David T. Bailey and E. Lynn Wagner in their own right and derivative for the use and benefit of Southeastern Healthcare Svcs., L.P., v. Tom Holbert, as general partner of Southeastern Healthcare Svcs. L.P. et al.
This is a suit by David T. Bailey and E. Lynn Wagner in their own right and derivatively for the use and benefit of Southeastern Healthcare Services, L.P., a Limited Partnership in which they were partners, against Tom Holbert, as general partner, Moore's Pharmacy, Inc., D/B/A Marcum's Healthcare Services, and Carl Marcum and Gina Marcum Pinney, as Officers and Directors and/or Employees and Agents of and for Moore's Pharmacy, Inc., and Tom HOlbert, Carl Marcum and gina Marcum Pinney, Individually. The suit stems from the purchase by Southeastern Healthcare Services of a unit dosage pharmacy business from Moore's Pharmacy, Inc., for the sum of $275,000. The complaint alleged a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation and breach of warranty. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Robert T. Irvin, v. The Plasma Center, et. al.
Robert T. Irvin sued the defendants for refusal to continue to accept his donation of plasma to The Plasma Center. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court entered an order stating that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and, that if Mr. Irvin’s cause of action lies in medical malpractice, he failed to meet his requisite burden in responding to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The motion for summary judgment was granted and Mr. Irvin appeals. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Montague, v. Tennessee Department of Correction and Warden Howard Clayton - Concurring
I concur with the court’s conclusion that Mr. Montague’s complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-5-223 through 4-5-225 (1991 & Supp. 1997). |
Court of Appeals | ||
Planned Parenthood Association of Tennessee, v. Don Sundquist, Governor of the State of Tennessee
This appeal presents a multifaceted challenge to the constitutionality of Tennessee’s abortion statutes. After a physician and a clinic in Knoxville were charged with violating these statutes, two other clinics in Memphis and Nashville, joined by three physicians, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Davidson County seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Constitution of Tennessee. The trial court struck down the residency requirement, the waiting period, and the requirement that physicians inform their patients that an abortion is a major surgical procedure. After making its own substantive revisions in the statutory text, the trial court upheld the mandatory hospitalization requirement, the remaining informed consent requirements, and the newly enacted parental consent requirement. We have determined that the trial court erred by revising the text of several provisions. We have also determined that the emergency medical exception enacted by the General Assembly is unconstitutionally narrow, that the combined effect of the waiting period and the physician-only counseling requirement places an undue burden on women’s procreational choice, and that the remaining challenged provisions as construed herein pass constitutional muster. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gerald A. Ottinger v. Kimberly S. Ottinger
This is a child custody case in which both Gerald Ottinger (father) and Kimberly Ottinger (mother) filed petitions for primary residential custody of their daughter, Marlah Whitley Ottinger. The trial court granted joint legal custody to the parties and awarded primary residential custody to the father. The mother appeals, asserting that the court should have awarded her primary residential custody. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Tami Sprintz Hall v. Richard Hamblen, et al.
Homeowners of a new residence brought an action against a subcontractor for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, professional negligence, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court found that there was a breach of contract and awarded attorney's fees under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Subcontractor appealed insisting that because no violation of the TCPA was found, the trial court lacked a basis to award attorney's fees. We agree and reverse the judgment of the trial court with respect to the award of attorney's fees. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: M.E., M.E., R.B., M.B., S.B.
Mother and father of three children appeal termination of their respective parental rights. Mother appeals arguing that the trial court erred in finding persistence of conditions sufficient to terminate her rights. We reverse, finding that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite Mother with her children. Father appeals alleging that he was denied counsel and/or the effective assistance of counsel. The trial court appointed counsel to represent Father but thereafter relieved appointed counsel without stating a basis and did not appoint substitute counsel. Father retained an attorney on the eve of trial but this retained attorney only appeared on four of the seven days of trial and was absent during significant portions of the days he attended. Since the trial court initially found that Father was entitled to appointed counsel and never made a finding that Father was no longer entitled to appointed counsel or that he had waived the right to counsel, we find that the trial court erred when it failed to appoint substitute counsel. Father attempted to retain counsel; however, retained counsel's repeated failures to attend the hearings was equivalent to Father having no counsel. Thus, Father was deprived of the right to counsel. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment terminating Father's parental rights. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marty Lavern Pyburn
The appellant, Marty Lavern Pyburn, was convicted by a jury in the Marion County Circuit Court of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the appellant challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the admission of his prior conviction of aggravated robbery for impeachment purposes; (3) the admission of photographs of the crime scene; (4) the expert testimony of Dr. Charles Harlan; and (5) the trial court's charge to the jury. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In the matter of: C.T.S.
The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6) and Mother’s parental rights based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1). Mother and Father appeal. We affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: S.R.C.
The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights. We affirm. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Albert Yarbrough v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Albert Yarbrough, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of rape, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the petitioner as a violent offender to fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Following an unsuccessful appeal of his conviction, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, among other grounds, ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition, finding the petition to be barred by the statute of limitations and the petitioner’s allegations to be without merit. The petitioner now brings this appeal challenging the denial of his petition for relief. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the petitioner timely filed his petition for post-conviction relief. However, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition on the merits. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Danny Joe Wright
The Defendant, Danny Joe Wright, was convicted of driving under the influence second offense and violating the open container law. He was also found to have violated the implied consent law. In this direct appeal, he argues that the trial court improperly limited his cross-examination of the arresting officer and that the trial court erred by refusing to admit the testimony of an expert witness in field sobriety testing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Hodge, et al v. Shelly Renae Cornelison, et al.
In boundary line dispute, owner of southern tract of real property (appellee) brought action against adjacent land owner to the north (appellant) to quiet title and restrain appellant from alleged offending use of disputed piece of property. Appellant filed counter-claim to quiet title and have appellee ejected from property. Trial court decreed appellee lawful owner of disputed property, relying upon evidence of three iron pins referenced in deed to appellee as the proper boundary markers. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Malcolm Benson
Following a jury trial on April 23, 2003, the defendant was convicted of one count of sale of a controlled substance more than .5 grams. He was sentenced to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction and fined $3000. He appeals this conviction. The defendant argues two issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction; and (2) whether the trial court erred by not allowing the defendant’s uncle to testify at trial as to the identity of an individual in the videotape of the drug sale. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mark McGehee v. Julie McGehee
In this divorce case, Mark K. McGehee ("Father") appeals the Trial Court's order regarding child support, its award of primary residential parenting responsibility to Julie A. McGehee ("Mother"), the propriety of the Court's decision to amend its final decree of divorce pursuant to Mother's Tenn.R.Civ.P. 60 motion and the granting of Tenn.R.Civ.P. 11 sanctions against Father's attorney. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Debra Lynn Lawson Gorman v. Richard Eugene Gorman
This is a post-divorce custody case wherein the Trial Court denied the Father’s petition for change of custody and denied the Mother’s petition for payment of uncovered medical expenses and attorney fees. Both parties appealed. We have determined that the Trial Court did not err and we affirm its decision. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Alton Wayne Saddler, Deceased
The niece of a decedent filed a claim against his estate, contending that she was entitled to compensation for allowing her late uncle to live rent-free for more than four years in a house that she inherited from another uncle. The trial court granted her claim. We reverse. |
DeKalb | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Anthony v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant, Kenneth Anthony, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Anthony was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and attempted second degree murder. On appeal, Anthony argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for a new trial. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John C. Walker, III
The Appellant, John C. Walker, III, was convicted of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to twenty-five years of incarceration. In this direct appeal, Walker alleges that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the action due to destruction of evidence; (3) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on certain lesser included offenses and by giving other improper jury instructions, such as instructing on “flight,” giving substantive instruction at the beginning of the trial, and providing papers to the jury unseen by counsel; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing Walker to the maximum sentence of twenty-five years. After review of the record, we find no error and affirm the conviction and resulting sentence. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John C. Walker, III - Concurring/Dissenting
JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part I join with the majority in affirming the appellant’s conviction and resulting sentence. I dissent, however, from that portion of the opinion which holds that aggravated assault and assault are not lesser included offenses of first degree (premeditated) murder. In State v. Paul Graham Manning, No. M2002-00547-CCA-R3-CD, 203 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 117, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Feb. 14, 2003), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2003), a panel of this Court reasoned that: [f]irst degree premeditated murder is the “premeditated and intentional killing of another.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1). An aggravated assault is committed, on the other hand, when the accused intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes serious bodily injury to another. See id. § 39-13-102(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A). Similarly, an assault is committed when one “intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.” Id. § 39-13-101(a)(1). The mens rea of intentional includes the mens rea of knowing and reckless. See id. § 39-11-301(a)(2). A killing certainly includes serious bodily injury (as well as bodily injury). Thus, all of the statutory elements of these forms of aggravated assault and assault are included within the statutory elements of first degree premeditated murder, and they are therefore lesser included within the statutory elements of first degree premeditated murder, and they are therefore lesser included offenses under Part (a) of the Burns test. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Karl P. Birkholz, et ux. v. Davis N. Hardy, et ux.
Appellants/buyers appeal from judgment entered for Appellees/sellers on promissory note given for purchase of real estate. The note contained a condition precedent wherein the principal would not be due until Appellants/buyers sold commercial property they owned. The trial court imposed five years as a reasonable time for performance of the contract and awarded prejudgment interest. Appellants/buyers appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ronnie Simpson v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant, Ronnie Simpson, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Simpson pled guilty to especially aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and received an effective fifteen-year sentence. On appeal, Simpson challenges the validity of his guilty plea upon grounds of: (1) voluntariness and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Lee
The defendant appeals his conviction for attempted first degree murder. The defendant’s sole issue on appeal is a claim that the jury venire was unconstitutionally empaneled by failing to include adequate representation of African-Americans. The defendant failed to prove a prima facie case, and the conviction is affirmed. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeff Willard v. Golden Gallon-TN, L.L.C.
This is a retaliatory discharge case wherein the plaintiff/employee alleged that his employment was terminated, inter alia, in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act and because he obeyed a lawful subpoena. The trial court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment. The employee appealed. We vacate the trial court's grant of summary judgment because we have determined that (1) a claim for retaliatory discharge in violation of Tennessee public policy lies in cases where a substantial factor in an employer's decision to terminate an employee is the fact that the employee honored a lawful subpoena, (2) a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the employee was terminated for honoring a lawful subpoena, and (3) a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the employee was terminated in violation of the Family Medical and Leave Act. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carl Creason
A jury found the Defendant, Carl Creason, guilty of driving on a revoked driver's license. After conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial judge sentenced the Defendant to six months in the county jail. The Defendant appeals his sentence, arguing that the trial court erred by not allowing him to serve his sentence on probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court, but remand for entry of a uniform judgment document. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals |