WORKERS COMPENSATION PANEL OPINIONS
| Carole Simpson v. Saturn Corp. 01S01-9607-CV-00146 Authoring Judge: Robert S. Brandt, Senior Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jim T. Hamilton, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Saturn Corporation appeals from the trail court's award of permanent partial benefits based upon a 65% disability to the whole body. The fundamental issue is whether the plaintiff's disability from depression is caused by her work injury at Saturn. The Court concludes that it is and affirms the trial court. Carole Simpson, the plaintiff, on August 19, 1991 fell down some stairs and hurt her left shoulder, arm, and hand. She eventually came under the care of Dr. Robert F. Clendenin, III, a Nashville physical medicine and rehabilitation specialist. He concluded that she suffers from a spinal nerve root irritation and assessed her impairment at 5% to the whole body. The doctor restricted the plaintiff's lifting to twenty pounds frequently and forty pounds occasionally and instructed her not to do repetitive overhead work. With those restrictions, the plaintiff has not been able to do her normal work at Saturn. Instead, she has been assigned the less strenuous job of putting together foam clips. At the time of the trial, the plaintiff testified her work consisted mostly of waiting in the cafeteria to be called to perform some duty her injuries would allow. The problem in this case is caused by the plaintiff's depression. She believed her co-workers were constantly harassing her. She was depressed, she testified, because of "all the harassment" she was receiving and because of her pain. She felt constantly harassed by her fellow workers. When asked point blank what she attributed the depression to, the plaintiff said "the lack of a job, the harassment that I have had to endure, the doors that keep closing in my face every -2- |
Maury County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Empire Berol , U.S.A. v. Nancy Lee Estes 01S01-9610-CH-00205 Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Tyrus H. Cobb This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The posture of this case is somewhat unusual. The plaintiff is Empire Berol U.S.A., the employer of the defendant Nancy Lee Estes. It sought a declaratory judgment on March 11, 1993 of the respective rights of the parties under the workers' compensation law, alleging that Estes was asserting a job-related accident resulting in physical injury. Estes filed her answer, admitting that she was injured, but that her condition was one that progressively occurred and was not diagnosed as carpal tunnel syndrome until December 28, 1992. About four months later, Estes filed another answer, coupled with a counter-claim, through different counsel, in which she alleged that she sustained an injury by accident on or about November 17, 1992 during the course of her employment by the plaintiff. All this was followed by the filing of another complaint, by the plaintiff, on May 2, 1994, against Estes and Golden Corral, alleging as a result of discovery, that the injury to Estes arose out of her employment at the Golden Corral, which was designated as a third-party defendant. Golden Corral filed a motion to dismiss, alleging, in effect, procedural errors. The plaintiff thereupon amended its complaint, alleging that Golden Corral was a necessary party under RULE 19, but the procedural problem was unaddressed. Before the motion to dismiss was heard, the parties agreed that it was well- taken, and Estes averred her intention to file a complaint against Golden Corral, which soon followed, in which she alleged that a "gradual injury did occur and that [she] was employed by Golden Corral during a time frame in which the injury may have begun" and that she "sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment while performing work at the place of business of Golden Corral in Shelbyville, Tennessee." Golden Corral denied that Estes was injured as alleged, but if so, her suit was time-barred under TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-21. Upon the trial of the case, the central issue was causation, since Ms. Estes' carpal tunnel syndrome was evident and not disputed. She testified that she began 2 |
Bedford County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Darla Gail Farmiloe v. Saturn Corporation 01S01-9610-CV-00199 Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jim T. Hamilton, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This complaint was filed June 23, 1994. The plaintiff alleged that she sustained various job-related injuries arising from her employment, the first being November 21, 1991 involving upper back and shoulder pain which developed gradually. The defendant admitted the report of these injuries. Trial of the case in February 1996 resulted in a finding that the plaintiff's job duties advanced the severity of her pre-existing conditions and that she had sustained a 75 percent occupational disability with benefits payable in a lump sum. The employer appeals, and presents for review the issues of (1) whether the plaintiff sustained a compensable injury to her neck, back and left upper extremity, (2) whether the award is excessive, and (3) whether the award should be paid in a lump sum. W e will consider these issues jointly. Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 584 (Tenn. 1991). Where testimony is presented by deposition, this Court is able to make its own independent assessment of the proof to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies. |
Maury County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Smith County | Workers Compensation Panel | |||
| Ssi Services, Inc. v. Howard L. Baker 01S01-9609-CV-00191 Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Gerald L. Ewell, Sr., This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This action began as one for a declaratory judgment under the workers' compensation laws that the accident suffered by the employee ("hereafter, plaintiff") resulted in minimal impairment only. The plaintiff counterclaimed, alleging that he sustained a job-related rotator cuff tear of his left shoulder with a biceps tendon tear requiring surgical repair on May 2, 1993, and that he aggravated the condition in the Spring of 1994 when further surgery was required. The plaintiff is 59 years old, employed as a painter, with an excellent work ethic. It is not controverted that he suffered the injury as alleged. He returned to full, uninterrupted employment in December, 1994 with restrictions. The trial court found that the plaintiff had sustained a 13 percent permanent partial disability to his whole body, and that the "cap embodied in the 1992 Amendment should apply since the plaintiff has returned to meaningful work activities." The plaintiff appeals, insisting (1) that the award of 13 percent permanent partial disability to the whole body is "contrary to the evidence and the law," and (2) that the plaintiff is "entitled to more than 13 percent permanent partial vocational impairment to the body as a whole." Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 584 (Tenn. 1991). Where the medical testimony is presented by deposition, this Court is able to make its own independent assessment of the medical proof to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies. |
Coffee County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| David H. Crenshaw, Sr. v. Ats Southeast, Inc. 01S01-9701-CH-00018 Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers Trial Court Judge: Chancellor This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This is an appeal by the employer from an order of the trial court setting aside a previously issued order of dismissal for failure to prosecute a workers' compensation case within one year under the local rules of court for Davidson County. The trial court set aside the dismissal order under Rule 6.2, TENN. R. CIV. P. The complaint for workers' compensation benefits was filed October 14, 1994. The defendant filed an answer on November 17, 1994. The trial court, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint on November 6, 1995 under the local rule for failure to prosecute. The record before us, which consists of the pleadings, orders and an affidavit of the employee's counsel in support of his Rule 6 motion, show the notice of dismissal was filed on counsel for the plaintiff on November 14, 1995. On January 22, 1996, plaintiff filed a Rule 6 motion to have the order dismissed or set aside. On February 26, 1996, the trial judge found "Plaintiff [had] not made out a sufficient showing of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect to justify relief under Rule 6, Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure," however "because this matter is a workers' compensation action, the Order of Dismissal will be set aside and this case shall be put back on the Court's active docket." Unless otherwise set out in the order of dismissal, such order operates as an adjudication upon the merits. Rule 41.2(3), TENN. R. CIV. P. Rule 59.4, TENN. R. CIV. P., provides for a motion to amend or alter a judgment. Such motions must be filed and served on the opposite party within 3 days of the entry of the judgment in question. A judgment becomes final in 3 days and cannot be reviewed after that time. Algee v. State Farm General Ins. Co., 89 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). The order of dismissal in this case became final 3 days after entry thereof, 2 |
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| David Hickman v. Continental Baking Company W1999-00520-WC-R3-CV Authoring Judge: Don R. Ash, Sp. J. Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr., Chancellor The trial court did not issue a final order in this case. We therefore remand with instructions for further proceedings and a final judgment. |
Hickman County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Hamblen County Board of Education v. Michael Jinks 03S01-9708-CH-00094 Authoring Judge: Special Judge Joe. Loser, Jr. Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Thomas R. Frierson This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellant contends the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the battering of a school teacher in a school corridor by a student arose out of and in the course of the teacher's employment. The appellee insists the appeal is frivolous. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed, but declines to award damages for a frivolous appeal. |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Harris v. Burlington 03S01-9606-CV-00069 Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Richard G. Johnson This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellant recognizes the established rule in this State that a second injury is not compensable unless there is evidence of an anatomical change, Cunningham v. Goodyear, 841 S.W .2d 888 (Tenn. 1991), but insists the rule should not have been applied in this case. The plaintiff alleged and testified that he injured his back on January 4, 1994 while lifting a heavy object during the course of his employment. He had injured his back in 1991, and was treated by chiropractic, but did not pursue a claim for benefits. Between 1991 and 1994 he denied a re-injury, but testified to a number of "flare-ups." The plaintiff insists that he suffered an aggravation of the 1991 injury and that he is entitled to benefits accordingly. Following the January 4, 1994 injury, he sought chiropractic treatment again, and was referred to Dr. Stephen Natelson, a neurosurgeon, who performed a hemilaminectomy. The plaintiff represented to Dr. Natelson that he had no previous back problems. He was initially seen by Dr. Natelson on November 14, 1994. The corrective surgery was performed on January 1, 1995. On January 5, 1994, the day after the plaintiff allegedly injured his back, he was seen by Dr. John L. Holbrook, an orthopedic surgeon, to whom he related a lengthy history of back problems. A comprehensive examination was made resulting in a final diagnosis of degenerative disc disease. He was seen again on May 24, 1994, complaining of back pain, and another examination resulted in the same findings as before. During all this time the plaintiff was also being treated by chiropractic. Dr. Holbrook testified that there were no anatomical changes in the plaintiff's lumbar spine between 1991 and 1994; i.e., that the plaintiff had not suffered a re-injury as claimed. Our review is de novo on the record, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact of the trial court unless the preponderance of 2 |
Washington County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Lowe v. Jefferson 03S01-9605-CV-00060 Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Ben W. Hooper Ii, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This appeal has been perfected by the employer, Jefferson City Zinc, later identified by stipulation as Savage, Inc., from a ruling by the trial court that the employee, Walter P. Lowe, was totally and permanently disabled as a result of a work-related accident which occurred on October 22, 1992. On appeal there are only two issues. First, the employer questions the trial court's determination of total disability and ordering benefits payable under T.C.A. _ 5-6-27(4) until the employee becomes sixty-five years of age. In the second issue, the employer contends the court was in error in apportioning the award of benefits under T.C.A. _ 5-6-28(a) causing the employer to be liable for 65% of the award and the state Second Injury Fund to be liable for 35% of the award. As to the first question, the employer concedes employee Lowe is totally disabled but argues the award should not be fixed at 1% disability because the medical impairment does not exceed 12% for the last injury and that T.C.A. _ 5-6- 241 limits disability awards to six times the medical impairment, which would be a 72% award. In support of this reasoning, it also contends employee Lowe meets three out of the four factors set out in T.C.A.. _ 5-6-242 and, therefore, the award of benefits would be payable for a period of four hundred weeks. The trial court heard conflicting evidence from several expert medical witnesses. All of this testimony was by deposition. Dr. Robert E. Finelli, a neurosurgeon who had treated the employee for the last injury and several prior injuries, gave a 12% medical impairment for the last injury. Dr. Mark McQuain testified to a 11% impairment. Dr. W illiam E. Kennedy, an orthopedic surgeon, gave a 2% impairment. In addition to this evidence, the court heard testimony from Dr. Kelley W alker, a psychiatrist, who was of the opinion the employee was suffering from a depressive disorder due to his last injury. She assessed his permanent disability as a Class 3, Moderate Impairment, which means his impairment level is compatible with some but not all useful functioning. She told the court the Third and Fourth Editions of AMA 2 |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Rainey v. Oak Ridge 03S01-9607-CV-00077 Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. James B. Scott, Jr., This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff alleged that on February 15, 1994, during the course of his employment as a janitor, he