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| Hon. Frank v. Williams, Iii,
03S01-9706-CH-00062
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff filed suit in 1989 for work-related injury to his left hand and alleged a related psychiatric disability. By final judgment entered September 5, 1991, the trial court awarded accrued and future medical and psychiatric benefits and permanent partial disability to his hand but found he had failed to prove any permanent psychiatric disability. The judgment was not appealed. On January 2, 1995, plaintiff filed this suit alleging that (1) under T.C.A. _ 5-6-231 he was entitled to modification of the 1991 final judgment due to increased psychiatric impairment, or (2) in the alternative, he was entitled to benefits for a new accidental [psychiatric] injury which occurred on September 2, 1994. The trial court found that plaintiff had failed to prove that he gave timely notice to the employer of a new work-related accident, had failed to prove a new compensable injury, and was barred from reopening the prior case for modification of the award owing to the doctrine of res judicata and the statute of limitations, since the denial of permanent psychiatric disability in that case was never appealed. The plaintiff appeals, insisting that notice of a new injury was provided to the defendant in a letter to the employer from his doctor and by comments made by the plaintiff at work, and that a particular stressful incident at work was a sufficient mental stimulus to constitute a new psychiatric injury. Defendant insists the trial judge correctly decided those issues and correctly held that the denial of permanent psychiatric disability in 1991 was not subject 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Billy Joe White, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/01/98 | |
| Elizabeth Anne Flickner v. Crete Carrier Corp.
03S01-9708-CH-00095
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Ms. Flickner is 55 years old, has eight years of formal education, and has worked as a truck driver for most of her adult life. She testified that she injured her back in 1975 in a work-related accident in Florida, that she underwent back surgery after the injury, and that she received Florida workers' compensation benefits for that injury. Exhaustive attempts by the parties failed to discover her Florida workers' compensation records owing to the 2-year time lapse. Ms. Flickner testified that after the 1975 injury she recovered and was able to work full-time at various jobs, mostly truck driving, for the next 2 years. On June 16, 1995, she injured her lower back while driving a truck for Crete Carrier Corporation, and the extent of her vocational disability from that injury is the issue before us. After the 1995 injury, Ms. Flickner was treated by Dr. Robert E. Finelli, who diagnosed lumbar disk defects at L3/4 and L4/5, and scar tissue from her previous surgery at L3/4 and L5/S1. He performed extensive lumbar surgery on September 18, 1995. Vocational Rehabilitation Specialist Dr. Julian Naldosky testified for the employee that she could no longer perform her truck driving job and had no skills which would transfer to a semi-skilled, light or sedentary job. He opined that jobs available to her in her disabled condition, in light of her employment background, abilities and education, and assuming her ability to tolerate sitting and standing throughout the workday, would include cashier in a restaurant or parking lot, ticket seller, retail receiving clerk, automobile self-serve service station attendant, gate tender, security monitor, hardware assembler, gasket inspector, packager of small parts or small products, and a bottling line 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Sharon Bell, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/27/98 | |
| Special Judge Hamilton v. Gayden, Jr.
01S01-9704-CV-00081
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. |
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/21/98 | |
| Special Judge Hamilton v. Gayden, Jr.
02S01-9707-CV-00069
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial judge found the plaintiff had suffered a 5 percent impairment to each of her arms as a result of carpal tunnel syndrome which arose out of her employment with United Postal Service ("UPS"). We find the evidence in this case preponderates against an award of 5 percent to each arm and find the evidence preponderates in favor of an award of 25 percent to each arm. At the time of the trial of this case, the plaintiff was 45 years of age. She has a twelfth grade education and had worked for UPS for 18 years as a truck driver. The plaintiff's work history included operating an antique store and working as a sales clerk, a loan officer for a bank, and an executive secretary. The only issue before us is whether the trial court's award of 5 percent to each arm is supported by the evidence. The evidence concerning the extent of the plaintiff's disability is supplied by the plaintiff's testimony; by the medical report and records of Dr. Lowell Stonecipher, an orthopedic surgeon and the treating physician who was furnished by the defendant; by the report of Dr. Robert J. Barnett, an orthopedic surgeon, who evaluated the plaintiff at her request; and by the report of Dr. Ronald C. Bingham, who conducted nerve conduction tests on the plaintiff at the request of Dr. Stonecipher -- these tests showed mild residual median neuropathy. The plaintiff began to experience difficulty with her arms and hands in June 1996. Dr. Stonecipher diagnosed the condition as carpal tunnel syndrome and did surgery to relieve the condition in her left arm on February 21, 1996. On April 2, 1996, Dr. Stonecipher did surgery on the plaintiff's right arm. The plaintiff returned to work in June 1996 doing the same work she had done prior to having surgery. The plaintiff testified the work caused her hands and 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. C. Creed Mcginley, |
Henry County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/15/98 | |
| James Biggs v. Jones Stone Company, Inc.
01S01-9711-CH-00239
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee was awarded benefits for a 3 percent permanent partial disability to his whole body. He appeals, claiming that his anatomical impairment is ten percent, which should be extrapolated to total and permanent disability. The thrust of his argument is directed to the weight to be given to the expert testimony. The employer admitted that the employee suffered a compensable back injury on September 8, 1995. The issues at trial were limited to the extent of physical impairment and residual vocational disability. The Chancellor found the plaintiff had a five percent impairment. He applied a multiplier of six, T.C.A. _ 5-6-241, resulting in a finding of 3 percent permanent partial disability to his whole body. The treating physician was Dr. Stanley G. Hopp, an orthopedic specialist, who testified that the plaintiff's radicular pain was emanating from the right L-5 nerve root. He performed surgery on February 23, 1996 and removed the offending spurs. Recovery was hampered because of diabetes, but with the passage of time the plaintiff was able to work, with lifting restrictions. Dr. David Gaw, orthopedic specialist, examined the plaintiff for purposes of evaluation. He testified that in his view the plaintiff had a ten percent impairment based on DRE Category III of the Guidelines, which he interpreted as requiring this rating because "anybody that has a radiculopathy that's proven by tests and has surgery, that throws them into Category III." He conceded that he found no symptoms of nerve damage, that the plaintiff was in no distress or pain, that he was taking no medications, had no back spasm, no atrophy or weakness in his legs and had good movement. 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Irvin H. Kilcrease, |
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/11/98 | |
| Thurman D. Vanwinkle v. Bridgestone U.S.A., Inc.
01S01-9709-CH-00190
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff alleges that he suffered a heart attack attributable to the demands of his job and therefore compensable within the purview of the Workers' Compensation law. The words "heart attack," as alleged, are generically used and are generally referable to any sudden adverse cardiac condition; in the case at Bar, the plaintiff suffered a myocardial infarction.1 The trial court found that the "petition for workers' compensation benefits should be sustained," and that the plaintiff had a 6 percent permanent impairment,2 presumably attributable to his heart condition. The employer appeals, questioning the finding that the plaintiff's heart problem is work-related. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2), Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). Background 1An infarct is a region of dead or dying tissue which is the result of a sudden obstruction to the blood circulation supplying the involved part, usually by a clot. A myocardial infarct is a region of dead or dying tissue in the muscle of the heart which is the result of an obstruction to the blood supply usually by a clot lodged in a coronary artery. 2The judgment refers to a letter containing a "Finding of Facts" but this letter is not in the record. We thus have no findings to review under the appropriate standard, RULE 13(d), T.R.A.P., which requires a presumption of correctness. We therefore have conducted a de novo review with no presumption. 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. James K. Clayton, Jr. |
Rutherford County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/11/98 | |
| Andy Phillips v. Anthony Hall Construction, et al.
01S01-9710-CC-00213
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This case involves a weighty issue of whether the judgment is supported by the preponderance of all the evidence. RULE 13(d), T. R. A. P. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6- 225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). Adjunctive is the established rule that we are as well positioned as the trial judge to gauge the worth of the depositional testimony, and we have done so, in accordance with our prerogative and responsibility. Cooper v. INA, 884 S.W.2d 446, 451 (Tenn. 1994); Landers v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 775 S.W.2d 355, 356 (Tenn. 1989). The plaintiff is 39 years old. He completed eleven years of schooling and apparently has no marketable job skills. On December 21, 1995, while working on a barn, he chose to descend from the roof by sliding down a brace rather than using a ladder as instructed. He fell against another brace and injured his left arm and back. He continued to work but developed problems the following day and was given his choice of physicians. He selected Dr. Wayne Wells, who passed him on to Dr. Michael Moore, who released him to return to work on January 15, 1996 with temporary restrictions against overhead lifting and lifting more than 25 pounds with his left arm. 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. J. O. Bond, |
Wilson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/11/98 | |
| Marilyn L. Knight v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Group
01S01-9710-CH-00214
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. |
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/11/98 | |
| Sherry Maxwell v. Nissan Motor Mfg. Corp., et al.
01S01-9711-CH-00241
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This is a bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome case involving a 34-year-old woman whose impairment to each arm was judicially found to be 33 percent. Her condition gradually evolved, and she was initially treated by Dr. Thomas Tompkins, an orthopedic specialist, on August 21, 1995. Six weeks later he performed the usual surgical releases, which were successful. Dr. Tompkins last saw the plaintiff on January 12, 1996 when he released her to resume employment but without repetitive forceful gripping. Basing his assessment on the Guidelines, Dr. Tompkins testified that she had five percent impairment to each arm. In February 1996, Dr. David Gaw, an orthopedist, was employed by the plaintiff's counsel to perform an IME. He testified that the plaintiff had a ten percent impairment to each arm. Because the plaintiff returned to work in January 1996 and from that day forward "has not missed work," "has not complained to anyone about your job," "has not complained to the doctors or anyone at Nissan about your hands," "has gotten good work reviews since then," the employer complains that the assessment of a 33 percent impairment to each arm is excessive, arguing that if this finding is correct the plaintiff is ipso facto unable to perform her job, i.e., that the anomaly is apparent. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The inferred thrust of the appellant's argument respecting our
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Don R. Ash, |
Rutherford County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/11/98 | |
| J.C. Penney, Inc. v. Debra Sue Crawford
01S01-9707-CH-00167
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee filed this complaint for a determination of the benefits available to the defendant on account of asserted compensable injuries to her arms/hands, i.e., carpal tunnel syndrome. The Chancellor awarded benefits for a three percent permanent partial disability to each arm. The employee appeals, and presents two issues for review, which we restate as whether the award was inadequate, and whether the employee should have been allowed to state an opinion concerning her ability to perform certain jobs. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). Ms. Crawford is 37 years old. She is a high school graduate, five feet three inches tall and weighs 295 pounds, according to the IME, Dr. David Gaw. She began working as a customer service representative in the telemarketing division of J.C. Penney Company in 199, where she remains employed. In January 1995 she reported symptoms of hand pain to her employer who referred her to Dr. James Lanter, orthopedic specialist. Dr. Lanter first saw her on February 22, 1995 and diagnosed her condition as tendinitis with possible carpal tunnel syndrome. He recommended a reduction in her working hours to 32 per week, and continued to see her through February 21, 1996. During this time Dr. Lanter's treatment was extensive; he obtained two EMG's and nerve conduction studies which indicated mild bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, not progressive. He continued treating her for more than a 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Chancellor |
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/11/98 | |
| Hon. Frank v. Williams,
03S01-9706-CH-00074
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In March 1995, the plaintiff in this case brought suit against Superior Steel, Inc. and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company ("the defendants") and the Second Injury Fund1 claiming that he was entitled to recover workers' compensation benefits for two work related injuries: a knee injury and an occupational disease. First, the trial judge found that the plaintiff had sustained a ten percent permanent partial disability to his right leg. Second, the trial judge found that the plaintiff was 1 percent permanently and totally disabled as a result of a chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder which he classified as an occupational disease because the plaintiff's condition was exacerbated by breathing diesel fumes during his employment with the defendant. The trial judge merged the two injuries and thereby awarded the plaintiff 1 percent disability benefits. The defendants appeal the trial court's findings regarding the plaintiff's occupational disease, contending that the trial judge erred (1) in ruling that the statute of limitations had not expired, (2) in ruling that notice had been properly given, and (3) in finding that the plaintiff's condition was an occupational disease which arose out of and in the course of his employment with the defendant. The defendants do not appeal the trial court's findings of disability to the plaintiff's leg, but a brief reference to the knee injury is necessary for a proper discussion of the facts. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. BACKGROUND The plaintiff, 48 years of age, worked as an oiler and crane operator for most of his working life -- approximately 28 years. For almost 32 years of his life, the plaintiff smoked two packs of cigarettes per day. The plaintiff quit smoking in June 1992. 1 The trial judge dismissed the Second Injury Fund from this case and we find the dismissal was proper. By reason of Tenn. Code. Ann. __ 5-6-28(a) and (b), the Second Injury Fund is not liable to the plaintiff. 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Frederick D. Mcdonald, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 04/30/98 | |
| Pam Ogren v. Housecall Health Care, Inc.
03S01-9706-CH-00078
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial judge found the plaintiff had sustained a 7 percent permanent vocational impairment as a result of an on-the-job injury. The defendant says the evidence preponderates against the award of 7 percent and says the trial judge should have limited the award to 2.5 times the medical impairment rating because the plaintiff failed to return to work when she was afforded a job within her medical limitations. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The undisputed evidence shows the plaintiff was injured on December 16, 1994 as she performed her duties as a certified nursing assistant for the defendant. The plaintiff was assisting a paraplegic patient to dress at the time of the injury. The patient had raised himself on a trapeze bar by his arms and the plaintiff was attempting to dress his lower body. The base of the bar moved onto the plaintiff's left shoe. The plaintiff pushed on the bar to free her foot. The plaintiff heard a "pop" in her left shoulder and began to experience pain in her neck, shoulder, arm, and hand. It appears the plaintiff had some medical care at Athens Community Hospital; however, there is little in the record concerning this treatment. On March 27, 1995, the plaintiff was seen by Joel B. Ragland, a neurosurgeon in Knoxville. Dr. Ragland conducted examination and testing and found the plaintiff had a rather large disc rupture at C5-6 and C6-7. Dr. Ragland concluded surgery was required for the plaintiff's injury and this was done on April 21, 1995. Dr. Ragland did an anterior cervical diskectomy and fusion on the effected vertebrae. Dr. Ragland continued to see the plaintiff until October 1995 at which time he released her and found she had suffered a ten percent medical impairment to the body as a whole. Dr. Ragland was of the opinion the plaintiff could return to work with a ten pound lifting restriction. 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Frank V. Williams, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 04/27/98 | |
| Carroll Edward Mumpower v. City of Erwin, Tennessee
E2000-00698-WC-R3-CV
The issue raised on appeal is whether the filing of a complaint by plaintiff Mumpower within one year after discovering his current medical condition to be causally related to an earlier accident is time-barred and cause for dismissal of this suit. The trial court found equitable estoppel not implicated and the fact that in 1998 plaintiff received additional information that his 1992 injury was worse than originally believed did not serve to extend the operation of the statute of limitations. We affirm the judgment of the court.
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Sr. J.
Originating Judge:Jean A. Stanley, Circuit Court Judge |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 04/27/98 | |
| Hon. Frank v. Williams,
03S01-9708-CH-00093
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, Benjamin K. Reed, has appealed from a ruling of the trial court dismissing his claim for benefits as a result of an accident while working for defendant, Mueller Company. The trial court found the employee had failed to establish that his back injury was caused by the accident at work on July 26, 1994. Since the case was dismissed, there was no ruling on the employer's defenses of lack of proper notice and the expiration of the one year statute of limitations. Employee Reed was 44 years of age at the time of the trial and had completed the 12th grade. He had some trade school education and was employed by defendant as an industrial maintenance technician. On the day in question, he was carrying a "hulk gun" when he stepped on a metal grate and received an electrical shock. He stated it threw him into a beam causing an injury to his back. A co-worker, Dennis Disney, was nearby and saw the accident. Plaintiff testified he notified his supervisor about the accident and also discussed it with the company nurse. He continued to work and later saw Dr. Celeste Long; he did not improve and went to see his family doctor, David C. Conner; Dr. Conner eventually referred him to Dr. Paul A. Blackstone; he remained off work from sometime in January 1995 to March 1995; Dr. Blackstone diagnosed his problem as a ruptured disc; he did not improve and ceased working during September 1995. Plaintiff has seen numerous doctors during 1994-1996. Surgery was performed on October 14, 1995 by Dr. Scott D. Hodges to remove the ruptured portion of the disc. He did not get much relief from this surgical procedure and was operated on again by Dr. Blackstone on May 3, 1996 to remove the whole disc. At the trial below, he stated he was still having a lot of pain. During his examination, he admitted he was drawing company related disability benefits while he was off from work. He admitted that he had never requested his employer to furnish him a doctor and that the first time his employer was aware he was insisting his claim was work- related was when the suit was instituted on January 24, 1996. He also stated he had 2
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. R. Vann Owens, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 04/27/98 | |
| Anthony Johnson v. The Travelers Ins. Co .
01S01-9706-CH-00125
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue in this case is whether the plaintiff forfeited the right to have the defendant pay for future medical expenses, if any are required, for a compensable injury for failure to have an annual physical examination as provided for in the settlement of the plaintiff's compensation claim against the defendant. Under the circumstances in this case, we find the plaintiff has not forfeited this right. The relevant part of the settlement order, which was entered on December 7, 1993 in the trial court provided: "The defendant has paid all of the plaintiff's medical bills to date, which total $63,298.23. In addition to the medical benefits heretofore provided to the plaintiff, the defendant shall continue to pay all reasonable and necessary medical and hospital expenses for medical care and treatment, which is directly related to the aforesaid work related accidental injury provided such medical treatment is performed by or prescribed by Dr. Thornton Perkins, an orthopaedic specialist in Chattanooga, Tennessee, or another physician mutually selected by the parties under the procedure set forth in the W orkers' Compensation Act. The duty of the defendant to continue to provide the aforesaid medical benefits to the plaintiff shall be contingent upon the plaintiff being examined at least one (1) time annually by Dr. Thornton Perkins or such other mutually selected physician. The failure of the plaintiff to undergo the annual examination by Dr. Perkins or such other physician as the parties may select under the procedure set forth in the W orkers' Compensation Act shall result in the plaintiff forfeiting his rights to receive such future medical treatment and shall terminate the defendant's obligation to provide the same." On December 9, 1995, the plaintiff filed a "petition to enforce settlement agreement" in which he alleged the defendant had refused to pay for medical treatment as required by the order of December 7, 1993. The trial court held a hearing on the petition on September 1, 1996 at which no testimony was taken. The matter was presented to the court on statement of counsel. The record is necessarily sparse on the proceeding and the relevant matters are contained in the pleadings. From this we find the order of settlement was filed December 7, 1993, that the petition to enforce the settlement agreement was filed on December 9, 1995, and that the trial judge held a hearing on the petition on September 1, 1996 and entered an order thereon on February 4, 1997. Further, we 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Anthony Johnson, |
Johnson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 04/22/98 | |
| Gloria Benson v. Northern Telecom, et al.
01S01-9706-CH-00137
Authoring Judge: Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Irvin Kilcrease |
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 04/22/98 | |
| George Goff v. City of Decherd v. Dina Tobin, Director
01S01-9611-CH-00232
This workers' compensation appeal from the Franklin County Chancery Court has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The defendant, City of Decherd, appeals the ju dgment of the trial court findin g the plaintiff, George Goff, suffered an occupational disease; awarding the plaintiff eighty- five percent (85%) permanent partial disability to th e body as a who le; and requiring the defen dant to pay certain medical expenses. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the trial court, as modified. George Goff wa s 41 at the time of this trial. He dropped out of high schoo l in the ninth grade to work on the farm, and he has been unable to pass his G ED on three or four attem pts. His work history is composed of manual labor. The City of Decherd hired him as a laborer in 1984 and made him a crew foreman in 1987. On May 11, 199 , during the course of his employment he was exposed to chlo rine gas and missed ap proximately one w eek of work. He wa s treated by his family physician, Dr. Dewey Hood, for complaints of shortness of breath, coughing and fatigue on 11 or 12 occas ions throu gh Septem ber, 1993 . Dr. Hood re ferred plaintiff to Dr. Eric Dye r, a pulmonologist, who first treated plaintiff on May 18, 1993. Dr. Dyer told plaintiff he became asthmatic due to the 199 chlorine exposure and advised him to avoid asthma triggers, such as chemicals, humidity , and temperature extremes . He continued to w ork for the City of Dech erd without significant pro blems until January 2 8, 1994, when he was exposed to paint fumes and h is condition deteriorated. After the 1994 exposure, Dr. Dyer added paint fumes to his list of asthma triggers to avoid. Dr. Dyer assessed his permanent impairment at forty percent (4%) to the body as a whole, described h is prognosis as poo r, and advised the plaintiff he sh ould not return to wo rk for the City of Decherd. Dr. Hood stated "he is somewhat limited with his education and things he can do, and it may be that he just could not find a job--a sedentary job or a light working condition that he could return to." Plaintiff has not worked since January 28, 1994. Betty Morris, a vocational expert for the plaintiff, testified plaintiff had a ninety-six percent (96%) loss of access to jobs and should be limited to sedentary work. The defendant presented Charles Randolph Thomas, also a vocational expert, who testified plaintiff suffered a sixty-two and one half percent (62.5%) loss of access to jobs due to the 199 and 1994 chemical exposures, but only a one and one half percent (1.5%) loss of access due to the January 28, 1994, paint fumes 2
Authoring Judge: William Michael Maloan, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Jeffrey F. Stewart, |
Franklin County | Workers Compensation Panel | 04/22/98 | |
| Ralph D. West v. Sonic Drive-In, et al.
01S01-9704-CH-00099
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This case is here in a different position than most appeals. On October 31, 1995, a judgment awarding the plaintiff compensation was entered in the Chancery Court of Smith County. After review by a Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel and the Supreme Court, the judgment entered in Smith County was modified and affirmed. On December 4, 1996, an order in conformity with previous proceedings was entered in Smith County. Among other things, the final judgment provided that the defendants would furnish medical treatment for the plaintiff, required as a result of the injury subject to the proceedings hereafter had. On December 6, 1996, the plaintiff filed a motion for medical treatment and alleged the defendants had refused to furnish medical treatment as required. The plaintiff asked the trial court to order the defendants to furnish a list of three physicians from which he could select a physician for treatments. The defendants responded to the motion and say they are willing to furnish medical treatment to the plaintiff for treatments necessary to treat the plaintiff for residual problems from the November 27, 1991 accident which is the subject injury in this case. The defendants asked the court to order the plaintiff to produce his medical records and submit to an examination by a specialist to make an initial determination of whether the complaints of the plaintiff are related to the November 27, 1991 injury. In response to the pleadings, the trial judge entered the following order: This cause came on to be heard on this the 21st day of February, 1997, upon the motion of Plaintiff for a panel of three (3) physicians to treat the Plaintiff's injuries received at Sonic Drive-In, to-wit, ruptured disc at L5-S1. And after argument, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff should execute a release for Defendant to obtain any medical related to his back injury since November, 1991, within five (5) days and that Defendant shall furnish the panel of treating physicians to Plaintiff from Smith or contiguous counties. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendant shall furnish to Plaintiff a panel of treating physicians from Smith or contiguous counties and Plaintiff shall furnish to Defendant a release 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. C. K. Smith, |
Smith County | Workers Compensation Panel | 04/22/98 | |
| Linda Sue White v. Eaton Corp.
01S01-9709-CH-00203
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The only issue raised in this case is whether the award of 35 percent permanent disability to the plaintiff's right arm is excessive. We find that it is not and affirm the judgment of the trial court. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). At the time of the trial, the plaintiff was 33 years of age; she had graduated from high school; she had two years of training as a nursing assistant; and she had served four years in the U.S. Navy, where she was trained and worked as a dental assistant. The plaintiff began work for the defendant on June 23, 1993, and on July 19, 1993, she began work on the production line. This work required considerable use of the hands and the use of tools. Soon after commencing this work, the plaintiff began to experience pain in her right wrist. On August 9, 1993, the defendant sent the plaintiff to Dr. Samuel Sells. Dr. Sells diagnosed the plaintiff's problem as carpal tunnel syndrome. The plaintiff was assigned another job and was sent or went again to see Dr. Sells on February 4, 1994 for pain in her left and right arms. Dr. Sells advised the plaintiff to stay off from work until February 27, 1994. On June 26, 1994, the plaintiff left work because, according to the record, she was unable to find a day care facility for her child.1 Dr. Sells referred the plaintiff to Dr. James K. Lanter, a hand surgeon. Dr. Lanter saw the plaintiff on March 17, 1994 and diagnosed her condition as DeQuervain's tenosynovitis in 1 The plaintiff testified she asked for that entry to be made on her discharge sheet rather than discharge for injury in order to help her in future job searches. 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Tyrus H. Cobb, |
White County | Workers Compensation Panel | 04/22/98 | |
| Margaret Henry v. Cedar Creek Home Health Agency
01S01-9707-CV-00150
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The trial judge dismissed the plaintiff's case and held there was no evidence that two vaginal prolapses suffered by the plaintiff were caused by her work. We affirm the judgment.
