Cumulus Broadcasting, et al. v. Jay W. Shim, et al.
The chancery court granted a motion for summary judgment to the Plaintiff on the theory of adverse possession under the common law. The Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed based upon Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-2-110 (2000), holding that there was a failure on the part of the Plaintiff to pay real estate taxes on the land area at issue. We granted permission to appeal in order to determine whether the chancellor erred by failing to address a motion to amend before ruling on the motion for summary judgment and also to consider whether the statutory bar applies in these circumstances. Although the chancellor erred by failing to grant the motion to amend before entering judgment, the error was harmless because the statutory bar to an adverse possession claim does not apply to contiguous tracts where the area of dispute is not substantial and each of the owners have paid taxes on their respective properties. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Tevias Bledsoe
The Defendant, Tevias Bledsoe, was charged with premeditated murder, murder in the perpetration of a felony, especially aggravated robbery, and unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, all in connection with the shooting death of Nathan Maroney. Apparently accepting the Defendant’s theory that the shooting was accidental, the jury acquitted him of all charges except felonious possession of a handgun. On direct appeal, the Defendant challenged for the first time the trial court’s jury instructions, claiming that the court should have charged the jury on the defense of duress. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the defense of duress was plain error and granted the Defendant a new trial. The State sought, and we granted, permission to appeal. We hold that the Defendant is not entitled to a new trial on the basis of plain error. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Arthur Buford
We granted this appeal of the defendant’s perjury conviction to determine whether the prosecutor must prove which of the defendant’s two inconsistent statements was false. We hold that pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-707 (1997), the prosecutor was not required to prove which of the two statements made by the defendant was false. Therefore, the State was relieved of any election requirement, and no enhanced unanimity instruction was warranted. We also hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s perjury conviction and that the trial court properly allowed the defendant’s trial counsel to testify. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Roberto Vasques, Kevin Joel Hernandez, Luis Martin Vasquez, Hector Alonzo and Victor Hugo Garza - Concurring/Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Vasquez and Garza are entitled to coram nobis relief. In my view, the impeachment evidence in this case does not merit coram nobis relief as to any of the defendants. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Roberto Vasques, Kevin Joel Hernandez, Luis Martin Vasquez, Hector Alonzo and Victor Hugo Garza
Our grant of the applications for permission to appeal filed by the State of Tennessee and certain of the defendants was for the purpose of determining (1) whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the convictions for conspiracy to possess with intent to sell more than seventy pounds of marijuana within one thousand feet of a school zone; (2) whether the waiver of lesser-included offense instructions under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-18-110 violates constitutional principles; and (3) whether the Court of Criminal Appeals applied the proper standard in affirming the grant of coram nobis relief to Vasquez and Garza, reversing the trial court, and denying the relief to Vasques, Hernandez, and Alonzo. We conclude that the trial evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that the statutory waiver of the entitlement to complete jury instructions does not violate the right to a jury trial or the separation of powers principle. We also hold that Vasquez and Garza are entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence and that Vasques, Hernandez, and Alonzo are not entitled to coram nobis relief. In consequence, the judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeals are affirmed. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Robert Dye v. Witco Corp. A/K/A Witco Corporation et.al.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer in this workers’ compensation case, finding that the statute of limitations bars the employee’s claim and that the savings statute provides no relief to the employee. We hold that the employee’s complaint for workers’ compensation benefits is barred by the statute of limitations. We further hold that the employee failed to file his complaint within the time allowed by the savings statute. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Steven A. Edwards, et al. v. Nancy Allen, et al.
The Plaintiffs, who own property adjacent to a shooting range, sought declaratory relief from the Defendant property owners and leaseholders of the range. Rutherford County, whose board of commission had passed a resolution to reclassify the property in 1992 to permit usage as a range, was joined as a Defendant. The chancellor ruled that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and granted motions to dismiss filed by each of the Defendants. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the county resolution reclassifying the property was void. We granted this appeal to consider whether the reclassification qualified as a rezoning amendment; if so, whether the deviation by the Rutherford County legislative body from the issue considered by its planning commission subjected the ordinance to a declaration of void ab initio; and, finally, whether the record establishes circumstances which might preclude the Plaintiffs from a remedy. Because the reclassification qualified as a zoning amendment, the deviation by the county from the proposal before the planning commission was substantial, and because there are no circumstances in the record which might preclude the Plaintiffs relief, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the chancery court. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
City of Memphis, a Municipal Corporation v. The Civil Service Commission of the City of Memphis et. al.
After an internal administrative hearing, the appellee, the City of Memphis (“the City”), discharged Police Officer Jack Vincent (“Vincent”), the appellant. The Civil Service Commission (“the Commission”) heard Vincent’s appeal, ruled that the termination was not reasonable, and ordered reinstatement with full back pay and benefits. Subsequently, the City filed a petition for writ of certiorari challenging the decision of the Commission. The Chancery Court reviewed the record and affirmed the Commission. On direct appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Vincent was lawfully terminated. We granted an application for permission to appeal to ascertain whether substantial or material evidence supported the decisions of the Commission and the Chancery Court. Because it is our view that there was no substantial or material evidence supporting the reinstatement of Vincent, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. James Riels
In this case, we granted permission to appeal to determine whether a prisoner serving concurrent state and federal sentences in a federal correctional institution may attack his state convictions pursuant to a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in this state. We hold that the petitioner, who is incarcerated in a federal correctional institution serving concurrent state and federal sentences, is not barred from challenging his state convictions by a state writ of habeas corpus. Because the petitioner has failed to attach the requisite documentation in support of his claim that his sentences are illegal, however, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition but do so on different grounds than either the trial court or the Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon automatic appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(a)(1) (2003), this Court entered an order specifying four issues for oral argument:3 (1) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to cross-examine the defendant regarding the circumstances of the offenses and, if it did, was the error harmful; (2) whether the sentence was invalid under any of the mandatory issues for review set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1)(A)-(D) (2003); (3) whether the trial court’s instruction to the jury that aggravated robbery is a felony whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; and (4) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. After a careful review of the record and relevant legal authority, we hold that the trial court erred in allowing the State to cross-examine the defendant and that the error was reversible. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case for a new capital sentencing hearing. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
George Haskel Stewart V. Demple L. Sewell et al.
We granted this appeal to clarify the applicability of the rule of ademption by extinction and of Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-3-111 concerning the sale of specifically devised property. In August 1994, the decedent Clara Stewart executed her last will and testament in which she left a parcel of real estate to her stepson, the plaintiff in this matter. In November 1994, the decedent executed a durable power of attorney to her natural children, defendants Sewell and Judkins. In January 1997, the decedent’s health had so far deteriorated that she required placement in a nursing home. In February 1997, Sewell and Judkins sold a portion of the devised real estate in order to fund the decedent’s nursing home expenses. After their mother’s death, Sewell and Judkins inherited the remaining proceeds of the sale; the plaintiff inherited that portion of the real estate which had not been sold. Plaintiff sued Sewell and Judkins as well as the purchasers of the real estate, alleging fraud. After a trial, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals determined that Sewell and Judkins had acted improperly and granted the plaintiff relief. We granted the defendants’ application for permission to appeal and hold that the specific devise of the real property was adeemed by extinction and that the Court of Appeals erred in applying retroactively Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-3-111 and in imposing a constructive trust in order to avoid that result. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s case. |
Franklin | Supreme Court | |
Phil Bredesen, Governor of the State of Tennessee v. Tennessee Judicial Selection Commission, et al.
This appeal concerns the process for appointing a new justice to become the fifth member of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The issues in this case involve the proper interpretation of sections 17-4- 101 to 17-4-118 of the Tennessee Code Annotated (“the Tennessee Plan”) and matters of constitutional law. For the reasons stated below, we hold that: (1) the first list of nominees certified to the Governor under the Tennessee Plan was not rendered invalid upon one nominee’s subsequent withdrawal from consideration for appointment; (2) an individual listed on a panel of nominees certified to the Governor by the Tennessee Judicial Selection Commission (“the Commission”) which has been rejected by the Governor may not be included on the second panel of nominees certified to the Governor under the Tennessee Plan; (3) the Governor’s rejection of Lewis and Gordon did not violate the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”) because a nominee or applicant to fill a judicial vacancy is not an “employee” for purposes of the THRA; (4) the equal protection challenge to the Governor’s rejection of the first panel is a non-justiciable political question; (5) the equal protection challenge to the Governor’s rejection of the first panel is otherwise without merit; (6) the Governor's letter rejecting the first list of nominees did not encroach on the powers assigned to the Commission by the Tennessee Plan; and (7) the trial court erred in its determination of the appropriate remedy. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Frances Barnett v. Milan Seating Systems
We accepted this appeal prior to its review by a Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel primarily to determine whether the chancery court correctly ruled that an employee is working for her “pre-injury employer” for purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) when the company she was working for at the time of the injury is sold to a new entity and the employee’s place of work, job duties, and rate of pay with the new entity remain unchanged. We conclude that an employee is not working for her “pre-injury employer” when she returns to work and the company she was working for at the time of the injury then is purchased by a different company, and this is so even if the employee’s place of work, job duties, and rate of pay remain unchanged. The judgment of the chancery court on this particular issue is, therefore, reversed. |
Gibson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Stephen McKim
We accepted this extraordinary appeal in order to (1) determine the effect of a district attorney general’s consideration of an irrelevant factor in deciding whether to grant pretrial diversion and (2) clarify when an interlocutory appeal from a denial of pretrial diversion should be granted. In this case, the defendant was indicted for criminally negligent homicide following the death of his daughter after the defendant left her in his car on a hot summer day. The defendant applied for pretrial diversion. The district attorney general’s office denied diversion, in part on the basis of its judgment that diversion of a negligent homicide “appears to be an aberration of the law.” The trial court refused to overturn the prosecutor’s decision, and the defendant applied for permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal. The trial court denied permission, and the defendant then applied to the Court of Criminal Appeals for permission to pursue an extraordinary appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeals denied the defendant’s application. We granted review and hold that the district attorney general abused his discretion when he relied upon an irrelevant factor in denying pretrial diversion. The trial court’s judgment affirming the denial of the defendant’s application for pretrial diversion is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Melissa Ann Layman - Concurring and Dissenting
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Anderson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Melissa Ann Layman
We granted and consolidated the applications for permission to appeal filed on behalf of Melissa Ann Layman and Jonathan Ray Taylor to determine the scope of a trial court’s discretion to deny a motion to nolle prosequi to which the defendant has consented. Layman’s appeal also presents the issue of whether a victim’s family has a right to be heard at a pretrial hearing concerning a plea agreement or a nolle prosequi. We conclude that when an uncontested motion to nolle prosequi or dismiss a criminal charge is independent of a plea agreement, a trial court’s discretion to deny the motion under Rule 48(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure is limited to extraordinary circumstances indicating betrayal of the public interest. Because in each case the prosecutor’s independent, uncontested motion to nolle prosequi the greater charge of the indictment was neither filed in bad faith nor motivated by considerations clearly contrary to manifest public interest, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting the nolle prosequi. We also hold in Layman’s case that the victim’s family did not have the right to be heard at the pretrial hearings concerning the plea agreement and nolle prosequi because such pretrial hearings are not critical stages of the criminal justice process as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-38-302(2). Any error in considering the statements of the family, however, was harmless. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals in each case and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Anderson | Supreme Court | |
In Re Adoption of A.M.H.
This case concerns the termination of parental rights. The appellants, who are the parents, seek reversal of the termination of their parental rights to the care and custody of their daughter, A.M.H. The trial court predicated the termination on the ground that the parents abandoned A.M.H. by willfully failing to visit her for four months. First, we hold that the statute of repose under section 36-1-113(q) of the Tennessee Code Annotated does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction to review the termination of parental rights. Second, because the undisputed evidence shows that there was animosity between the parties and that the parents were actively pursuing custody of A.M.H. through legal proceedings during the four-month period immediately preceding the filing of the petition for termination of parental rights, we hold that the trial court erred in finding a willful failure to visit. Finally, we conclude that the parents’ consent to transfer custody and guardianship of A.M.H. to the appellees was not made with knowledge of the consequences of the transfer. Therefore, according the parents those superior rights to the custody of their child that constitutional law mandates, only a showing of substantial harm that threatens the child’s welfare may deprive the parents of the care and custody of A.M.H. Although A.M.H. has now been with the appellees for more than seven years, six of those years elapsed after the parents’ first unsuccessful legal filing to regain custody. Evidence that A.M.H. will be harmed from a change in custody because she has lived and bonded with the Bakers during the pendency of the litigation does not constitute the substantial harm required to prevent the parents from regaining custody. For the reasons discussed below, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the chancery court to be expeditiously transferred to the Juvenile Court of Shelby County for the entry of an order that implements a plan to reunite A.M.H. with her natural parents. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Patti Zakour v. Ut Medical Group, Inc., & Scott Craig, M.D.
The issue we review in this case is whether the defendants exercised peremptory challenges during jury selection based on race and/or gender in a discriminatory manner contrary to the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Batson v. Kentucky. The Defendants used six of their seven peremptory challenges to strike women from the jury panel, including the only African-Americans who were seated in the jury box. In response to the Plaintiff’s race-based Batson challenge, the Defendants responded that one of the African-American women was dismissed because she had difficulty remembering the verdict in a previous civil jury case in which she had served as a juror and because she had a family history of cancer. As to the Plaintiff’s gender-based Batson objection, the Defendants responded that the women were excused based on “experience and body mechanics.” The trial court overruled the Plaintiff’s objections and the trial proceeded. Following a defense verdict, the Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. After careful review of the record and applicable authorities, we hold that the Defendants’ stated reasons for exercising peremptory challenges to strike the African-Americans and women from the jury panel were insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Batson v. Kentucky. Because the trial court erred in overruling the Plaintiff’s Batson objections, we reverse and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial. |
Tipton | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Kelly Michael Pickett
We granted the appeal in each of these cases to determine the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1003 (2003), which prohibits the possession of child pornography. Initially, the statute is neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad. Secondly, we hold that because the charges against Pickett were multiplicitous, only one conviction is permissible under the circumstances of that case. In consequence, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals in each case is affirmed. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Diane Jordan, et al. v. Knox County, Tennessee, et al.
In this expedited appeal, the primary issue presented for review is whether Knox County, Tennessee, has a valid governmental charter. A secondary issue is whether a term limits amendment to the county charter should be applied and, if so, to which of the elected county officials. We hold that while Knox County failed to comply with the enabling legislation for instituting a charter form of government, since September 1, 1990, Knox County has been governed under a de facto charter with a county mayor, county commissioners, and other de facto officers. For the reasons set out in this opinion, it is our conclusion that the term limits amendment meets due process guidelines and applies to all elected Knox County Government officials except for the court clerks and the school board member, each of whom is protected by either the state constitution or statute. The judgment of the Knox County Chancery Court, which invalidated both the charter and the amendment, is therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul Dennis Reid, Jr. - Concurring and Dissenting
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Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul Dennis Reid, Jr.
The defendant, Paul Dennis Reid, Jr., was convicted of three counts of premeditated murder, three counts of felony murder, one count of attempted murder, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged each of the felony murder convictions with the corresponding premeditated murder convictions. The jury sentenced the defendant to death based upon four aggravating circumstances, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (6), (7), (12) (Supp. 1996), and further found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(g)(1) (Supp. 1996). We hold that (1) the trial court did not err by finding the defendant competent to stand trial; (2) the trial court did not err by admitting the testimony of the defendant’s former employer; (3) the trial court did not err by denying the motion to limit proof regarding the defendant’s financial condition; (4) the trial court did not err by refusing to recuse itself from the case; (5) the trial court did not err by allowing the State to introduce evidence of the murders at the Captain D’s restaurant to establish the “mass murder” aggravating circumstance; and (6) the defendant’s sentences of death are not invalid under the mandatory review criteria of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1). As to the remaining issues, we agree with the conclusions reached by the Court of Criminal Appeals. The relevant portions of its opinion are appended. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is, therefore, affirmed. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Shaun Hoover v. State of Tennessee
We granted permission to appeal in this habeas corpus case to consider the legality of a sentence imposed pursuant to a plea agreement. The agreed sentence exceeds the maximum available term in the offender Range but does not exceed the maximum punishment authorized for the offense. For the reasons explained herein, we conclude that the plea-bargained sentence is legal. Thus, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus is affirmed. |
Lauderdale | Supreme Court | |
Linda Smallwood, et al., v. Jessica Mann
In this case, the paternal grandparents of a minor child whose parents were not married petitioned the Juvenile Court of Gibson County for an order of visitation for the father. After a hearing, the trial court granted the petition and entered an order awarding visitation to the grandparents conditioned on the father’s unavailability. We accepted review of this matter pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure in order to determine whether the trial court’s “conditional” order is governed by the statute allowing visitation rights to grandparents. Upon consideration, we have determined that the order entered by the trial court is, indeed, an order granting visitation to the grandparents and that the grandparents are not entitled to visitation under either the grandparents’ visitation statute or through an “assignment” of the father’s rights. Because section 36-6-306 of the Tennessee Code Annotated vests only the circuit and chancery courts with jurisdiction in grandparents’ visitation matters, the Juvenile Court of Gibson County had no authority to adjudicate the issue of grandparent visitation. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, the judgment of the juvenile court is reversed to the extent it awarded visitation to the grandparents, and the case is remanded to the juvenile court for dismissal. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Affirmed |
Gibson | Supreme Court | |
Cathy L. Chapman, et al. v. Rick J. Bearfield
We accepted this appeal to clarify whether experts testifying in legal malpractice cases must be familiar with a single, statewide professional standard of care or a standard of care for a particular locality within the state. Because we hold that a single, statewide professional standard of care exists for attorneys practicing in Tennessee, expert witnesses testifying in legal malpractice cases must be familiar with the statewide professional standard. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. We remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Washington | Supreme Court | |
Donald Fitzgerald v. BTR Sealing Systems North America-Tennessee Operations
This workers’ compensation action arose out of an employee’s motion to compel medical treatment. The employee had settled a workers’ compensation claim with his employer involving a work-related injury sustained in 1997. This settlement provided that the employer was responsible for future medical treatment. The employer refused to pay for recommended shoulder joint replacement surgery, arguing that the need for the surgery was not causally related to the initial injury. The trial court found that the need for the surgery was related to the initial injury and ordered the employer to provide for that treatment. The employer appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof to the employer and that the evidence did not support the finding that the need for surgery was causally related to the initial injury. We accepted review before the case was heard or considered by the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel. We hold that the trial court did not shift the burden of proof to the employer and that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding of causation. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Supreme Court |