suffered a lumbar strain while lifting a trash barrel which resulted in permanent, partial disability. As the case unfolded it developed that the plaintiff had a job-related injury in 1979, requiring surgery, for which he received an award for 21.25 percent permanent partial disability. The medical proof established that the 1994 lifting incident aggravated a long- standing disc problem to the extent of causing some nerve irritation but no anatomical changes. The treating orthopedic physician, Dr. Fred Killeffer, testified that the plaintiff had a four percent impairment attributable to the 1994 accident, but opined that he should not continue to work as a painter or custodian. The defendant offered the plaintiff continued employment at the same wages, with an accommodation for the restrictions recommended by his physician. The plaintiff testified that he attempted to work but could not do so within the lifting restrictions. The trial judge found that the plaintiff was unable to return to his former employment and awarded him "six times his aggravation of a pre-existing condition which is 24 percent to the body as a whole." We assume this finding is intended to mean six times the impairment of four percent attributable to the 1994 injury. The plaintiff appeals, insisting that his entitlement should not have been limited to six times his impairment because he met three of the four criteria set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-242 and thus should have been awarded a greater degree of disability. Pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-242, a trial court may award an employee permanent partial disability benefits in excess of the maximum disability allowed by applying the multiplier but not to exceed 4 weeks. In such cases, there must be clear and convincing evidence to support at least three of the following four criteria: 2 |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Jantice L. West v. Nashville Tent & Awning Company, Inc. and General Accident Insurance Company 01S01-9501-CH-00008 Authoring Judge: Per Curiam Trial Court Judge: Hon. Irvin H. Kilcrease, This case is before the Court upon a motion for review pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-225(e)(5)(B), the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim for workers' compensation benefits on the grounds that it was untimely under the statute of limitations. |
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Williams v. Sweetwater 03S01-9607-CH-00084 Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Earl H. Henley, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff alleged a work-related aggravation of a pre-existing non-work-related back condition. She alleged that medical expenses and temporary total disability benefits had been paid by the employer but sought permanent partial disability, future medical expenses and discretionary costs. The trial court found that the temporary aggravation of her back condition had resolved with no permanent impairment and awarded no future benefits. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Plaintiff, a registered nurse, injured her back at home in June, 1992. Dr. David Hauge, orthopedic surgeon, performed lumbar disk surgery at L4-L5 on November 19, 1992 and returned plaintiff to work the following January with lifting restrictions. Plaintiff alleged that on January 25, 1993, she re-injured her back while lifting a patient at work. Dr. Hauge placed her on temporary total disability for three weeks and treated her conservatively, after which she returned to work again. Dr. Hauge opined that 2 percent of patients who have disk surgery experience recurrent herniations of the same disk. There are various causes of such recurrences, some related to the surgery itself and some which are due to just normal activity. He could not state within reasonable medical certainty whether or not plaintiff's recurrent herniation was work-related. Dr. Hauge opined that the original, non-work-related injury resulted in eleven percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole: "I would state that the 11% impairment to the body . . . is a result of the injury she sustained in June, 1992 and her subsequent surgery. The percentage impairment this patient has did not change as a result of the January, 1993 incident, although it certainly can be argued that she was much more likely to have an aggravation requiring medical treatment because of the existence of this previous problem." Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the 2 |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Stewart v. City of Johnson City 03S01-9606-CH-00066 Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. GERALD JOHNSON This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. |
Stewart County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Gibson County | Workers Compensation Panel | |||
| Henry County | Workers Compensation Panel | |||
| Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Francine Kuntz 01S01-9609-CH-00187 Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr., This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This appeal presents us with an issue involving venue in a workers' compensation case. As discussed below, the panel concludes the judgment of the trial court, dismissing the case for improper venue, should be affirmed. The employer's insurer, Yasuda, commenced this action in Davidson County where, according to the complaint, its principal place of business is located. The employee moved, without supporting affidavits, to dismiss for improper venue. The trial court granted the motion without an evidential hearing.1 The relevant facts are undisputed. The employee is a resident of Robertson County; the corporate employer has its principal office in Sumner County, where the injury occurred; and the employer's insurer has its principal office in Davidson County. The trial judge dismissed the complaint for improper venue because, according to the employee's brief, the employee "may not have a different residence than (sic) the employer for the purpose of determining proper venue under the Workers' Compensation Law of Tennessee." Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court. Presley v. Bennett, 86 S.W.2d 857 (Tenn. 1993). In a significant number of past cases, our Supreme Court held that a workers' compensation action was a transitory one and that venue was to be determined by considering both the provision of the Workers' Compensation Act with respect to venue and the general rules relating to transitory actions. Those cases were overturned by that court's opinion in Five Star Express, Inc. v Davis, 866 S.W.2d 944 (Tenn. 1993), wherein it said in conclusion, ".... we now hold that venue in workers' compensation actions is to be determined solely by the workers' compensation venue statute -- section 5-6-225(c)(1) -- and any other authority indicating otherwise is hereby expressly overruled." The section provides as follows: (c)(1) The party filing the petition may, at such party's option, instead of filing the same before the county judge or chair, file the same as an original petition in either the circuit, criminal or chancery 1 The employee has filed a separate action for benefits in Robertson County. 2 |
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Carol A. Hilliard v. Tn. State Home Health Services, et al. 01S01-9609-CH-00193 Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Robert E. Burch, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee contends, in this appeal, that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning causation and that the summary judgment of dismissal should be reversed. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the case should be remanded for trial. In 1971 and 1972, the claimant underwent gallbladder surgery and a hysterectomy. In conjunction therewith, she was given two blood transfusions. Over the next several years, she carried on a normal life and exhibited no more than normal health problems. However, in 1988, the claimant visited a doctor complaining of extreme fatigue, a symptom of hepatitis C. In 1989, she visited a doctor who noted she had an enlarged liver, also a symptom of hepatitis C. By 1992, the claimant's fatigue had become worse and she experienced a series of colds and viruses. She was again diagnosed with an enlarged liver, and hepatitis C was diagnosed for the first time. She has seen several doctors, including Dr. Ellen B. Hunter, whose deposition was filed in support of the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Dr. Hunter testified that hepatitis C sufferers often remain asymptomatic for many years. The claimant testified that the signs of the disease began after she started working for the employer providing nursing care for medical patients. She said she never had any major health problems before that, a circumstance confirmed by her family doctor in his affidavit. Dr. Hunter testified the condition could have been caused by the above transfusions or by working with patients having hepatitis C. She confirmed that a health care worker such as the claimant "is at risk for acquiring hepatitis C." The trial court granted a summary judgment of dismissal. Appellate review is controlled by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56. Downen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 811 S.W.2d 523 (Tenn. 1991). The pleadings and evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent of the motion. Wyatt v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 566 S.W.2d 276 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977). Summary judgment is to be rendered only when it is shown that there is no genuine issue as to a material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56. It is almost never an option in workers' compensation cases. Berry v. Consolidated Systems, Inc., 84 S.W.2d 445 (Tenn. 1991). In a summary judgment hearing, even where the parties have no right to a jury trial, the trial judge is not at liberty to weigh the evidence. 2 |
