WORKERS COMPENSATION PANEL OPINIONS

Felipe Aguirre v. James and Patsy Chambers, d/b/a Big C
E2000-00980-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: O. Duane Sloan, Circuit Judge

Plaintiff Felipe Aguirre suffered the loss and amputation of his arm as a result of a traffic accident allegedly occurring in the course of his employment with defendant. The circuit court found the accident to be unconnected to his employment and dismissed his suit. We affirm.
Knox County Workers Compensation Panel
Gerald Atkins v. Wozniak Industries, Inc.,
W2000-00665-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe H. Walker III, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: George R. Ellis, Chancellor

Employee suffered a brown recluse spider bite while at work. The incident resulted in infectious eczematoid dermatitis that affected his ability to work by causing swelling, interfering with sweating, severe itching and required employee to be cautious of overheating from direct rays of sunlight, justifying an award of forty percent to the body as a whole.
Gibson County Workers Compensation Panel
John Edward Whitaker v. Lear Corporation
E2000-00060-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Thayer, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Kindall T. Lawson, Circuit Judge

The appellant-employer appealed the trial court's ruling awarding appellee-employee 6 percent permanent partial disability to each arm. Appellant argues the award of disability is excessive and should be reduced. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Knox County Workers Compensation Panel
Mary Martin v. Catholic Mutual Group
M2000-00228-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Tom E. Gray, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: James Weatherford, SR. J. by designation

The trial court awarded to the employee a forty (4%) percent vocational disability to each arm for the work related injury of bilateral carpel tunnel syndrome. No award of vocational disability was made to the claimant for bilateral epicondylitis and the trial court found evidence was insufficient to award future medical for epicondylitis. We affirm the findings of the trial court.
Montgomery County Workers Compensation Panel
Nikki F. Nelson v. Magnetic Separation Systems, Inc., and
M1999-02009-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John A. Turnbull, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Irvin Kilcrease, Jr., Judge

