State of Tennessee v. John Whatley
The appellant, John Whatley, was convicted by a jury in the Maury County Circuit Court of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court sentenced the appellant to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's actions as thirteenth juror, the specificity of the indictment, the trial court's instructions regarding lesser-included offenses, the trial court's evidentiary rulings, sentencing, and the denial of his motion for new trial. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court; however, in light of Blakely v. Washington, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), we modify the appellant's sentence to eleven years. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Murrey Louis Wakefield, Deceased; AMSouth Bank and Judith Wakefield Sandlin, Co-Executors, Linda Wakefield Melvin and Judith Sandlin Melvin and Judith Sandlin v. Estate of Nancy Wakefield Coleman, et al.
This case involves the construction of a will. The will established a trust for the benefit of the decedent's children that provided income for eleven years. At the end of the eleven year term, the trust was to be terminated and the trust assets distributed to the beneficiaries. During the eleven-year term, one of the decedent's children died, leaving no spouse, children or surviving parent. The beneficiary under the deceased child's will sued, seeking that child's share of the trust assets. At issue was whether the trust assets vested in the beneficiaries when the testator died or when the trust terminated. The probate court held that the decedent intended for the trust corpus not to vest in the beneficiaries until the trust terminated, and that the beneficiary under the child's will would not receive her share of the trust assets. We affirm, finding that the language of the will indicates that the testator intended for the corpus of the trust to vest when the trust terminated. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of Michael Thomas Jones and Timothy Alan Jones Beverly Anne Jones v. Kevin Thomas Jones
This appeal involves the court's authority to order a parent to pay support for an adult disabled child. The parties were married with two severely disabled adult sons. In 1995, while the parties were still married, the probate court established them as co-conservators for their sons. In June 2001, the mother filed a petition for divorce in circuit court. Neither party informed the divorce court of the conservatorships that had been established for their sons. The circuit court entered a final decree of divorce which incorporated a parenting plan, submitted by the father, which provided for joint custody of the sons. The divorce decree required the mother to pay child support to the father. The divorce decree was not appealed. The mother later filed a motion requesting that the decree requiring her to pay child support be vacated pursuant to Rule 60.02(3), asserting that the divorce court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to require her to pay support for the adult sons. Rather than rule on the mother's motion, the divorce court transferred the case to the probate court, which had before it the conservatorship actions. The father then filed a motion in the probate court asking it to confirm the divorce decree entered by the divorce court. The probate court, in the same order, denied the mother's motion to vacate and granted the father's motion to confirm the decree adopting the parenting plan, determining that the divorce decree entered by the divorce court was valid. The mother now appeals that order. We reverse, concluding that the divorce court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to order the parent to pay support for the adult disabled children, but finding that the probate court is permitted to consider requiring the parents to pay support in the context of the conservatorship proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Karen Stowers Smith vs. Mark Edward Smith
Lisa Karen Stowers Hoffer, formerly Smith ("Mother"), filed a petition against her former husband, Mark Edward Smith ("Father"), seeking to modify the provisions of the parties' judgment of divorce, which judgment required Father to pay $1,200 per month in child support. The trial court, finding that, in the most recent three years, Father had had an average annual income of $117,238, held that there had been a substantial and material change in circumstances justifying an order requiring Father to pay child support of $2,803 per month. Father appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in its calculation of his income. We affirm in part and vacate in part. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, et al. v. 1998 Deliquent Taxpayers
This appeal stems from an action filed by the State of Tennessee, in its own behalf and for the use and benefit of Hamilton County and certain municipalities ("the state"), against property owners (collectively "the defendants") who had not paid their 1998 real estate taxes. Following the entry of a default judgment as to certain property, a delinquent tax sale was conducted at which Carlton Ditto and Positive Impact, Inc. ("the purchasers") bought a parcel of land. The purchase, however, was subsequently voided because the Hamilton County Property Assessor ("the Property Assessor") inadvertently reflected someone other than the true owner on its property rolls. As a consequence of this mistake, the true owner of the property was never made a party to the delinquent tax suit. The purchasers sought compensation for interest on the bid amount and the cost of recording the decree of sale. The purchasers also sought damages for the state's negligence. The trial court awarded interest on the bid amount and the cost of recording the decree, but refused to award damages for negligence. The state appeals. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Julia V. Lee and Robert Joe Lee v. State of Tennessee
This appeal stems from an action filed by the State of Tennessee, in its own behalf and for the use and benefit of Hamilton County and certain municipalities ("the state"), against property owners (collectively "the defendants") who had not paid their 1998 real estate taxes. Following the entry of a default judgment as to certain property, a delinquent tax sale was conducted at which Carlton Ditto and Positive Impact, Inc. ("the purchasers") bought a parcel of land. The purchase, however, was subsequently voided because the Hamilton County Property Assessor ("the Property Assessor") inadvertently reflected someone other than the true owner on its property rolls. As a consequence of this mistake, the true owner of the property was never made a party to the delinquent tax suit. The purchasers sought compensation for interest on the bid amount and the cost of recording the decree of sale. The purchasers also sought damages for the state's negligence. The trial court awarded interest on the bid amount and the cost of recording the decree, but refused to award damages for negligence. The state appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Biggs v. Reinsman Equestrian Products, Inc.
