State of Tennessee v. Kevin D. Guffey
The appellant, Kevin D. Guffey, pled guilty in the Hamilton County Criminal Court to driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county workhouse, to be suspended after serving forty-eight hours, and imposed a fine in the amount of three hundred sixty dollars ($360). The trial court also suspended the appellant's driver's license for one year and ordered the appellant to attend "DUI school." Pursuant to the plea agreement, the appellant reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Torrance Maurice Knight
The defendant pled guilty to three counts of aggravated assault, two counts of solicitation of a minor, four counts of indecent exposure, and possession of a dangerous weapon. He agreed to an effective five-year sentence, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying him an alternative sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Nadia Coffer v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Nadia Coffer, appeals the lower court’s denial of her post-conviction relief petition. The petitioner originally entered guilty pleas in the Shelby County Criminal Court to especially aggravated kidnapping and attempted first degree murder and received two concurrent fifteen-year sentences, the minimum sentences for these Class A felonies. On appeal, the petitioner contends her pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily entered due to ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eslie L. Morgan
A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Eslie L. Morgan, of attempted voluntary manslaughter. The trial court sentenced him to eight years in confinement as a Range II multiple offender. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; and (2) the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to ask the victim an improper question during redirect examination. Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Johnson
The jury convicted the defendant of especially aggravated robbery and theft over $10,000. The trial court imposed consecutive twenty-five-year and ten-year sentences, respectively. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for especially aggravated robbery; (2) the trial court erred in not allowing him to move from the defense table to view evidence on a monitor; and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing him. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas Anthony Talley
The defendant was convicted of driving under the influence, fourth offense, and violation of the implied consent law. He contends on appeal that (1) there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop and (2) the evidence was insufficient because the officer used a non-standardized test. Crossing the yellow line on several occasions and almost hitting a trooper provided sufficient probable cause for the stop, and the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tim Holt
The defendant, Tim Holt, appeals as of right from his conviction by a jury in the Hancock County Criminal Court for first degree, premeditated murder. The defendant received a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. He contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erroneously allowed the defendant's wife to testify, violating his privilege regarding marital communications, (3) the trial court erroneously allowed prejudicial exhibits to be entered into evidence, and (4) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on second degree murder. We affirm the trial court. |
Hancock | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tavares Hill v. State of Tennessee
The appellant, Tavares Hill, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the trial court dismissed as an untimely petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that due process tolled the statute of limitations for post-conviction relief. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christie Dianne Webb
The defendant pled guilty to reckless aggravated assault of her three-month-old son and was sentenced to four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court incorrectly applied some of the enhancement factors. However, the factors that were correctly applied substantially outweighed any incorrectly applied factors. There were no mitigating factors. The record does not indicate that the sentence was excessive. In light of the defendant's extensive criminal history, the trial court did not err in denying alternative sentencing. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dennis Gilliland v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Dennis Gilliland, appeals the Dickson County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 1996 felony murder conviction. He contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the issue of alibi. He also raises ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not request an alibi instruction, requested the dismissal of the premeditated murder count instead of the felony murder count after the jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts, and did not raise relevant arguments about the jury seeing the petitioner in handcuffs. Last, the petitioner claims that he was denied the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury because the jury was allowed to hear evidence that he had been involved in two other, recent shooting deaths. We affirm the denial of the post-conviction petition. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terrance G. Motley
The Appellant, Terrance G. Motley, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of forty-four years in the Department of Correction. At trial, Motley waived his right to be represented by counsel and proceeded pro se. On appeal, Motley raises three issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court denied him his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel by failing to ascertain if his waiver was knowingly and intelligently given; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal attempt to commit voluntary manslaughter; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. After a review of the record, we conclude that issues (1) and (3) are without merit. With regard to issue (2), we conclude that failure to give an instruction on the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter was error, but harmless. Accordingly, the judgments of conviction are |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terrance G. Motley - Concurring
I concur in the result reached and most of the reasoning in the majority opinion. However, I do not believe that we should rely on T.C.A. § 40-18-110 to bar relief in this case relative to a jury instruction for the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter. The state has not raised the statute to bar the defendant’s jury instruction claim, and, obviously, the defendant has not had an opportunity to address the validity of the statute. In this respect, I believe that legitimate questions exist about the constitutionality of, at least, part of T.C.A. § 40-18-110 but that this case is not the one to answer those questions. The fact that no harm could flow to the defendant under the circumstances in this case is sufficient, by itself, to warrant affirming the judgments of conviction. Therefore, I concur in the majority opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Devon Crawford v. State of Tennessee
On August 19, 1999, the petitioner, Devon M. Crawford, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of aggravated robbery, especially aggravated robbery and first degree murder. Counsel was appointed and an evidentiary hearing was held. In this appeal, petitioner argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. After a review of the record, we reverse and remand this case to the trial court for a decision on the merits of the post-conviction petition as it relates to indictments 97-02686 and 97-03493. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Calvin Lyons, Sr.
The Defendant, Calvin Lyons, Sr., appeals as of right from the judgment of the trial court, which revoked the Defendant’s probation and reinstated his original sentence. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Antonio Bonds v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Antonio Bonds, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief based upon its filing beyond the statute of limitations. He argues his petition was timely filed. We hold that for purposes of the post-conviction relief statute of limitations, the final action of the Tennessee Supreme Court is the date of its denial of an application for permission to appeal, not the date it denied the petition to rehear. Because the instant petition was filed more than one year from the date of denial of the application for permission to appeal, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Antonio Bonds v. State of Tennessee - Dissenting
I fully agree with my colleagues that the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure do not recognize a petition to rehear the denial by our supreme court of an application for permission to appeal. In several instances, our supreme court had observed that there is no authority for such a petition. See, e.g., John Wayne Slate, Jr. v. State, No. 03C01-9201-CR-00014 (Tenn., at Knoxville, Feb. 6, 1995) (stating that “a petition to rehear the denial of a Rule 11 application for permission to appeal is unknown to the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure”). In this case, however, as in some others, our supreme court “denied” the petition, thereby acting on the request. Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-202(a) requires a post-conviction petition within one year of “the final action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal is taken.” In Lease v. Tipton, 722 S.W.2d 379 (Tenn. 1986), our high court issued an opinion resulting from a petition to rehear its denial of an application for permission to appeal. Further, the Advisory Commission Comments to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 39 provide that the court “generally disfavors petitions to rehear following denials of applications for permission to appeal.” (Emphasis added.) The Comments do not indicate that such petitions are prohibited. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Billy B. Brown v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. He argues the post-conviction court erred in determining he received the effective assistance of counsel at his trial. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry S. Reese
The defendant, Larry S. Reese, was found guilty of aggravated assault based, in part, on the violation of a protective order obtained by the victim, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102(c), and public intoxication, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-310. Upon finding that the order of protection had not been served on the defendant prior to the assault, the trial court modified the aggravated assault conviction to simple assault and ordered a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days. In this appeal, the state asserts that the trial court erred by reducing the defendant’s conviction to simple assault. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry S. Reese - Dissenting
Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that there was no valid order of protection at the time of the instant offense, I must respectfully dissent. Orders of protection are governed in general by Tennessee Code Annotated sections 36-3-601 through 36-3-324. Initially, an ex parte order of protection is issued, followed by a hearing to determine whether a permanent order should be entered: |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ernesto Gonsales
The defendant, Ernesto Gonsales, pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault. After determining that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had a detainer out for the defendant, the trial court modified the defendant's sentence to six years' unsupervised probation and release to the INS, noting that the defendant would immediately be deported to Mexico. In this appeal, the state contends that the trial court exceeded its authority by modifying the terms of the plea bargain agreement. Because the initial judgment should not have been altered, the order of modification is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Brewer
The defendant pled guilty to aggravated burglary, theft over $1000, and vandalism and was sentenced to five years probation. Subsequently, after the defendant tested positive for marijuana and his probation officer filed a probation violation report, the trial court revoked his probation following a hearing. The defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in relying upon a laboratory report showing marijuana in his urine because the accompanying affidavit had not been executed by the technician who performed the test but by the assistant laboratory director. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court revoking the defendant's probation. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mitchell Wayne Hiles
The Appellant, Mitchell Wayne Hiles, was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual battery, a class B felony, following a jury trial. The trial court sentenced Hiles to an eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Hiles raises the single issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. After review of the record, we affirm the conviction. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Albert G. Gassaway
The defendant, Albert G. Gassaway, appeals his conviction for DUI, second offense. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with six months to be served in the county workhouse and the remainder on probation, ordered him to pay a $600 fine, and suspended his driving privileges for two years. The defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for DUI, second offense, and that the court erred in imposing more than the minimum sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Stewart | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew Phillip Stover
The defendant pled guilty to the sale of less than .5 gram of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class C felony, and two counts of the sale of a Schedule VI controlled substance, Class E felonies, receiving an effective sentence of five years in the Department of Correction. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court granted the defendant's request for judicial diversion, concluding he was eligible for diversion because he had not previously been convicted of a felony or a Class A misdemeanor and his history and circumstances demonstrated he was a suitable candidate for judicial diversion. The State appealed, arguing that the defendant was eligible for diversion only because the trial court modified his prior conviction from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class C misdemeanor. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Fredrequos Damon Neal
The defendant, Fredrequos Damon Neal, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-two years as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals |
