Jennie Jones v. Professional Motorcycle Escort Service, LLC, et al
We accepted Defendant’s interlocutory appeal in this personal injury action to determine whether, under Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119, a plaintiff is required to obtain the permission of the trial court to file an amended complaint naming an additional defendant after an original defendant alleges possible fault by that nonparty. We conclude that permission to file is necessary under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.01. We also conclude that, under the facts of this case, Plaintiff has substantially complied with the applicable rules. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Roy L. Tidwell and Richard Coggins, et al. v. City of Memphis
This case involves an appeal filed by thirteen firefighters and one police officer currently or previously employed by the City of Memphis. Each of the employees was diagnosed with an illness or condition claimed to be work-related. After the City of Memphis denied the employees’ claims for benefits stemming from their work-related conditions, the employees appealed to the Chancery Court of Shelby County. The chancery court consolidated the cases, reversed the City’s denial of benefits, and awarded benefits to each of the employees. The chancery court’s decision was based upon its determination that the cases should have proceeded under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act “UAPA” rather than an alternative process adopted by the City to handle such claims. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the City was not required to comply with the UAPA in resolving claims for work-related benefits. After careful consideration of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the chancery court correctly determined that the employees’ cases were subject to the contested case procedures set forth in the UAPA. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. We also reverse the trial court’s judgment to the extent that it awards benefits to the employees. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings pursuant to this opinion. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Randy Alan Barnes v. Amy Robertson Barnes
In this appeal, we must determine whether the trial court had the authority to enforce the marital dissolution agreement signed by the parties when one of the parties repudiated its terms prior to court approval. The parties entered into and signed, in the presence of a notary public, a marital dissolution agreement. Shortly thereafter, the husband filed a complaint for divorce in which he expressed his repudiation of the agreement. The wife filed a motion to enforce the agreement as a validly executed contract. The trial court granted the husband a divorce, but enforced the terms of the marital dissolution agreement as a valid contract between the parties. The Court of Appeals overruled the trial court’s enforcement of the agreement, holding that the trial court did not have authority to enter a consent judgment because one of the parties had withdrawn his consent prior to the entry of judgment. We granted the wife’s application for permission to appeal and hold that the marital dissolution agreement was an enforceable agreement, and reinstate the opinion of the trial court. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Daryl Keith Holton v. State of Tennessee and Paul Denis Reid, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
We granted these appeals to determine whether a post-conviction trial court has the authority to consider petitions that are filed by the Post-Conviction Defender but are not verified under oath or signed by the petitioners. In Holton v. State, the post-conviction trial court entered an order staying Holton’s execution, appointing counsel, and requiring Holton to meet with counsel and a court appointed mental health expert. In Reid v. State, the post-conviction trial court entered an order staying Reid’s execution, appointing counsel, and staying the post-conviction proceedings. In both cases, the Court of Criminal Appeals denied the State’s application for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. After reviewing the records and applicable authority, however, we conclude that the post-conviction trial courts did not have the authority to consider the petitions because they had not been signed or verified under oath and because the Post-Conviction Defender did not establish a proper basis to initiate the proceedings as “next friend.” Accordingly, the post-conviction trial courts’ orders are vacated, and the petitions are dismissed. |
Bedford | Supreme Court | |
Clinton Books, Inc. v. City of Memphis
This appeal relates to the plaintiffs’ challenge to the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 7-51-1402 (1998), which regulates the hours during which adult-oriented establishments may remain open and, if violated, results in criminal penalties. We must determine 1) whether the trial court had jurisdiction to issue a temporary injunction barring enforcement of the statute; and 2) whether the trial court erred in consolidating the request for injunctive relief with the declaratory judgment action and addressing the constitutionality of the statute. We conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief. Furthermore, the trial court erred in addressing the constitutionality of the statute without providing notice to the parties that the court was consolidating the action for injunctive relief with the declaratory judgment action. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for a trial on the merits of the declaratory judgment action. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Paula P. King Booker v. The Boeing Company, d/b/a Boeing-Oak Ridge Company
We accepted a question certified to this Court from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee to clarify the operation of the statute of limitations for discriminatory pay claims under the Tennessee Human Rights Act. After considering the arguments of the parties and the applicable authority, we hold that a claim of discriminatory pay may be brought at any time within one year that a plaintiff has received discriminatory pay and that back pay is available for the duration of the unequal pay. |
Supreme Court | ||
Mae Ellen Williams, et al. v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, et al.
We granted this appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in denying the plaintiffs’ motion for an enlargement of time under Rule 6.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and in granting summary judgment to the defendants. A majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude (1) that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ motion for an enlargement of time because the plaintiffs failed to show excusable neglect under Rule 6.02 and (2) that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants. As a result, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. James D. Nicholson
We granted review to address the following certified question that was reserved by Defendant, James D. Nicholson, following his guilty plea to possession of cocaine for resale: “whether the evidence seized from the defendant in this case should have been suppressed because it was seized pursuant to the warrantless arrest of the defendant for which the police had no probable cause in violation of the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article One, Section Seven of the Tennessee Constitution as well as the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in State of Tennessee v. Perry Thomas Randolph, 74 S.W.3d 330 (Tenn. 2002).” After being instructed to “hold up” by a detective, Defendant turned and ran. A majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that Defendant was seized when he was thereafter pursued and apprehended by officers. The intermediate court concluded that, because the detectives lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to effectuate such a seizure, the evidence flowing therefrom must be suppressed. After careful review of the record and applicable authority, we concur with the judgment rendered by the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, reverse and vacate Defendant’s conviction and dismiss the charges. We also emphasize the importance of creating an adequate record for review in cases such as this one. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. James D. Nicholson - Dissenting
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Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Sherry A. Hubble et al. v. Dyer Nursing Home
This workers’ compensation action arose out of an automobile accident occurring while the plaintiff was on her way to an orientation session held at a location separate from the nursing home facility at which she had been hired to work. The chancery court awarded the plaintiff 95% permanent partial disability and also ordered the defendant employer to reimburse State Farm, the insurer of the driver of the automobile, for medical payments made under the driver’s policy. The court did not order reimbursement for amounts paid by State Farm under the liability portion of the policy. On appeal, the defendant argues: 1) the plaintiff was not an employee at the time of the accident; 2) if she was an employee, the injury did not arise out of and in the course of the plaintiff’s employment; 3) the trial court erred in ordering the defendant to reimburse State Farm for medical payments made; and 4) the trial court erred in not allowing the defendant a credit for those amounts already paid by State Farm. The plaintiff appeals the finding of 95% permanent partial disability, arguing that the evidence supports a finding of permanent total disability. State Farm appeals the court’s denial of reimbursement for the amount State Farm paid under the liability provision of the policy. We accepted review before the case was heard or considered by the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel. Upon due consideration, we affirm the decision of the chancery court that the plaintiff was an employee, that she was injured in the course and scope of her employment, and that she suffered 95% permanent partial disability. We also hold that the trial court correctly ordered the defendant to reimburse State Farm for the medical benefits paid while denying reimbursement for the amounts paid under the liability provision. Finally, we conclude that the defendant is not entitled to a credit for the amount paid by State Farm. |
Gibson | Supreme Court | |
Walter Bailey, et al. v. County of Shelby, et al.
In this expedited appeal, this Court is asked to decide two questions of first impression. The first question is whether a term limit provision contained in a county charter is authorized by Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-1-210(4). Like the lower courts, we answer this question in the affirmative. The second question before this Court is whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-1-210(4) violates Article VII, section 1, of Tennessee’s constitution to the extent that the statute authorizes a county with a charter form of government to impose term limits upon members of its legislative body. Unlike the Court of Appeals, we answer this question in the negative. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the chancery court is reinstated. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Wade Davis - Dissenting
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Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Wade Davis
We granted the defendant permission to appeal to consider whether the exact copy requirement of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c)1 applies to an affidavit that has been incorporated by reference into a search warrant. Upon consideration, we hold that the exact copy requirement expressly applies to search warrants only and does not apply to incorporated affidavits. The record supports the trial court’s finding that the defendant a copy of the search warrant was “identical in every respect” to the original search warrant. Furthermore, even if the exact copy requirement expressly applied to affidavits, we would conclude, as did the Court of Criminal Appeals, that the insignificant differences between the original affidavit and the defendant’s copy of the affidavit do not warrant suppression of the evidence. For these reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Steven Rollins - Concurring and Dissenting
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Sullivan | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Steven Rollins
The defendant, Steven James Rollins, was convicted of premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. The trial judge merged the felony murder conviction with the premeditated first degree murder conviction. Upon conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the jury found that the State had established beyond a reasonable doubt the following five aggravating circumstances: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person; (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death; (3) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another; (4) the murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant, while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, any robbery; and (5) the victim of the murder was seventy (70) years of age or older. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (5), (6), (7), (14) (1999). After further finding that these aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury imposed a sentence of death. The defendant appealed, challenging both his conviction and sentence of death.1 The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The case was automatically docketed in this Court. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(a)(1). Thereafter, this Court entered an order specifically requesting that the parties address the following three issues at oral argument:2 (1) whether the interrogation of the defendant by the sheriff’s officers after his arrest violated the defendant’s state and federal constitutional rights to counsel such that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress the defendant’s statements; (2) whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow the defendant to call his codefendant, Greg Fleenor, to the witness stand to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination in the jury’s presence; and (3) whether the mandatory review provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1) require reversal of the defendant’s death sentence.3 Upon thoroughly considering these and all issues raised by the defendant, the record on appeal, and the relevant authority, we affirm the defendant’s conviction of first degree murder and sentence of death. |
Sullivan | Supreme Court | |
Donna J. Overman v. Altama Delta Corporation - Dissenting
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Henderson | Supreme Court | |
Donna J. Overman v. Altama Delta Corporation
We accepted this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to determine the enforceability of the employee’s prospective waiver of her reconsideration rights in a workers’ compensation settlement agreement. We conclude that the waiver provision is contrary to both the plain language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-114(a) and public policy and, therefore, is unenforceable. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Henderson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Stephen Lynn Hugueley
Defendant, Stephen Lynn Hugueley, was convicted by a jury of one count of first degree premeditated murder. During the penalty phase of the trial, the jury found four aggravating circumstances: (1) Defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person; (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death; (3) Defendant committed the murder while he was in a place of lawful confinement; and (4) the victim was a corrections employee. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (5), (8), (9) (Supp. 1999). Additionally, the jury determined that the evidence of these aggravating circumstances outweighed the evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at (g)(1). The jury thereupon sentenced Defendant to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and the death sentence. After the case was docketed in this Court, we entered an order identifying several issues for oral argument.1 We now hold as follows: (1) the 1 trial court did not commit reversible error in concluding that Defendant failed to establish purposeful discrimination by the prosecution in its exercise of peremptory challenges in violation of Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.; (2) the trial court did not commit reversible error in refusing to dismiss prospective juror Watkins for cause; and (3) the death sentence is valid under this Court’s mandatory review pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1) (2003). We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ conclusions with respect to the remaining issues, the relevant portions of which are included in the appendix to this opinion. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment is affirmed. |
Hardeman | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Stephen Lynn Hugueley - Concurring and Dissenting
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Hardeman | Supreme Court | |
Misty Michelle Glisson v. Mohon International, Inc./Campbell Ray
The employer in this workers’ compensation action has appealed from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Henry County finding that the employee suffered a work-related back injury. The trial court awarded the employee benefits based on 30% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer contends on appeal that the medical proof, which does not include any medical testimony, is insufficient to establish a causal connection between the employee’s injury and her employment. The dispositive question before this Court is whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the employee’s injury arose out of her employment. We conclude that the record and applicable law support the trial court’s decision to award benefits. We further hold that a local rule of the 24th Judicial District which prohibits the taking of medical depositions in workers’ compensation cases absent leave of court is invalid. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. |
Henry | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. David Ivy - Concurring and Dissenting
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. David Ivy
The defendant, David Ivy, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder and was sentenced to death. In imposing a death sentence, the jury found that two aggravating circumstances, i.e., the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person and the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another, had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2) and (6) (Supp. 1999). In addition, the jury determined that the evidence of aggravating circumstances outweighed the evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at (c). The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and the death sentence. After the appeal was docketed in this Court, we entered an order identifying eight issues for oral argument.1 Having reviewed the record and applicable authority, we now hold that: 1) the evidence was sufficient to support the first degree murder conviction; 2) the trial court did not err in impaneling an anonymous jury; 3) the trial court properly ruled that the victim’s statements were admissible under the “forfeiture by wrongdoing” hearsay exception; 4) the evidence supported the jury’s findings that the two aggravating circumstances were proven beyond a reasonable doubt; 5) the trial court erred during the sentencing phase in instructing the jury that two of the five prior felony convictions relied on by the prosecution involved violence to a person, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; 6) the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to introduce the defendant’s prior indictment for first degree murder in the sentencing phase of the trial where the defendant had been convicted of second degree murder, but the error did not affect the outcome; 7) the trial court erred in ruling that defense counsel could not argue residual doubt as a mitigating circumstance during the sentencing phase, but the error did not affect the outcome; and 8) the evidence of aggravating circumstances outweighed the evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, and the death sentence was not arbitrary or disproportionate. We also agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ conclusions with respect to the remaining issues, the relevant portions of which are included in the appendix. Thus, the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment is affirmed. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Rice - Concurring and Dissenting
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Rice
A jury convicted the defendant, Charles Rice, of first degree murder. Following a capital sentencing hearing, the jury found three aggravating circumstances: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, the statutory elements of which involve the use of violence to the person; (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death; and (3) the murder was knowingly committed by the defendant while the defendant had a substantial role in committing, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit a rape. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 204(i)(2), (5), (7) (1997). The jury also found that these aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the jury imposed a sentence of death. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed both the conviction and sentence. Upon automatic appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206 (2003), this Court entered an order specifying seven issues for oral argument,1 including (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction; (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the aggravating circumstances found by the jury; (3) whether the trial court’s instruction to the jury that aggravated assault was a felony whose statutory elements involve violence to the person violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; (4) whether the trial court’s restriction of the defendant’s cross-examination regarding Tony Evans’ prior conviction was harmless error; (5) whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow the defendant to sit at the defense counsel table; (6) whether the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of facilitation; and (7) whether the death sentence is comparatively proportionate and valid under the mandatory review provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1)(A)- (D) (2003). After a careful review of the record and relevant legal authority, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
David D. Orrick v. Bestway Trucking, Inc., et al.
We granted review in this workers' compensation case to determine whether the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel erred in reducing the trial court's disability award from 33% to 3%. After reviewing the record and the applicable authority, we conclude that reduction of the trial court's award is appropriate. We further conclude, however, that we are unable to enter an appropriate award based on the record before us. We therefore remand to the trial court to enter an award consistent with this opinion. |
Warren | Supreme Court |
