State of Tennessee v. Wilmore Hatfield
M2002-00939-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Eric Shayne Sexton

This is an appeal from the Criminal Court for Fentress County which convicted the defendant, Wilmore Hatfield, of felony reckless endangerment as a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault. Relying on this Court's decision in State v. Moore, 77 S.W.3d 132 (Tenn. 2002), the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction, concluding that felony reckless endangerment was not a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault. The State then sought, and this Court granted, permission to appeal on the sole issue of whether felony reckless endangerment is a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault committed by intentionally or knowingly causing bodily injury to another by the use of a deadly weapon. We hold that it is a lesser-included offense under State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn. 1999). Consequently, the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision with respect to the felony reckless endangerment conviction is reversed, and that conviction is reinstated.

Harold Woodroof, pro se v. State of Tennessee
M2003-01020-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

The Petitioner, Harold Woodroof, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner failed to file his post-conviction petition within the one year statute of limitations. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Tonya Jennings
M2002-01190-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steve R. Dozier

In a bench trial, the defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity of the charge of stalking. Following her release from judicial hospitalization, she moved to have her public records in this case expunged under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-32-101(a)(1). Because the pertinent statutory language only provides for expungement upon "a verdict of not guilty returned by a jury," we find that the defendant is not entitled to expungement and affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

In The Matter of S.L.O.
W2002-00905-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Clayburn L. Peeples

This case presents an issue of jurisdiction–whether the circuit court or the Court of Appeals has the authority to hear and decide this appeal from the juvenile court. We hold that the Circuit Court for Haywood County has jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Accordingly, we remand the case to the Circuit Court for Haywood County to conduct an appeal de novo pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-159(a). The parties have also challenged the circuit court’s authority to transfer the case to the Court of Appeals. Because we hold that the circuit court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal, we do not consider the transfer issue.

State of Tennessee v. Michael Lenard Hall
E2002-01834-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mary Beth Leibowitz

Michael Lenard Hall appeals from his Knox County Criminal Court conviction of first degree murder of his ex-wife, Pamela Hall. He claims that insufficient evidence supports his conviction, that the jury instructions were flawed, and that the prosecution denied him a fair trial through improper questioning of witnesses and improper argument. Because we agree with the defendant that the state failed to present sufficient proof of premeditation, we modify the first degree murder conviction and impose a second degree murder conviction in its place. However, we are unpersuaded of error warranting a new trial. We remand for sentencing on the second degree murder conviction.

Shamery Blair and Titus Blair v. West Town Mall
E2002-02005-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge Dale C. Workman

We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's judgment granting summary judgment for Defendant. In resolving this issue, we must also determine whether Tennessee recognizes the "method of operation" theory in premises liability cases and whether Plaintiff's reliance upon that theory is appropriate, as a matter of law, in this case. We hold that plaintiffs in premises liability cases in Tennessee may attempt to establish constructive notice of the presence of a dangerous condition by showing a pattern of conduct, a recurring incident, or a general or continuing condition indicating the dangerous condition's existence. This theory is available to Plaintiff in this case to pursue at trial. Because Defendant in this case failed to affirmatively negate an essential element of Plaintiff's claim or conclusively establish an affirmative defense, Plaintiff's burden to produce evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue for trial was not triggered. Thus, the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment is affirmed. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and modified in part, and this case is remanded to the trial court.

Jason Blake Bryant v. State of Tennessee
E2002-00907-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge James Edward Beckner

The petitioner filed a Petition for Post-conviction Relief September 26, 2001. After holding a hearing on the petition, the trial court denied the petition. The petitioner appealed the trial court's decision. We have reviewed the petitioner's many issues, including allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and entry of an involuntary guilty plea, and we affirm the trial court's decision to deny the petition for post-conviction relief.

State of Tennessee v. Robert Simerly
E2002-02626-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Cupp

The defendant, Robert Simerly, appeals from his Johnson County Criminal Court conviction of first degree felony murder. On appeal, he claims: 1. The convicting evidence is insufficient. 2. The trial court erred in allowing evidence of non-testifying co-defendants' and accomplices' statements that inculpated the defendant. 3. The trial court erred in denying a mistrial when (a) an officer testified that, during pretrial questioning, the defendant requested an attorney, and (b) another witness testified that he had been threatened during the trial. 4. The trial court erred in the admission of expert testimony. 5. The trial court erred in the admission of a prejudicial videotape that depicted the deceased victim's face. 6. The trial court erred in excluding the defendant's proffered evidence of judgments of convictions of two state witnesses. 7. The trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense. Discerning no reversible error in the proceedings below, we affirm the judgment.

Roger D. Reynolds v. Tennessee Municipal League Risk
W2003-00448-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe H. Walker, III, Sp.J.
Trial Court Judge: William D. Acree, Jr., Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-6-225(e) (3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of the finding of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the Employee failed to prove causation and failed to give notice as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-6-21. We affirm.

Henry Earl Campbell v. Jim Keras Buick Company and
W2003-00158-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe H. Walker, III, Sp.J.
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown, Jr., Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee. Code Annotated section 5-6-225(e) (3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of the finding of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the Employee failed to prove causation, failed to give notice as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-6-21, and waived his right to worker's compensation benefits for a back injury. We affirm on the basis that Employee failed to prove causation and failed to prove notice. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed JOE H. WALKER, III, SP.J., in which JUSTICE JANICE M. HOLDER, J., and JAMES L. WEATHERFORD, SR.J., joined. James L. Gordon, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Henry Earl Campbell B. Duane Willis, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellee, Jim Keras Buick Company and Great American Insurance Companies MEMORANDUM OPINION FACTUAL BACKGROUND Employee was 47 years of age, and had worked for the Employer for over twenty- five years. He has an eleventh grade education and a history of cleaning and detailing cars that Employer sells. Employee alleges that on June 1, 1998, he was getting in a car when his foot slipped, causing him to fall on his rear end and injure his back. 1 The Employee had a prior back injury in 1976, and a settlement was court- approved in 1977, awarding Employee benefits amounting to twenty percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. On May 17, 1978, Employee and Employer entered into a written agreement which acknowledges the prior injury and in which Employee agrees to not lift any heavy object which "could result or cause injury to my back." The agreement stated in part "my back was previously injured and under no condition will I hold Reed Keras Buick responsible for a back injury sustained on the job." Dr. Gary L. Kellett testified that he treated Employee in May 1997 for low back and right leg pain caused by a sneezing and coughing episode about a week before the office visit. The pain radiated down the right leg of Employee. Dr. Kellett recommended conservative treatment with exercises and medication. Dr. Kellett was aware of the prior disc operation and fusion Employee had and felt he was doing well prior to the sneeze. Employee alleges he was injured at work June 1, 1998. Dr. John P. Howser, neurosurgeon, testified that he examined Employee August 28, 1998, for back pain. Employee gave a history that approximately three months before the examination he sneezed and his foot slipped and he had the onset of back pain. His left leg had sharp pains which radiate to the back. Employee reported he had seen Dr. Kellett who gave him pain pills. Dr. Howser was aware of the past history of fusion surgery. Employee told Dr. Howser he had been doing well since the surgery until he sneezed. Examination revealed muscle spasm and restricted range of motion of the lumbar spine. He saw Employee during several visits and treated Employee with lumbar epidural and caudal epidural blocks, hamstring exercises, and facet blocks. Employee did not mention an injury at work during these visits. On December 21, 1998, Employee phoned and related he had an incident at work in May 1998, where he slipped on some chemicals on the floor and fell at work. Employee saw Dr. Howser again January 26, 1999, for an office visit. Dr. John Lindermuth, neurosurgeon, testified that he first saw Employee April 22, 1999. Employee gave a history of injury at work in May 1998. Dr. Lindermuth diagnosed failed back syndrome, based on Employee's previous surgery in 1976 with a good result, and then having re- injured himself. Employee testified at trial that he reported his fall and injury on June 1, 1988 to his supervisor, Steve Markle. Markle testified that Employee did not report a work- related injury on June 1, or any other day. He never filled out any worker's compensation forms, or referred Employee to a doctor. Employee has not returned to work at Employer's place of business, but has worked briefly at two other jobs. 2

Joe Martin v. State of Tennessee
M2003-00534-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his post-conviction relief petition relating to his convictions for first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and attempted second degree murder. On appeal, the petitioner contends: (1) the state withheld exculpatory evidence; (2) the state failed to correct perjured testimony at trial; and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Linda Clark, et al. v. Nashville Machine Elevator Company Incorporated
M2003-01568-SC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Donald P. Harris

In this workers' compensation case, the employer, Nashville Machine Elevator Co., Inc., has appealed the trial court's award of death benefits to the widow and son of the employee, Eddie W. Clark, Jr., who suffered a fatal heart attack while driving the employer's vehicle home from work. The employer contends generally that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the employee suffered an injury causally related to his employment activities, and specifically argues that the heart attack was not compensable because the employee was not physically exerting himself when he suffered the heart attack. The appeal was argued before the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3), but the appeal was transferred to the full Supreme Court prior to the Panel issuing its decision. The question before this Court is whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the employee's heart attack arose out of his employment. After carefully examining the record and the relevant authorities, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. We further hold that physical exertion or strain is not required at the instant an employee's heart attack occurs, provided there is evidence linking the physical activities of the employment with the heart attack.

Kevin Tate, pro se., v. Bruce Westbrook, Warden
W2003-01477-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph B. Dailey

The Petitioner, Kevin Tate, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Eddie Dean Hall v. State of Tennessee
E2002-01986-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ben W. Hooper, II

Petitioner, Eddie Dean Hall, pled guilty to two counts of first degree murder and received concurrent sentences of life without parole. No direct appeal was taken. Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that counsel was ineffective and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Petitioner appeals from the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. James Anthony Hill
M2003-00516-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Charles Lee

The defendant, James Anthony Hill, was convicted of possession of a weapon in a penal institution, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to thirteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues: (1) the trial court erred in not instructing the jury as to the lesser-included offense of possession of a prohibited weapon; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and (3) his sentence is excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Darrell Davon King
M2003-00196-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Seth W. Norman

After being indicted on two counts of rape by force, two counts of rape, two counts of incest, and one count of sexual battery, the appellant, Darrell Davon King, pled guilty to two counts of rape, for which he received two, concurrent eight-year sentences at 100% service. The manner of the service of the sentences was left open. The trial court subsequently ordered the appellant to serve the sentences in incarceration. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying him probation or community corrections. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to state on the record its reasons for denying probation and/or a community corrections sentence. As a result we REVERSE the trial court's sentencing order and REMAND with directions that the trial court make specific findings of fact with respect to its sentencing determinations

State of Tennessee v. Joey Thomas Holland
M2003-00988-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael R. Jones

The Appellant, Joey Thomas Holland, appeals the judgment of the Robertson County Circuit Court denying his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Holland was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery of his minor son. Holland alleges that his convictions should be set aside because the victim recanted his trial testimony. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the decision of the trial court denying the petition.

In Re: C.M.M. and S.D.M
M2003-01122-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Sidney Vinson, III

This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights with regard to two of her six children. Less than four months after the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services was granted temporary custody of the children, their foster parents filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Houston County seeking permanent custody and the termination of the parental rights of the biological parents. The children’s mother contested the petition, but the father did not. Following a hearing, the juvenile court terminated the parental rights of both parents. The mother has appealed. We have determined that the order terminating the mother’s parental rights must be vacated because the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence that the Department made reasonable efforts to reunite the mother with her children.
 

State of Tennessee v. Robert Allen Crawford
E2003-00627-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Cupp

The defendant was convicted by a Washington County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of an aggravated burglary; criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony; aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and reckless endangerment, a Class E felony. The trial court merged the conviction for criminally negligent homicide with the conviction for first degree murder, and the defendant received concurrent sentences of life for the first degree murder conviction, four years for the aggravated burglary conviction, three years for the aggravated assault conviction, and one year for the reckless endangerment conviction. He raises two interrelated issues on appeal: whether the evidence was sufficient to support his felony murder conviction and whether the aggravated burglary count of the indictment was fatally defective for failing to name a victim for the underlying intended assault, thereby invalidating his convictions for aggravated burglary and first degree murder. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Wendell Freels and wife, Gweneth Freels v. Gus W. Chilton
E2003-01319-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge Russell E. Simmons, Jr.

Plaintiffs obtained two judgments in General Sessions Court. On appeal to Circuit Court the second Plaintiffs were awarded a monetary Judgment against defendant in Sessions Court, and defendant appealed to Circuit Court, where the Court declared the Judgment void for lack of  jurisdiction, and dismissed the case judgment was vacated for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal we affirm.

Tennessee Environmental Council, Inc., et at., v. Bright Par 3 Associates, L.P., et al.
E2003-01982-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Howell N. Peoples

A conservation easement affecting property adjoining South Chickamauga Creek in Chattanooga was created in 1996. Property zoned for business and owned and developed by some of the Defendants is adjacent to the easement. The Plaintiffs allege that the development and construction activities of the Defendants adversely and unlawfully affect the easement. The complaint was dismissed upon a ruling that the Plaintiffs had no standing to enforce the easement, notwithstanding the language of the Conservation Easement Act, Tennessee Code Annotated § 66-9-301, et. seq., that it may be enforced by the “holder and/or beneficiaries” of the easement. The controversy centers on the meaning of the word “beneficiaries.” We hold that any resident of Tennessee is a beneficiary of the easement, and thus has standing to enforce it. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed and Remanded.
 

Judith A. Johnson, Surviving Widow of David C. Johnson, et al. v. Robert B. Richardson, d/b/a Richardson Landscaping & Trucking
M2002-02968-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Allen W. Wallace, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann._ 5-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The defendant/appellant has appealed the action of the trial court, which overruled his motion to set aside a default judgment under the provisions of Tenn. R. Civ. P., Rule 6. The standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the judgment. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court is Reversed and Remanded JOHN K. BYERS, SR. J., in which ADOLPHO A. BIRCH and WILLIAM C. KOCH, JJ., joined. Debra A. Wall, Clarksville, Tennessee, attorney for appellant, Robert B. Richardson. Timothy K. Barnes, Clarksville, Tennessee, attorney for appellee, Judith A. Johnson, Kimberly Ann Mahoney and Sean Patrick Mahoney. MEMORANDUM OPINION Facts The plaintiffs brought this compensation suit to recover benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act as a result of an accident on July 22, 1994 in which her husband and the step- father of the two minor children was killed. The suit was filed on September 7, 1994. The defendant subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. On December 3, 1994 the trial judge overruled the motion for summary judgment. There are no orders in the record before us from the date of the overruling of the summary judgment on December 3, 1994 until the entry of the default judgment which was entered on September 7, 21. The plaintiffs were awarded $167,832.. Subsequent to the order amending the motion for a summary judgment, the defendant filed a petition in the federal court declaring bankruptcy. This stayed the proceedings in the trial court. On August 1, 21, the defendant filed a motion to have a default judgment set aside which he averred was entered on May 25, 21. The motion further avers that on May 1, 21 the trial judge ordered the plaintiff to "place a document in the court file evidencing this matter had been removed from bankruptcy court" and the defendant further avers the plaintiff did not place said document in the file prior to May 25, 21, as directed by the trial judge. On the record before this court is a document designating notice as an order entered in the United States Bankruptcy Court granting relief from a stay of the proceedings in the Bankruptcy Court. This document recites that the relief from the automatic stay of this case was granted on October 2, 1998. Marked on the order was the notation "Received for Entry,"nunc pro tunc to 1/2/98." This appears to be placed there by the Bankruptcy Court. The order also shows a stamp which is "21 August 23 a.m. 9:32." This also appears to be an entry by the Bankruptcy Court. There is nothing in the record to show when this order was placed in the record in this case. There are no orders in the record memorializing any proceedings being held in the trial court on either May 1, 21 or May 25, 21. On September 7, 21 the trial judge entered a default judgment against the defendant in favor of the plaintiffs. The order recited that defendant was not present despite being duly notified of said court date. The order, approved by plaintiff's attorney for entry has a certification of service thereof on defendant's attorney which is undated. On September 19, 22, the plaintiff filed a "supplemental response to the motion to set aside the default judgment." (There is not another response to the motion to set aside the default judgment in the record.) On October 1, 21, the defendant filed another motion to have the default judgment set aside. This motions was accompanied by an affidavit from the defendant. Also on October 1, 21, the defendant filed a motion seeking to have the operation and effect of the default judgment suspended. On October 25, 22, the trial court entered an order denying the defendant's motion to set -2-

State of Tennessee v. Jared Singleton
M2002-02392-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Charles D. Haston, Sr.

The defendant, Jared Singleton, entered pleas of guilt to forgery, a Class E felony, and criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor. After denying the defendant's request for judicial diversion under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of two years for the forgery and six months for the criminal impersonation. Probation was to be granted after service of 30 days in the county workhouse. In this appeal of right, the defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying judicial diversion. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the defendant is granted judicial diversion. The cause is remanded to the trial court for the imposition of conditions of the probationary term.

Roger T. Johnson, Pro Se v. State of Tennessee
M2002-02902-CCA-R3-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert L. Jones

The Petitioner, Roger T. Johnson, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. James Lee Foreman, II
M2002-02595-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael R. Jones

A Montgomery County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, James Lee Foreman, II, of two counts of rape, a Class B felony. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the defendant as a violent offender to ten years in confinement. The defendant appeals, claiming that his sentence is excessive. Having determined that we lack jurisdiction in the case, the defendant's appeal is dismissed.