State of Tennessee v. Timothy Baggett
After a jury trial held on January 15 and 16, 2003, the defendant, Timothy Ryan Baggett, was found guilty of one count of rape as charged. The trial court then sentenced the defendant to ten (10) years as a violent offender at 100% service of sentence. The defendant appealed to this Court arguing: (1) that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction; (2) that the prosecutor made improper comments during closing argument that amounted to prosecutorial misconduct; and (3) that in sentencing the defendant the trial court relied upon evidence not in the record. We have found each of these issues to be without merit and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court, but modify the defendant's sentence to eight years at 100% service of sentence. |
Houston | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bradley Lonsinger
The defendant, Bradley Lonsinger, was convicted of attempt to manufacture a Schedule II controlled substance, methamphetamine, a Class D felony, and was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction and fined $5000. He raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the search warrant leading to his arrest was based on sufficient probable cause; and (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony L. Washington v. State of Tennessee
This matter is before the Court upon the State's motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has appealed the trial court's order summarily dismissing the petition for the writ of habeas corpus. In that petition, the petitioner alleges that the indictment charging the petitioner with first degree felony murder is void because the word "robbery" was handwritten on the indictment. Upon a review of the record in this case we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jon Hall v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jon Hall, appeals as of right the judgment of the Madison County Circuit Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief from his capital murder conviction. The petitioner was convicted of the 1994 first degree murder of his estranged wife, Billie Jo Hall. At the conclusion of the penalty phase of the trial, the jury found one aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death. See T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(5). The jury further found that the aggravating circumstance outweighed the evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and sentenced the petitioner to death. The petitioner’s conviction and sentence of death were affirmed on appeal. See State v. Hall, 8 S.W.3d 593 (Tenn. 1999), reh’g denied, (Dec. 27, 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 837 (2000). The petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief on December 7, 2000, which was followed by an amended petition on November 1, 2001. On February 20, 2003, the trial court denied relief and dismissed the petition. The petitioner appeals, claiming that: (1) counsel were ineffective at the guilt phase; (2) counsel were ineffective at the penalty phase; (3) the heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance is unconstitutional as applied in this case; (4) the imposition of the death penalty is unreliable and violates principles protected by both the United States and Tennessee Constitutions; and (5) the death sentence is unconstitutional as it infringes upon the petitioner’s right to life and is not necessary to promote any compelling state interest. We conclude that no error of law requires |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bobby R. Posey, and wife, Sabrina Posey, and Dale Teague, et al., v. Dryvit Systems, Inc., et al.
In this appeal we remand to the Trial Court with instructions and lift stay issued by this Court. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Clyde Dewayne Wesemann v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Clyde Dewayne Wesemann, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree murder, aggravated burglary, and theft of property under $500, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Weltha Womack
The Appellant, Weltha Womack, was convicted by a Knox County jury of one count of aggravated rape, a class A felony, and two counts of misdemeanor assault, resulting in an effective fifteen-year sentence. On appeal, Womack raises the following issues for our review: (1) the voluntariness of his statements to the police; (2) whether the trial court erred by permitting the State to amend the presentment on the morning of trial; (3) whether the trial court properly instructed the jury with regard to the requisite mental state for aggravated rape; and (4) whether the prosecutor's comments constituted prosecutorial misconduct in its closing argument. After review, we find merit with regard to issues (1) and (3) with respect to Womack's conviction for aggravated rape. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction for aggravated rape is reversed, and this case is remanded for a new trial consistent with this opinion. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Will A. Cantrell v. Allen Cantrell
After the death of his estranged wife, the surviving husband discovered that she had secretly placed their marital residence into a revocable trust the assets of which, on her death, passed to the benefit of their son. The husband brought suit to have the transfer to the trust declared a fraudulent conveyance and to impose a resulting trust on the property for his benefit. The trial court granted him the relief he requested. While we agree with the trial court that the wife could not convey away the husband's interest in the farm, our reasoning and ultimate result differ from that of the trial court. We affirm the resulting trust, but reverse the voiding of the conveyance of the wife's half interest. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Woods Hartman v. Patrick Erwin Hartman
