State of Tennessee v. Randy Ray and Bobby Pryor
The defendants, Bobby Pryor and his son-in-law, Randy Ray, were indicted by a Marion County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated assault and one count of vandalism over $1000 based on a November 8, 1999, altercation with the victim, Randy Hutchins. A third count of the indictment charged Pryor with another aggravated assault against the same victim, based on a separate incident on November 8, 1999, in which Ray was not involved. At the conclusion of the defendants' joint trial, Pryor was found guilty of assault, a Class A misdemeanor, in count one; vandalism over $1000, a Class D felony, in count two; and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony, in count three. Ray was found guilty of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony, in count one; and vandalism of $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor, in count two. Following the denial of their motions for new trial, both defendants filed timely appeals to this court. However, during the pendency of the appeal, Pryor's counsel filed a suggestion of Pryor's death, followed by a copy of his death certificate. Consequently, on May 1, 2002, this court entered an order declaring that the criminal proceedings against Pryor were abated by his death, leaving only Ray's appeal to continue. Ray raises four issues for our review: (1) whether he was denied a fair trial by the victim's allegedly having tampered with the jury; (2) whether he was denied his right to an impartial trial judge; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for vandalism; and (4) whether count one of the indictment was fatally defective. Based on our review of the record and of applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Courtney Anderson
The defendant appeals his resentencing of 162 years, 11months and 29 days, as excessive. The defendant failed to provide this Court with transcripts of the sentencing hearing, the presentence report, or the guilty plea submission hearing. Therefore, the record is insufficient and incomplete for our review. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Jones
A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Kevin Jones, of aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, violent offender to twenty years in confinement. The defendant appeals, claiming (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred by failing to grant his request for a mistrial when a police officer testified that the defendant refused to give a statement to the police; (3) that the trial court should have ordered a mistrial when the state failed to provide him with Jencks material; and (4) that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Jones
A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Kevin Jones, of aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, violent offender to twenty years in confinement. The defendant appeals, claiming (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred by failing to grant his request for a mistrial when a police officer testified that the defendant refused to give a statement to the police; (3) that the trial court should have ordered a mistrial when the state failed to provide him with Jencks material; and (4) that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rufus Steven Johns
The Defendant, Rufus Steven Johns, entered a nolo contendere plea to illegally registering to vote, a class E felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I standard offender to eighteen months to be served on probation. In this appeal as of right, he raises three issues: (1) whether the district attorney general abused his discretion by denying the Defendant pretrial diversion, (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to grant judicial diversion, and (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert S. Lutrick
After a Giles County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Robert S. Lutrick, of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, he applied to the court for an order of diversion. The trial court denied the request and sentenced the defendant to the minimum Range I sentence of three years, to be served on probation. The defendant now appeals the denial of judicial diversion. Upon review, we affirm. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeremy Kyle Massey v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jeremy Kyle Massey, appeals the Lawrence County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He challenges his conviction pursuant to a plea agreement with the state and contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Patrick Wingate v. State of Tennessee
Patrick Wingate appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He is serving sentences of life and 25 years in the Department of Correction as a result of his 1998 convictions of first-degree murder and arson. This court affirmed the convictions. See State v. Patrick Wingate, No. M1999-00624-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, May 25, 2000), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 2000). Wingate's post-conviction petition challenged (1) the effectiveness of his trial counsel's assistance and (2) the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. On April 30, 2001, the post-conviction court entered an order dismissing the petition on grounds that it contained mere conclusions of law and bare, unsupported factual allegations. Because we agree that the post-conviction petition was properly dismissed, we affirm. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Chester Floyd Cole
The defendant appeals his conviction and sentence for rape of a child alleging insufficient evidence and excessive punishment. The trial court failed to apply pre-July 1995 sentencing guidelines for this April 1995 crime, and the trial court erred in applying one enhancement factor. After careful review, we affirm the conviction and remand for a new sentence. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eric D. Wallace v. Warden, James M. Dukes
In 1995, petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder and sentenced to consecutive sentences of life and fifteen years, respectively. Petitioner now files for habeas corpus relief, alleging he was convicted based on defective indictments. The trial court summarily dismissed petitioner's claim. We affirm the trial court's dismissal. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charjoray P. Weir v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner was indicted for first degree murder. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled guilty to second degree murder, and received a sentence of fifteen years to serve in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel resulting in an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. The trial court dismissed the petition based on its untimely filing. However, our Court reversed that finding. The Petitioner filed an amended petition, and following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the request for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying him post-conviction relief. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ervin Lee Hayes v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner was indicted for two counts of attempted first degree murder. Following a jury trial, the Petitioner was convicted of both counts of attempted first degree murder. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a Range II, multiple offender to thirty-five years for each count and ordered that the sentences be served consecutively. The Defendant appealed, and this Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal. The Petitioner then filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief. The trial court found that the Petitioner failed to state any grounds for which relief could be granted and ordered that the Petitioner respond within fifteen days. Receiving no response, the trial court dismissed the petition. Eventually, with permission from the trial court based on extenuating circumstances, the Petitioner filed an amended pro se petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition. The Petitioner now appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky E. Pullen
