Sheryl Heggs v. Wilson Inn Nashville-Elm Hill, Inc.
M2003-00919-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Brothers

This appeal involves a dispute between a hotel and a guest who slipped on a wet tile floor as she was making her way to an elevator on one of the hotel's guest floors. The guest filed a negligence action against the hotel in the Circuit Court for Davidson County, and the hotel answered and filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the hotel's motion after determining, as a matter of law, that the hotel had satisfied its duty to the guest by setting out a yellow "wet floor" warning sign and that the guest was fifty percent or more at fault for her injuries. The guest has appealed. We have determined that the hotel has not demonstrated that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law and, therefore, we vacate the summary judgment.

The City of Humboldt, et al. v. J.R. McKnight, et al.
M2002-02639-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

This lawsuit is about the operation and funding of public schools educating the children in Gibson County. Since 1981 the county has not operated a county school system, and all K-12 students have been in schools operated by the municipal and special school systems. The county ceased operating schools when a 1981 Private Act created the Gibson County Special School District. This arrangement was ratified by a 2002 Public Act stating that where all K-12 students are eligible to be served by city and special school systems, the county is not required to operate a separate county school system or have a county board of education. The trial court held that the 2002 Act was unconstitutional as special legislation and that the 1981 Act, though constitutional, was illegal. It ordered the dissolution of the Gibson County Special School District and that the county undertake operation of the schools not included in the other municipal or special school systems within the county. The court further found that the county was required to levy a countywide property tax to fund the local share of education costs and divide the proceeds among all school systems in the county. We hold that the 2002 Act does not violate Article XI, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution and, consequently, there is no obligation for the county to operate a county school system. We also conclude that the facts do not establish any disparity of educational opportunity among the school systems in the county and, consequently, the principles and holdings in the Small Schools cases do not apply to require a specific organizational structure and do not preclude the method used in Gibson County. Finally, we conclude the county is not required to levy a countywide property tax for schools. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment.

Donnie Wayne Johnson, Jr., v. City Roofing Company
W2003-01852-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge William B. Acree

This case is an appeal from an order granting Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. Appellant argues, as he did at trial, that this case involves genuine issues of material fact, rendering summary judgment inappropriate for this action. For the following reasons, we affirm.

St. Paul Reinsurance Co., LTD, v. Robert Williams and Sherrod Jackson, Individually and D/B/A Pure Passion, Pure Passion, Inc. and Eugene Pugh
W2003-00473-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Walter L. Evans

This case arises from events surrounding the shooting death of Decedent, Appellant’s son. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment claiming its policy of insurance did not apply to the
circumstances of this case because Appellant’s claim was specifically excluded from the insurance policy. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment and, for the following reasons, we affirm.

Jasmine Ali v. Eric Fisher, et al
E2003-00255-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge John S. McLellan, III

We granted this appeal to determine whether an owner who negligently entrusted his car to another may be held vicariously liable for the driver's negligence in the operation of the car. The trial court submitted the case to the jury for allocation of fault on comparative fault principles, and the jury found the owner twenty percent (20%) at fault and the driver eighty percent (80%) at fault. The trial court later amended the judgment by holding that the owner-entrustor was vicariously liable for the negligence of the driver-entrustee and thus liable for all of the compensatory and punitive damages. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in concluding that the owner-entrustor was vicariously liable for the driver-entrustee's actions and reinstated the initial judgment. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that an owner-entrustor's liability for negligent entrustment does not result in vicarious liability for the negligence of the driver-entrustee and that the trial court erred in holding the owner-entrustor liable for all the damages. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Susan Chales and James Charles v. Ruth Latham and Ralph Latham
E2003-00852-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Dale Young

In a dispute over an easement, the Trial Court awarded damages to plaintiffs for interference with use of easement, nuisance and punitive damages. On appeal, we affirm the award of compensatory damages, but vacate the award of punitive damages and remand to assess punitive damages in accordance with Hodges v. Toof & Co., 833.S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1992).

Rachel Stephens v. John Manville International, Inc.
E2003-01068-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Jerri S. Bryant, Chancellor
The trial court awarded the Plaintiff an additional 5 percent for an injury to her left arm for which she had been compensated. This award was supported essentially by the Plaintiff's testimony. She was also awarded benefits for an injury to her right arm and neck. The award for an additional 5 percent to the left arm is vacated. Otherwise, the judgment is affirmed.

Victor Rivera v. Jeld-Wen, Inc.
M2003-01651-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Patricia J. Cottrell, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: John A. Turnbull, Judge
In this case, the plaintiff whose arm was amputated as a result of a work-related injury had entered into a settlement agreement with his employer. The plaintiff claims this agreement obligated his employer to pay for an expensive, state-of-the-art myoelectric prosthesis. The trial court agreed and expressly found that the provision of the myoelectric arm was within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of the agreement and compelled the employer to pay for it. The Panel has concluded that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

Samuel L. Rowe v. Sverdrup Technology, Inc. and
M2003-01467-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Roger A. Page, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: John E. Rollins, Judge
. In this appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred by finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee's hip replacement surgery and subsequent disability were due to an injury that arose out of his employment. Specifically, the issue is whether the employee's injury resulted from a pre-existing cancerous condition of the right hip. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Robert Kendall Broadbent v. Shari Katherine Langhi Broadbent
M2003-00583-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Marietta M. Shipley

This appeal involves a dispute over the responsibility for investment losses incurred by a spouse before and during the parties’ marriage. After only one year of marriage, the husband filed suit for divorce in the Circuit Court for Davidson County. The wife counterclaimed for divorce and, among other relief, sought alimony in solido to offset the loss of her separate property resulting from the husband’s aggressive stock market trading. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the wife a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct and then, employing a comparative fault analysis, determined that the husband should pay the wife $51,500 in alimony in solido to reimburse her for her separate property lost in the stock market. The husband has appealed. We have determined that the wife is not entitled to be reimbursed for the losses caused by the husband’s investments.
 

Rocky Garner v. Phil Breeden & Associates
M2002-03103-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol L. McCoy

Appellant sued Appellee for breach of contract or in the alternative for quantum meruit value of services rendered. At the conclusion of Plaintiff's proof the trial court sustained a motion for a directed verdict on behalf of Defendant as to the quantum meruit claim and further sustained that motion on a large portion of the contract claim. As to remaining portions of the contract claim the motion for a directed verdict was overruled, and Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the remaining claims without prejudice. We hold that the trial court erred in granting the motion for a directed verdict as to the contract case but correctly granted a directed verdict as to quantum meruit. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for trial on the contract issues.

Jamie Edward Hines v. Terrell Lynn Simms
M2003-01459-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Muriel Robinson

This appeal involves a custody dispute triggered by a paternity action. The trial court fashioned a permanent parenting plan which named Father the primary residential parent during the school year and Mother the primary residential parent during summer vacation. Mother appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Kyle Ann Wiltse v. Christopher Allen Wiltse
W2002-03132-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge James F. Russell

This case involves issues arising out of the parties’ divorce. The trial court divided the parties’ marital assets, awarded Appellee alimony in futuro, ordered Appellant to pay Appellee’s attorney’s fees, and ordered Appellant to pay for Appellee’s health insurance premiums. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, modify in part, and remand for any further proceedings.
 

Kenneth A. Brasel, Sr., v. John Stanley Brasel, Sr. et al.
W2003-02965-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge John R. McCarroll, Jr.

This is a child custody case. Father/Appellant appeals from the trial court’s Order, which
denied Father/Appellant’s Petition to change custody from the minor child’s grandparents to Father. Finding that there is not a material change in circumstances to warrant a change of custody and that Father is not entitled to the Superior Rights Doctrine, we affirm.
 

Ricky Eugene Cofer v. State of Tennesse
E2003-01400-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge James B. Scott, Jr.

The petitioner, Ricky Eugene Cofer, appeals the order of the Circuit Court for Anderson County dismissing his post-conviction relief petition. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was previously determined on direct appeal. The petition was properly dismissed. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bobbi Jo Fisher v. Tennessee Insurance Company
E2004-00189-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Harold Wimberly

The defendant issued a policy of automobile insurance to the plaintiff which provided coverage for liability claims and for collision damage, but each of these insuring agreements was subject to an exclusion of coverage if the insured automobile was being operated by a non-licensed driver at the time of the accident giving rise to the claim. The plaintiff loaned her Pontiac to a non-licensed driver under the mistaken belief that he was properly licensed. The trial judge found that the plaintiff reasonably believed that her permittee had a valid driver’s license and allowed recovery. We reverse and dismiss.
 

Bobbi Jo Fisher v. Tennessee Insurance Company - Concurring
E2004-00189-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Harold Wimberly

While I concur in the majority’s decision to reverse and dismiss this case, I feel it necessary to concur separately to state my understanding that our holding in this case is limited to an insured’s claim for collision damage coverage only. I believe there may be public policy considerations that would need to be considered in a case involving liability, as opposed to collision, coverage. That question is not now before us, and I do not believe those public policy considerations are applicable in a case such as the one now before us involving an insurance claim solely for collision damage coverage. I, therefore, concur in the majority’s decision to reverse and dismiss.