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with the Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee contends the Chancellor erroneously: [1] considered as substantive evidence the medical report of Dr. Miller; [2] failed to find her elbow, shoulder, neck and spine disabilities were caused by her work, and therefore [3] rendered an inadequate award. As discussed below, the panel concludes that the parties offered voluminous medical records, including those of Dr. Miller, which were, without objection or limitation, treated by the parties throughout the trial as substantive evidence. The chancellor properly treated those reports as substantive evidence. The panel further concludes the chancellor's decision limiting the award to work-related disability to the hands and wrists is supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and that the award of 2 percent disability to both arms should be affirmed in all respects. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed. JOHN A. TURNBULL, Sp. J., in which FRANK F. DROWOTA , III, and FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR.,, Sp.J., joined. Peter D. Heil and Michael A. Friedland, Alan Wise, Stillman, Karr, & Wise, Nashville, TN, for the appellant, Nikki F. Nelson Sean Antone Hunt, Spicer, Flynn & Rudstrom, PLLC, Nashville, TN, for the appellees, Magnetic Separation Systems, Inc. and Travelers Insurance Co. MEMORANDUM OPINION Nikki Nelson worked for Magnetic Separation Systems as an electronics technician, a job which included assembling electronic devices. Her job included some highly repetitive work with screwdrivers and other hand tools. There is a significant dispute in the testimony and other evidence as to whether the tasks required hand and wrist activity which were both forceful and repetitive. Live demonstrations of the tasks required and a video tape of the assembly work were a part of the evidence at trial. Ms. Nelson was not a happy employee. Her 18 month tenure with her employer was marked with numerous inter-office memos demonstrating a deteriorating relationship with her supervisors, and dissatisfaction by the employer with the quantity and quality of Ms. Nelson's work. During her last months of work for MMS, Ms. Nelson began having hand and wrist problemsand reported: "My hands and wrists were hurting from doing coil bobbins all day. Normally I would work until my hands fell off, but being put on 3 days probation and all, my husband told me to go to the doctor." The first among many doctors who treated Ms. Nelson was Dr. David McCoy, her family doctor, who first saw her on February 5, 1995. Clinical testing and the history related by Ms. Nelson caused Dr. McCoy to form the opinion that she had work-related carpal tunnel syndrome. Ms. Nelson then selected Dr. Jack Miller, an orthopaedic surgeon, from a list of doctors furnished by MMS. Dr. Miller treated her from February 14, 1995 until September, 1996. On his initial examination, Dr. Miller, based on Ms. Nelson's complaints of rather severe pain in both wrists together with positive Phalen sign and Tinel sign, diagnosed carpel tunnel syndrome and referred her to a neurologist for EMG testing. Dr. Miller was "shocked" that Ms. Nelson's initial EMG was normal and elected not to perform carpel tunnel release surgery at that time, but instead, Dr. Miller treated Ms. Nelson conservatively with physical therapy and cortisone injections. Dr. Miller directed that she not work. When Ms. Nelson's symptoms did not improve, Dr. Miller, in March, 1995, thought "carpel tunnel release is going to be justified, being recommended even though EMG's are normal." The employer then referred Ms. Nelson to Dr. Stephen Pratt for a second opinion. Dr. Pratt was "most certain that it is not carpel tunnel syndrome" and did not recommend carpel tunnel release surgery. Upon receiving Dr. Pratt's report, Dr. Miller elected not to proceed with surgery at that time. Dr. David Gaw did an independent medical exam in October, 1995, and agreed with Dr. Miller that Ms. Nelson had carpal tunnel syndrome, and recommended that she have surgery, even without a positive EMG. Dr. Miller again examined Ms. Nelson in October of 1995, and "strongly recommended carpal tunnel release" because of her persistent, long-standing complaints and clinical symptoms. Not satisfied to authorize surgery, the worker's compensation insurer, Travelers, sought a fourth opinion from Dr. Michael Milek who examined Ms. Nelson in January, 1996. Dr. Milek found "classic" carpel tunnel compression phenomena" and opined that "in all likelihood, she does have bilateral carpel tunnel compression." He recommended a repeat electrical study, and if "the electrical study is abnormal, then I would recommend carpel tunnel release." Finally, in May, 1995, surgery was authorized by Travelers, and bilateral carpel tunnel release surgery was performed on May 8, 1996, by the company doctor, Dr. Jack Miller, who noted during surgery that "the median nerve did not appear to be significantly altered." In subsequent visits in May, June, July, September of 1996, Ms. Nelson reported serially to Dr. Miller "her pain is 95 -2-
Davidson County Workers Compensation Panel
Tommie A. Drumwright v. Anderson Hickey Company and
W1999-00817-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: W. Michael Maloan, Sp. J
Trial Court Judge: Martha B. Brasfield, Chancellor

The plaintiff, Tommie A. Drumwright, appeals the judgment of the trial court which found the plaintiff failed to carry her burden of proving a work-related injury and dismissed her claim. For the reasons stated in this opinion, We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Anderson County Workers Compensation Panel
Kenneth Crotts v. Benchmark Mechanical Contractors,
W1999-00711-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: W. Michael Maloan, Sp. J,
Trial Court Judge: C. Creed Mcginley, Judge

The plaintiff, Kenneth Crotts, appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Hardin County which found the plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proving an injury by accident and dismissed his claim. For the reasons stated in this opinion, We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Hardin County Workers Compensation Panel
Rodney Stafford v. Sara Lee Corporation,
W2000-00705-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe H. Walker III, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: R. Lee Moore, Jr., Judge

Employee was cleaning a machine at work while it was running, in violation of safety rules, and received an injury to his hand and arm. The trial court found willful misconduct and refused worker's compensation benefits. The panel finds that the evidence fails to preponderate against the Chancellor's findings, and affirms.
Dyer County Workers Compensation Panel
Alfredia J. Leach v. Henry I. Siegel Company, Inc.,
W1999-00923-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: W. Michael William Michael Maloan, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Julian P. Guinn, Judge

The defendants, Henry I. Siegel Co., Inc. and Royal Insurance Company (H.I.S.), appeal the judgment of the Circuit Court for Carroll County awarding the plaintiff, Alfredia Leach (Leach), fifty percent (5%) permanent partial disability to her right arm and twenty percent (2%) permanent partial disability to her left arm as being excessive. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but modify the award to a single award of thirty-five percent (35%) permanent partial disability to both arms.
Henry County Workers Compensation Panel
Stoney Mccarter v. Transportation Insurance Company,
W1999-00667-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: W. Michael William Michael Maloan, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Childers, Judge

The plaintiff, Stoney McCarter, appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Shelby County granting defendants' motion for summary judgment. The trial court held plaintiff's court-approved lump sum settlement was not entered into pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-241(a)(1) and therefore could not be reopened pursuant to _ 5-6-241(a)(2). For the reasons stated in this opinion, We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Carter County Workers Compensation Panel
David Coleman v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company
W2000-01168-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe H. Walker III, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Walter L. Evans, Chancellor

Employee was injured when a sofa fell on him at work, and was awarded twenty five percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. On appeal, the award was affirmed, but the court determined that the evidence supported a finding of permanent partial disability for a psychiatric injury, and remanded to the trial court for a determination as to the percentage. Coleman v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co., 2 Tenn. LEXIS 98; 2 WL 236424 (Tenn., March 2, 2). On remand the Chancellor determined that plaintiff was entitled to fifty percent permanent partial disability total for both shoulder and psychiatric injuries.
Shelby County Workers Compensation Panel
Billy Ray Holley v. Bobby Holley,
W1998-00737-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Wil V. Doran, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: James E. Swearengen, Judge

The issue presented for review is whether or not Mississippi Boulevard Christian Church was the plaintiff's statutory employer as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-113. We reverse the judgment of the circuit court and dismiss the cause as to Mississippi Boulevard Christian Church.
Shelby County Workers Compensation Panel
Stanley R. Wilbanks v. Corrections Corporation of
W1999-01732-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Wil V. Doran, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: C. Creed Mcginley, Judge

Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by the presumption of correctness, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). The appellant presents the following issues for review: (1) Did the trial court err in ruling that the plaintiff gave proper notice of the alleged back injury?; (2) Did the trial court err in ruling that Dr. Frazier related causation of the back injury to the accident which occurred on July 24, 1998?; and (3) Did the trial court err in relying on the testimony of Dr. Joseph C. Boals, III, as competent expert testimony? The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Hardin County Workers Compensation Panel
Elsie Anne Bullock v. Medical Professional, Inc., and
E1998-00315-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Peoples, H.N., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Jr., Judge

The appellant, Elsie Bullock, appeals the dismissal of her claim for workers' compensation benefits. The trial court found that she had "failed to meet her burden of proof that the conditions of which she complains are related to work-related accident of February 14, 1996." Ms. Bullock contends the trial court (1) erred in finding that she did not have a compensable injury to her back, and (2) erred in finding she did not have a compensable mental injury as a result of the injury she sustained at work. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Knox County Workers Compensation Panel
Carol Dickens v. Federal-Mogul Systems Protection, Inc.,
M1999-02264-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: J. O. Bond, Judge

The trial court found the plaintiff had suffered a twenty percent vocational disability to the body as a whole and that she was entitled to receive temporary total disability payments from August 27, 1997, through May 11, 1998. The defendant raises as issues the failure of the trial judge to exclude a medical deposition entered into evidence by the plaintiff; the failure of the trial judge to limit the award to two and one-half times the medical impairment rating of five percent; and questions the extent of the temporary total benefits awarded. We affirm the judgment in part and modify the judgment in part.
Smith County Workers Compensation Panel
Richard Scott Stainforth v. Chemetals, Inc.,
M1999-00459-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Loser, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: C. Creed Mcginley, Judge

