State vs. John Roy Polly
M1999-00278-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: William Charles Lee
In this direct appeal, the defendant argues that he was incorrectly sentenced as a "persistent offender." We agree that the twenty-four hour merger rule bars use of one of his previous convictions and therefore reverse and remand for resentencing as a "multiple offender" within Range II.
Marshall
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Andrew D. Bledsoe
M1999-00788-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.
The defendant, after being convicted of reckless homicide, appeals his sentence of three and one-half years incarceration. He argues that the trial court incorrectly imposed an excessive sentence and that the trial court erred by not imposing any form of alternative sentence. We hold that a death, although unfortunate and tragic, standing alone, is insufficient to deny an alternative sentence given our legislative mandate that Range I standard offenders convicted of any Class D felony are presumed to be favorable candidates for alternative sentencing. Therefore, after careful review, we affirm the length of the sentence; however, we modify its manner of service to an alternative sentence of split confinement of one year and the remaining two and one-half years on probation.
Davidson
Court of Criminal Appeals
Mark E. Oliver vs. State
M1999-02323-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Timothy L. Easter
The petitioner, Mark E. Oliver, appeals as of right from the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He contends that his original sentence of sixty years as a Range II offender for the offense of second degree murder is an illegal sentence because the trial court was without jurisdiction to sentence him under the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1982. We hold that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sentence the petitioner under the 1982 Act; therefore, the sentence imposed is an illegal sentence. We remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Hickman
Court of Criminal Appeals
Claude Garrett vs. State
M1999-00786-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman
The defendant, after being convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, was denied post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court of Davidson County. Defendant now appeals that denial and asserts that (1) the State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, thereby undermining the confidence of the outcome of the trial; (2) the trial court erred by unconstitutionally instructing the jury; (3) the defendant was not afforded effective assistance of counsel; and (4) juror misconduct and bias violated the defendant's constitutional rights. The issue of juror misconduct was addressed by this court on direct appeal and, therefore, is not properly before this court. After review, we affirm the trial court's finding that the defendant received effective assistance of counsel; however, we reverse and remand the case for a new trial because the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, thereby undermining the confidence in the outcome of the trial.
Davidson
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Toronda Sherelle Williams
M2000-00212-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman
Following a grand jury indictment, Toranda Williams, the defendant and appellant, was tried and convicted of first-degree murder in the Davidson County Criminal Court. On appeal, she argues (1) that the trial court erroneously admitted testimony about the results of a polygraph examination; (2) that the court erroneously admitted hearsay testimony; and (3) that the cumulative effect of these errors was substantial enough to require reversal. Because we find the trial court's error in admitting the polygraph test results was harmless, and because the issue regarding hearsay testimony has been waived for failure to include it in the motion for a new trial, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Davidson
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Jack Welch
W1999-00860-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: J. Steven Stafford
Dyer
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Frank Tate
W1999-01068-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Bernie Weinman
Shelby
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Owens
W1997-00237-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Joseph B. Dailey
Clark Earls vs. Shirley Earls
M1999-00035-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Russell Heldman
This extraordinary appeal involves the efforts of one party to effectuate an opinion of this court which the Tennessee Supreme Court declined to review. On the first appeal, this court reversed portions of the trial court's final decree and remanded the case with specific directions regarding the details of the order to be entered. After the Tennessee Supreme Court denied the wife's application for permission to appeal, the husband asked the trial court to enter an order consistent with the directions in this court's opinion. After conducting two hearings, the trial court declined to enter the proposed order. We have granted the husband's application for an extraordinary appeal because the trial court, by its refusal to enter a judgment consistent with this court's opinion, has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings that immediate review of its actions is required. We now (1) vacate the trial court's orders filed after March 29, 2001, (2) direct the clerk of the trial court to enter this opinion and the order accompanying it as the final order in this proceeding, and (3) direct that this case be assigned to another judge in the Twenty-First Judicial District for any further proceedings.
Williamson
Court of Appeals
In the matter of B.B.
M1999-00643-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Burton D. Glover
Davidson
Court of Appeals
State vs. Frank Michael Vukelich
M1999-00618-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz
On December 8 through December 17, 1998, Frank Vukelich, the defendant and appellant, was tried in the Davidson County Criminal Court for one count of conspiracy to deliver 700 pounds or more of marijuana, three counts of conspiracy to commit money laundering, and five counts of money laundering. The jury found the defendant not guilty of one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, but guilty on all other counts. Following a subsequent sentencing hearing, the court effectively sentenced the defendant to thirty-four years of incarceration and ordered the defendant to pay fines totaling $180,000. After a hearing regarding the defendant's motion for new trial, however, the trial court dismissed four money laundering counts. The defendant appeals here, arguing; (1) that the trial court erroneously allowed the consolidation of indictments; (2) that although the trial court correctly dismissed four money-laundering counts, the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss the counts prior to trial, thus prejudicing the defendant; (3) that the trial court erroneously denied the defendant's motion to suppress the fruits of two search warrants executed at the defendant's home; (4) that the defendant's confrontation rights were violated by the introduction of hearsay at trial; (5) that the trial court erroneously refused to grant a mistrial; (6) that the trial court erroneously allowed the introduction of prior acts of the defendant at trial; and (7) that his sentence is excessive. The State also appeals here, arguing that the trial court's dismissal of the four money-laundering counts was erroneous. After a review of the record, we hold that the trial court erroneously dismissed the four money laundering counts, and those counts must be reinstated. As to the defendant's claims, we find no merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
