Susan Whiton vs. Alan Whiton
E2000-00467-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Ben W. Hooper, II

Susan Whiton vs. Alan Whiton
E2000-00467-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Ben W. Hooper, II

State v. John R. Farner, Jr.
E1999-00491-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck
The primary issue presented in this appeal is whether Tennessee law recognizes a co-perpetrator rule which bars the defendant's convictions for criminally negligent homicide on the basis that the victims were co-participants in the drag race. After fully and carefully considering the record in this case in light of the relevant authorities, we conclude that no rule of Tennessee law bars the defendant's convictions for criminally negligent homicide as a matter of law. We hold that causation in criminal cases generally is a question of fact for a properly instructed jury, that a victim's contributory negligence is not a complete defense but may be considered in determining whether or not the defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of death, and that a jury's determination of the causation issue will be reviewed on appeal under the familiar sufficiency of the evidence standard and not disturbed so long as the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's determination. Because the trial court in this case failed to provide the jury with an instruction on proximate causation, an essential element of the offense, and because the jury was erroneously provided an instruction as to criminal responsibility, a theory that the State now concedes is inapplicable, the defendant's convictions for criminally negligent homicide must be reversed.

Susan Whiton vs. Alan Whiton
E2003-01279-COA-RM-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Ben W. Hooper, II
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, it reversed our determination that the guidelines promulgated with regard to child support were unconstitutional and remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration in light of the recently-released opinion in Gallaher v. Elam, S.W.3d 2003 WL 2010731 (Tenn. May 2, 2003).f

David Prater v. Mayfield Dairy Farms, Inc.
E2000-03030-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Jerri S. Bryant, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found the plaintiff 9 percent vocationally disabled. We affirm the judgment of the trial court but find the preponderance of the evidence indicates the plaintiff is entitled to a award of permanent total disability. We modify the judgment accordingly. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed as Modified JOHN K. BYERS, SR. J., in which E. RILEY ANDERSON, J. and ROGER E. THAYER, SP. J., joined. Bert Bates, Cleveland, Tennessee for the appellant, David Prater. Kent T. Jones, Chattanooga, Tennessee for the appellee, Mayfield Dairy Farms, Inc. MEMORANDUM OPINION Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in workers' compensation cases. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The plaintiff, age forty at the time of trial, is married with two minor children. He has a high school education and graduated from a two-year vocational program in auto mechanics. His work history consists of work in a service station, in a machine shop, as a local delivery truck driver and in a factory. The plaintiff began working for the defendant sometime in October of 1995. While employed with the defendant, the plaintiff also worked as a part-time police officer for the City of Niota and as a reserve officer for the McMinn County Sheriff's Department. On December 1, 1998, the plaintiff was nearing the end of his shift and was performing trash detail duties when he injured his back. The plaintiff was lifting 2 to 5 pounds of cardboard boxes at a time and placing them in a baler. He bent over to lift some boxes into the baler, experienced "excruciating pain" and blacked out. He was taken to the hospital by ambulance and kept overnight for treatment. An MRI revealed a ruptured disc, which was subsequently treated with surgery. After surgery, the plaintiff continued to experience disabling pain in his back and leg. Despite extensive treatment for his work-related injury, the plaintiff has not been able to return to work. A post-surgical MRI revealed inoperable scarring at the surgical site. A Functional Capacity Evaluation was performed on February 23, 1999; it showed the plaintiff capable of performing sedentary work. A later Functional Capacity Evaluation performed by the same examiner showed the plaintiff incapable of even sedentary work as defined by the United States Department of Labor. The trial court found the plaintiff suffered a work-related injury resulting in a medical impairment of 25 percent to the body as a whole and further found the plaintiff sustained a 9 percent permanent partial disability. We affirm the judgment of the trial court but find the preponderance of the evidence indicates the plaintiff is entitled to a award of permanent total disability. We modify the judgment accordingly. Medical Evidence Dr. Robert E. Finelli first saw the plaintiff on December 7, 1998, on referral from the physician who treated the plaintiff's work-related injury at the hospital. Dr. Finelli reviewed the plaintiff's MRI, which showed a very large extruded disc at the L-5, S-1 level on the left side. Dr. Finelli also noted the plaintiff had weakness and a positive straight leg raise. Surgery was recommended, and Dr. Finelli advised the plaintiff about the risk of pain syndrome as a post-surgical complication whenever weakness is present pre-operatively. On December 21, 1998, Dr. Finelli performed a laminectomy and removed a large free fragment of disc material that was compressing the nerve root on the plaintiff's left side. When the plaintiff's condition failed to improve after surgery, Dr. Finelli referred the plaintiff to a pain management specialist. Dr. Finelli referred the plaintiff for the February 23, 1999, Functional Capacity Evaluation, which showed the plaintiff capable of sedentary work; he then assigned the plaintiff a 12 percent whole body impairment rating. Dr. Finelli stated in his deposition testimony that he traditionally adopts the findings of the Functional Capacity Evaluation. Dr. Finelli last saw the plaintiff in March of 1999. He was no longer treating the plaintiff when the second Functional Capacity Evaluation, which showed the plaintiff incapable of even sedentary work, was performed. Dr. Finelli was made -2-