This appeal arises out of the parties’ divorce following their second marriage to each other. The trial court inter alia awarded the wife $75,000 for her contributions, in the form of personal services to the husband’s medical practice, and awarded her one-half of the equity in the home where the parties resided during the second marriage. Husband appeals the first award, arguing that the medical practice was his separate property and that the wife failed to prove any increase in the value of the practice during the marriage. He appeals the second award, arguing that the trial court erred by not considering two marital debts when it awarded half of the equity in the home to the wife. We vacate the $75,000 award pertaining to the value of the husband’s medical practice because there is no evidence of the value of the practice at the beginning or end of the second marriage. We remand for further proceedings the award of the equity in the home because the trial court failed to consider two marital debts, the husband’s loan to wife of $18,500 – which she used to buy her current residence – and the couple’s debt of $10,599.12, for which they were jointly liable. On remand, the trial court should consider inter alia: 1) the purpose of each debt, 2) which party incurred the debt, 3) which party benefitted from incurring the debt, and 4) which party is best able to repay the debt. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Woods Hartman v. Patrick Erwin Hartman - Concurring
I concur in the results of the opinion written by Judge Clement under the facts of this case and also concur in the holding that the method of presenting evidence to the trial court characterized as a “mediation” or an “Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedure” qualifies as neither under Tenn. S. Ct. R. 31. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Demotto Linsey - Concurring
I concur with the majority opinion in all respects save its treatment of the question whether the appellant waived his right to review alleged sentencing error vis-a-vis Blakely v. Washington, 542 U. S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). First, a number of members of this Court, including the author of this concurring opinion, have concluded that Blakely review is not waived because the appellant failed to raise the issue at trial after Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000); was decided but before Blakely was decided, so long as the case was pending on direct appeal at the time of the Blakely decision. See e.g. State v. Ricky Grover Aaron, No. M2002-02288-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 1533825 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Jul. 8, 2004); State v. Charles Benson, No. M2003-02127-CCA-R3-CD, 2004WL2266801 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Oct. 8,2 004); State v. Julius E. Smith, No. E2003-01059-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 1606998 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, July 19, 2004); State v. Michael Wayne Poe, No. E2003-00417-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 wl 1607002 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, July 19, 2004). These cases rest on the proposition that Blakely establishes a new rule in this State with respect to sentencing, one that was not dictated by the existing precedent of Apprendi. State v. Ricky Gover Aaron, No. M2002-02288- |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marilyn MacLeod Reed v. John William Reed
This is a divorce case. Prior to their marriage, the parties entered into an antenuptial agreement, designed to keep separate all property brought into the marriage, as well as all property acquired during the marriage unless acquired jointly. The trial court granted Wife a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court classified and divided the parties' separate and marital property in accordance with the antenuptial agreement. As a result, Husband was allowed to retain much of his separate property and retirement. The trial court denied Wife's requests for alimony and attorney's fees. Wife has appealed. For the reasons stated below, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Demotto Linsey
The Appellant, Christopher Demotto Linsey, appeals from the judgment of the Montgomery County Circuit Court revoking his community corrections sentences. Linsey pled guilty to aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and theft of property over $1,000.00 and, for these convictions, he received an effective eight-year sentence to be served in the Community Corrections Program. On November 21, 2002, a warrant was issued, alleging that Linsey violated the terms of his community corrections agreement based upon new arrests for domestic assault and possession of illegal drugs for resale and of drug paraphernalia. Following a hearing, the trial court ordered revocation of his community corrections sentences, and further ordered that his sentence for aggravated robbery be increased to ten years and that he serve the remainder of his now effective ten-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Linsey argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to establish that a violation occurred, (2) the trial court, in resentencing him to ten years for aggravated robbery, failed to conduct a sentencing hearing as required by the 1989 Sentencing Act, and (3) his sentences are excessive in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Finding no reversible error, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terrance Cecil
A Maury County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Terrance Cecil, of possessing twenty-six grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to ten years to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Deborah Graham v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Deborah Graham, appeals the trial courts denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gloria J. Bevill v. Ellis M. Bevill, Sr.
This is a post-divorce case. The parties were divorced in 1999. The judgment of divorce awarded Gloria J. Bevill ("Wife") alimony in futuro of $1,750, subject to provisions pertaining to the retirement of her then-former spouse, Ellis M. Bevill, Sr. ("Husband"). In specific terms, the judgment provided that upon Husband's retirement, he was entitled to reduce the amount of his alimony payment to $1,300, subject, however, to a stipulation in the judgment providing that Husband's post-retirement earnings could affect the amount of his obligation. Husband retired and, pursuant to the divorce judgment, unilaterally reduced the amount of his monthly alimony payments. In response, Wife filed a petition to interpret the divorce judgment and/or modify the spousal support award. The trial court interpreted the divorce judgment as permitting an upward modification of Husband's alimony obligation. Upon review of the evidence, the trial court subsequently increased Wife's alimony award to $1,900 per month, in addition to awarding her attorney's fees. It is from this order that Husband appeals. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donna K. Buck
The defendant appeals her conviction for first degree premeditated murder. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction and contends that the trial court erred in disallowing cross-examination of an unavailable witness. We affirm the conviction. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. T.N.S.S.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of T.N.S.S. ("Mother") with respect to her three children, D.D.M. (DOB: February 10, 1989), D.S.Jr. (DOB: August 7, 1990), and D.J.S. (DOB: July 27, 1991). Mother appeals, arguing, inter alia, that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's dual findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the best interest of the children. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Davidson
The defendant, Anthony Davidson, appeals the trial court's order revoking his probation. The single issue presented for review is whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the remainder of the sentence to be served. The judgment is affirmed. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carolyn Marie Leasure White, et al. v. Timothy Wade Moody
This is the third appeal of a case involving a divorced father’s parental rights to his eleven-year-old daughter. The father maintained only sporadic contact with his daughter following his divorce from the child’s mother. After the child’s mother remarried, she and her new husband filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Robertson County seeking to terminate the father’s parental rights and to permit the mother’s new husband to adopt the child. We reversed the first order terminating the father’s parental rights because the trial court had failed to conduct the statutorily required best interests analysis. On remand, the trial court determined that terminating the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests without conducting an evidentiary hearing. We reversed the second termination order and remanded the case to enable the parties to present evidence. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered a third order terminating the father’s parental rights and granting the stepfather’s petition to adopt the child. The father has appealed the trial court’s conclusion that terminating his parental rights is in his daughter’s best interests. We have determined that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s decision. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Williamson
The Defendant, Anthony Williamson, was convicted by a jury of robbery. He was subsequently sentenced as a Range III offender to serve fifteen years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Finding the evidence legally sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Pamela D. Vickroy v. Pathways, Inc., Dyersburg, TN, Kimberly Bord, J. Forstlam, M.D. Methodist Hospital, Coleman Foss, Administrator, and Western Mental Health Institute
This case involves involuntary commitment to a mental institution. Paramedics were called to the plaintiff’s home by her roommate, and she was brought involuntarily to the hospital for evaluation. She was admitted to the emergency room and examined by the physician on duty. She was interviewed by a mental health clinician. The physician then went off duty and the defendant physician took charge. The defendant physician examined the patient’s chart, reviewed the history taken by the prior physician and the mental health clinician, and then signed a form committing the plaintiff to a mental institution. The form stated that the defendant physician had examined the plaintiff, but the plaintiff was examined only by the prior physician, who was no longer on duty. The plaintiff then sued the defendant physician for involuntarily committing her to a mental institution without personally examining her. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant physician, classifying the action as medical malpractice and finding that the plaintiff failed to offer competent expert proof as required under T.C.A. § 29-26-115. We affirm the grant of summary judgment as to claims of medical malpractice, and reverse the grant of summary judgment for the claims of negligence and false imprisonment, finding that T.C.A. § 36-6-402 requires that a physician or designated professional who commits a patient to a mental institution must first personally examine the patient, rather than relying exclusively on medical records or someone else’s examination of the patient. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court is Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jon Seiler
The Defendant, Jon Seiler, pled guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”), second offense. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, the Defendant reserved as a certified question of law the issue of whether the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mae Ellen Williams v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, et al. - Dissenting
This is a wrongful death action growing out of allegations of medical malpractice lodged against Dr. Becky C. Wright and Metropolitan Anesthesiologist Alliance. On December 7, 2000, surgery was performed on the decedent to remove her gallbladder. Ultimately, the decedent suffered irreversible encephalopathy and lingered in a comatose state for nearly a year and a half before she died on April 24, 2002. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Cynthia Lynn Alston Houston Johnston v. Walter Rex Houston
This is a child support case. The parties divorced in 1991 and were awarded joint custody of their three minor children. Since the divorce, the parties have been engaged in an ongoing legal battle over child support issues. In May 2002, the trial court confirmed the findings of a special master, resolving all disputes except for child support for years 2001, 2002, and 2003. In September 2003, the parties agreed to use the findings of the special master to calculate the remaining child support issues. The mother filed a proposed consent order. After she received no response, she filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted. The grant of summary judgment to the mother resolved the remaining issues. The father appealed the grant of summary judgment arguing, inter alia, that the report of the special master was “clearly erroneous.” We affirm the findings of the trial court with modifications, and grant the mother’s request for attorney’s fees. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |