Doris Tabor v. Crossville Ceramics 03S01-9510-CV-00117
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. John J. Maddux, Jr.,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff alleges that on March 7, 1994 she sustained injuries to her arms and hands during the course of her employment owing to their repetitive use; that she returned to work as a polisher for the Crossville Ceramics Company and that on March 23, 1994 she injured her neck or back while pushing a box of tiles. The defendants admitted that the plaintiff suffered a temporary injury but denied that she sustained a permanent disability. Thereafter, on May 24, 1995, an approved Order was entered whereby the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed "her cause of action as to her March 23, 1994 injuries" pursuant to Rule 41, Tenn. R. Civ. P. This procedure is unchallenged, and we will treat the complaint as having been amended to allege a compensable injury by accident which occurred on March 7, 1994. The plaintiff testified that she worked as a sorter in the polishing department of the ceramics manufacturer, the kind of work that required repetitive motions of both arms. On March 7, 1994 numbness and tingling developed in both arms which she reported to her supervisor and for which she received conservative medical treatment. She continued at her job for more than one year, leaving employment in April 1995 after allegedly suffering a neck injury. During the thirteen months between March 1994 and April 1995 the plaintiff was seen by a procession of physicians practicing various disciplines. Dr. Simpson, the orthopedic physician selected by the plaintiff, treated her over a period of months and concluded that she exaggerated her symptoms which were not anatomic. He testified that she suffered no impairment. His findings are supported by those of the Knoxville Neurology Clinic and the East Tennessee Orthopedic Clinic. The plaintiff was referred by her attorney to Dr. Gorman, an orthopedic surgeon practicing in Johnson City, who testified that she had a five (5) percent impairment in each arm, and recommended avoidance of "repetitive factory work." 2
Rebecca Caldwell v. Kelly Services, Inc. and Continental Casualty Company 03S01-9603-CH-00022
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer contends the evidence preponderates against an award of permanent partial disability benefits. The panel concludes the award of permanent partial benefits should be reversed. On September 1, 1994, the employee or claimant, Caldwell, an employee of Kelly Services, was sent to work at Moore's Quality Snack Foods. While working there, she slipped and fell, landing on her hand and arm. After receiving emergency care at the emergency room of a hospital, she was referred to Dr. Michael Lady, who diagnosed tenosynovitis and prescribed a splint and rest from work until her bruising and swelling subsided. On October 19, 1994, the claimant, while visiting a relative in Louisiana, saw Dr. Steiner, and orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Steiner eventually released her to return to work without any restrictions or permanent impairment. She did. On December 2, 1994, she left work because her injured arm was hurting. The next day, she revisited Dr. Lady, who prescribed a wrist splint, medication and rest. The doctor continued to treat her conservatively. His testimony by deposition included the following relevant questions and answers: Q. Okay. Now, Dr. Lady, based upon the American Medical Association guidelines, do you have an opinion which is also based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty as the 2
Ernest O. Wood v. Aluminum Corporation of America 03S01-9601-CV-00007
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. W. Dale Young,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Fairly stated, the issues in this appeal are whether the employee should have been awarded permanent partial disability benefits and additional temporary total disability benefits. The panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The employee or claimant, Wood, is a high school graduate who has worked for the employer, ALCOA, since approximately 1971. On June 7, 1991, while at work, he fell from the top of a tray of carbons, landing on his right side and injuring his right elbow, shoulder and hip. He continued working for the employer, while being conservatively treated for a torn right rotator cuff, until August 15, 1991. The injury was surgically repaired September of the same year and the employee returned to work for the employer on or about May 8, 1992 with minor restrictions. He was laid off six weeks later and has not worked since July 6, 1992. Because of other illnesses, he is receiving disability retirement benefits. He has received temporary total disability benefits for the time he lost from work before the layoff. He has also received medical benefits as required under the workers' compensation law. The medical proof as to whether the claimant's disability is causally related to his injuries is speculative and equivocal. In separate litigation, he claims to be disabled from asbestos-related lung disease. The trial judge disallowed the claim for disability workers' compensation benefits for insufficient proof that the disability is causally related to the injury at work. 2
This case involves contempt proceedings brought against Wendell Ray Loyd (“Husband”) by Brenda Bailey Loyd (“Ex-Wife”) for failure to pay alimony. The trial court found that Husband did not have the present ability to pay and therefore could not be incarcerated for contempt. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
State vs. Curtis R. Sparks M1999-01330-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Cornelia A. Clark
The defendant, Curtis R. Sparks, was convicted of sale of cocaine over .5 grams. The jury assessed a fine of $2,000. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of nine years. In this appeal of right, the defendant contends that the sentence is excessive and that the trial court should have granted an alternate, community-based sentence. Because the defendant was clearly untruthful in much of his testimony and demonstrated little indication of rehabilitation, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Joe Rines v. Mahle, Inc. and Royal Insurance Company 03S01-9509-CV-00101
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. William L. Jenkins
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This appeal results from the refusal of the trial court to modify a judgment entered April 2, 1993 that the employee sustained no permanent disability as a result of a job-related injury in 199 but was entitled to future medical expenses associated with any spinal fusion he elected to undergo. The petition to modify was filed November 23, 1994. The plaintiff alleged that he "has increased disability from surgery performed by Dr. Wallace over and above that which he had when this matter was previously heard." The defendants [hereafter "employer"] moved to dismiss, alleging that the "Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the Petition filed on behalf of the plaintiff or to award him any relief and, further, that neither the provisions of T.C.A. _ 5-6-231 nor of Rule 6.2, TENN. R. CIV. P., are applicable herein." Thereafter, the plaintiff announced that he was relying exclusively upon T.C.A. _ 5-6-231, which provides: 5-6-231. Lump payments final -- Modification of periodic payments for more than six months. -- All amounts paid by employer and received by the employee or the employee's dependents, by lump sum payments, shall be final, but the amount of any award payable periodically for more than six (6) months may be modified as follows: (1) At any time by agreement of the parties and approval by the court; or (2) If the parties cannot agree, then at any time after six (6) months from the date of the award an application may be made to the courts by either party, on the ground of increase or decrease of incapacity due solely to the injury. In such cases, the same procedure shall be followed as in _ 5-6-225 in case of a disputed claim for compensation. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that since there was no "award payable periodically for more than six (6) months" the statute was inapplicable. On appeal the plaintiff argues that the award of future medical expenses qualifies as an "award payable periodically" within the purview of the statute, as contrasted to the argument of the employer that "an award payable periodically"
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
Kevin G. Mckenzie v. Blount Memorial Hospital, Inc., Royal Insurance Company and Tha Workers' Compensation Group 03S01-9603-CV-00028
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. W. Dale Young,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff, Kevin G. McKenzie, has appealed from the action of the trial court in dismissing his claim by sustaining a motion for summary judgment filed by defendants, Blount Memorial Hospital, Inc., and THA Workers' Compensation Group. The circuit judge ruled the claim was barred by reason of the expiration of the one year statute of limitations. The complaint was filed on November 4, 1994, alleging plaintiff had sustained an injury on September 13, 1993, and on May 7, 1994. The hospital was provided insurance coverage by THA Workers' Compensation Group to December 31, 1993, and Royal Insurance Company for the period in question during 1994. The hospital and THA Group filed the motion for summary judgment contending any claim for the September, 1993, injury was barred. The motion is supported by two affidavits and Plaintiff's Answers To Interrogatories. The affidavit of Joe B. Hill, Jr., the Director of Human Resources, recites plaintiff originally injured himself during January, 1993; he reported on September 13, 1993, he had experienced a recurrence of pain from the injury and he received two sessions of therapy; the last medical treatment for the September 13, 1993, work-related aggravation of his pre-existing condition was on September 15, 1993; that on May 7, 1994, he reported to their emergency room requesting treatment; and the hospital did not make any voluntary payments to any health care providers nor was plaintiff billed for any treatment by the hospital. The other affidavit was executed by Mary Jane Johnson, a family nurse- practitioner of the hospital. This document indicates she saw plaintiff during January, 1993, for evaluation of a neck and shoulder injury which plaintiff said he had sustained a few days earlier; on September 13, 1993, he reported he had re- injured his neck and shoulder; he was referred to a medical group where he was seen the same day but he did not return for a follow-up appointment on October 4, -2-