State of Tennessee v. Gdongalay P. Berry - Concurring and Dissenting
M2001-02023-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

State of Tennessee v. Gdongalay P. Berry
M2001-02023-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

A jury convicted the defendant, Gdongalay P. Berry, of two counts of premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of especially aggravated robbery, for the murders, kidnappings and robberies of DeAngelo Lee and Gregory Ewing.¹ Following a capital sentencing hearing, the jury found three aggravating circumstances in each murder: (1) that the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies other than the present charge, the statutory elements of which involve the use of violence to the person;² (2) that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another; and (3) that the murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit robbery or kidnapping. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (6), (7) (1996). The jury also found that these aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the jury imposed sentences of death for each of the murder convictions. As to the remaining felony convictions, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a violent offender, and imposed an effective fifty-year sentence, to run consecutively to the death penalty.³ The defendant appealed, challenging both his convictions and the sentences of death. After fully considering the issues raised by the defendant, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and the sentences.

John Whitney Evans III v. Dinah Petree Evans
M2002-02947-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jim T. Hamilton

In this appeal, Husband seeks to be relieved from his obligation to pay alimony in futuro to his former wife. In support of his request, Husband asserts that his former wife’s cohabitation with another man terminated his obligation since Wife was being supported by that third person and was in no need of alimony. The trial court denied Husband’s petition finding Wife was not living with a third person, had rebutted presumption that she does not need the alimony, and that no material change in circumstances had occurred to warrant modification of the initial award of alimony. We affirm those holdings. However, we reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Wife.
 

Eloris Williams Presley v. Charles Ray Sattler
M2002-02868-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carol L. Soloman

This appeal involves a former wife’s efforts to recover damages from her former husband for misdeeds during their marriage and following their divorce. Approximately ten years after the parties’ divorce in Louisiana, the former wife filed a pro se complaint in the Circuit Court for Davidson County seeking to recover $10,000,000 from her former husband for “eight years of trauma and distress, abuse and torture.” The former husband filed a pro se “exception” to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the former wife has appealed. We affirm the dismissal of the complaint.
 

John Whitney Evans III v. Dinah Petree Evans - Concurring
M2002-02947-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge William C. Koch, Jr.

I concur with the results of the court’s opinion. However, I have elected to file this separate
opinion because I cannot concur with several parts of the court’s analysis.
 

James A. Drake, Jr. v. JPS Elastomerics Corp.
W2003-01579-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor D. J. Alissandratos

This case involves the breach of an employment compensation contract. Under the sales employee’s compensation plan with his employer, he was to earn extra commission for any sales that exceeded his annual quota. In the compensation plan, the employer reserved the right to pay only the standard commission on “windfall” sales. For the fiscal year at issue, the sales employee exceeded his quota. The employer invoked the windfall provision of his compensation plan and paid him only the standard commission on the sales over his quota. The sales employee sued his employer, arguing that he was entitled to the extra commission on the sales over his quota. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the judge ruled in favor of the plaintiff sales employee. On appeal, the defendant employer argues that the “windfall provision” applies to all sales that were unbudgeted or unforecast and that the plaintiff sales employee’s excess sales fall in that category. We hold that the defendant employer’s interpretation conflicts with the plain meaning of the contract, and affirm the decision of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Anthony Antonio Anderson
W2003-01418-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.

The Appellant, Anthony Antonio Anderson, was convicted by a Madison County jury of rape and was sentenced to nine years in the Department of Correction as a violent offender. On appeal, he argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the verdict. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Joe Rankin and wife, Brenda Rankin v. Lloyd Smith
W2003-00992-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor J. Steven Stafford

This is a breach of contract case. The plaintiffs entered into a contract to sell their home and
farm to the defendant. On the scheduled closing date, the defendant refused to purchase the property. The plaintiffs sold the property to a third party for substantially less than the amount the defendant had agreed to pay. In April 2002, the plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit against the defendant for breach of contract. The defendant argued that he was fraudulently induced into signing the contract, because the parties had a verbal understanding that the contract would not be enforced. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendant now appeals. We affirm, finding that the defendant alleges promissory fraud, that evidence of the parties’ verbal agreement is inadmissible under the parol evidence rule, and that the evidence submitted by the defendant does not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding fraudulent inducement.