Regina Ann Thompson v. Vivra Renal Care, Inc.
W2000-03017-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: William Michael Maloan, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Although the only issue at trial was the extent of the employee's permanent disability, the employer contends in this appeal the evidence preponderates against the trial court's findings as to causation and permanency. The panel has agreed to address the issues on appeal and, as discussed below, concluded the judgment should be affirmed. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (2) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed JOE C. LOSER, JR., SP. J., in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J., and ROBERT L. CHILDERS, SP. J., joined. John D. Burleson and V. Latosha Mason, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellant, Vivra Renal Care, Inc. Mary Dee Allen, Cookeville, Tennessee, and George L. Morrison, III, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellee, Regina Ann Thompson MEMORANDUM OPINION The employee or claimant, Regina Ann Thompson, is a licensed practical nurse. She began working for the employer, Vivra Renal Care around September 1995 in its dialysis clinic. She is also trained in the care of HIV positive and hepatitis patients. Approximately two years after beginning work for the employer, she was required to perform a treatment on an HIV positive, hepatitis infected patient. She followed the usual precautions of donning two pairs of gloves, two pairs of shoes, a coat and a cap, then began the treatment in a room secluded from other patients. After she removed the needle from the patient, the patient made an unexpected move and the claimant accidentally stuck herself in the thumb with the dirty needle. Although tests conducted soon after the accident reflected no evidence of infection, she received a notice from the Obion County Health Department that a letter from the Shelby County Health Department indicated that she was HIV positive. She later learned that the letter was intended for someone else with the same or similar name and that she was not infected. The tests had been conducted in Shelby County. She was given literature to read and advised of organizations available to her as her disease progressed. She became anxious about her condition and her family and other personal relationships suffered. Her attorney referred the claimant to Dr. Elias King Bond, a psychiatrist, who established both medical causation and permanency. The record contains no countervailing medical or lay proof. At the time of the trial the claimant was taking prescription antidepressant medication. She is now working for a different employer but becomes squeamish at the sight of blood and in the use of needles. The trial court awarded, inter alia, permanent partial disability benefits based on 15 percent to the body as a whole. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225 (e)(2). This tribunal is not bound by the trial court's findings but instead conducts an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance lies. Galloway v. Memphis Drum Serv., 822 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Tenn. 1991). Where the trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses, especially if issues of credibility and weight to be given oral testimony are involved, considerable deference must be accorded those circumstances on review, because it is the trial court which had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and to hear the in-court testimony. Long v. Tri-Con Ind., Ltd., 996 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Tenn. 1999). The appellate tribunal, however, is as well situated to gauge the weight, worth and significance of deposition testimony as the trial judge. Walker v. Saturn Corp., 986 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Tenn. 1998). The extent of an injured worker's vocational disability is a question of fact. Story v. Legion Ins. Co., 3 S.W.3d 45, 456 (Tenn. 1999). The employer argues that the mental injuries are compensable only if they can be traced to an identifiable, stressful, work-related event producing a sudden mental stimulus such as fright, shock or excessive unexpected anxiety, citing Batson v. Cigna Property and Cas. Co., 874 S.W.2d 566, 569 (Tenn. 1994). However, mental and nervous illnesses are also compensable when causally connected to a work-related accident. Gentry v. Dupont, 733 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Tenn. 1987). The employer argues that Dr. Bond's report does not establish permanency. From our independent examination of Dr. Bond's report, we disagree. For the above reasons and because the evidence fails to preponderate against the findings of the trial court, the judgment is affirmed. Costs are taxed to the appellant. -2-