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. John A. Turnbull, |
Henry County | Workers Compensation Panel | 04/22/98 | |
| Teresa M. Mccarley Johnson v. Maury Regional Hospital,
M1999-00291-WC-R3-CV
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The employee or claimant, Johnson, filed this civil action on April 2, 1998 to recover benefits for injuries which she alleged resulted from an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment by the employer. By its answer, the employer denied the occurrence of a compensable work related injury. Following a trial, the trial judge found that the claimant suffered a ruptured disc arising out of and in the course of employment and awarded, among other things, permanent partial disability benefits based on fifty-four percent to the bodyas a whole. As discussed below, this tribunal has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). This standard requires the panel to examine in depth a trial court's factual findings and conclusions. We are not bound by the trial court's factual findings, but must instead conduct an independent examination to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Authoring Judge: Loser, Sp. J.
Originating Judge:Jim T. Hamilton, Judge |
Johnson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 04/20/98 | |
| William R. Cross v. Mahle, Inc.
03S01-9704-CV-00038
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee contends the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that his heart attack was not a compensable injury by accident under the workers' compensation laws of Tennessee. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The employee or claimant, Cross, was injured in an automobile accident in 1994 and left with a partial disability. In order to accommodate that disability, the employer placed him in a light duty position as a security guard, where he worked in an air conditioned guard shack. He would leave the shack from time to time to check the identity of a vehicle driver, a distance of twenty to twenty-five feet from the shack. In July of 1995, he was prescribed nitroglycerin for chest pain. On the evening of August 17, 1995, he experienced slight chest pain at home. The next day, a very hot one, he felt chest pain at work. The pain gradually increased in severity and did not subside for several hours, although he did not engage in any unusual physical exertion or stress. He left work and went home, then to the hospital, accompanied by his wife. Dr. Kenneth Allum treated the claimant. He testified that the claimant had suffered a minor heart attack and that going in and out of the guard shack in hot weather could have been the cause. Dr. Alfred Beasley disagreed on both counts, from medical records. Both doctors are board certified in internal medicine. Dr. Beasley is also a cardiologist. The medical records reflect the claimant as having poorly controlled diabetes, as being overweight and a heavy smoker and having a family history of coronary artery disease. The trial judge prepared and filed an exhaustive opinion in which he found that the claimant had failed to carry the burden of proof as to causation, and dismissed the claim. Appellate review is de novo upon the record 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Ben K. |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 04/14/98 | |
| Howard F. Stanley v. South Central Bell
03S01-9705-CH-00048
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff filed a "Petition to Reopen" a workers' compensation case wherein the judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court on March 26, 199. In the initial case, the Chancellor awarded the plaintiff benefits for a knee injury, a psychological disability, and vision loss. This Petition was filed November 27, 1995. The plaintiff alleged that he continues to suffer from "depression and other psychological problems," for which he seeks additional benefits. He amended the petition to allege that a management plan instituted in the "mid-197's" caused "stress and depression," which have gradually worsened. The defendant answered generally, and specifically pleaded the bar of the Statute of Limitations presented by T.C.A. _ 5-6-23 and T.C.A. _ 5-6- 224. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the plaintiff's claim for workers' compensation benefits had been fully and finally adjudicated; that the plaintiff retired from Bell South on August 25, 1985, and thus was no longer an employee as defined by T.C.A. _ 5-6-12(3); and that the benefits owing to the plaintiff as a consequence of his initial action were paid in a lump sum which, by statute, forecloses the issue pursuant to T.C.A. _ 5-6-231. The motion for summary judgment was granted and the plaintiff appeals. The issue is whether the case should have been resolved summarily. We need not belabor the point. The plaintiff seeks benefits for some kind of incident that occurred five (5) years before the knee injury (then alleged 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. H. David Cate, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 04/14/98 | |
| Carol Douglas v. Graves Gold Leaf Gallery of West Tennessee, Inc., et al
02S01-9801-CH-00011
Authoring Judge: J. Steven Stafford, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Joe C. Morris, |
Madison County | Workers Compensation Panel | 04/13/98 | |
| Pamela K. Cole v. Baptist Hospital of Cocke County, Inc.
03S01-9701-CV-00015
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. _________________________________ Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr., Special Judge CONCUR: ________________________________ John K. Byers, Senior Judge ________________________________ Adolpho A. Birch, Jr., Justice 2
Authoring Judge: Special Judge Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
Originating Judge:Hon. Ben W. Hooper, Ii, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 04/03/98 |