Donna Woods Hartman v. Patrick Erwin Hartman - Concurring
I concur in the results of the opinion written by Judge Clement under the facts of this case and also concur in the holding that the method of presenting evidence to the trial court characterized as a “mediation” or an “Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedure” qualifies as neither under Tenn. S. Ct. R. 31. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Demotto Linsey - Concurring
I concur with the majority opinion in all respects save its treatment of the question whether the appellant waived his right to review alleged sentencing error vis-a-vis Blakely v. Washington, 542 U. S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). First, a number of members of this Court, including the author of this concurring opinion, have concluded that Blakely review is not waived because the appellant failed to raise the issue at trial after Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000); was decided but before Blakely was decided, so long as the case was pending on direct appeal at the time of the Blakely decision. See e.g. State v. Ricky Grover Aaron, No. M2002-02288-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 1533825 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Jul. 8, 2004); State v. Charles Benson, No. M2003-02127-CCA-R3-CD, 2004WL2266801 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Oct. 8,2 004); State v. Julius E. Smith, No. E2003-01059-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 1606998 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, July 19, 2004); State v. Michael Wayne Poe, No. E2003-00417-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 wl 1607002 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, July 19, 2004). These cases rest on the proposition that Blakely establishes a new rule in this State with respect to sentencing, one that was not dictated by the existing precedent of Apprendi. State v. Ricky Gover Aaron, No. M2002-02288- |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marilyn MacLeod Reed v. John William Reed
This is a divorce case. Prior to their marriage, the parties entered into an antenuptial agreement, designed to keep separate all property brought into the marriage, as well as all property acquired during the marriage unless acquired jointly. The trial court granted Wife a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court classified and divided the parties' separate and marital property in accordance with the antenuptial agreement. As a result, Husband was allowed to retain much of his separate property and retirement. The trial court denied Wife's requests for alimony and attorney's fees. Wife has appealed. For the reasons stated below, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Demotto Linsey
The Appellant, Christopher Demotto Linsey, appeals from the judgment of the Montgomery County Circuit Court revoking his community corrections sentences. Linsey pled guilty to aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and theft of property over $1,000.00 and, for these convictions, he received an effective eight-year sentence to be served in the Community Corrections Program. On November 21, 2002, a warrant was issued, alleging that Linsey violated the terms of his community corrections agreement based upon new arrests for domestic assault and possession of illegal drugs for resale and of drug paraphernalia. Following a hearing, the trial court ordered revocation of his community corrections sentences, and further ordered that his sentence for aggravated robbery be increased to ten years and that he serve the remainder of his now effective ten-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Linsey argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to establish that a violation occurred, (2) the trial court, in resentencing him to ten years for aggravated robbery, failed to conduct a sentencing hearing as required by the 1989 Sentencing Act, and (3) his sentences are excessive in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Finding no reversible error, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terrance Cecil
A Maury County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Terrance Cecil, of possessing twenty-six grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to ten years to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Deborah Graham v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Deborah Graham, appeals the trial courts denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gloria J. Bevill v. Ellis M. Bevill, Sr.
This is a post-divorce case. The parties were divorced in 1999. The judgment of divorce awarded Gloria J. Bevill ("Wife") alimony in futuro of $1,750, subject to provisions pertaining to the retirement of her then-former spouse, Ellis M. Bevill, Sr. ("Husband"). In specific terms, the judgment provided that upon Husband's retirement, he was entitled to reduce the amount of his alimony payment to $1,300, subject, however, to a stipulation in the judgment providing that Husband's post-retirement earnings could affect the amount of his obligation. Husband retired and, pursuant to the divorce judgment, unilaterally reduced the amount of his monthly alimony payments. In response, Wife filed a petition to interpret the divorce judgment and/or modify the spousal support award. The trial court interpreted the divorce judgment as permitting an upward modification of Husband's alimony obligation. Upon review of the evidence, the trial court subsequently increased Wife's alimony award to $1,900 per month, in addition to awarding her attorney's fees. It is from this order that Husband appeals. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donna K. Buck
The defendant appeals her conviction for first degree premeditated murder. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction and contends that the trial court erred in disallowing cross-examination of an unavailable witness. We affirm the conviction. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. T.N.S.S.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of T.N.S.S. ("Mother") with respect to her three children, D.D.M. (DOB: February 10, 1989), D.S.Jr. (DOB: August 7, 1990), and D.J.S. (DOB: July 27, 1991). Mother appeals, arguing, inter alia, that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's dual findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the best interest of the children. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Davidson
The defendant, Anthony Davidson, appeals the trial court's order revoking his probation. The single issue presented for review is whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the remainder of the sentence to be served. The judgment is affirmed. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carolyn Marie Leasure White, et al. v. Timothy Wade Moody
This is the third appeal of a case involving a divorced father’s parental rights to his eleven-year-old daughter. The father maintained only sporadic contact with his daughter following his divorce from the child’s mother. After the child’s mother remarried, she and her new husband filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Robertson County seeking to terminate the father’s parental rights and to permit the mother’s new husband to adopt the child. We reversed the first order terminating the father’s parental rights because the trial court had failed to conduct the statutorily required best interests analysis. On remand, the trial court determined that terminating the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests without conducting an evidentiary hearing. We reversed the second termination order and remanded the case to enable the parties to present evidence. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered a third order terminating the father’s parental rights and granting the stepfather’s petition to adopt the child. The father has appealed the trial court’s conclusion that terminating his parental rights is in his daughter’s best interests. We have determined that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s decision. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Williamson
The Defendant, Anthony Williamson, was convicted by a jury of robbery. He was subsequently sentenced as a Range III offender to serve fifteen years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Finding the evidence legally sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Pamela D. Vickroy v. Pathways, Inc., Dyersburg, TN, Kimberly Bord, J. Forstlam, M.D. Methodist Hospital, Coleman Foss, Administrator, and Western Mental Health Institute
This case involves involuntary commitment to a mental institution. Paramedics were called to the plaintiff’s home by her roommate, and she was brought involuntarily to the hospital for evaluation. She was admitted to the emergency room and examined by the physician on duty. She was interviewed by a mental health clinician. The physician then went off duty and the defendant physician took charge. The defendant physician examined the patient’s chart, reviewed the history taken by the prior physician and the mental health clinician, and then signed a form committing the plaintiff to a mental institution. The form stated that the defendant physician had examined the plaintiff, but the plaintiff was examined only by the prior physician, who was no longer on duty. The plaintiff then sued the defendant physician for involuntarily committing her to a mental institution without personally examining her. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant physician, classifying the action as medical malpractice and finding that the plaintiff failed to offer competent expert proof as required under T.C.A. § 29-26-115. We affirm the grant of summary judgment as to claims of medical malpractice, and reverse the grant of summary judgment for the claims of negligence and false imprisonment, finding that T.C.A. § 36-6-402 requires that a physician or designated professional who commits a patient to a mental institution must first personally examine the patient, rather than relying exclusively on medical records or someone else’s examination of the patient. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court is Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jon Seiler
The Defendant, Jon Seiler, pled guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”), second offense. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, the Defendant reserved as a certified question of law the issue of whether the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mae Ellen Williams v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, et al. - Dissenting
This is a wrongful death action growing out of allegations of medical malpractice lodged against Dr. Becky C. Wright and Metropolitan Anesthesiologist Alliance. On December 7, 2000, surgery was performed on the decedent to remove her gallbladder. Ultimately, the decedent suffered irreversible encephalopathy and lingered in a comatose state for nearly a year and a half before she died on April 24, 2002. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Cynthia Lynn Alston Houston Johnston v. Walter Rex Houston
This is a child support case. The parties divorced in 1991 and were awarded joint custody of their three minor children. Since the divorce, the parties have been engaged in an ongoing legal battle over child support issues. In May 2002, the trial court confirmed the findings of a special master, resolving all disputes except for child support for years 2001, 2002, and 2003. In September 2003, the parties agreed to use the findings of the special master to calculate the remaining child support issues. The mother filed a proposed consent order. After she received no response, she filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted. The grant of summary judgment to the mother resolved the remaining issues. The father appealed the grant of summary judgment arguing, inter alia, that the report of the special master was “clearly erroneous.” We affirm the findings of the trial court with modifications, and grant the mother’s request for attorney’s fees. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Quentin Lewis v. Tony Parker, Warden
The Defendant, Quentin Lewis, appeals from an order of the trial court dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The allegations contained in the petition fail to establish either a void judgment or an expired sentence. The judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Edward Hutchinson, James Hutchinson, and Sharon Hutchinson v. Estate of Allien Day Morrison Nunn by and through Rebecca D. Ozier, Executrix
This is an action by remaindermen against a life tenant for property damage and waste to real property. The defendant’s decedent had a life estate in a 1,700 acre tract of land. In September 1995, she sold timber from the property to a timber company. At that time, a timber deed was registered in the county register’s office. The timber deed was later extended through October 1997. The decedent died in February 1998. The plaintiff remaindermen, who had received title to the property in fee simple at the death of the decedent, subsequently discovered that the deceased life tenant had clear-cut all of the timber from the property. In June 2000, the plaintiffs filed this action against the decedent’s estate, claiming damages from the clear-cutting of the property. The estate filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the claim was time-barred based on the applicable three-year statute of limitations. It asserted that the cause of action accrued in September 1995 when the timber deed was registered, because registration of that instrument constituted “notice to the world” under T.C.A. § 66-26-102. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the estate. The plaintiffs now appeal. We reverse, concluding that registration of the timber deed alone does not constitute constructive notice, and that genuine issues of material fact exist as to when the damage occurred and when the plaintiffs knew or should have known of it. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Terri Mitchell v. Saratoga Investment Company and William Leighton Reed
This case is about enforcement of a settlement agreement. In 1994, the parties entered into a joint agreement for the development of residential property. In 1996, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendants, alleging breach of contract. The parties attempted to reach a settlement agreement to resolve the dispute. This resulted in a written agreement signed only by the defendant. The defendant made some payments pursuant to the written agreement, but further disputes arose. The defendant moved to enforce the settlement agreement. The plaintiff alleged that she never agreed to the final settlement agreement. The trial court held that the written settlement agreement was binding on the parties. The plaintiff then appealed this ruling, again alleging that no settlement agreement ever existed, and, in the alternative, that the defendant breached the settlement agreement by not tendering the required payments. We vacate the order of the trial court, finding that even if a valid settlement agreement existed, the defendant breached the agreement by failing to tender the required payments. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Ivy
The Appellant, David Ivy, appeals as of right his sentence of death resulting from the June 2001 murder of Lakisha Thomas. On January 10, 2003, a Shelby County jury found Ivy guilty of premeditated first-degree murder. Following a separate sentencing hearing, the jury unanimously found the presence of two statutory aggravating circumstances, i.e., Ivy had previously been convicted of a violent felony offense and the murder was committed to avoid prosecution. The jury further determined that these aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances and imposed a sentence of death. The trial court approved the sentencing verdict. Ivy appeals, as of right, presenting for our review the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator, (2) whether the trial court improperly permitted hearsay statements of the victim to be admitted into evidence, (3) whether the trial court erred by impaneling an anonymous jury, (4) whether the trial court erred in refusing to permit the defense, during closing argument, to discuss the rationale behind the hearsay exclusion, (5) whether the trial court erred by preventing defense counsel from arguing “residual doubt” as a non-statutory mitigating circumstance, (6) whether the trial court erred by permitting the State to introduce evidence that Ivy had previously been charged with first degree murder, (7) whether the trial court’s instruction that Ivy’s prior offenses were offenses whose statutory elements involved the use of violence violated his right to trial by jury, (8) whether the death penalty imposed in this case violated due process because the indictment failed to allege the aggravators relied upon by the State, (9) whether the trial court erred in refusing to answer the jury’s questions as to the consequences if they were unable to reach an unanimous verdict as to punishment, and (10) whether Tennessee’s death penalty statutory scheme is unconstitutional. Finding no error requiring reversal, we affirm Ivy’s conviction and sentence of death. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Duke Bowers Clement v. Janet Leigh Traylor Clement
In an appeal from a final decree of divorce, Wife challenges trial court’s classification, |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Mae Ellen Williams, et al., v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, et al.
This is a medical malpractice case. Appellants appeal from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees, a doctor and her employer. The trial court found that the affidavit of Plaintiffs/Appellants’ expert was inadmissible because it was filed after the deadline for identifying experts and that such late filing was not excusable neglect under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 6.02. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Nashville Ford Tractor v. Great American Insurance Company
This appeal involves a dispute over the payment for leased construction equipment used on two sewer projects for the City of Gallatin. The general contractor was required to take over and complete the work after a subcontractor and sub-subcontractor defaulted. Thereafter, the company that had leased three pieces of construction equipment to the subcontractor and sub-subcontractor submitted claims for payment to the general contractor and the contractor's bonding company. The general contractor declined to pay for the equipment and filed suit for breach of contract against the subcontractor in the Circuit Court for Sumner County. The contractor also sought a declaratory judgment regarding its rights, as well as those of its bonding company, the subcontractor, and the City, under the construction contract, the subcontracts, and the payment bond. Following a two-day bench trial, the trial court awarded the equipment leasing company a $38,399 judgment against the bonding company and the sub-subcontractor and a $29,232 judgment against the subcontractor. The court also denied the equipment leasing company's request for pre-judgment interest because it had intentionally falsified documents during the collection process. The bonding company appealed. We have determined that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss all of the equipment leasing company's claims against the payment bond after expressly finding that the leasing company had committed fraud during the claims process. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment against the contractor's surety. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffery D. Hostetter
Defendant, Jeffery D. Hostetter, pled guilty to one count of furnishing intoxicating alcoholic beverages to a person under twenty-one years of age in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-15-404, a Class A misdemeanor, without a recommendation as to sentencing. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with fifty percent of the sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the period of confinement imposed by the trial court is excessive and inconsistent with sentencing principles, and the trial court improperly applied enhancement factors and failed to apply appropriate mitigating factors. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Estate of Clyde M. Fuller v. Samuel Evans, et al.
The issue in this case is whether the Counter-Plaintiff may testify at trial regarding transactions and conversations with the deceased Counter-Defendant when the deceased Counter-Defendant's pre-trial discovery deposition had been taken, but was incomplete. We hold that the trial court, pursuant to the Dead Man's Statute, properly prohibited the Counter-Plaintiff from testifying about transactions and conversations with the deceased Counter-Defendant. Therefore, we affirm the ruling of the trial court and remand. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals |