Johnny Tyus v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for delivery of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance, cocaine, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Shannon D. Young v. Tony Parker, et al.
The Petitioner, an inmate in custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction, appeals from the order of the trial court dismissing his petition for common law writ of certiorari as being untimely filed. We affirm. |
Lake | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Ferris
The defendant, William Ferris, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; two counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; and one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him as a violent offender to twenty-five years for each of the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions and as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years for the aggravated burglary convictions and twenty years for the aggravated robbery conviction. The court merged the two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and the two counts of aggravated burglary and ordered that the kidnapping, burglary, and robbery sentences be served consecutively to each other for an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. The defendant raises essentially three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred by not declaring a mistrial sua sponte upon admission of testimony about the defendant’s pending indictment for attempted second degree murder; and (3) whether the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Amy Brown Young v. Insurance Company of The State of Pennsylvania, et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff complained of wrist pain which was subjectively diagnosed as cumulative trauma. The treating physician found no impairment, as did neither of the first two physicians to whom the plaintiff was referred. The third physician, Dr. Fishbein, relying on subjective complaints, made four years after the plaintiff left her job, found a 5 percent impairment in each arm. We find the evidence preponderates against the judgment. |
Grundy | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Jimmy R. Lyle v. Pasminco Zinc, Inc.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff alleged that he has a repetitive-stress job-related condition in his right knee diagnosed as degenerative arthritis. Surgery was performed September 18, 1997. After giving notice in July 1999, this action was filed on March 20, 2000. The trial judge concluded that the one-year statute of limitations precluded recovery and granted summary judgment. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Keith Edward Garrett v. Priscilla Louise Garrett, et al., Estate of Luther Gaston Garrett
In this second appeal of this case, the Trial Court had ruled that appellee was entitled to a dwelling house and all improvements on land owned by the Deceased. Appellant appeals this and numerous issues. We affirm. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Estate of Joseph Owen Boote, Jr., Decedent, et al. v. Helen Boote Shivers, et al.
Appellants are residuary beneficiaries of their father's estate. They challenge the estate's payment of attorney fees and expenses incurred by executrix (the widow of testator and stepmother of Appellants) in unsuccessfully defending against her removal as executrix. Appellants contend that because litigation concerning the removal of their stepmother as executrix was solely for the personal benefit of the executrix and was necessitated by her neglect in administering the estate, the trial court erred as a matter of law in ordering the attorney fees and expenses incurred in defending against the removal petition be paid out of the estate. Appellee, the former executrix, contends that the trial court did not err in exercising its discretion in ordering legal fees to be paid out of estate. Finding that the trial court erred in ordering the expenses paid out of the estate, we reverse and remand. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
William L. Smith v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, William L. Smith, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because the petitioner's sentence for rape of a child is illegal, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is reversed, relief is granted, and the cause is remanded to the Bledsoe County Circuit Court for transfer to the Hamilton County Criminal Court for appropriate remedial action. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gloria Kim Smith v. Charles A. Portera, M.D., et al.
The plaintiff in this medical battery case argues that the trial court erred in granting the defendant doctor summary judgment and argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether she consented to an unnamed surgical procedure in addition to scheduled procedures named in a hospital consent form. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment upon findings that the case was actually a suit for medical malpractice, rather than medical battery, and that the plaintiff failed to present expert proof that such surgery was not in her best interest. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for trial on the merits upon our finding that the plaintiff's suit states a cause of action for medical battery; and that the consent form signed by the plaintiff authorized the additional surgery only if it was required by an unforseen condition and whether there was an unforseen condition requiring the additional surgery remained a genuine issue of material fact. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Williams
The defendant, Robert Williams, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and sentenced by the trial court as a career offender to fifteen years in the Department of Correction. The sole issue he raises on appeal is whether the circumstantial evidence presented in his case was sufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerry Trull, et ux. v. Brad Ridgeway, et ux.
Plaintiffs-landowners filed a chancery court complaint seeking to establish ownership of a parcel of real estate which they claimed by adverse possession. The trial court dismissed the complaint pursuant to the provisions of T.C.A. § 28-2-110 (failure to pay real estate taxes for twenty years) and also allowed defendants to take a voluntary nonsuit of a counter-claim against the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Candice Workman
The defendant, Candice Workman, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to soliciting the sale of less than one-half gram of cocaine, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced her to one year in the workhouse to be served on probation and fined her $2000.00. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying her request for judicial diversion. We affirm the trial court but remand the case for correction of a clerical error on the judgment of conviction. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dawn Eileen Shannon v. Thomas Rex Shannon
The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s petition to register and modify a foreign decree of child support for lack of jurisdiction. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lillian Griffis, et al. v. Davidson County Metropolitan Government d/b/a Davidson County Board of Education
In 1908, a fee simple determinable estate in real property was conveyed to the Davidson County Board of Education and its successors ("Metro"). The deed required the property to be used "for school purposes" and to be "devoted exclusively to the cause of education." The deed further provided that the property would revert to the grantors or their heirs should the property be "abandoned" for these purposes. In July 2000, the defendant Metro ceased using the property for classroom instruction and administration but continued to maintain the property, to use it to store surplus food service equipment, and to hold it in reserve for possible use in the indefinite future. In April 2001, heirs of the grantors brought suit against Metro, claiming that the property had been abandoned for school purposes, thereby triggering reversion to them. Concluding that there had been no abandonment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Metro. However, the Court of Appeals concluded that the limitations "for school purposes" and the "cause of education" are satisfied solely by classroom instruction. The Court of Appeals thus not only held that Metro had abandoned the property for these limitations, but also granted summary judgment in favor of the nonmovants, the heirs of the grantors. We vacate the Court of Appeals' holding that "school purposes" and the "cause of education" require classroom instruction alone. We hold that these limitations permit any use that directly benefits and enhances the process of learning and instruction or that directly advances the objective of instructing, training, and rearing. Further, we hold that in a fee simple determinable where the term "abandon" is not otherwise defined, the common law definition of abandonment applies; a complainant therefore must show both intent to abandon for the stated limitations and some external act or omission by which the intent to abandon is effectuated. Whether abandonment has occurred is predominantly a factual determination based upon all the relevant circumstances. In the proceedings below, the parties lacked the benefit of our holding today concerning the legal standard for abandonment; consequently, the factual record relevant to this standard has not been sufficiently developed. We thus vacate both the Court of Appeals' grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. We remand this case to the trial court to allow the parties the opportunity to litigate the case in accord with the legal standard adopted herein. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Kelli Whiteside v. Michael A. Hedge, et al.
The sole issue in this case is whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the attention of the jury. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas Eugene Graham v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Thomas Eugene Graham, appeals from the trial court's order denying the petitioner's motion to reopen his post-conviction petition. The states moves the court to affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of this court's rules. The motion was properly denied for lack of merit. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Larry W. Clark v. Ricky Bell, Warden
The Petitioner, Larry W. Clark, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that the Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Amanda Hardin, et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Father appeals from the order of the Juvenile Court of Benton County terminating his parental rights. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the grounds of failure to substantially comply with the permanency plan and persistence of conditions are not supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record, that the Department of Children’s Services failed to exercise reasonable efforts toward reunification and/or relative placement, and that termination of his parental rights is not in the best interest of the child. Because we find clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings, we affirm. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
Harold Wayne Shaw v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Harold Wayne Shaw, was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and aggravated kidnapping in 1996. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the petitioner's conviction, but remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. See State v. Harold Wayne Shaw, No. 01C01-9707-CR-00259, 1998 WL 731573 (Tenn. Crim. App, at Nashville, Oct. 21, 1998), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 1999). On remand, the petitioner was resentenced. The petitioner appealed, challenging his sentence for the second time, and this Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See State v. Harold Wayne Shaw, No. M1999-01119-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1606585 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Oct. 27, 2000), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. 2001). The petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in various ways. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Angel Silva, III
On July 21, 2003, the Grand Jury for Bedford County returned an indictment against the defendant charging him with one count of aggravated rape. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted as charged on October 1, 2003 and sentenced on October 27, 2003, to twenty-two (22) years in the Department of Correction. The defendant now appeals this conviction. He argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion for a new trial where there is evidence that a juror failed to disclose to the trial court after voir dire that she had had a conversation with the Defendant's brother and knows the brother personally; and (2) that the State violated Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose evidence of the victim's pretrial statement which contained exculpatory information. We conclude that these issues are without merit and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Larue Davis
The appellant, Joseph Larue Davis, pled guilty in the Cocke County Circuit Court to aggravated burglary and theft of property over $1,000. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the appellant received concurrent four-year sentences with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the appellant to serve his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the appellant claims the trial court improperly enhanced his sentences and erred by refusing to grant his request for alternative sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stanley Davis IN RE: Ray Driver d/b/a Driver Bail Bonds
We granted the applications of the State and Ray Driver d/b/a Driver Bail Bonds pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 in order to determine whether the imposition of sentence upon Stanley Ray Davis, the defendant, effectively terminated Driver's obligations under an appearance bond, and whether Driver is liable for the payment of the fine and costs assessed against the defendant. Although the issue was contested in the Court of Criminal Appeals, in its brief and oral argument to this Court, the State concedes that Driver's obligation to secure the defendant's appearance terminated upon imposition of sentence upon him and entry of judgment. We hold that Driver's obligation terminated upon Davis' sentencing and reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to the Criminal Court for Campbell County for further orders in aid of this opinion. |
Campbell | Supreme Court | |
Reginald Thomas v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Reginald Thomas, appeals from the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After reviewing the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William L. Miller
A Montgomery County jury convicted the defendant, William L. Miller, of possession with intent to sell over 0.5 grams of cocaine, simple possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, evading arrest, assault, resisting arrest, and driving on a revoked driver's license. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve an effective sentence of eight years, with six days in the county jail and the remainder to be served in Community Corrections. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for possession with intent to sell over 0.5 grams of cocaine and assault. After reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeremy S. Crosby v. State of Tennessee
The Defendant, Jeremy S. Crosby, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State's motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals |