State of Tennessee v. Michael Shawn Shoffner
Michael Shawn Shofner appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of his "Motion to Void Judgment," in which he seeks relief under Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 from an order declaring that he is an habitual motor vehicle offender. He claims on appeal that the habitual motor vehicle offender order is void because (1) no summons was attached to the show cause order served upon him to notify him of the habitual motor vehicle offender proceedings, and (2) the state failed to obtain an alias summons after process was not returned within thirty days of entry of the show cause order. We hold that Shofner's motion for relief under Rule 60.02 is untimely. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Riley Roper
The defendant appeals from his conviction for driving under the influence, third offense, contending that the trial court erred by denying his motion to sever. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Colvin - Dissenting
I am unable to join with my colleagues in holding that a trial judge may not modify a misdemeanant’s “program eligibility” percentage following revocation of the misdemeanant’s suspended sentence. Our sentencing laws provide that “in imposing a misdemeanor sentence, the court shall fix a specific number of months, days or hours and the defendant shall be responsible for the entire sentence . . .,” subject to various authorized sentencing credits. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-302(b). The program eligibility percentage, as provided by subsection 302(d), has no bearing upon the misdemeanant’s length of sentence or when the sentence expires; rather, as noted above, every non-suspended misdemeanor sentence is served at one hundred percent. Moreover, as observed by the majority, program eligibility percentage is distinguished from probation, which is authorized in subsection 302(e). Program eligibility, which is viewed under our sentencing law as a rehabilitative measure, relates only to placement in “rehabilitative programs” for service of the sentence as |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lillie Fran Ferguson
The Defendant, Lillie Fran Ferguson, pled guilty to possession with intent to sell or deliver less than .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance and to failure to obey a stop sign. As part of her plea agreement, she expressly reserved with the consent of the trial court and the State the right to appeal certain certified questions of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) relating to the frisk of her person and the subsequent seizure of contraband. In this appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress the evidence obtained against her as the result of an unlawful frisk. She claims that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion that she was armed and dangerous, thereby warranting a Terry pat-down, and that the incriminating nature of the crack pipe felt by the officer during the pat-down was not immediately apparent within the meaning of the "plain feel" doctrine. However, because the Defendant failed to properly certify her issues for review, we are unable to reach the merits of her case. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeffery Lynn Anderson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner originally pled guilty to felony reckless endangerment, evading arrest in a motor vehicle, and two counts of theft over $1,000. The petitioner sought post-conviction relief, which was denied by the post-conviction court. In this appeal, the petitioner contends his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the post-conviction court correctly denied post-conviction relief. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Ray Swan
The defendant, Michael Ray Swan, was convicted for simple assault, driving on a revoked, suspended, or cancelled license, and violating the implied consent law. The trial court sentenced the defendant to 11 months, 29 days for the assault; ordered a term of six months on the revoked license conviction; and revoked the defendant's license for one year for violating the implied consent law. In this appeal of right, the defendant presents the following issues: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions; (2) whether the trial court properly charged the jury; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing the state to submit a statement of evidence; (4) whether the trial court erred by denying defendant's motion to stay the suspension of his license; and (5) whether the trial court erred by revoking the defendant's license. After a review of the record, we reverse and dismiss the conviction for driving on a revoked, suspended, or cancelled license; the judgment for the implied consent violation is modified to a one-year suspension rather than revocation. The conviction for simple assault is affirmed. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Lamont Anthony
The Defendant, Kenneth Anthony, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of first degree pre-meditated murder and attempted second degree murder. For these offenses, the Defendant received a sentence of imprisonment for life and a concurrent sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, respectively. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to the first degree premeditated murder conviction. Finding sufficient evidence in the record to support the Defendant's convictions, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alvin Ray Taylor
Alvin Ray Taylor was convicted by a jury of driving on a revoked license, second offense. The jury fixed his fine at $27,500. Taylor argues on appeal that the fine provisions of TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-50-504(a)(2) permit the imposition of a fine with no maximum limit violating the Eighth Amendment protection against excessive fines. After review, we find the penalty provisions of the statute, as it relates to the amount of fine which may be fixed, unconstitutional and the fine imposed in this case excessive. Accordingly, that portion of the judgment imposing a fine of $27,500 is vacated. The Appellant’s fine is modified to reflect a fine of $2,500 pursuant to TENN.CODE ANN. § 40-35-111 (e)(1) ( maximum authorized fine for class A misdemeanor). |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alvin Ray Taylor - Dissenting
I find that I must respectfully depart from Judge Hayes’s opinion. I concur in the reversal of the fine of $27,500, but I disagree that the fine provision of Code section 55-50–504(a) should be declared unconstitutional and that we should impose a fine pursuant to the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-111(e)(1). I have concluded that we should hold that the particular fine in this case is excessive via our sentencing law but that we may, and should, stop short of declaring the statutory provision unconstitutional. On de novo review, we should impose a fine of $3,000, as is authorized by Code section 55-50-504(a). |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus W. Keener
The defendant was indicted for first degree murder and convicted by a Lawrence County jury of second degree murder. In this appeal as of right, the defendant presents two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; and (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on the lesser-included offenses of criminally negligent homicide and reckless homicide. The trial court charged the jury as to first degree murder, second degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter. The defendant received a sentence of twenty years to be served at 100% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Having reviewed the entire record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of second degree murder. We further conclude that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct on two additional lesser-included offenses. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus W. Keener - Concurring
While I concur in the result, I write separately because I believe that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of criminally negligent homicide and reckless homicide. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Danyelle Dewain Parker
The defendant was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and kidnapping, for which he received an effective sentence of eighteen years. In this appeal as of right, he raises the following issues: 1) whether the trial court erred in allowing the victim's son to testify about the defendant's prior assault on the victim; 2) whether the convictions for aggravated assault and kidnapping should have been merged; and 3) whether the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Darryl J. Ross v. State of Tennessee
The Defendant was convicted in two jury trials of six counts of aggravated robbery and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. He received an effective sentence of sixty years for these crimes. The Defendant subsequently pled guilty to three additional counts of aggravated robbery, one additional count of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of theft. After an unsuccessful appeal of his second trial, the Defendant filed for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing the post-conviction court denied relief, which ruling the Defendant now appeals. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Doug Myers
Doug Myers was convicted by a Warren County Circuit Court jury of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Myers, as a Range I standard offender, to six years incarceration in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Myers raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support his aggravated assault conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing testimony concerning Myers' subsequent criminal conduct; and (3) whether the trial court erred in sentencing Myers to six years incarceration. After review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Glenn Wiley
William Glenn Wiley was convicted by a Davidson County jury of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. Wiley was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction and sentenced to twenty-five years for the robbery conviction, with the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, Wiley raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the conviction for felony murder; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for especially aggravated robbery; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's reliance on two aggravating factors when imposing a sentence of life without the possibility of parole; and (4) whether the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the theory of self-defense. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey E. Copeland
The defendant appeals from his conviction for vehicular homicide, contesting the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of his motion to suppress the result of his blood alcohol test. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Clement Dale Potter
In this Rule 9 interlocutory appeal, the defendant, an incumbent district attorney general, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss a presentment returned against him by the grand jury. He asserts that the General Assembly, in Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-6-112, vested the sole or exclusive authority to investigate and prosecute an incumbent district attorney general in the Attorney General and Reporter's office. After review, we disagree with the defendant and affirm the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joseph A. Maine v. State of Tennessee
On May 12, 1998, the petitioner, Joseph A. Maine, pled guilty in the Cocke County Circuit Court to one count of first degree murder and one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the murder conviction and to twenty-five years incarceration in the Department for the conspiracy conviction. The petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his convictions were based upon unlawful guilty pleas, that his convictions were based on a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination, and that his plea counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court appointed counsel, and an amended petition was filed contending that the petitioner was misinformed about his release eligibility date. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition for relief without holding an evidentiary hearing, and the petitioner appeals that dismissal. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this case for an evidentiary hearing. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marsha L. McClellan
The defendant pled guilty to one count of theft of property over $1,000, and one count of conspiracy to commit theft of property over $1,000. The trial court sentenced her to concurrent sentences of two years on each conviction, suspended, with the defendant placed on four years of probation, and ordered to pay $10,000 restitution at $225 per month for the duration of her probationary period. In this appeal as of right, the defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request for judicial diversion. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Johnny F. Dugger
The defendant pled guilty to four charges arising out of events in Carter County and thirteen charges arising out of events in Washington County. Other than a forgery charge in Carter County, the charges all stemmed from criminal acts occurring on March 12, 1999, when the defendant and a friend broke into two vehicles parked at a local night spot in Johnson City, stealing various pieces of sound equipment. When confronted by two security guards, the defendant knifed one guard and ran into the other with his car. A high-speed chase involving the defendant and officers of the Johnson City Police Department ensued. The chase, crisscrossing between Washington and Carter Counties, ended with the apprehension of the defendant, who was subsequently charged with, and pled guilty to: DUI; driving with a suspended license; aggravated assault of the two security guards; felony evading arrest (two counts); automobile burglary (two counts); theft under $500 (two counts); aggravated assault of two Johnson City police officers; and assault of another officer. According to a plea agreement, the defendant received an effective sentence of eight years as a Range I, standard offender. The trial court denied probation and any community-based alternative to incarceration and ordered that the defendant serve his sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant presents one issue for our review: whether the trial court appropriately sentenced him as to the manner of service of his sentence. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Carter | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andre Dwayne Tucker
The defendant was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The defendant now contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) his sentence is excessive. After a thorough examination of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joseph A. Hough v. State of Tennessee
In February 2000, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, setting out several claims as to the invalidity of his June 12, 1998, DUI guilty plea in the Greene County General Sessions Court. He had not appealed the plea of guilty but claimed that his post-conviction petition was timely because he had a "mental disability," which tolled the running of the applicable statute of limitations. The post-conviction court concluded that the petition was untimely and dismissed it. Finding that the allegations of "mental disability" are insufficient to toll the statute, we agree that the dismissal of the petition was proper. Further, we find that the notice of appeal was not timely filed. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Calvin Smith
The defendant pled guilty to two counts of felonious possession of a weapon with an agreed sentence of two consecutive two-year terms. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing. Upon review of the record, we affirm the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marvin Matthews v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Marvin Matthews, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Because the petition is barred by the statute of limitations, among other reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey T. Siler
Defendant was convicted by a Knox County jury of the offense of felony murder and received a life sentence. He raises the following two issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his confession; and (2) whether the trial court erred in disallowing certain expert testimony. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals |
