Clessie Jaco, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
We granted permission to appeal in this post-conviction case to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that Mr. Jaco's guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered even though he was not informed of the psychiatric certification mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-503(c) for sex offenders before release on parole. We hold that Mr. Jaco's guilty plea met the standard of knowing and voluntary. A defendant need not be informed of all criteria that affect his possible release on parole in order for his guilty plea to be constitutionally sound. Accordingly, the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
|
Maury | Supreme Court | |
William Perrin v. Gaylord Entertainment, Company, et al.
We granted review to determine whether the employee's action for reconsideration of his workers' compensation benefits was filed too late pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2) (1999). The trial court found that the employee's action to reconsider his prior award was untimely because it was filed more than one year after his employment with his pre-injury employer had ended and also found that the employee's settlement with his pre-injury employer had waived his right to reconsideration. The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel affirmed the trial court's ruling on the ground that the action was untimely. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we agree that the employee's action to reconsider his award of benefits was untimely because it was not filed within one year of his loss of employment with his pre-injury employer as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2). Accordingly, we affirm the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Panel. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Peggy Gaston v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company
We granted review to decide whether there was sufficient evidence to require a jury to determine |
McMinn | Supreme Court | |
Randy Arnwine v. Union County Board of Education, et al.
We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether the Union County Board of Education had authority to enter into a four-year employment contract with an assistant superintendent. The trial court found that the parties' four-year contract was valid. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that no statutory authority existed for the Union County Board of Education to enter into a multi-year employment contract with an assistant superintendent. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. |
Union | Supreme Court | |
Stanley David Alford v. Pamela Ward Alford
We granted permission to appeal in this divorce case to determine: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying a "joint benefit" definition of marital debt and holding that debt incurred by Wife during the parties' ten-year separation was marital debt; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals correctly allocated this debt when it held that Husband should be required to pay Wife's marital debts. We hold that debts incurred by either or both spouses during the course of a marriage are properly classified as marital debt; therefore the debts at issue in this case are marital. In allocating marital debts, trial courts should consider the following four factors: (1) the debt's purpose; (2) which party incurred the debt; (3) which party benefitted from incurring the debt; and (4) which party is best able to repay the debt. Because the record does not contain sufficient evidence to determine how the debts in this case should be allocated, this case is remanded to the trial court to determine the proper allocation of the marital debts. The trial court's determination shall be guided by the four factors set out above. |
Hamblen | Supreme Court | |
In Re: Estate of Donald Ben Henderson, Deceased, Jeff Henderson v. Kenneth Henderson
We granted review in this case to decide whether a probate court's rejection of all purported wills submitted for probate and the entering of an order finding that the decedent died intestate constitutes a final order for purposes of appeal. Jeff Henderson, the plaintiff-appellant, asserts that the trial court's order rejecting the decedent's wills and finding that he died intestate was not a final order because the trial court did not certify it as such under Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The defendant-appellee, Kenneth Henderson, responds that the rejection of the submitted wills and the finding of intestacy represent a final judgment which must be appealed, if at all, within thirty days. The Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant, and held that the probate court's order rejecting the wills for probate was a final judgment that had to be appealed within thirty days. Since the plaintiff's notice of appeal was filed beyond thirty days, the appeal was dismissed. After careful consideration, we have determined that the intermediate court correctly resolved the case. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
|
Monroe | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Vernon Waller
We granted this appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in ruling that the appellant's prior felony drug convictions would be admissible for impeachment purposes if he testified. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that the prior convictions were relevant to the issue of the appellant's credibility and that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any unfair prejudicial effect. We granted the appellant's application for permission to appeal. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable law, we conclude that the trial court erred in allowing the State to use the appellant's prior felony drug convictions for impeachment purposes. However, because the appellant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the trial court's erroneous ruling, we hold that the error was harmless. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Mark Henderson v. Board of Professional Responsibility
This is a direct appeal from an attorney disciplinary proceeding originating in the Board of Professional Responsibility ("Board"). After the appellant, Mark Henderson, disagreed with an initial proposal for a public censure, Disciplinary Counsel filed a petition for discipline. Henderson entered a conditional guilty plea before the Board in exchange for a public censure, but upon review, this Court rejected that plea. The Board ultimately recommended that Henderson be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months. Henderson then filed a petition for certiorari in the Chancery Court for Sumner County alleging several procedural defects, including the allegation that the Board did not have authority to pursue the disciplinary petition because he had not demanded a formal hearing. The trial court dismissed Henderson's petition for certiorari due to his failure to file a complete transcript with the court. On direct appeal to this Court, Henderson argues that the Board lacked jurisdiction to pursue the petition for discipline, that the Board failed to follow the required procedure when it submitted the conditional guilty plea to this Court for review, and that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for certiorari. We affirm the decision of the trial court, holding that it properly dismissed the petition for certiorari, that the Board had authority to initiate a formal petition for discipline, and that this Court had the authority to review and reject the conditional guilty plea. |
Sumner | Supreme Court | |
Joan Schmitt v. James Charles Smith; In Re: S. Denise McCrary v. Joan Schmitt
The issues in this case are whether the lien for attorney's fees was properly preserved, and if so, whether a separate action was required to enforce that lien. The trial court found that the lien had been properly preserved and enforced it in the amount of $37,332. On direct appeal, the intermediate court reversed that judgment and held that the attorney's failure to note the lien in the final judgment as required by Chumbley v. Thomas, 198 S.W.2d 551 (Tenn. 1947), or to amend the judgment to include a notation of the lien, was fatal to the preservation and enforceability of the lien. We granted permission to appeal to revisit and reconsider the "notation" requirement of Chumbley. After careful consideration, we now overrule Chumbley to the extent that it requires an attorney's lien be noted in the final judgment. We also hold that the lien in this case was properly enforced in the court in which the matter was litigated. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for enforcement of the lien and a determination of attorney's fees on appeal. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Rutherford County v. Martha Jordan Wilson, et al
This appeal arises out of a condemnation proceeding brought by Rutherford County against the appellees. The appellant, claiming an interest through her deceased husband in the property to be condemned, filed a motion to intervene in the proceeding. The trial court denied the appellant's motion to intervene and dismissed her cross-claim for declaratory judgment, finding that she held no interest in the property under the provisions of the granting instrument. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the granting instrument conveyed a contingent remainder to each member of the class. As such, the conveyance to the appellant's husband lapsed when he predeceased the life tenant, leaving appellant without an interest in the property. We granted review, and we now hold that each class member held a vested, transmissible interest in the property prior to the death of the life tenant and that the appellant holds no interest in the property. We remand this cause to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. James Mellon
Although the defendant, James A. Mellon, raises numerous issues on appeal, the dispositive issue is whether his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary, and the subsequently imposed death sentence in violation of due process, when he was not adequately informed of the consequences should he breach the plea agreement. Prior to trial, the defendant pleaded guilty to felony murder and especially aggravated robbery as part of a plea agreement with the prosecution. The agreement provided that, in exchange for his pleas of guilty, the State would recommend a sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole on the felony murder conviction and a concurrent sentence of fifteen to twenty-five years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, with the trial court to decide the actual length of the sentence. Pursuant to the agreement, sentencing would be reserved until after testimony by the defendant in any related proceeding or at the conclusion of such proceedings. The defendant reneged on the agreement and instead moved to withdraw his guilty pleas. The trial court denied the defendant's motion and empaneled a jury. A sentencing hearing was conducted, resulting in a sentence of death. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and death sentence for the felony murder. On automatic appeal to this Court, we conclude that the defendant was not adequately informed of the consequences if he should breach the plea agreement. We are constrained to hold that the defendant's pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered, and thus the subsequent sentence denied him due process of law. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Reginald Terry
We granted the defendant's application for permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to decide whether attempted aggravated criminal trespass is a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated burglary, and, if so, whether the trial court in this case committed plain error by failing to so instruct the jury. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that attempted aggravated criminal trespass is not a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated burglary and thus found no error in the trial court's failure to so instruct the jury. The defendant appealed to this Court. After a thorough review of the record and the relevant case law, we conclude that attempted aggravated criminal trespass is a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated burglary. However, we hold that the failure to instruct the jury on this lesser-included offense was not plain error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
In the Matter of D.L.B., A Minor
This appeal involves an action to terminate parental rights filed by the prospective adoptive parents of a child. The child’s father asserts that the chancery court erred in terminating his parental rights on the basis that he abandoned his child for the four-month period set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). To compute the four-month period, the chancery court used the date on which the Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) filed a petition in juvenile court to terminate the father’s parental rights. CASA’s petition was later dismissed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the chancery court’s termination of parental rights under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) and found an additional ground for abandonment as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iii). Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iii) specifies that parental rights may be terminated if the father “willfully failed to make reasonable payments toward the support of the child’s mother during the four (4) months immediately preceding the birth of the child.” We granted permission to appeal. We hold that the commencement of the four-month period of abandonment under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) is properly computed from the date on which the petition to terminate parental rights was filed in chancery court, not from the filing date of the earlier juvenile court petition. We further hold that the Court of Appeals erred in terminating the father’s parental rights based upon Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iii). Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State v. Jerry Davidson
|
Dickson | Supreme Court | |
State v. Jerry Davidson
|
Dickson | Supreme Court | |
State v. Jerry Davidson
|
Dickson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Anderson Toliver
The defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated child abuse. The trial court imposed a |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Anderson Toliver - Dissenting
The majority has concluded that the trial court committed reversible error by consolidating |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Anderson Toliver - Concurring
Although I concur in the analysis and holding of the majority, I write to address an issue of concern: whether in today’s society a parent’s right to corporally chastise a refractory child survives, and, if so, how does one reconcile that right with the child abuse statutes as currently written and interpreted. It is my intention by this concurring opinion to raise the level of discussion and to provide, perhaps, a measure of guidance for the trial court on remand. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Michael Binkley v. Rodney Medling
|
Humphreys | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Gerald E. Saylor
|
Washington | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Gerald E. Saylor
|
Washington | Supreme Court | |
State v. Preston Carter
|
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State v. Preston Carter
|
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy White
We granted review to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in concluding that defense counsel's dual roles as part-time assistant district attorney and defense counsel in this case created a conflict of interest requiring removal of counsel. The trial court found that defense counsel must be disqualified under the facts of this case because a "perceived" conflict of interest existed that could not be waived by the defendant. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed on the ground that an actual conflict of interest existed. After reviewing the record, we conclude that counsel's dual roles as prosecutor and defense counsel created an actual conflict of interest that required disqualification. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
|
Shelby | Supreme Court |
