Antonio Sweatt vs. Billy Compton W2001-00002-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: R. Lee Moore Jr.
This appeal arises from a specialist physician's recommendation that the appellant, an inmate, undergo nasal surgery. The Utilization Review Committee of the Tennessee Department of Correction denied the appellant's recommended surgery. The appellant filed a complaint against the appellees, prison employees of the Lake County Regional Correctional Facility, alleging federal constitutional violations, negligence, and medical malpractice. The appellees filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. On appeal, this Court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the appellees on the Eighth Amendment claim that arose out of the delay in the recommended surgery and remanded for further discovery. This Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Appellees on all other claims. The trial court permitted the parties to conduct further discovery on the Eighth Amendment claim concerning the delay in the recommended surgery. The trial court granted summary judgment to the appellees. The appellant appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the appellees. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court's decision.
Lake
Court of Appeals
Clark Earls vs. Shirley Earls M1999-00035-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Russell Heldman
This extraordinary appeal involves the efforts of one party to effectuate an opinion of this court which the Tennessee Supreme Court declined to review. On the first appeal, this court reversed portions of the trial court's final decree and remanded the case with specific directions regarding the details of the order to be entered. After the Tennessee Supreme Court denied the wife's application for permission to appeal, the husband asked the trial court to enter an order consistent with the directions in this court's opinion. After conducting two hearings, the trial court declined to enter the proposed order. We have granted the husband's application for an extraordinary appeal because the trial court, by its refusal to enter a judgment consistent with this court's opinion, has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings that immediate review of its actions is required. We now (1) vacate the trial court's orders filed after March 29, 2001, (2) direct the clerk of the trial court to enter this opinion and the order accompanying it as the final order in this proceeding, and (3) direct that this case be assigned to another judge in the Twenty-First Judicial District for any further proceedings.
The Defendant, Cyrus D. Wilson, was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.1 The Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief alleging that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that his trial was tainted by due process violations. After an evidentiary hearing the post-conviction court denied relief. The Defendant now appeals as of right. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.
Upon his guilty plea, the Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent ten year sentences to be served on community corrections. Several months into service of his sentences, the Defendant was arrested and his community corrections sentences were revoked. The trial court subsequently resentenced the Defendant to two consecutive ten year sentences. The Defendant now appeals, contending that the trial court was without authority to impose consecutive sentences and that consecutive sentences are improper. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
The Defendant, Jerry Lynn Sanders, appeals from his convictions of aggravated burglary, theft of property less than $500.00, and possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance. He asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by denying his request to admit into evidence a notarized statement wherein the alleged victim stated that he wanted to dismiss the charges in this matter. We find no error; thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The Defendant pleaded guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying him alternative sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
A jury convicted the Defendant of first degree premeditated murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Henry
Court of Criminal Appeals
Linda O'Mary vs. Protech Builders, Inc. E2000-02539-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Dale C. Workman
The plaintiff, Linda O'Mary, brought this action against the defendant, Protech Builders, Inc., seeking damages for the defendant's alleged faulty construction of an addition to the plaintiff's home. Before trial, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, under the terms of which the defendant agreed to perform certain repairs, including "replac[ing]" any wood in the back wall of the addition showing signs of water damage, and to pay the plaintiff $2,000 in attorney's fees. When the defendant refused to remove several water-damaged studs from the back wall, the plaintiff filed a motion seeking, inter alia, to set the case for a full trial on the merits. The trial court found that the plaintiff was unreasonable in demanding that the water-damaged studs be removed. The court below concluded that the defendant's efforts to perform the repairs, along with its payment of $2,000 to the plaintiff, operated as an accord and satisfaction. The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion and dismissed her complaint. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Knox
Court of Appeals
Arlanda Haynes v. Steel Fabricators, Inc., W2000-00329-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Wil V. Doran, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris, Chancellor
The appellant presents the following issues for review: (1) Does the evidence preponderate against the trial court's ruling that the plaintiff failed to give proper notice to his employer of his gradually occurring injury to his right arm and back?; (2) Does the evidence preponderate against the trial court's ruling that the plaintiff has no permanent disability? After a review of the entire record, briefs of the parties and applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
The defendant, indicted for the false reporting of a bomb threat at an elementary school, was convicted of the offense of harassment, and fined $1000. No motion for a new trial was filed. In a pro se appeal to this court, the defendant raises essentially four issues: (1) whether he was denied effective assistance of counsel; (2) whether he was denied the right to testify at trial; (3) whether the State withheld exculpatory evidence; and (4) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction of harassment. After a careful review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The petitioner appeals from the denial of his post-conviction petition, contending that his guilty plea was not entered voluntarily and intelligently and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the trial court's denial of the petition.
The Defendant pled guilty to selling over twenty-six grams of cocaine, possession with intent to sell over 300 grams of cocaine, and possession with intent to sell between ten and seventy pounds of marijuana. As to his conviction for possession with intent to sell over 300 grams of cocaine, the Defendant reserved the following certified question of law: whether the search warrant was void for execution more than 120 hours after issuance. We hold that the five-day period in which a search warrant must be executed is to be computed using calendar days rather than hours. Thus, a search warrant is valid if executed by midnight of the fifth day after its issuance, with the calculation of days to exclude the day of issuance. We further hold that the search warrant in this case was properly executed within the five-day period and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Brian Boyd vs. Bill Berrier, et al E2000-02546-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Jerri S. Bryant
The Plaintiff, Brian Boyd, agreed to purchase three (3) mobile home lots on an installment basis. After nominal down payments he made monthly payments for several months, during which time he received rental income. The contracts provided for forfeiture in the event Mr. Boyd failed to make two (2) consecutive payments or failed to pay the taxes. Mr. Boyd missed four payments, and failed to pay the taxes. He was ordered to quit the property in a detainer action, which was consolidated with a complaint in Chancery for damages for the asserted violation by the assignee of the seller of the Consumer Protection Act. The complaint was dismissed. We affirm.
The defendant, Thomas Jared Richardson, pled guilty to two counts of possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of six years for each count, to be served in the Davidson County Workhouse. The trial court also assessed a fine of $3,500 and ordered the defendant to forfeit his weapon. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the trial court should have imposed probation or some other alternative sentence. The judgment is affirmed.
Davidson
Court of Criminal Appeals
Dorothy Bond v. Murray, Inc. W2000-01830-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer insists the trial court erred in finding that the employee's disability to her left arm was work-related. No issue is made with respect to the right arm. The trial court treated the gradual injury as two separate injuries and awarded permanent partial disability benefits based on 38 percent to the right arm and 3 percent to the left arm. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the award should be modified, by converting it to one based on 34 percent to both arms, and affirmed.
Madison
Workers Compensation Panel
Hae Suk Holder v. Whirlpool Corporation M2000-01368 WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Catalano, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Corlew, III Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The defendant, Whirlpool Corporation, appeals the judgment of the Chancery Court of Rutherford County where pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-241(a)(2) the trial court allowed reconsideration of the plaintiff's industrial disability and found that the plaintiff was entitled to receive an additional award of six percent (6%) to the body as a whole in addition to the previous award of eight percent (8%) made in accordance with the original settlement order between the parties filed in the Chancery Court of Davidson County. The defendant submits that the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiff, who was terminated for personal misconduct, was entitled to reconsideration pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-241(a)(2), resulting in enhancement of a prior disability. Under the recent ruling of the Tennessee Supreme Court in Freeman v. Marco Transportation Co., 27 S.W.3d 99 (Tenn. 2), in which the Court held that a request for reconsideration brought pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-241(a)(2) must be filed in the same court that exercised jurisdiction over the original workers' compensation claim, we do not reach the issue raised by the defendant and find that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the cause dismissed without prejudice. Under the savings statute, the plaintiff can refile her request for reconsideration in the Chancery Court of Davidson County within one year of the date of the judgment that is the final disposition in this case. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225 (e)(2) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed and Dismissed. CATALANO, SP. J., in which BIRCH,J. and WEATHERFORD, SR. J., joined. David T. Hooper, Brentwood, Tennessee for the appellant, Whirlpool Corporation. Christopher K. Thompson, Murfreesboro, Tennessee for the appellee, Hae Suk Holder. MEMORANDUM OPINION In 1995, Hae Suk Holder injured her right shoulder while working for Whirlpool Corporation (Whirlpool). She returned to work in February 1996 making the same wage she had been earning prior to her injury. On October 23, 1996, the ChanceryCourt of Davidson County approved a lump- sum settlement between the parties awarding Ms. Holder an eight percent (8%) permanent partial impairment to the body as a whole. The order also provided that Whirlpool was "relieved of any further liability to [Ms. Holder] under the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Law or otherwise, except for the obligation of the defendant to provide future medical benefits attributed to this injury...." The order did not contain any provisions regarding the right to reconsideration under Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6- 241(a)(2). Ms. Holder continued to work for Whirlpool until June of 1998 when she had a physical altercation with another employee that resulted in her termination. On August 7, 1998, Ms. Holder filed a complaint in the Chancery Court of Rutherford County seeking additional workers' compensation benefits by a reconsideration of her industrial disability pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-241(a)(2). The trial court found that Ms. Holder had sustained a fourteen percent (14%) vocational disability (an additional award of six percent (6%) to the original settlement award of eight percent (8%) vocational disability). ANALYSIS Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-241(a)(2) provides in pertinent part: In accordance with this section, the courts may reconsider, upon the filing of a new cause of action, the issue of industrial disability. Such reconsideration shall examine all pertinent factors, including lay and expert testimony, employee's age, education, skills and training, local job opportunities, and capacity to work at types of employment available in claimant's disabled condition. Such reconsideration may be made in appropriate cases where the employee is no longer employed by the pre-injury employer and makes application to the appropriate court within one (1) year of the employee's loss of employment, . . . . Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-241(a)(2). In the recent case of Freeman v. Marco Transportation Co., 27 S.W.3d 99 (Tenn. 2), our Supreme Court held that a request for reconsideration pursuant to Tennessee Code -2-
Rutherford
Workers Compensation Panel
Holly Paul vs. Thomas Paul E2000-02161-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: John B. Hagler, Jr.
Holly Lynn Coleman Paul ("Wife") filed a complaint seeking a divorce from Thomas Frazier Paul ("Husband") on the basis of inappropriate marital conduct or, in the alternative, irreconcilable differences. Husband filed a counterclaim seeking a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. The Trial Court granted Husband the divorce, divided the marital property which the parties could not divide by agreement prior to trial, awarded custody of the two minor children to Husband, and granted visitation to Wife. Wife appeals challenging the Trial Court's determinations on all of these issues. We affirm as modified.
McMinn
Court of Appeals
Mary Costa, Sue Henard, et al vs. James Clayton, LaRue Homes, et al E2000-02627-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: John F. Weaver
Plaintiffs' action to invalidate an agreement between the defendants to grant an easement as consideration for land was found to be meritorious by the Trial Judge, and plaintiffs were granted summary judgment. On appeal, we affirm.
Knox
Court of Appeals
Kanta Keith, et al vs. Gene Howerton, et al E2000-02703-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Dale C. Workman
In this appeal from a judgment of the Knox County Circuit Court the Plaintiffs/Appellants, Kanta Keith, Darlene Keith and Walter Jackson, contest the Trial Court's ruling that the Defendants/Appellees, Gene Ervin Howerton and Easy Money, Inc., did not violate the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977 with respect to pawn transactions entered into with the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs also contest the amount of damages awarded by the Trial Court for property belonging to them which was stolen while in possession of the Defendants. We affirm in part as modified, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. We adjudge costs of the appeal against the Defendants, Gene Ervin Howerton and Easy Money, Inc.
Knox
Court of Appeals
Debra Smith vs. EZ Pawn Co., et al E2000-02741-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: William E. Lantrip
This is a suit by Debra Smith seeking damages against EZ Pawn Company and others because of sexual harassment visited upon her by James Cameron, the owner of the company. The Trial Court found that her claim under the Tennessee Human Rights Act and under the Malicious Harassment Statute were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. We affirm.
Anderson
Court of Appeals
Charles Doss et al vs. Grace T. Sawyers E2000-01745-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Jeffrey F. Stewart
This is a suit wherein the Plaintiffs seek to remove a cloud in the form of a purchase agreement from the title of property owned by the Plaintiffs. The Trial Court found that the purchase agreement was invalid because of lack of mental capacity of the then owner, Charles Doss, to sign the agreement, and awarded a judgment in the amount of $6900 to the Defendant for payments made under the agreement. We reverse the judgment of the Court relative to the invalidity of the purchase agreement and, in accordance with the prayer of the counter-complaint, order that the property be conveyed by the Clerk and Master to the Defendant subject to payment of the balance owed on the property as determined upon remand.
The plaintiff, a manufacturers' representative, filed this action for a declaratory judgment that it is not indebted to the defendant for commissions on sales of tee shirts manufactured by Tee Jays Manufacturing Company and sold to Planet Hollywood, in light of the fact that the defendant's sole participation was to arrange a meeting between buyer and seller. The Chancellor found the plaintiff was liable for the commission under a contract theory. We affirm.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
In re: Estate of Pauline Maddox M1998-00925-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Tom E. Gray
This appeal involves the testamentary intent of an 89-year-old widow who died leaving a sizeable estate. After one of the decedent's grandsons, acting as her executor, submitted for probate a February 1991 will and a June 1995 codicil, the decedent's surviving daughter filed a will contest proceeding in the Chancery Court for Sumner County, alleging that the will had been procured by the executor's undue influence and that the distribution of the estate should be governed by a 1989 holographic instrument. Following a bench trial, the trial court upheld the validity of the 1991 will and the 1995 codicil. On this appeal, the decedent's daughter asserts that the trial court erred by determining that the 1991 will and the 1995 codicil expressed the decedent's testamentary wishes rather than the 1989 document. We have determined that the evidence supports the trial court's conclusions and, therefore, affirm the judgment.
The SREE General Partnership was formed for the purpose of owning and managing motel property in Nashville, Tennessee. During the ownership period, the property deteriorated. The partners sued a co-partner for breach of fiduciary duty, claiming that his negligent management of the property was what caused the deterioration and resulting economic loss. The trial court ruled for the defendant. We affirm.