Stewart County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Kay E. Blackwood, Jr. v. The Berkline Corp., et al. 01S01-9609-CV-00190 Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. John A. Turnbull, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellants contend (1) the award of permanent partial disability benefits is excessive, (2) it was error for the trial judge to become a witness in the case and (3) the trial judge abused his discretion by commuting permanent partial benefits to a lump sum. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the award of permanent partial disability benefits should be modified and, as modified, paid in a lump sum, and the evidential remarks of the trial judge were harmless in light of our modification. The claimant, Kay Eugene Blackwood, Jr., is thirty-nine years old with a high school education and vocational training as an automobile mechanic and some college training as a minister of the gospel. He gradually developed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome from the repetitive use of his hands at work for employer, Berkline. The employer referred him to Dr. James B. Talmage. The doctor diagnosed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and prescribed braces for both wrists. He restricted the claimant from repetitive work with his right hand and recommended wearing the braces while sleeping. The claimant was totally disabled for several weeks. The doctor assigned zero percent permanent impairment, but acknowledged some loss of grip strength and conceded that, on the basis of lost grip strength, the AMA Guidelines provided twenty percent permanent impairment to the right arm and ten percent to the left, using a method the doctor considered inappropriate. Dr. Talmage did not concede the loss of grip strength was permanent. Dr. Randy Gaw, a neurologist, diagnosed mild right carpal tunnel syndrome but found no evidence of "left median nerve mononeuropathy" or "generalized neuropathic or myopathic process involving the upper extremities." The claimant returned to work for the employer. Dr. S. M. Smith, who did not treat the claimant but evaluated him, diagnosed moderate carpal tunnel syndrome on the right and mild carpal tunnel syndrome on the left. He assigned twenty percent permanent impairment to the right hand and ten percent to the left. The trial court awarded, among other things, permanent partial disability benefits based on fifty percent to each arm, commuted to a lump sum. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). This tribunal is required to conduct an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies. |
Clay County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Brenda Durham Konyndyk v. Eagle Displays, Inc. 01S01-9609-CH-00188 Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers Trial Court Judge: Hon. John W. Rollins, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff appeals the trial court's finding that she did not retain any permanent partial disability as a result of her work-related injury. We affirm the trial court's judgment. On July 24, 1993, plaintiff was hit by a forklift from behind while she was squatting to take plastic wrap off supplies for the work she was performing. She injured her left shoulder when she fell as a result of this accident. She continued to work after her injury except for a few breaks to rest her shoulder, either at her doctor's request or her own, until March 31, 1995, when she voluntarily quit or retired. She testified that she quit because of her continued shoulder pain, but it is not clear from the transcript whether she gave this reason to her employer. She testified that she continues to experience pain in her shoulder which limits her ability to reach, especially overhead, and lift. She testified that she has difficulty cleaning showers and overhead cabinets, working in her garden and swimming. Plaintiff has mostly received her treatment from her family practitioner, Dr. J. Richard Thomasson. He diagnosed tendinitis of the left shoulder. He also diagnosed tenosynovitis in her right thumb after it began to bother her in the late fall of November 1994; however, he could not testify with any certainty as to the cause of her right thumb tenosynovitis. He opined that she had a medical impairment rating of 27% to the whole body, which he broke down to 7% whole body impairment due to her left shoulder tendinitis and 22% whole body impairment due to her right thumb tenosynovitis. Dr. Thomason testified the plaintiff's thumb problem was due either to overuse or trauma. Dr. Thomason's testimony was uncertain and not persuasive in establishing plaintiff's disability, if any, from her work-related injury. Plaintiff was also evaluated by three orthopedic surgeons. Dr. Robert E. Stein ordered an MRI, which showed mild degenerative disc disease from the C5 through the C7 disks, but was within normal limits. He opined that it was "an MRI that would be 2 |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Randy Pertuset v. Pargo's, Inc. 01S01-9609-CH-00189 Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers Trial Court Judge: Hon. Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr., This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's petition for workers' compensation benefits. The plaintiff raises the following issues: I. The trial court erred in finding that the altercation between the plaintiff and Thomas Wilson, a co-employee, was not an "accident" sufficient to justify an award of workers' compensation benefits. II. The trial court erred in finding that the medical evidence was insufficient to justify an award based on a mental or nervous disorder. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The plaintiff in the case was employed as a supervisor at Pargo's, Inc., a restaurant. On January 27, 1994, during the lunch hour, the plaintiff became involved in an exchange with a cook over an order. The evidence shows the plaintiff entered the kitchen to reprimand the cook. The plaintiff pointed his finger at the cook's face as he spoke to him. There is a dispute between the plaintiff and the other witnesses about what then occurred. The plaintiff testified the cook struck him on the neck with his arm, and that he fell to the floor as a result of the blow. The plaintiff was the only witness to give this history of the confrontation. The other witnesses testified the cook placed his hand on the plaintiff's face and pushed him away. All of these witnesses testified the plaintiff did not fall. The day following the incident, the plaintiff became emotionally upset and had to leave work. Basically, the plaintiff was never successfully employed after this time because his mental condition seemed to deteriorate. The Chancellor's memorandum stated in its most pertinent part as follows: The Court finds that the altercation on January 27, 1994 between the plaintiff and Mr. Wilson did not amount to an "accident" sufficient to justify an award. While the plaintiff claims that the plaintiff assaulted him with such force sufficient to cause him to fall to the floor and suffer from neck stiffness, evidence in the record and testimony at trial do not support such a conclusion. Testimony at trial by co-workers who witnessed the altercation reports that the plaintiff began the altercation by verbally 2 |
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Donald Groton, Etc. v. Traverlers Insurance Co. 01S01-9607-CV-00154 Authoring Judge: Robert S. Brandt, Senior Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Bobby Capers, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This Court is once again called upon to decide wither an injury sustained en route to work is compensable. We conclude that it is not and reverse the trial court's finding that it is. Regrettably, this case involves more than an injury. Donald Groton died from injuries he sustained in a car wreck while traveling to work on January 14, 1994. He worked for John Coleman Hayes, P.C. an engineering firm under contract with Nashville's airport authority to supervise noise abatement modifications being made to homes in the Antioch and Donelson neighborhoods close to the airport. Groton was one of two inspectors who examined the work of the contractors. He used his own vehicle in his work. The employer paid Groton mileage for driving from the office to job sites and from one job site to another. The employer did not pay Groton for driving from his home to the office or to the first job site of the day if Groton went there first. Likewise, the employer did not pay Groton for travel away from the office or from the last job site at the end of the work day. On the date of the accident, Groton did not report for duty at either the office or a job site as usual. James Michael Smith, John Coleman Hayes's construction manager, called Groton the day before and instructed him to go to a job site of a sister company, John Coleman Hayes Construction Company. Smith needed some surveying work done and Groton knew how to do it. -2- |
Wilson County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Franklin Hartsell v. Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co., et al. 01S01-9608-CH-00164 Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Ellen Hobbs Lyle, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff, age 54, suffered a job-related myocardial infarction on March 1, 1994. A coronary arteriogram revealed an 8% blockage of his left anterior descending artery which was alleviated by an angioplasty procedure which reduced the blockage to less than 15%. Conservative treatment followed, and he was released to return to full employment on January 1, 1994. From that day forward, the plaintiff has worked steadily and without incident. In July 1991, the plaintiff was hospitalized with chest pains. A cardiac catheterization was performed, which revealed a serious lesion in his left circumflex coronary artery at the left ventricular ridge, with another lesion in his left anterior descending coronary artery. After the 1994 infarction, the lesion in the left anterior artery was substantially worsened. The employer insists that the award is excessive because it was improperly onerated with liability for impairment resulting from pre-existing coronary artery disease. Liability for benefits resulting from impairment as a consequence of the myocardial infarction is conceded. The dispositive issue at trial was the extent of the plaintiff's partial permanent disability. The Chancellor found that the plaintiff had a 5% permanent partial disability and awarded benef its accordingly. Our review is de novo on the record, accompanied by the presumption that the trial court's judgment is correct unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). The treating physician, Dr. K.P. Channabasappa, testified that the plaintiff's impairment was 29%, which may be extrapolated to Category II of the AMA Guidelines. He stated in a pre-deposition letter that "it is 29%" and on direct examination testified that the impairment was 29%. There was no countervailing testimony offered. 2 |
Franklin County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Earl Barrett v. City of Lebanon, et al. 01S01-9608-CH-00158 Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Charles K. Smith, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff is a 4-year-old man whose work experience has essentially been limited to manual labor. On August 2, 1994, during the course and scope of his employment by the City of Lebanon and while using a jackhammer, he sprained a neck muscle while attempting to dislodge the implement. He returned to light duty on February 6, 1995 and full duty on March 2, 1995. The issue is whether the evidence preponderates against the judgment of the trial court that the plaintiff retained a 12.5% permanent partial disability to his body as a whole as a result of the cervical strain. Our review is de novo on the record with the presumption of the correctness of the judgment unless the evidence otherwise preponderates. T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(2) and TENN. R. CIV. P. 13(d). The treating physician was Dr. W. Garrison Strickland, board-certified in psychiatry and neurology. His examination and testing revealed mild degenerative changes in the cervical spine. He testified that the results of a functional capacity evaluation were inconsistent, meaning that the plaintiff's efforts were not always sincere. Dr. Strickland declined to state an opinion as to whether the plaintiff had any impairment because there were no objective findings and the functional capacity evaluation was inconsistent. The plaintiff was referred to Dr. Jack Fishbein, an orthopedic surgeon, by his attorney. He saw the plaintiff only on one occasion and testified that he found muscle tightness and limited range of motion with pain radiating from the right shoulder. He assessed 5% impairment to the body as a whole. The trial judge found the testimony of Dr. Fishbein to be more credible than the testimony of Dr. Strickland, who, as stated, declined to state an opinion because he found no objective symptoms and does not give impairment ratings if the functional capacity evaluation is inconsistent. 2 |
Wilson County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Eddie Bryant v. Opryland USA, Inc., et al. 01S01-9611-CH-00231 Authoring Judge: Frank F. Drowota, III, Justice Trial Court Judge: Hon. Alex W. Darnell, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The defendants in this appeal contend that the Chancellor's award of benefits to the plaintiff on the basis of a percentage to the body as a whole was error in light of the proof which established injuries only to both of plaintiff's arms which are scheduled members. The panel concludes that the award of benefits on the basis of sixty percent to the body as a whole should be modified to provide for an award of sixty percent to both arms. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-27(3)(A)(ii)(w) (1996 Supp.) The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed as modified. The plaintiff, Eddie Bryant, was thirty-six years old at the time of trial. Following his graduation from high school, Bryant served three years in the Navy and received training as a mechanic in diesel repair and in boiler repair. He completed three different training courses at Gravely Equipment, Briggs Equipment School and Echo Power Equipment. Subsequent to his discharge from the Navy, Bryant began working for the defendant Opryland as a mechanic in the horticulture department. Although Bryant was also in charge of the trash crew and performed some tree trimming, his primary job was that of mechanic. In 1992, Bryant began dropping tools and experiencing numbness in his hands. Bryant first saw Dr. Steven Salyers, a medical doctor who specializes in orthopedics, on September 18, 1992. Based upon testing and examination of Bryant, Dr. Salyers diagnosed Bryant as having carpal tunnel syndrome in his right hand. Initially, Dr. Salyers prescribed conservative treatment for Bryant, however, that treatment proved unsuccessful. On January 28, 1993, Dr. Salyers performed corrective release surgery on Bryant's right wrist. Bryant returned to work on light duty, but began experiencing pain and discomfort in his left hand. Electrodiagnostic studies done on March 12, 1993 revealed mild carpal tunnel syndrome. Dr. Salyers -2- |
Montgomery County | Workers Compensation Panel |