Firefly Industries, Inc. v. Rhonda Sexton
E2001-00132-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Thayer, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Conrad Troutman, Jr., Circuit Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann._ 5-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the employee 25 percent disability to the body as a whole. The employee has appealed insisting the award is inadequate and should be much higher. The employer argues certain medical expenses were unauthorized and that the incident in question caused no vocational disability. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed as to the award of disability and modified as to the allowance of medical expenses. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Modified and Affirmed THAYER, SP. J., in which ANDERSON, J. and BYERS, SR. J., joined. Charles B. Sexton, Oneida, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Rhonda Sexton. Linda J. Hamilton Mowles, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Firefly Industries, Inc. OPINION In this case the trial court awarded the employee, Rhonda Sexton, 25 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Being dissatisfied with the amount of the award, the employee has appealed. Basic Facts The record indicates the employee was 49 years of age and lacked one and one- half credits in graduating from high school. She never obtained a G.E.D. certificate but has some vocational training in a basic computer course. She was a licensed cosmetologist and had 15 years experience in this type of work. She had some training and experience as an insurance sales agent and five years experience (part-time) as a school bus driver. During her employment career, she had 15 years experience in secretarial work. At the time in question, January 13, 1998, she was employed as a secretary with Firefly Industries, Inc., a company involved in metal fabrication. On this day she was asked to go down in the plant and work with a box of metal parts. She testified the box of parts weighed about 4-5 pounds and as she attempted to pull it off the table to move the box, she said the box started to fall and she felt a pop in her back with pain running down her buttock and left leg. She called for help and supervisor Gloria Adkins came over and assisted her. She told Adkins she had hurt herself but did not need medical treatment. On January 2, she decided she had better go see a doctor and went to Dr. D. Bruce Coffey, a family practice physician, who treated her with medicine and therapy and then after a period of time referred her to several other doctors. She eventually returned to work during March 1998 but only worked a light duty job for about 1 days. As to her physical condition prior to the incident in question, she told the court she had neck and shoulder pain that had been diagnosed as fibromyalgia; she suffered from endometriosis which caused some back pain; she had upper back pain for which she took pain medication; and she had suffered from depression. She also testified she had hurt her back at work during June 1997 while lifting but never mentioned the event to her employer. Medical records (Exhibit #3) from a doctor's clinic indicate chronic back pain dating back to late 1996. At the trial she stated she could not do housework or walk very far; that because of the pain she could not really do any type work and had not looked for work. She said she was very depressed and had gained 3-4 pounds since the accident. Gloria Adkins, a supervisor in the plant, testified that before the January 13 incident, she complained all the time about back pain and she quoted the employee as saying she hurt her back (1) at home scrubbing carport concrete, (2) at a family reunion, (3) vacuuming the office, and (4) moving stuff in the office. She said the box of metal parts weighed about 2-3 pounds and that the box did not start to fall but was still resting part on and part off the table when she took it from her. Adkins also testified that before the incident the employee said she was taking six different kinds of medicine for various problems. Lester S. Webster, Sr., part owner and president of the company, testified she told him shortly after the incident she had hurt her back but she did not need to see a doctor. The incident was not reported to the workers' compensation carrier as an injury. He stated the first he realized she was claiming any injury was when one of the doctors called his office several weeks thereafter. He said she had a lot of complaints about back pain before the incident and she said she was taking six different kinds of medicine. Mr. Webster also told the court that when she stopped working she -2-

In re: Estate of M.L. Wakefield, Deceased
M1998-00921-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Frank G. Clement, Jr.

In re: Estate of M.L. Wakefield, Deceased
M1998-00921-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Frank G. Clement, Jr.

Charles Hardy, et al. v. Robert Miller, et al.
M1998-00940-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy
This appeal involves a dispute among members of a joint venture regarding their rights under suretyship agreements each member signed to guarantee a loan to the joint venture. After the joint venture defaulted, the bank looked to the members of the joint venture for payment of the debt. After three members of the joint venture paid the bank more than their prorated share of the debt, they filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County against a former member, seeking contribution for the amount they had paid in excess of their prorated share. The former member counterclaimed, seeking to recover the payments he had made to the bank on the joint venture's debt. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the members were co-sureties, awarded the three members a $150,145.10 judgment against the former member, and denied the former member's counterclaim. The former member appealed, arguing that his former co-venturers lost their right to contribution when they expelled him from the joint venture and that he is entitled to be reimbursed for the payments he made to the bank on the joint venture's debt. We have determined that each member of the joint venture agreed to be severally liable to the bank for the joint venture's debt and, therefore, that the members were not entitled to contribution from the former member. We have also concluded that the trial court correctly dismissed the former member's counterclaim.

Forrest Cate Motor v. Dealer Computer Services
M2001-01577-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Buddy D. Perry
Plaintiff appeals a declaratory judgment wherein the trial judge held that the mandatory arbitration provisions in the contract between the parties controlled and declared accordingly. We affirm.

Anthony Myers, et al. v. Allen Bryan, III
M2000-03188-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Russell Heldman
This case originated as a suit against a subdivision developer, W. Allen Bryan, III, ("Bryan"), for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, all predicated on the failure of a subdivision plat plan to reflect an existing drainage easement. Thereafter, Bryan filed a third-party complaint seeking indemnification from the surveyor who prepared the plat plan, Ragan-Smith, Associates, Inc. ("Ragan-Smith"), in the event Bryan was cast in judgment. On this Tenn. R. App. P. 54.02 appeal, we are presented with the issue of whether Bryan's cause of action for failure to reflect the drainage easement on the plat plan is barred by the four-year statute of repose for surveying errors. The court below granted Ragan-Smith summary judgment, finding that Bryan's claim is barred by the aforesaid statute of repose. Bryan appeals, arguing that Ragan-Smith is not entitled to summary judgment because, according to Bryan, the omission of the drainage easement is an engineering error, not a surveying error, and hence, so the argument goes, the subject claim is not barred by the four-year statute of repose for surveying errors. In the alternative, Bryan argues that even if the failure to reflect the drainage easement on the plat plan is a surveying error, his third-party complaint was timely filed. We affirm.

Guy Wilson, et al. v. Thompson Const. Co., et al.
M2000-03200-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: C. L. Rogers
This is a suit by Guy Wilson and his wife Rhessa, owners of a building in Gallatin, Tennessee, against their general contractor in the construction of an addition to the building and against their electrical subcontractor. The complaint charges negligence in the use of a defective fiberglass ladder that broke as Guy Wilson was climbing on it to inspect the work. The trial court held that the general contractor, Thompson Construction Company, had breached no duty of care to Plaintiffs and that the electrical contractor, Gary R. Boyd, was an independent contractor for whose alleged negligence Thompson Construction Company was not vicariously liable. On such basis, the trial court granted summary judgment to Thompson Construction Company on all issues and, pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 54.02, entered final judgment on all issues in favor of Thompson Construction Company. Plaintiffs appeal, and we affirm the trial court.

Janet Harper, et al. v. Keith Churn, et al.
M2000-02353-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr.
This is a personal injury case arising from a vehicular collision. The plaintiffs, the Harpers, and the defendants, Mr. Churn and Mr. Beard, along with several others, were traveling together in a rented vehicle at the time of the collision. Mr. Churn was the driver of the vehicle; Mr. Beard was the pastor of the parties' church. At trial, the Harpers asserted that Mr. Churn was negligent in his operation of the vehicle. Additionally, the Harpers claimed that Mr. Beard was vicariously liable for their injuries, or in the alternative, that Mr. Beard was liable under the theory of negligent entrustment. The trial court granted Mr. Beard's motion for a directed verdict, and the jury found in favor of Mr. Churn. The Harpers appeal both decisions. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jo Anne Hofmeister v. John Hofmeister
M2000-00363-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Marietta M. Shipley
A series of post-divorce petitions resulted in a hearing on July 22, 1999 in which no witnesses were called nor any sworn testimony offered. Based on the petitions, the answers, and the statements of counsel, the court modified the final decree of divorce with respect to the husband's obligations to pay the wife's medical insurance premiums, medical expenses, and life insurance premiums. The court also denied the wife's petition for post-judgment interest on a payment to the wife that had been ordered in the final decree. The wife appeals on the grounds that (1) there were no pleadings or proof justifying the amendments and (2) the court erred in not granting her petitions. We affirm the trial court.

