Lillard Watts vs. Kroger W2001-01834-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Rita L. Stotts
This is a personal injury case dismissed by the trial court as barred by the statute of limitation because it was filed more than one year after the first voluntary nonsuit. Plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend the order of dismissal pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04 and also filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion to set aside the orders of nonsuit as invalid. The trial court denied both motions, and plaintiff has appealed. We affirm.
The appellant, Steven James McCain, was convicted by a jury in the Criminal Court of Davidson County of two counts of first degree premeditated murder. He received two consecutive sentences of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant's "Motion to Suppress Identifications Made During an Unconstitutional Photographic Line-Up Procedure"; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant's "Motion to Suppress Defendant's Statements"; (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting the audio-tape-recorded statement of Chad Collins; (4) whether the trial court erred in overruling the defense request for a mistrial when the prosecution improperly argued that the jury should consider Chad Collins' statement as substantive evidence at trial; and (5) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
Davidson
Court of Criminal Appeals
State of Tennessee v. Willie J. Miller, Jr. M2001-01868-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter
The defendant appeals from his conviction for child rape rendered after a jury trial. On appeal, the defendant claims: (1) the trial court erred in denying the defendant's request for an appointed DNA expert; (2) the victim, who was five years old at the time of trial, was not competent to testify; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the victim's testimony should not have been presented. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Larry Butler vs. Gwendolyn Butler W2001-01137-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: George R. Ellis
This is a contempt of court case. The father and mother were divorced in August 1999. The father was ordered to make child support payments to the mother. The mother later filed a motion to require the father to pay his child support obligation through income assignment. The mother then sought the assistance of a state-authorized child support enforcement contractor to assist her in obtaining an increase in child support. This act triggered statutory provisions associated with Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. The trial court denied the mother's motion to require income assignment, and ordered that the child support payments continue to be paid directly to the mother. The child support contractor then caused a child support payment coupon to be sent to the father, and also issued, on behalf of the Tennessee Department of Human Services, an administrative order to redirect the child support payments to the State's child support collection and disbursement unit. In response, the father filed a motion to hold the mother in civil contempt for taking actions to have the child support payments made by income assignment, and also sought an order enjoining the mother from utilizing the child support contractor. The trial court ordered that the administrative order be set aside. The mother then filed another motion, inter alia, to have the father pay child support by income assignment through the State's central child support collection and disbursement unit. The father filed another motion to have the mother and the child support contractor cited for contempt of court. The trial court held the mother and the child support contractor in contempt, fined each of them, ordered that they reimburse the father for the administrative fees and his attorney's fees, and pay court costs. We reverse, holding that the finding of contempt by the trial judge was an abuse of discretion because the original order was contrary to Tennessee law; Tennessee statutes require the father's child support payments to be redirected through the State child support collection and disbursement unit, and the record does not include evidence supporting an exemption from the statutory requirement that the payments be made by income assignment.
Haywood
Court of Appeals
Frankie Davis vs. Jason Davis W2001-01842-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: George R. Ellis
In this post-divorce proceeding, the State of Tennessee filed a petition against Mr. Jason Davis (hereinafter "Father") for contempt and seeking child support arrears ordered to be paid to the custodial parent, Ms. Frankie Davis (Gant) (hereinafter "Mother"). The trial court granted the State a judgment in the amount of $1,660.00, representing the amount of State assistance paid to the Mother and children, to be liquidated by the Father at the rate of $10.50 per week. The State has appealed. We affirm as modified in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Gibson
Court of Appeals
CH-00-0659-1 CH-00-0659-1
Trial Court Judge: Walter L. Evans
State of Tennessee v. Steven Dalton M2001-00756-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald P. Harris
A Hickman County Criminal Court jury found the defendant, Steven Dalton, guilty of voluntary manslaughter for the killing of a fellow inmate. The trial court imposed a six-year sentence to be served consecutively to the defendant's existing life sentence. The defendant appeals his conviction, claiming: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to impeach him with his prior felony murder conviction and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for voluntary manslaughter. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Hickman
Court of Criminal Appeals
Orlando Residence, Ltd. v. Nashville Lodging M2001-00648-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
This is an action for damages for the fraudulent conveyance of a Nashville hotel to defeat the rights of a creditor of the original owner. After a trial and two prior appeals, the Chancery Court of Davidson County tried the case on the merits again in August of 2000. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for $797,615. The defendants assert on appeal that the statute of limitations barred the claim, that the trial court erred in miscalculating the defendants' claim for restitution, and that there is no evidence in the record to support a finding that the transfer was fraudulent. We reverse the lower court's ruling that as a matter of law the statute of limitations had not run. In all other respects we affirm the lower court's judgment.
