jones’ home. |
Smith | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shanterrica Madden
The defendant was found guilty after trial by jury of second degree murder and tampering with evidence. She received an effective sentence of twenty-nine years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by denying her motion to recuse, that her constitutional rights were violated by the manner in which the trial court allowed jurors to ask questions during her trial, and that her sentence is excessive. After review, we find that the defendant has failed to establish her entitlement to any relief on these claims. We affirm the judgments of the trial court accordingly. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shanterrica Madden - Concurring
I join with the majority in this case. I write separately, however, to further elaborate on whether the trial judge’s status as a “Facebook friend” with a prospective witness, standing alone, is sufficient to require recusal. Here, Appellant moved for recusal alleging the trial judge was biased based on his affiliation with MTSU, the judge’s alma mater. Specifically, Appellant claimed she was denied a fair and impartial trial due to the trial judge’s Facebook connections with the MTSU women’s basketball team and their coach, a prospective State’s witness. Rather than an actual conflict of interest, Appellant contends that the trial judge’s Facebook connection gave the appearance of impropriety in violation of the Tennessee’s Code of Judicial Conduct. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Anthony Frank
The Defendant, Michael Anthony Frank, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation for his robbery conviction and ordering his three-year sentence into execution. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Adam Sharp
The Defendant, Adam Sharp, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s orders revoking his community corrections sentences for his automobile burglary conviction in case number 92782 and his aggravated burglary and reckless endangerment convictions in case number 95696. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve his effective eight-year sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Harold Tolley v. Sharon Taylor, Warden
The Petitioner, Harold Tolley, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 1998 conviction for first degree murder and his resulting life sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by summarily denying relief because he was denied his right to defend himself at the trial by presenting an intoxication defense to show he had diminished capacity. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Daniel Pagan
The Defendant, Daniel Pagan, pled guilty to possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to deliver and, thereafter, was convicted by a jury of voluntary manslaughter. The trial court imposed consecutive terms of six years for the voluntary manslaughter conviction and four years for the drug possession conviction, for a total effective sentence of ten years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove that he had the requisite intent to support a conviction for voluntary manslaughter and (2) that the trial court improperly determined that he was a dangerous offender for consecutive sentencing purposes. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cortino Harris
In Madison County Circuit Court case number 12-285, Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of driving on a suspended license in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-50-504(a)(1) and of operating a motor vehicle without a valid registration in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-50-114(d). Defendant was sentenced to serve six months in the county jail for the driving on a suspended license conviction. His punishment for the violation of registration law conviction was a $25.00 fine. Defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction for driving on a suspended license and the sentence of incarceration imposed by the trial court. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court pursuant to Rule of the Court of Criminal Appeals 20. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William F. Chumley v. State of Tennessee
William F. Chumley (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of rape of a child and sentenced to twenty-five years’ incarceration. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction. See State v. William Franklin Chumley, No. W2011-01832-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 3134033, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 1, 2012). The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s decision denying relief. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mashaal Arradi
The Defendant, Mashaal Arradi, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of three counts of tax evasion and one count of theft of property valued at over $1,000 but under $10,000. He received an effective sentence of three years, to be released after serving 10 days incarceration, and was ordered to pay restitution. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in (1) permitting admission of unreliable scientific evidence through a non-expert witness; (2) allowing multiple references to 404(b) evidence without a jury-out hearing; (3) permitting the felony theft charge to be based on an aggregation of evidence; (4) permitting multiple references to the Defendant’s Yemeni background and Arabic language; and (5) allowing instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marcus Deangelo Lee v. State of Tennessee
On December 11, 1995, appellant, Marcus Deangelo Lee, pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of a deadly weapon with the intent to employ it during the commission of a crime, and the sale of cocaine. The trial court sentenced appellant to serve concurrent sentences of three years, one year, and three years, respectively, in the county workhouse. After numerous unsuccessful attacks on his convictions, on December 3, 2012, appellant filed a motion to correct clerical errors entitled “Motion to Correct Clerical Errors in the Judgment or Entry that Renders the Judgments Void Nunc Pro Tunc.” The trial court determined that appellant’s motion was time-barred and dismissed the motion. On appeal, appellant alleges that: (1) the trial court made a clerical error in appellant’s judgments; (2) the trial court erred by failing to vacate his judgments under the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure; and (3) his judgments should be corrected in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 because he received illegal sentences. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marquest Mays
Marquest Mays (“the Defendant”) was indicted for first degree felony murder during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child abuse. A competency hearing was held, and the trial court found that the Defendant was competent to stand trial. The Defendant proceeded to trial, and a jury found him guilty on both counts. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment on the first degree murder conviction and dismissed the aggravated child abuse conviction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it declared him competent to stand trial; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict; and (3) the trial court prevented him from presenting a defense when it excluded expert testimony regarding his vulnerability to giving a false confession. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael W. Belcher v. David Sexton, Warden
In this appeal as of right, the State challenges the Johnson County Criminal Court’s grant of habeas corpus relief to the petitioner, Michael W. Belcher, in the form of pretrial jail credits. Because the habeas corpus court’s order awarding jail credits is somewhat vague, we vacate that order and remand the case to the habeas corpus court for the entry of an order directing the trial court to amend the petitioner’s judgment in count two to reflect the grant of appropriate pretrial jail credits. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ronald Eugene Brewer, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
Ronald Eugene Brewer, Jr., (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and attempted first degree murder. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for each first degree murder conviction and a concurrent twenty-five-year sentence for the attempted first degree murder conviction. The trial court then merged the felony murder conviction with the premeditated murder conviction. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions. See State v. Ronald Eugene Brewer, Jr., No. E2010-01147-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 2732566, at *22 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 14, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2011). The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that he was denied due process and the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s decision denying relief. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Michael Brown
A Monroe County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Jonathan Michael Brown, of facilitation of second degree murder and being an accessory after the fact to second degree murder, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eight years to be served in confinement. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion to dismiss based upon the loss or destruction of evidence, the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, and the denial of alternative sentencing. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher Lee Pirtle v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Christopher Lee Pirtle, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Clinton Travis Simpson
The defendant, Clinton Travis Simpson, appeals the revocation of the three-year probationary sentence imposed for his Hamilton County Criminal Court conviction of aggravated burglary. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeffrey D. Miree v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jeffrey D. Miree, appeals the summary dismissal of his 2012 petition for post-conviction relief from his 1990 conviction of first degree murder as time barred. Because the petition was filed decades beyond the applicable statute of limitations and because the petitioner failed to either allege or prove a statutory exception to the timely filing or a due process tolling of the statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lane Lee Coggins
In this appeal, the defendant, Lane Lee Coggins, challenges his Cocke County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of driving under the influence, see T.C.A. § 55-10-401(a), and violating the financial responsibility law, see id. § 55-12-139(c), via a certified question of law, see Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b). Because the defendant failed to properly reserve the certified question, the appeal is dismissed. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Egan Underwood
The defendant, Joseph Egan Underwood, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Franklin Fitch v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Franklin Fitch, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel were ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joey Godwin
Appellant, Joey Godwin, was convicted of two counts of the sale of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, for which he received consecutive sentences of thirty years each. He appeals his convictions and sentences on the following grounds: (1) the evidence underlying the convictions was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences; and (3) the trial court erred in finding that the State did not improperly exercise some of its peremptory challenges during jury selection. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joey Godwin-Concurring In Part and Dissenting In Part
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the trial court did not err by ordering consecutive sentences in this case. I agree with the majority that the trial judge in this case recited his reasons for imposing consecutive sentences and that the ruling is therefore entitled to a presumption of reasonableness. See State v. James Allen Pollard, -- S.W.3d --, No. M2011-00332-SC-R11-CD, 2013 WL 6732667, at *7-9 (Tenn. Dec. 20, 2013). “So long as a trial court properly articulates reasons for ordering consecutive sentences, thereby providing a basis for meaningful appellate review, the sentences will be presumed reasonable and, absent an abuse of discretion, upheld on appeal.” Id. at *9 (citing Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1) (“The order [for consecutive sentences] shall specify the reasons for this decision and is reviewable on appeal.”)); see also State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 705 (Tenn. 2012). I agree as well that the record supports the trial judge’s determination that appellant’s record of criminal activity is extensive pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b)(2). That, however, in my opinion does not end our inquiry. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals |