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The claimant gradually developed pain in his hands and arms at work, which he reported to the employer on March 9, 1998. He was referred to Dr. Wade Reynolds, who diagnosed tendinitis of the thumbs, restricted him from repetitive use of the thumbs and prescribed non-narcotic medication. The claimant continued working with pain and was later referred to Dr. John McInnis, who treated him for swollen thumbs, but did nothing to alleviate the pain in his hands and arms. Dr. McInnis prescribed pain medication, which was helpful, but the claimant continued to suffer from pain in his hands and arms and swelling in his thumbs. In his deposition, Dr. McInnis said the claimant had arthritis in both thumbs and opined the injury would not cause any permanent medical impairment. The claimant was evaluated by Dr. Joseph Boals, who made a report on a form prescribed by the director of the workers' compensation division and a narrative report, both of which are included in the record. Dr. Boals diagnosed overuse syndrome in both upper extremities, manifested by mild carpal tunnel syndrome, severe arthritis of the thumbs and decreased grip strength, causally related to the work the claimant was doing. He estimated the claimant's permanent impairment at twenty percent to each arm. The trial judge found that the claimant suffered an injury byaccident arising out of and in the course of employment and awarded, inter alia, permanent partial disability benefits based on sixty- two and one-half percent to both arms. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). The reviewing tribunal is not bound by a trial court's factual findings but instead conducts an independent examination to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Scott County Workers Compensation Panel
Anna D. Nicholson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
M1999-01137-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Loser, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Carol A. Catalano, Chancellor

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the SpecialWorkers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the case remanded. The employee or claimant, Nicholson, commenced this civil action on May 8, 1996, seeking recovery of medical and disability benefits under the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Law, for an injury that occurred in November, 1994. After a trial on the merits, the trial judge found that the claimant became aware that her injury was work related on April 25, 1995, thirteen days more than one year before the suit was filed, and concluded the action was therefore barred by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-23. The court further found that there was no evidence of a voluntary payment of benefits on behalf of the claimant by the employer, Wal-Mart, within one year of the date of commencement. The claimant contends the record does contain such evidence. It is significant that the trial judge also found that the injured employee's claim for the employer's group health insurance benefits and employer's group short term disability benefits were denied on June 5, 1995 and June 24, 1995 respectively, because her injury was work related. It is also significant that the trial judge found that her claim for workers' benefits was not denied until August 9, 1995. We note that no issue is taken with respect to these three events, all of which occurred within one year of commencement of this civil action. Appellate review of findings of fact by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). This standard requires the panel to examine in depth the trial court's findings and conclusions. This tribunal is not bound by the trial court's factual findings but instead conducts an independent examination to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Montgomery County Workers Compensation Panel
Gregory Childress v. Winsett-Simmonds, Inc. & Usf&G Ins. Co.
M1997-00164-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Thomas W. Brothers, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Ellen Hobbs Lyle,

The appellant-employee argues that the employee proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he sustained a work-related injury which caused him permanent injury. The employee also argues that the trial court erred by ordering the appellant to pay the cost of the entire transcript. The employer argues that the trial court erred in not allowing the employer to be reimbursed for previously paid workers' compensation benefits. The employer also argues that the trial court was correct in its determination of what items were to be included in the appellate court record. As discussed below, the panel has concluded that the trial court should be affirmed on all points.
Davidson County Workers Compensation Panel
John Paul Miller v. Fleetwood Homes of Tennessee and
M1999-00275-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Weatherford, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Thomas E. Gray, Chancellor

The plaintiff, John Paul Miller, appeals the judgment of the Chancery Court of Sumner County, where the trial court found: (1) that Mr. Miller failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered a neck injury arising out of and in the course of his employment with Fleetwood Homes on or about August 4, 1997; (2) that had the neck injury occurred as alleged by Mr. Miller it was due to his own willful misconduct and his claim was otherwise barred under Tennessee Code Annotated _5-6-11 (a); (3) and that Mr. Miller was not entitled to any further benefits for his hand/wrist injury of June 13, 1997. For the reasons stated in this opinion, We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Sumner County Workers Compensation Panel
Phelps and Amanda Lee Phelps v. Tennessee Woolen
M1998-00666-WC-R3
Authoring Judge: Weatherford, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: C.K. Smith, Chancellor

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to theSpecial Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _5-6- 225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The defendants, Tennessee Woolen Mills, Inc. and The Travelers Insurance Company appeal the judgment of the Chancery Court of Smith County, where the Trial Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Lana Phelps, finding that there were no material factual issues in dispute on the issue of causation and that the plaintiff was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law when the decedent, Joseph Phelps, sustained an injury by accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment at Tennessee Woolen Mills when he fell off a ladder and subsequently died of sudden cardiac death. The trial court incorporated its order of partial summary judgment in its final order awarding plaintiff a total recoveryof one hundred forty-five thousand two hundred and four dollars ($145,24.). For the reasons stated in this opinion, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for a hearing on the merits. Tenn. Code Annotated _5-6-225 (e)(1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court; Reversed and Remanded. WEATHERFORD, SR. J., in which BIRCH, J. AND RUSSELL, J. joined. Janelle S. Evyan, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellants, Tennessee Woolen Mills, Inc. and The Travelers Insurance Company Bratton H. Cook, II, Smithville, Tennessee and Jacky O. Bellar, Carthage, Tennessee for the appellees, Lana Phelps, individually and as next friend/guardian of her two minor children, Kurtis Tyler Phelps and Amanda Lee Phelps. MEMORANDUM OPINION The decedent, Joseph Phelps, was employed by Tennessee Woolen Mills, Inc. on January 2, 1995 as an electrician. He was married to Lana Phelps and they had two minor children, Kurtis Tyler Phelps and Amanda Lee Phelps, at the time of Mr. Phelps' death at age 56. According to Safety Manager, Roger Osborn's report at approximately 1:1 to 1: 15 p.m., on January 2, 1995, Joseph Phelps was "engaged in the process of installing a folding machine in the finishing department on the second floor. In particular he was installing a metal support to which a folding machine would later be attached." Apparently, as described by workers in this area, Mr. Phelps was climbing up a ladder and about half way up when he fell. Judy Williams (sewing machine operator in the nearby area) observed Mr. Phelps falling via peripheral vision. Mrs. Williams also mentioned that she thought Mr. Phelps was carrying something in his hand. At the time Mr. Phelps made impact with the floor, a loud "bang" occurred. Several employees responded to the area after hearing this noise. Sometime thereafter, employees began to perform CPR. Approximately five to ten minutes later the ambulance arrived and transported Mr. Phelps to University Medical Center. The report also stated that, "Mrs. Hardin was the first person to see Mr. Phelps on the floor [and stated] that he `may have' hit his head on the hitch of a blanket truck in the near vicinity of the ladder." Scott Giles, D.O., Emergency Medicine Physician, treated Joseph Phelps in the Emergency Room in Lebanon, Tennessee. Dr. Giles testified that Mr. Phelps essentially had no vital signs when he arrived at the hospital and none of their resuscitative efforts were successful. Mr. Phelps was pronounced dead approximately ten minutes after his arrival. Dr. Giles assessed Mr. Phelps cause of death as "sudden cardiac death" which is caused by a massive heart attack or "an arrhythmic event." The plaintiff filed her complaint for workers' compensation benefits on April 19, 1995 alleging that the decedent sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment and as a consequence of the accident, plaintiff claimed that the decedent suffered a cardiac arrest which caused his death shortly after the accident. On October 19, 1995, the plaintiff moved to amend her complaint to add that the decedent's sudden cardiac death was (1) an accidental injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment with Woolen Mills, and alternatively (2) an occupational disease pursuant to Tenn. Code Annotated _5-6-31 et seq. The trial court granted the motion by order entered November 22, 1995. On April 2, 1996, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that she was entitled to judgment for statutory benefits due them as a matter of law, and filed the deposition of -2-
Smith County Workers Compensation Panel
Shirley Loope v. Institutional Jobbers Co., Inc.
E1999-02503-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Daryl L. Fansler, Judge

The trial court found a work-related injury and awarded a ten percent whole body impairment. The defendant argues the evidence preponderates against the finding of compensability. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Knox County Workers Compensation Panel
Beatrice Scott Nall v. E. I. Dupont De Nemours and
M1999-00375-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Loser, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Allen W. Wallace, Judge

This workers' compensation case has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee or claimant, Beatrice Nall, was 59 years old at the time of the trial, which began on October 9, 1998 and ended on October 12, 1998. She has a high school education, some business college and experience as a factory worker, waitress and secretary, as well as 16 years with DuPont, where she worked as a utility worker from 1977 until 1981, when she was promoted to a wet treatment operator. She suffered a previous injury in 1983, from which she received an award based on eighteen percent to the body as a whole. The claimant's duties as a wet treatment operator required her to unload railroad tank cars, which she had done for 12 to 15 years before suffering the present injury in 1993. Because some of the tank cars contained hazardous material, DuPont had established specific standard job procedures (SJP'S) for the unloading of railcars on the plant site. The claimant was intimately familiar with the SJP for unloading sulfuric acid cars. As the SJP'S were updated and changed, the claimant would review them again and initial them to document her review and understanding of the procedure. She last reviewed the SJP for unloading sulfuric acid from railcars on February 11, 1993, two months before her second acid related accident. All safety procedures were strictly enforced by the company. None of the several DuPont employees who testified was aware of anyone unloading acid cars without having on an acid suit. The applicable SJP required that the operator wear safety equipment and specifically required the wearing of an acid suit while unloading a railcar containing acid. On the day of her injury, the claimant attempted to inspect such a railcar, before commencing the unloading procedures, without donning the required safety equipment, particularly the acid suit. As she was doing so, she was sprayed with sulfuric acid and severely burned. The claimant initiated this action to recover medical and disability benefits as provided by the Workers' Compensation Act. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-11 et seq. By its answer, the employer, DuPont, denied that the injury was compensable and affirmatively asserted, in general terms, that the injury was barred by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-11. After a trial on the merits, the trial judge found that the injury was one arising out of and in the course of employment, that the employer had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant willfully violated a safety rule or refused to wear a safety device and that the claimant is permanently and totally disabled as a result of her injuries. The award was correctly apportioned between the employer and the second injury fund. The employer has appealed, contending (1) the trial judge erred in finding that the claim is not barred by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-11(a) and (2) the trial judge erred in entering an order finding that the plaintiff was permanently and totally disabled. Our review of the trial court's findings is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). The reviewing court is not bound by a trial court's factual findings but instead conducts an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Scott County Workers Compensation Panel
Kathy Kay Scott v. Cantech Industries,
E2000-00728-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Jean A. Stanley, Circuit Court Judge

The trial court found that the plaintiff suffered carpel tunnel syndrome as a result of her work with Contech Industries, Incorporated, that the disability should be converted to an injury to the body as a whole, and that the plaintiff had sustained a forty-two percent vocational impairment to the body as a whole. The trial judge found that Wausau Underwriters Insurance Company was the workers' compensation carrier at the time the plaintiff became unable to continue to work, and therefore, was the carrier responsible for the coverage. Wausau raises the issue of whether the trial judge properly found it, rather than Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, liable for the award to the plaintiff. Wausau and Contech Industries Incorporated further argue the trial court erred in finding the plaintiff gave sufficient or timely notice of the carpel tunnel syndrome injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Scott County Workers Compensation Panel
Earl Wagner v. The Tennessee Coal Company
E2000-01013-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: John Mcafee, Judge

The trial court found the plaintiff sustained a ten percent permanent partial medical impairment as a result of a compensable injury and awarded him forty percent whole body vocational disability. The defendant says the evidence does not support the finding that the plaintiff suffered any permanent impairment and further says if he did, the award should have been restricted to two and one-half percent times the medical impairment because the plaintiff had a meaningful return to work. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Knox County Workers Compensation Panel
Donald Picklesimer v. Mckee Foods Corporation
E2000-02694-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Thayer , Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: W. Frank Brown III, Chancellor

The trial court awarded the employee 72 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employee appealed insisting his disability was 1 percent. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Knox County Workers Compensation Panel