The defendant, Ricky E. Pullen, was indicted by a Rutherford County Grand Jury on one count of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual battery and acquitted of child rape. The trial court sentenced him as a violent offender to eight years in the Department of Correction. Only one issue is raised on appeal: whether the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated sexual battery. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient and affirm the conviction. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Terry David Stephens v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner was convicted in 1996 of aggravated rape and sentenced to confinement for twenty years as a Range I, standard offender. The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal and, subsequently, he filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition following a hearing, and the petitioner timely appealed, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to convey settlement offers and to request jury instructions as to lesser-included offenses. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition following a hearing, and we affirm that dismissal. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steven D. King v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Steven D. King, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and especially aggravated robbery. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Philip R. Workman
Petitioner, who received the death penalty at his original trial in 1982, now appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. On appeal, he contends the trial court should have granted relief based upon the recantation testimony of an alleged eyewitness and a newly discovered post-mortem x-ray of the victim. He further contends the trial court erred in prohibiting the testimony of an original trial juror who would testify that the recantation testimony and the newly discovered evidence would have affected the juror's verdict in the original trial. We conclude that the trial court's order reflects varying and sometimes inappropriate standards of review for coram nobis proceedings; nevertheless, the actual findings by the trial court are sufficient for this court to conclude that the trial court found no reasonable probability that the new evidence would have affected the jury's verdict. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Alan Hawkins
A Hamilton County jury convicted the defendant, Richard Alan Hawkins, of assault, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county workhouse to be served at 75%. In this appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the state's witnesses violated the rule of sequestration, and (2) whether the defendant's sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nkobi I. Dunn - Concurring
I write a separate concurring opinion to point out and review certain important facets of the appellate record in this case. The record reflects that the defendant’s guilty pleas were “open”; they did not contain any specified sentences pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(1)(C). See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(C) (providing for an agreement between defendant and state “that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case”). Had the plea agreement contained specific, properly articulated sentencing provisions pursuant to Rule 11(e)(1)(C), they may have survived the revocation of judicial diversion probation, depending upon the terms as accepted by the court. See State v. Hollie D. Campbell, No. E2000-00373-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, July 2, 2001) (Witt, J., concurring), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 2001); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-203(b) (1997) (dispensing with requirement of sentencing hearing when sentence is agreed upon and accepted by trial court); accord id. § 40-35-205(d). However, the trial court, having apparently received and accepted open pleas made in conjunction with the diversion provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313(a), was positioned and obliged, after revocation of the judicial diversion probation, to resume the case at the pre-diversion point of departure. This means that, following the revocation, the court’s next task was to conduct a sentencing hearing. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-203(a) (1997), -209(a) (Supp. 2002). |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nkobi I. Dunn
Pursuant to the judicial diversion statute, the Defendant pled guilty to possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and possession for resale of less than .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class C felony. The plea was entered pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-313, otherwise referred to as judicial diversion, and the trial court placed the Defendant on probation for three years. Approximately six months later, a probation violation warrant was issued against the Defendant, alleging that he had tested positive for marijuana use. An amended probation violation warrant was subsequently filed, alleging that the Defendant had failed to make payments on court costs and had failed to pay child support, the latter being a special condition of probation. The Defendant pled guilty to violating his probation and the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation. Without conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial court entered judgments sentencing the Defendant to concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days to serve in the county jail for the paraphernalia conviction and three years to serve in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the felony drug conviction. After reviewing the record, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a sentencing hearing. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Frank Gaitor
Frank Gaitor appeals from his Washington County Criminal Court convictions of Class B felony possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell and misdemeanor simple possession of marijuana. He is presently serving an effective 22-year sentence as a Persistent Offender for these crimes. In this direct appeal, he raises numerous challenges to the firmity of the conviction proceedings. Upon examination, however, none of these claims warrant relief. Thus, we affirm. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Otis Lee Price
A Cocke County jury convicted the Defendant of attempted burglary, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to three years incarceration. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to convict him of attempted burglary. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Glenn D. Gold v. State of Tennessee
Glenn D. Gold appeals from the Montgomery County Circuit Court's dismissal of his pro se petition in which he seeks post-conviction, habeas corpus, and coram nobis relief. Because his attempts to receive post-conviction and coram nobis relief are untimely and his attempt for habeas corpus relief does not state a claim cognizable in that type of action, we affirm the lower court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerome D. Manning
Jerome D. Manning appeals a certified question of law regarding a police officer's stop of him which resulted in his arrest for illegal possession of narcotics. Because we agree with the trial court that reasonable suspicion supported by specific and articulable facts existed for the stop and that the scope and duration of the detention were not unreasonable, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eric T. Davis
Eric T. Davis appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court's revocation of his probationary sentences and order that he serve the sentences as originally imposed in the Department of Correction. He claims that the lower court erred in finding that he committed a criminal offense based upon the uncorroborated testimony of a law enforcement informant. Because we are unpersuaded of error, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Thomason v. Kevin Myers, Warden
The defendant, Michael Thomason, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, which the trial court summarily denied. The defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals |
