State of Tennessee v. Michael Smith
A jury convicted Michael Smith (“the Defendant”) of aggravated assault, committed by violating a protective order, and evading arrest. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of ten years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days’ incarceration. The Defendant appealed his convictions and sentences, which the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. State v. Smith, No. W2013-01190-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 3954062, at *21 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 13, 2014). The Defendant then requested permission to appeal to this Court, alleging the following errors: (1) the trial court’s failure to require the State to make an election of offenses; (2) the insufficiency of the indictment; (3) the trial court’s refusal to allow the Defendant to sit at counsel table; (4) the trial court’s ruling that, should he elect to testify, the Defendant could be impeached with prior convictions; (5) the trial court’s denial of a mistrial after allowing a witness to testify about a different criminal proceeding against the Defendant; (6) the admission of the victim’s testimony about the Defendant’s prior bad acts; and (7) the trial court’s failure to confine the flight instruction to the aggravated assault charge. We granted the Defendant’s request for permission to appeal. Upon our review of the record and the applicable law, we hold that the State’s failure to elect an offense as to the aggravated assault charge resulted in plain error. Accordingly, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault and remand the matter to the trial court for a new trial on that charge. We affirm the Defendant’s conviction for evading arrest. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth McCormick
We granted this appeal to reconsider our decision in State v. Moats, 403 S.W.3d 170 (Tenn. 2013), which held that the community caretaking doctrine is not an exception to the federal and state constitutional warrant requirements. Having concluded that Moats was wrongly decided, we overrule Moats and hold that the community caretaking doctrine is analytically distinct from consensual police-citizen encounters and is instead an exception to the state and federal constitutional warrant requirements which may be invoked to validate as reasonable a warrantless seizure of an automobile. To establish that the community caretaking exception applies, the State must show that (1) the officer possessed specific and articulable facts, which, viewed objectively and in the totality of the circumstances, reasonably warranted a conclusion that a community caretaking action was needed; and (2) the officer’s behavior and the scope of the intrusion were reasonably restrained and tailored to the community caretaking need. We conclude, based on the proof in the record on appeal, that the community caretaking exception applies in this case. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court and Court of Criminal Appeals declining to grant the defendant’s motion to suppress are affirmed on the separate grounds stated herein. |
White | Supreme Court | |
Starlink Logistics, Inc. v. ACC, LLC, et al
After its closure, a Class II landfill continued to discharge contaminants into a creek that flowed into a lake located on adjoining property. Following years of investigations and multiple failed remedial measures, the landfill owner and the state agency with authority to direct landfill cleanup operations agreed that the most feasible, practical, and effective way to abate the discharge was for the landfill owner to divert water from entering the landfill and, over a four-year period, to remove and relocate the landfill waste. The neighboring landowner of the property on which the lake affected by the discharge was located objected to the plan, arguing that the landfill owner should also be required to treat or divert water leaving the landfill site. The Tennessee Solid Waste Disposal Control Board (“the Board”) heard the case and approved the landowner’s plan of action and did not require diversion of the water leaving the landfill. The neighboring landowner appealed, and the trial court affirmed the Board’s decision. The Court of Appeals, dissatisfied with the ruling, remanded the case to the Board to take additional proof on whether the neighboring landowner was willing to pay for the costs of diverting the discharge, the costs of implementing the diversion option, and the landfill owner’s ability to pay for the diversion plan. We granted the Board’s application for permission to appeal. We hold that the Court of Appeals failed to properly apply the judicial review provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322(h) (2011) and substituted its judgment for that of the Board. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
American Heritage Apartments, Inc. v. The Hamilton County Water and Wastewater Treatment Authority, Hamilton County, Tennessee
We granted permission to appeal to determine whether a customer who seeks to challenge monthly rates charged by its sewer service provider must exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. The plaintiff apartment complex filed this action individually and as a class representative, arguing that the monthly charge assessed by the defendant water and wastewater treatment authority is unlawful. In response, the defendant asserted that a customer who seeks to dispute the rates charged must first follow the administrative procedures provided in the Utility District Law of 1937, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 7-82-101 to –804 (2015). On this basis, the water and wastewater treatment authority sought dismissal of the lawsuit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and the Court of Appeals reversed. We hold that the administrative procedures in Part 4 of the Utility District Law of 1937 do not apply to a rate challenge filed by an individual customer against a water and wastewater treatment authority, so we agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred in dismissing the lawsuit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We affirm the remainder of the Court of Appeals’ decision, except that we vacate the trial court’s alternative ruling on class certification and remand that issue to the trial court for reconsideration. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Pervis Tyrone Payne v. State of Tennessee
We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether a capital defendant, via a petition for writ of error coram nobis, may obtain a hearing to determine whether he is ineligible to be executed because he is intellectually disabled. The Petitioner, Pervis Tyrone Payne, was convicted in 1988 of two first degree murders, and the jury imposed the death sentence for each murder. In 2001, this Court held that the federal and state constitutions prohibit the execution of individuals who are intellectually disabled. Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790, 812 (Tenn. 2001). The Petitioner asserts that he meets the statutory definition of intellectually disabled, but he has not yet been afforded an evidentiary hearing on his claim. In this proceeding, he has sought to establish his right to such a hearing via a claim of error coram nobis. The trial court denied relief without a hearing, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed with one judge dissenting. We hold that the Petitioner is not entitled to relief under a claim of error coram nobis. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Vodafone Americas Holdings, Inc. & Subsidiaries v. Richard H. Roberts, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee
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Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Vodafone Americas Holdings, Inc. & Subsidiaries v. Richard H. Roberts, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee - Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
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Davidson | Supreme Court | |
The Tennessean, et al v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, et al
The issue in this case is whether a coalition of media groups and a citizens organization, relying on the Tennessee Public Records Act, have the right to inspect a police department’s criminal investigative file while the criminal cases arising out of the investigation are ongoing. Four Vanderbilt University football players were indicted for aggravated rape and other criminal charges arising out of the alleged rape of a university student in a campus dormitory. Following the indictments, the Petitioners, a group of media organizations and a citizens group, made a Public Records Act request to inspect the police department’s files regarding its investigation of the alleged criminal conduct by the football players. The request was denied. We hold that the Public Records Act allows access to government records, but there are numerous statutory exceptions, including a state law exception in Tennessee Code Annotated section 10-7-503(a)(2), that shield some records from disclosure. Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure falls within the state law exception. Rule 16 provides for the release of certain information to the defendant in a criminal case, but does not authorize the release of any information to a nonparty to the case. Therefore, during the pendency of the criminal case and any collateral challenges to any conviction, Rule 16 governs the disclosure of information and only the defendant has the right to receive certain information. We hold that, based on Rule 16, the Petitioners have no right to the requested information during the pendency of the criminal cases and any collateral challenges. Jane Doe, the victim of the alleged criminal acts, intervened in this action to prevent disclosure of the investigative file, and particularly photographs and video images of the alleged assault. Based on our ruling today, these records are protected from disclosure until the conclusion of the criminal cases and all collateral challenges. At the conclusion of the criminal cases and following any guilty plea or conviction and sentencing, Tennessee Code Annotated section 10-7-504(q)(1) applies to block the release of Ms. Doe’s personal information and any photographic or video depiction of her. This requires no action on the part of Ms. Doe and no further court proceedings. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
The Tennessean, et al v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, et al - Concurring
I fully concur in the majority opinion in this case but write separately to respond to the dissent. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
The Tennessean, et al v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, et al - Dissenting
In the past, this Court has consistently refrained from creating public policy exceptions to the Tennessee Public Records Act (TPRA), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 10 7 101 to 702 (2012 & Supp. 2014), because the authority to enact such exceptions rests solely with the General Assembly. See, e.g., Schneider v. City of Jackson, 226 S.W.3d 332, 344 (Tenn. 2007) (“[T]he General Assembly, not this Court, establishes the public policy of Tennessee.”). Departing from this principle, the majority has concluded that Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 exempts all police records from public disclosure during the course of a criminal prosecution. The plain language of the rule, however, protects from disclosure only work product and witness statements. Moreover, I believe that the victim of the alleged rape is entitled to an adjudication of her claim that public disclosure of the police records would violate her statutory and constitutional rights. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Rashe Moore v. State of Tennessee
In this post-conviction case, we clarify the appropriate prejudice analysis for ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising from the failure to properly request jury instructions on lesser-included offenses where, as here, the jury was given no option to convict of any lesser-included offense. The jury convicted the petitioner as charged of one count of aggravated burglary and multiple counts of aggravated rape, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery in connection with a home invasion. On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and declined to address the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses because the petitioner’s trial counsel did not request the instructions in writing as required by statute. Thereafter, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, a majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals granted a new trial on the especially aggravated kidnapping charges based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in concluding that the petitioner was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction on aggravated kidnapping as a lesser-included offense of especially aggravated kidnapping. We conclude that no reasonable probability exists that a properly instructed jury would have convicted the petitioner of any of his asserted lesser-included offenses instead of the charged offenses. Because the petitioner suffered no prejudice, he did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel as to any of his convictions. We reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment granting a new trial on the especially aggravated kidnapping charges and reinstate the post-conviction court’s judgment denying relief on these convictions. We further hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals properly affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief on the petitioner’s other convictions. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Circle C. Construction, LLC v. D. Sean Nilsen, et al.
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Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. William Whitlow Davis, Jr.
We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether the traffic stop of the Defendant, William Whitlow Davis, Jr., violated the constitutional rights of the Defendant. The arresting officer initiated the stop after observing the Defendant cross the double yellow center lane lines with the two left wheels of the Defendant’s car. The Defendant subsequently was charged with driving under the influence and a traffic violation. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress, contending that the traffic stop was unconstitutional. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Defendant then pleaded guilty to driving under the influence and reserved a certified question of law regarding the legality of his traffic stop. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment. We hold that the traffic stop was supported by probable cause. Therefore, we affirm the Defendant’s judgment of conviction. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Linzey Danielle Smith
We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether the traffic stop of the Defendant, Linzey Danielle Smith, violated the constitutional rights of the Defendant. The arresting officer initiated the stop after observing the Defendant once cross and twice touch the fog line marking the outer right lane boundary on an interstate highway. After being pulled over, the Defendant was charged with alternative counts of driving under the influence. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress, contending that the traffic stop was unconstitutional. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Defendant then pleaded guilty to driving under the influence and reserved a certified question of law regarding the legality of her traffic stop. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment. We hold that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion and therefore met constitutional requirements. Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant’s judgment of conviction. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas Lee Hutchison
A jury convicted the defendant of three counts of facilitation of first degree murder and one count of facilitation of aggravated robbery. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and the sentence. On appeal to this Court, the defendant contends, inter alia, that the admission into evidence of an autopsy report through the testimony of a medical examiner who did not perform the autopsy violated his right to confront the witnesses against him under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. The defendant also argues that the warrantless search of his home by officers who entered the home after the first responding officer constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution, so the trial court should have suppressed the evidence seized in that search. We hold that, under the circumstances of this case, the autopsy report is not testimonial under Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012), so its admission into evidence did not violate the Defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. We further hold that, where the responding officer’s initial entry into the home was justified by exigent circumstances, the subsequent entry into the home by other officers constituted a mere continuation of the initial officer’s lawful entry into the home. Consequently, the trial court did not err by denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence that was in plain view and within the scope of the exigent circumstances search. Finally, we hold that the admission into evidence of items that were not in plain view, even if erroneous, constituted harmless error. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
In re Robert Lee Vogel, BPR #023374
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Supreme Court | ||
In re Carrington H. et al.
We granted review in this case to decide (1) whether an indigent parent’s right to appointed counsel in a parental termination proceeding includes the right to challenge an order terminating parental rights based on ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals must review any ground the trial court relied on to terminate parental rights when a parent fails to raise all grounds for termination on appeal. We hold that parents are constitutionally entitled to fundamentally fair procedures in parental termination proceedings. Nevertheless, this constitutional mandate does not require us to adopt a procedure by which parents may collaterally attack orders terminating parental rights based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Additionally, we hold that appellate courts must review a trial court’s findings regarding all grounds for termination and whether termination is in a child’s best interests, even if a parent fails to challenge these findings on appeal. Having reviewed the record on appeal in accordance with these holdings, we affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating the mother’s parental rights. |
Maury | Supreme Court | |
In re Carrington H. et al - Concurring In Part and Dissenting In Part
The Court has decided that an indigent parent has the right to assistance of counsel—but not the right to effective assistance of counsel—in a parental termination proceeding. I believe that the vast majority of lawyers provide competent representation as required by our Rules of Professional Conduct. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPCs 1.1 & 1.3. But in those rare situations where a lawyer makes a mistake or fails to do his or her duty to such an extent that the termination proceeding is not fundamentally fair, I favor providing the parent with an opportunity to seek relief. In my view, providing counsel for an indigent parent but not requiring counsel to render effective representation is an empty gesture. |
Maury | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Jimmy Dale Qualls
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the election of offenses doctrine, articulated in Burlison v. State, 501 S.W.2d 801 (Tenn. 1973), and reaffirmed in State v. Shelton, 851 S.W.2d 134 (Tenn. 1993), requires the prosecution to identify a single incident of sexual battery in cases, such as this one, where the child victim testifies to repeated incidents of sexual contact occurring over a substantial period of time but does not furnish any specific details, dates, or distinguishing characteristics as to individual incidents of sexual battery. We hold, as have courts in other jurisdictions, that where a prosecution is based on such nonspecific or “generic” evidence, requiring the prosecution to elect a single specific incident is not possible. However, to prevent infringement upon the defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict, the trial court must give a modified unanimity instruction which informs the jury that it must unanimously agree the defendant committed all the acts described by the victim in order to convict the defendant. Although the trial court did not have the benefit of this decision and therefore did not provide the modified unanimity instruction to the jury in this case, we conclude, based on the record in this appeal, that the omission of this instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment vacating the defendant’s convictions of sexual battery by an authority figure and reinstate the trial court’s judgment approving the jury’s verdict. |
Hardeman | Supreme Court | |
Board of Professional Responsibility v. Connie Reguli
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Williamson | Supreme Court | |
First Community Bank, N. A. v. First Tennessee Bank, N. A., et al
First Community Bank, N.A. (“Plaintiff”), brought suit against multiple defendants for fraud, constructive fraud, negligent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment, and violation of the Tennessee Securities Act, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 48-1-101—126. Three non-resident defendants, The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., and Fitch, Inc. (“Ratings Agencies”), filed motions to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, which the trial court granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal based on lack of personal jurisdiction as to the Ratings Agencies, and the Plaintiff requested permission to appeal. We granted review in this case to determine whether the trial court erred in determining that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Ratings Agencies and thereby dismissing the Plaintiff’s case as against the Ratings Agencies. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction under a theory of general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction. Therefore, we affirm the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals on these issues. With regard to the Plaintiff’s attempt to establish personal jurisdiction under a theory of conspiracy jurisdiction, we likewise conclude that the Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy jurisdiction at this point. However, we vacate the dismissal of the Plaintiff’s action against the Ratings Agencies on this theory and remand this case to the trial court to determine if the Plaintiff should be allowed to conduct jurisdictional discovery on the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction in a manner consistent with the guidelines set forth in this opinion. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Carlton J. Ditto, et al.
Petitioner Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) brought this action to set aside a tax sale of real property. MERS argues that the county’s failure to provide it with notice of the tax sale violated its rights under the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution. The defendant purchaser of the real property filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings; he argued that MERS did not tender payment of the sale price plus the accrued taxes before bringing suit, as is required by statute in a suit challenging the validity of a tax sale. The defendant purchaser also argued that MERS did not have an interest in the subject property that is protected under the Due Process Clause. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that MERS did not have an interest in the property. The Court of Appeals affirmed, though based on MERS’s lack of standing to file suit. We hold that when a plaintiff who claims a protected interest in real property files suit to have a tax sale declared void for lack of notice, the pre-suit tender requirement in Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-5-2504(c) does not apply, so MERS was not required to tender payment before filing this lawsuit. We further conclude that MERS acquired no protected interest in the subject property through either the deed of trust’s designation of MERS as the beneficiary solely as nominee for the lender and its assigns or its reference to MERS having “legal title” to the subject property for the purpose of enforcing the lender’s rights. Because MERS had no protected interest in the subject property, its due process rights were not violated by the county’s failure to notify it of the tax foreclosure proceedings or the tax sale. Accordingly, we affirm the grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of the tax sale purchaser, albeit on a different basis from the Court of Appeals’ decision. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Daniel Sungkook Chong v. Tennessee Board of Law Examiners
The petitioner appeals from a decision of the Board of Law Examiners denying his application to take the Tennessee bar examination. The denial was based on Mr. Chong’s noncompliance with Supreme Court Rule 7, section 7.01. We affirm the judgment of the Board of Law Examiners. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Paul J. Walwyn v. Board of Professional Responsibility Of The Supreme Court of Tennessee
A Hearing Panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility (the “Hearing Panel”) found that an attorney’s handling of three separate criminal appeals violated certain ethical rules. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 1.3, 1.4, 3.2, and 8.4(a), (d). The Hearing Panel suspended the attorney from the practice of law for six months and ordered him to serve thirty days’ active suspension and five months’ probation. The attorney appealed, and the trial court affirmed the Hearing Panel’s judgment. On appeal to this Court, the attorney contends that the Hearing Panel abused its discretion and acted arbitrarily and capriciously. Additionally, the attorney argues that the attorney disciplinary process in Tennessee is unconstitutional. After carefully reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court upholding the Hearing Panel’s decision. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. James D. Wooden
We granted this appeal to determine whether a party filing a motion under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 (“Rule 36.1”) states a colorable claim for relief for correction of an illegal sentence by alleging that the trial court increased his sentence above the statutory presumptive minimum sentence but failed to find enhancement factors justifying the increase. Answering this question requires us to determine the meaning of two terms used in Rule 36.1—“colorable claim” and “illegal sentence.” We hold that the definition of “colorable claim” in Rule 28, section 2(H) of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court applies to the term “colorable claim” in Rule 36.1. Additionally, we conclude that the definition of “illegal sentence” in Rule 36.1 is coextensive with, and actually mirrors, the definition this Court has applied to the term for purposes of habeas corpus proceedings. Compare Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(a), with Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445, 452 (Tenn. 2011). Taking the allegations of the Rule 36.1 motion in this case as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the moving party, we conclude that the moving party has failed to allege a colorable claim for correction of an illegal sentence. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming the trial court’s denial of the Rule 36.1 motion is affirmed. |
Bradley | Supreme Court |