A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Ricky T. Hughes, of facilitation of first degree felony murder, a Class A felony, and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of twenty-five years as a standard offender for the facilitation conviction and twenty-five years as a violent offender for the aggravated robbery conviction. The defendant appeals, claiming that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his confession, and (3) the trial court erred by not allowing him to testify about a prior consistent statement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Davidson
Court of Criminal Appeals
Huntington Eldridge vs. Deborah Eldridge W2000-00730-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Karen R. Williams
Husband filed for divorce alleging inappropriate marital conduct and irreconcilable differences. Wife countersued on the same grounds. After a lengthy trial, the court awarded Husband the divorce. Wife appeals several aspects of the court's decision, including the distribution and classification of the parties' property, child support, and alimony. Wife also contends that the court was biased against her and created an appearance of impropriety. Husband also raises issues on appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
State of Tennessee v. Terry Norris W2000-00707-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge James C. Beasley, Jr.
A Shelby County jury found the Defendant guilty of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-one years incarceration. The Defendant now appeals his conviction, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because (1) his counsel failed to file a motion to suppress his confession based upon a violation of the Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights; and (2) his counsel argued a theory of defense to the jury that was contrary to the Defendant's wishes and testimony. We conclude that the Defendant's trial counsel were not ineffective for failing to base the motion to suppress the Defendant's confession on a violation of the Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. We further conclude that although the Defendant's counsel did not comply with the Defendant's wish to proceed at trial under a theory of self-defense, any error in this regard was harmless in light of the record as a whole. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Shelby
Court of Criminal Appeals
Thomas Nelson vs. Robin Nelson W2001-01515-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: George R. Ellis
In this divorce case, Husband appeals the type and amount of alimony awarded Wife, the award to Wife of his military Survivor Benefit Plan, the calculation of his retirement pay and the award to Wife of her attorney's fees. We have determined, based on this record, that the judgment be modified to reduce the amount of alimony in futuro, but otherwise affirm.
Decatur County vs. Vulcan Materials W2001-00858-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Ron E. Harmon
This case involves the constitutionality of a mineral severance tax increase. In 1984, the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a public act of statewide application authorizing counties to collect a mineral severance tax, directing that the proceeds of the tax be deposited in the county road fund. In 1987, the General Assembly passed a private act allowing Decatur County to impose a mineral severance tax, but allocating the revenue from the tax to the county's general fund. Decatur County adopted the tax and the proceeds went to the county's general fund. In 1994, the General Assembly amended the private act to provide for an increase in the mineral severance tax. Decatur County adopted the increased rate, and then filed suit against a company that severed minerals from the earth in that county, to collect the mineral severance tax at the increased rate. The mineral company, and three other mineral companies, resisted payment of the tax, arguing inter alia that the tax was unconstitutional under Article XI, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution, the equal protection clause, because the proceeds were allocated to the county's general fund, rather than to the county road fund, as directed in the public act authorizing the tax. After a trial, the trial court held that the mineral companies were estopped from arguing that the tax was unconstitutional, and, in the alternative, that the tax was constitutional because the mineral companies failed to show that there was not a rational basis for the allocation of the funds to the county's general fund rather than to the road fund. Both parties appealed. We affirm in part and reverse in part, finding that the mineral companies were not required to pay the tax in protest, that the mineral companies have standing to sue and are not estopped from contesting the constitutionality of the tax, and finally that the tax is constitutional because there is a rational basis for allocating the revenue to the county's general fund rather than to its road fund.
State of Tennessee v. Tracy Farrell E2001-01199-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carroll L. Ross
The defendant, Tracy Farrell, appeals from his eleven drug convictions rendered by a McMinn County Criminal Court jury. On appeal he challenges the trial court's failure to grant a severance of offenses. We have determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever offenses, and we affirm the conviction judgments.
McMinn
Court of Criminal Appeals
CH-01-0200-2; CH-01-0200-2;
Trial Court Judge: Kenny W. Armstrong
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Lisa Gregory v. Bradley County Sheriff's Department E2001-01393-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Howell N. Peoples, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Jerri Bryant, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee appeals the denial of worker's compensation benefits on the basis that the trial court used an incorrect standard of proof in evaluating the medical evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Bradley County Chancery Court is Affirmed. HOWELL N. PEOPLES, SP. J., in which WILLIAM M. BARKER., JUSTICE, and JOHN K. BYERS, SR. J., joined. Bert Bates, Cleveland, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Lisa Gregory. William A. Lockett and Michael A. Kent, Cleary and Lockett, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Bradley County Sheriff's Department. 1 MEMORANDUM OPINION Facts On December 5, 1999, Lisa Gregory was employed as a correctional officer by the Bradley County Sheriff's Department. She observed an inmate hanging inside a holding tank and ran into the cell to assist. She lifted the inmate and felt something pop in her left wrist. That evening she went to the emergency room and was advised to follow up with an orthopedic surgeon. She went to Dr. Robert Beasley who advised her to wear a wrist brace for two weeks. Ms. Gregory returned to Dr. Beasley on December 27, 1999 and she had improved considerably, and had just about returned to her baseline condition. She was returned to her regular work duties with some restrictions. She was asked to return in six weeks, but did not return until May 9, 2. Ms. Gregory acknowledged that she had returned to work in her same job when her condition seemed to worsen in May, 2. On May 9, 2, Dr. Beasley took x-rays that revealed that her condition had changed and that the lunate bone in her wrist was deteriorating, which Dr. Beasley believed was a result of the progression of her Kienbock's disease. Dr. Beasley had treated Ms. Gregory for a work-related injury on July 25, 1992 when she fell down some steps and landed on her left wrist. The fall caused Ms. Gregory to develop Kienbock's disease in which the blood supply to the lunate bone is lost. Dr. Beasley testified that this condition is progressive and, over time, causes the lunate bone to hurt, fragment and ultimately collapse. In January 1993, Dr. Beasley had performed an intercarpal fusion in order to transfer some of the load away from the lunate bone. He assigned a 2 percent impairment rating to the left arm for the 1992 injury and she was awarded a judgment for worker's compensation benefits for 3 percent disability to the left arm on December 13, 1994. 2
The defendant pled guilty to one count of sexual battery, a Class E felony; one count of indecent exposure, a Class A misdemeanor; and one count of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. Denying his request for probation, the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to the maximum sentence for each offense, for an effective sentence of four years. In a timely appeal to this court, the defendant challenges his sentences, arguing that the trial court erred in its application of enhancement factors, and in failing to find any factors in mitigation. Based upon our review, we conclude that two of the three enhancement factors found applicable by the trial court are unsupported by the record, but that the remaining enhancement factor, the defendant's prior history of criminal conduct, is entitled to great weight. We further conclude that mitigating factor (1), the defendant's actions did not cause or threaten serious bodily injury, applies to the defendant's convictions for sexual battery and indecent exposure, but that it carries very little, if any, weight in mitigation. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of the defendant's request for probation, and the sentences imposed in this case.
The defendant was indicted for operation of a motor vehicle after being declared an habitual offender. Following a bench trial, he was convicted of the indicted offense. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.