American Child Care, Inc. v. Dept. of Human Services, et al.
M2000-01790-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
This appeal arises from the trial court's denial of appellant American Child Care, Inc.'s, request for attorney's fees resulting from an administrative action in which appellant's license was suspended and later reinstated. The trial court later granted appellee summary judgment on all issues, including attorney's fees. We reverse the trial court's decision denying the appellant's application and remand to the trial court to set a reasonable fee for the appellant.

Vandal Doss v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Ins. Co.
M2000-01971-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Don R. Ash
Trial Court Judge: E. Gray
This is an appeal from the Judgment of the Chancellor for Sumner County, Tennessee, dismissing Vondal Doss's Complaint against Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company, alleging breach of contract for failure to make payment for medical expenses pursuant to the medical payment coverage contained in two insurance policies and the Defendant's Counter-Complaint for subrogation. Doss had suffered a personal injury as a result of an auto accident which occurred on April 8, 1993 involving a third-party tort-feasor. Plaintiff/Appellant filed a Motion to Appeal on August 2, 2000. The Judgment of the Chancellor is affirmed on all counts. Doss's claim for additional post-settlement medical payments is denied as a result of the execution of the Release and Order of Compromise and Settlement which extinguished Tennessee Farmers' subrogation rights. Tennessee Farmers' claim for reimbursement is denied. Costs of this Appeal are assessed to the Appellant.

Cheryl Ann Cupples, v. Luther Wayne Cupples
02A01-9408-CH-00193
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Joe C. Morris

This divorce action involves dissolution of the 25 year marriage between Appellant, Cheryl Ann Cupples ("Wife"), and Appellee, Luther Wayne Cupples ("Husband"). Wife filed for divorce in September 1992, citing irreconcilable differences and inappropriate marital conduct. Husband counterclaimed for divorce alleging inappropriate marital conduct. Both parties sought custody of their minor son, Jonathan, age 10 at the time of trial.1 On appeal, Wife cites as error the trial court's award of an absolute divorce and custody of the child to Husband, its failure to award her alimony and its division of the marital estate. For reasons hereinafter expressed, we affirm.

Thomas Stubblefield vs. Monique Stubblefield
E2001-01433-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: William R. Brewer
Husband appeals the Trial Court's allocation of the parties' marital estate in this divorce action. We affirm.

State ex rel. Margaret Holtsinger vs. Jack Elrod
E2001-00257-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: William E. Lantrip
These parties were divorced in May 1996. Custody of their children was awarded to Wife. The oldest child, Catherine, DOB July 14, 1981, was mentally and physically afflicted. Support was awarded as the Guidelines direct. Father filed a petition to modify the judgment by eliminating the support requirement for Catherine, who reached her majority. The Chancellor held that the duty of support of the afflicted child was a continuing one. We affirm.

John Warfield, et ux vs. Carlos Lowe, et al
E2001-01042-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Jr.
Plaintiff sought to establish insurance coverage for his injuries under his employer's policy. The Trial Judge declared no coverage. On appeal, we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Jared M. Barnes
E2001-00325-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard R. Vance

The defendant, Jared M. Barnes, was convicted upon his guilty plea for vehicular homicide by recklessness, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to five years, with ten months, day for day, to be served in the county jail and the remainder of the sentence to be served on probation. In addition, the trial court suspended the defendant's driving privileges for five years and ordered that he complete five hundred hours of community service. The defendant appeals his sentence, contending that the trial court erred in denying him judicial diversion or full probation. We affirm the trial court's denial of judicial diversion and full probation, but hold that the order that the defendant serve his ten-month incarceration day for day does not preclude use of applicable conduct credits.

Cynthia Long vs. City of Maryville
E2001-00908-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: W. Dale Young
Upon remand from this Court, the Trial Court entered Judgment for defendant in this slip and fall case. On appeal, we reverse.

Boyd's Creek Enterprisesl vs. Sevier County
E2001-01975-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Telford E. Forgerty, Jr.
These beer permit cases were consolidated for trial, with a common issue: whether the proposed sale location was located within 2000 feet of a "public gathering place," and if so, whether the restriction was waived, owing to a discriminatory practice.

2001-00729-COA-R3-CV
2001-00729-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: W. Dale Young