Plaintiff sued for breach of employment contract. The Trial Court found a breach and awarded damages. On appeal we hold the employer had just cause to terminate, and reverse Judgment. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Judy S. Parnell v. APCOM, Inc., et al.
Forty-six year old female employee who had worked for company for seventeen years filed this action against her employer after her position and employment were terminated. She claims her termination constituted a breach of contract and violated the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The trial court dismissed the THRA claim on summary judgment as time barred, holding that the savings statute did not apply to THRA claims. The remaining contract claims were tried and resulted in judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiff appeals. We find that the trial court erred by holding the savings statute inapplicable to THRA claims against private employers. We also find that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the THRA. We affirm the trial court in all other respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Louis Hudson Roberts v. Mary Elizabeth Todd, et al.
This is an appeal from a trial court's denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment. We Affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Freddie William Lewis
The appellee, Freddie William Lewis, was indicted for custodial interference after allegations arose that he moved his child to another state in violation of a juvenile court order. The appellee filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that a default judgment taken against him in juvenile court on the paternity petition, which later formed the basis for the indictment, was void. The trial court dismissed the indictment after a hearing. The State appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in dismissing the indictment. We determine that the trial court erred in dismissing the indictment because the default judgment was not void, but merely voidable. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, reinstate the indictment and remand the case for trial |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Deborah B. Hall Byrd v. Danny K. Byrd
This is an appeal from a decree of legal separation, involving issues of division of marital property and debt, alimony, and attorney fees. Wife appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Donald Branch v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Donald Branch, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his aggravated vehicular homicide convictions, arguing that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to cite reported criminal law cases when arguing for a jury instruction on proximate causation and that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to supplement his appellate brief with State v. Farner, 66 S.W.3d 188 (Tenn. 2001), and for failing to raise as an issue on direct appeal the trial judge’s refusal to recuse himself. While the post-conviction appeal was pending, the petitioner sought and received permission to raise as an additional issue the impact of the United States Supreme Court’s Blakely v. Washington opinion on the sentencing in his case. Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we conclude that the petitioner has not met his burden of demonstrating either a deficiency in counsel’s representation or resulting prejudice to his case. We further conclude that Blakely does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William (Bill) Graves, et ux. v. Jeremy S. Jeter, et al.
This is a personal injury case arising from an automobile accident. Defendant/Appellee was traveling at an excessive rate of speed and attempted to pass Plaintiffs/Appellants’ vehicle in a no pass zone as Plaintiffs/Appellants were making a left-hand turn into their driveway. Following a bench trial, the trial court found Plaintiff/Appellant driver 40% at a fault for the accident and Defendant/Appellee 60% at fault. Plaintiffs/Appellants appeal on issues of fault and damages. We affirm as modified herein. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Ray Thompson
The Defendant, John Ray Thompson, appeals his convictions from two separate jury trials, where he was convicted of seventeen crimes involving his sexual contact with three minor girls. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of eighty years for his convictions in both trials, of which sixty-nine years must be served at 100%. On appeal, he contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain three of his convictions; (2) the State failed to elect facts to support two of his convictions; and (3) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After throughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm all of the Defendant’s convictions in both trials except for two of his convictions for sexual battery because the jury was improperly instructed on those counts, and the instructional error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, we hold that the trial court improperly enhanced the Defendant’s sentences in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and we reduce the Defendant’s sentence in accordance with this opinion to an effective sentence of sixty-eight years, sixty of which must be served at 100%. We remand the case for the entry of appropriate judgments of conviction. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tezozomoc "Ted" Alcantar, et al. v. Haulers Insurance Company
This is an action against an insurance company that is alleged to have breached its duties to an insured by failing to provide a defense in a prior personal injury action, wherein a substantial default judgment was entered against the insured. The former plaintiffs, now judgment creditors, and the purported insured, now judgment debtor, have joined forces as plaintiffs in this action to recover damages, including the amount of the default judgment, the purported insured suffered due to the insurer's refusal to provide a defense. The trial court dismissed the action on a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12 motion for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. We affirm. The judgment on which this action is based is void, because the relief granted therein by default judgment exceeded the relief sought. In the alternative, if the previous judgment on which this action is based is valid, the purported insured is not afforded coverage; the policy excluded injury or damage expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured and it was held in the previous judgment that the purported insured intended the collision and the Alcantars' injuries. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: S.C.H.
The mother of a three year old girl asked the court to deny the girl's father any visitation with the child because she believed that the father had sexually abused the child. The trial court did not find that the evidence conclusively proved abuse, but denied the father any visitation or other contact with his daughter, stating, "I have to side with the protection of the child." Because the trial court did not make the requisite findings to support elimination of all visitation, we must vacate the judgment. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stanley Earl Cates
The Appellant, Stanley Earl Cates, was convicted by an Anderson County jury of aggravated robbery and sentenced to eight years imprisonment. On appeal, Cates raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress, (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict, (3) whether the trial court erred by requiring him to provide a voice exemplar before the jury, (4) whether the trial court erred in giving sequential jury instructions, and (5) whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to sentence him as an especially mitigated offender. After review, we find that Cates' issues are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the Anderson County Criminal Court is affirmed. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerry Britt v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jerry Britt, entered Alford pleas in 1996 to three counts of attempted rape of a child and guilty pleas to one count of possession with intent to sell or deliver a Schedule II controlled substance, one count of possession with intent to sell or deliver a Schedule IV controlled substance, and six counts of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance, and received an effective sentence as a Range I, standard offender of forty-eight years in the Department of Correction. He appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that the trial court should have granted him relief based on newly discovered evidence, the victim's recantation testimony. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court dismissing the petition. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Billy Gene Gray v. Cullom Machine Tool & Die, Inc., et al.
We granted review in this workers' compensation case to determine whether the trial court erred in 1) awarding temporary total benefits, 2) apportioning liability between the employer and the Second Injury Fund, and 3) awarding 180 weeks of lump-sum benefits. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the trial court erred in awarding temporary total benefits to the employee who continued to work for the employer following his injury and then later operated his own unprofitable business. We also hold that the trial court erred in limiting the employer's liability for permanent total disability benefits to 60% of 400 weeks and in awarding 180 weeks of lump sum benefits. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
Byron Edwards v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Byron Edwards, appeals the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition fails to establish either a void judgment or an expired sentence. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gerald Pendleton
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant of first degree felony murder, aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, and perjury. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for felony murder; and (2) he was denied a fair trial because an expert witness for the State did not disclose to the jury that the witness was himself the subject of a federal criminal investigation. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Herbert F. and Shirel H. Pitz v. Donald E. and Dorothy D. Woodruff
This case involves claims of fraud arising out of the sale of a house. The plaintiff purchasers signed a contract to buy a house owned by the defendants. The contract to sell contained an "as is" clause, allowing inspection of the property but requiring the sale to be "as is." The purchasers did not inspect the house further before the closing. After the purchasers took possession, they noticed several defects in the house that were not disclosed by the sellers. The purchasers sued the sellers, alleging that the sellers had made material misrepresentations of fact and had fraudulently concealed or failed to disclose material defects in the house. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the sellers. It concluded that, although the sellers had made material misrepresentations of fact, the purchasers' reliance on those representations was not reasonable because of the "as is" provision in the contract and because the defects were either apparent or readily discoverable. The purchasers now appeal. We affirm, finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's conclusion that the purchasers' reliance was not reasonable. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Ames Davis, Administrator of the Estate of Mary Reeves v. W. Terry Davis
This case involves a claim for reimbursement against an estate. A trust was established during the decedent's lifetime to pay for her needs. Before the decedent died, her husband paid for her needs, in part to preserve trust property. After her death, the husband filed a claim against the wife's estate seeking reimbursement for his payments for the healthcare and support of the wife. The trial court found that the payments were made to protect the wife's trust property, as well as for the care and support of the wife, and would have been paid by the trustee but for lack of assets, and the wife's estate was the successor-in-interest to the remaining assets of the trust. Consequently, the trial court sustained the husband's claim against the wife's estate. The wife's estate now appeals. We affirm, finding the expenses paid by husband constitute a valid claim against the wife's estate. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Betty Lonora McMillin Whalen v. David Wesley Whalen
The issues in this case are whether the trial court's award of alimony to the wife was excessive because the husband's income may be diminished when he retires from his current employment and whether the trial court's award to wife for her attorney's fees and expenses was erroneous. Upon a finding that the time of the husband's retirement is uncertain and a further finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the wife attorney's fees and expenses, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as rendered and remand. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Walter Miller, et al., v. State Farm Insurance Company
Plaintiffs appeal an adverse judgment from the general sessions court to the circuit court for a trial de novo pursuant to T.C.A. § 27-5-108 (Supp. 2004). On motion of defendant, the circuit court transferred the case to the chancery court because a previous suit filed in the chancery court on the same cause of action was voluntarily dismissed by plaintiff. The chancery court granted defendant’s motion to adopt the findings of the special master filed in the previous chancery court suit and then granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs have appealed. We vacate and remand to the circuit court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |