State of Tennessee v. Linnell Richmond
Following a jury trial, the defendant, Linnell Richmond, was found guilty by a Knox County jury of aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery and two counts of attempted first degree premeditated murder. The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-two years for his convictions, to be served consecutively to a federal sentence arising out of the same criminal episode. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court upon finding that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on: (1) the "natural and probable consequence rule" in relation to the charges of attempted first degree murder; and (2) robbery as a lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery, and attempted robbery as a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated robbery. The State appealed to this Court, and we granted the application. We hold that: (1) it was harmless error by the trial court to fail to instruct the jury on the natural and probable consequences rule in relation to the charge of attempted first degree murder; and (2) it was likewise harmless error by the trial court in failing to instruct the jury regarding robbery as a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery, and attempted robbery as a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated robbery. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the defendant's convictions are reinstated. This case is remanded to the trial court for enforcement of the judgment. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Linnell Richmond
Following a jury trial, the defendant, Linnell Richmond, was found guilty by a Knox County jury of aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery and two counts of attempted first degree premeditated murder. The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-two years for his convictions, to be served consecutively to a federal sentence arising out of the same criminal episode. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court upon finding that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on: (1) the "natural and probable consequence rule" in relation to the charges of attempted first degree murder; and (2) robbery as a lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery, and attempted robbery as a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated robbery. The State appealed to this Court, and we granted the application. We hold that: (1) it was harmless error by the trial court to fail to instruct the jury on the natural and probable consequences rule in relation to the charge of attempted first degree murder; and (2) it was likewise harmless error by the trial court in failing to instruct the jury regarding robbery as a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery, and attempted robbery as a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated robbery. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the defendant's convictions are reinstated. This case is remanded to the trial court for enforcement of the judgment. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Takeita M. Locke
The defendant, Takeita M. Locke, was tried and convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery in the death of Chuck Newman. The Court of Criminal Appeals unanimously affirmed both convictions. We granted this appeal to determine if the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on certain lesser-included offenses of felony murder, namely: second degree murder, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide. Additionally, with respect to her conviction for especially aggravated robbery, the defendant maintains that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of facilitation of a felony (especially aggravated robbery), aggravated robbery, and robbery. After examining the facts and the law relevant to these issues, we hold that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of second degree murder, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide was reversible error. We also hold that the trial court's failure to instruct on the lesser-included offenses of facilitation of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and robbery was erroneous, but such errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Takeita M. Locke
The defendant, Takeita M. Locke, was tried and convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery in the death of Chuck Newman. The Court of Criminal Appeals unanimously affirmed both convictions. We granted this appeal to determine if the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on certain lesser-included offenses of felony murder, namely: second degree murder, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide. Additionally, with respect to her conviction for especially aggravated robbery, the defendant maintains that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of facilitation of a felony (especially aggravated robbery), aggravated robbery, and robbery. After examining the facts and the law relevant to these issues, we hold that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of second degree murder, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide was reversible error. We also hold that the trial court's failure to instruct on the lesser-included offenses of facilitation of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and robbery was erroneous, but such errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Hubert Patty v. Board of Professional Responsibility
This is a direct appeal in a Board of Professional Responsibility case. A hearing committee found that the petitioner violated four disciplinary rules arising out of client representation, imposed a one-year suspension from the practice of law, and ordered the petitioner to complete courses in ethics and civil procedure at an accredited law school before applying for reinstatement. The chancery court upheld the hearing committee's findings and conclusions with respect to the violations, but reduced the suspension to 60 days and vacated the requirement for law school education. After our review of the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the chancery court properly affirmed the hearing committee's findings with regard to the petitioner's violations of the disciplinary rules, but we modify the length of the suspension to four months and the condition for reinstatement by requiring the petitioner to complete six hours of continuing legal education in ethics and twelve hours of continuing legal education in courses related to civil trial practice or civil litigation, in addition to the three hours of ethics and twelve hours of general credit required annually of attorneys in this State. The judgment is, therefore, affirmed as modified. |
Blount | Supreme Court | |
State v. Christopher Flake
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Supreme Court | ||
Pero's Steak House v. Elizabeth Lee & 1st American Bank & 1st Tennessee Bank
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Knox | Supreme Court | |
Jackie Martin v. Lear Corporation
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Hamblen | Supreme Court | |
Larry Seal v. Charles Blalock & Sons
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Hancock | Supreme Court | |
Harold Wayne Nichols v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Harold Wayne Nichols, filed post-conviction petitions seeking relief from his conviction for felony murder, his sentence of death, and his numerous convictions for aggravated rape, first degree burglary, and larceny upon the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, as well as other legal grounds. After conducting several evidentiary hearings, the trial court denied relief as to the felony murder conviction and sentence of death, but granted partial relief by ordering new sentencing hearings as to the remaining convictions. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the trial court erred by allowing the petitioner to assert his right against self-incrimination during the post-conviction proceedings, yet upheld the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude: (1) that the petitioner was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel based on the failure to investigate and challenge his confessions as false; (2) that the petitioner was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel based on the failure to challenge the legality of his arrest; (3) that the petitioner was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his capital trial based on the failure to present additional mitigating evidence; (4) that the petitioner was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his capital trial based on the failure to object to misconduct by the prosecution; (5) that the petitioner was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his capital trial based on the failure to request mitigating instructions; (6) that the petitioner was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his capital trial based on the failure to raise issues regarding the constitutionality of capital punishment; (7) that the petitioner was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his capital trial based on the failure to object to the discovery of notes prepared by a defense psychologist on self-incrimination grounds; (8) that the Court of Criminal Appeals did not err in refusing to remand the case for additional DNA testing; (9) that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by addressing the issue of whether the petitioner had a right against self-incrimination in this post-conviction proceeding but the error had no effect on the outcome; and (10) that the trial court’s findings were not clearly erroneous and cumulative -2- error did not require the reversal of the petitioner’s convictions. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals Affirmed |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Harold Wayne Nichols v. State of Tennessee - Concurring/Dissenting
I fully concur in the conclusion of the majority that Nichols's convictions should be affirmed. To the extent, however, that the petitioner's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel may be interpreted to include the failure to object to the method of proportionality review, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in a long line of dissents beginning with State v. Chalmers, 28 S.W.3d 913, 923-25 (Tenn. 2000) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting), and elaborated upon in State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 793-800 (Tenn. 2001) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting). Those dissents suggest, essentially, that the comparative proportionality review protocol currently embraced by the majority is inadequate to shield defendants from the arbitrary and disproportionate imposition of the death penalty. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c) (1997). Accordingly, while I concur in the affirmance of Nichols's convictions, I cannot, for the reasons above stated, concur in the imposition of the death penalty in this case. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
State v. Richard Hale Austin
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State v. Richard Hale Austin
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Memphis Publishing Company, et al, v. Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc., et al. and John Morgan v. Cherokee Children & Family Svcs., Inc.
These two cases, consolidated for consideration, present two issues of enormous significance. First, we must decide whether a non-profit corporation that provides privatized services to a governmental entity is subject to the public access requirements of the Tennessee Public Records Act. The second issue concerns the authority of the state, acting through the Comptroller of the Treasury, to require said corporation to submit to a state audit. In Memphis Publishing Co. v. Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc., Memphis Publishing Company and others seek access to records belonging to Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc., a non-profit corporation which contracted with the Tennessee Department of Human Services to help administer a state-subsidized day care program. In seeking access to the records, the plaintiffs rely on both the Tennessee Public Records Act and provisions in the contracts between the corporation and the state. In Morgan v. Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc., the Comptroller of the Treasury, John Morgan, seeks to require the same corporation to submit to a state audit. As authority for the audit, Morgan relies upon the contracts at issue in Memphis Publishing Co. and upon 2000 Tenn. Pub. Acts. 960 (now codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-4-116 (Supp. 2001)), which authorizes the Comptroller to audit the records of entities which derive fifty percent or more of their gross revenue from state or local government. The trial -2- courts in the two cases found that Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc. was not a governmental agency, but that all records in its possession were state property pursuant to the contracts between it and the state. Additionally, the trial court in Morgan found that an audit was authorized by 2000 Tenn. Pub. Acts 960. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that (1) the contractual provisions at issue did not render the records public; (2) Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc. was not a governmental agency subject to the Public Records Act; and (3) retroactive application of 2000 Tenn. Pub. Acts 960 in Morgan would be unconstitutional. We granted permission to appeal. Because we have determined, for the reasons outlined below, that Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc. operates as the “functional equivalent” of a governmental (state) agency, we hold that all of its records are subject to the Tennessee Public Records Act and therefore |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Linda S. Reece v. Findlay Industries, Inc. and Harold Edward Tigue, Jr. v.Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Company, et al.
We granted this appeal to determine the propriety of the trial judge’s actions in the adjudication of these workers’ compensation cases. We hold that the trial judge failed to perform all the duties of the judge’s office prescribed by law in these consolidated cases by improperly delegating his authority to the clerk and master to adjudicate the cases. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are reversed, and the cases are remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Trial Court Reversed; |
Warren | Supreme Court | |
State v. Christopher Flake
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State v. Christopher Flake
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Michael Eugene Sample v. State of Tennessee
We granted review in this post-conviction capital case to address two issues: (1) whether the |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Michael Eugene Sample, et al., v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
I fully concur in the majority decision but feel compelled to write separately to respond to the dissent’s characterization of the majority’s decision in State v. Workman, 41 S.W.3d 100 (Tenn. 2001), as a “hastily considered decision – one brought on by the pressures of extraordinary circumstances – and it cannot be justified as a logical or natural progression of the law.” To the contrary, from even a cursory reading it is clear that the majority decision in Workman resulted from a principled application of established law to the facts of a particular case. The dissent’s claim that the majority opinion in Workman is not founded in logic or prior law is easily dispelled by simply considering the language of the opinion itself, rather than the dissent’s hyperbole. In concluding that consideration of Workman’s petition for a writ of error coram nobis was not foreclosed by the statute of limitations, the majority meticulously applied the due process balancing test outlined in Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204 (Tenn. 1992), Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272 (Tenn. 2000), and Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464 (Tenn. 2001). In so holding, we stated as follows: As in Burford, to determine whether due process requires tolling in this case, we must consider the governmental interests involved and the private interests affected by the official action. In this case, as in Burford, the governmental interest in asserting the statute of limitations is the prevention of stale and groundless claims. The private interest involved here is the petitioner’s opportunity to have a hearing on the grounds of newly discovered evidence which may have resulted in a different verdict if heard by the jury at trial. If the procedural time bar is applied, Workman will be put to death without being given any opportunity to have the merits of his claim evaluated by a court of this State. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Michael Eugene Sample v. State of Tennessee - Concurring/Dissenting
In the majority’s opinion today, I find much with which to agree. For example, I concur in the majority’s holding that our decision in Wright v. State, 987 S.W.2d 26 (Tenn. 1999), did not create a per se bar against all later-arising claims alleging suppression of exculpatory evidence. I also agree with the majority that a defendant may bring such a claim, not withstanding the running of the statute of limitations under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, so long as any delay in filing the petition for relief is reasonable under all the circumstances. Finally, I agree that the Middlebrooks error here is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the standard recognized by this Court in State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. 1993). However, I write separately to respectfully express my disapproval with the majority’s reliance on Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100 (Tenn. 2001), as authority for finding that the defendant in this case made a timely filing for post-conviction relief. I was one of two members of this Court who dissented from the decision in Workman, and I regret that it has been used today as authority to toll the post-conviction statute of limitations for a sixteen-month period. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
The Bank/First Citizens Bank v. Citizens And Associates
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Bradley | Supreme Court | |
State vs. William Torres
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Knox | Supreme Court | |
Eva M. Lemeh, Trustee v. Emc Mortgage Corporation
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Supreme Court | ||
Robert Powell, Jr. v. Blalock Plumbing
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Franklin | Supreme Court | |
Robert Powell, Jr. v. Blalock Plumbing
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Franklin | Supreme Court |
