State of Tennessee v. Erick Darnell Bailey
M2001-01974-CCA-MR3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Seth W. Norman

The defendant, Erick Darnell Bailey, appeals his first-degree murder convictions imposed following a jury trial in the Davidson County Criminal Court. The defendant was tried and convicted on both felony-murder and premeditated-murder counts in the indictment, and the  trial court merged the convictions into a single conviction of first-degree murder. The single issue raised on appeal is whether the convicting evidence is sufficient to support the verdicts. We modify the conviction for premeditated murder to second-degree murder and affirm the conviction for first-degree, felony murder. The second-degree  murder conviction merges into the felony murder conviction.

State of Tennessee v. Floyd Earl Rayner, III
M2001-00971-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Seth W. Norman

The defendant, Floyd Earl Rayner, III appeals from his five convictions of rape of a child and five convictions of aggravated sexual battery, claiming that the trial court (1) failed to fulfill its duty as the "thirteenth juror" and (2) erred in its sentencing determinations by not applying mitigating factors in establishing the length of his sentences and in ordering partial consecutive service of the sentences. Because we hold that the trial court discharged its "thirteenth juror" responsibility and that the sentencing issues have been waived, we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Matric Becton & Antonio Sykes
W1999-00581-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph B. Dailey
The Defendants, Matrin Becton and Antonio Sykes, were convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder, especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. Both defendants were sentenced by the same jury to life without the possibility of parole for the first degree murder. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced both defendants to twenty-five (25) years for each of the remaining counts and ordered all the sentences to run consecutively, for effective sentences of life without parole plus seventy-five (75) years. On appeal, Defendant Sykes contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict and that the trial court erred in allowing testimony concerning a statement made by the victim prior to his death. Defendant Becton argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion to sever, erred in allowing certain photographs into evidence, erred in charging the jury both in the guilt and sentencing phases, and erred in imposing consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Matric Becton & Antonio Sykes - Concurring
W1999-00581-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph B. Dailey

I join with the majority on all issues with the exception of their holding that the hearsay statement of the victim was admissible. The majority finds that the deceased victim's statement "that he was tired of the lifestyle, being in that environment, and he didn't want to be a part of it anymore" was admissible to establish the victim's existing state of mind.

State of Tennessee v. Kenneth A. Phillips a/k/a Kenneth Arnold Phillips a/k/a Kenny Dent
W2001-01831-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III
The defendant was convicted by a Tipton County jury of theft of property valued over $1000, a Class D felony. After a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced as a Range II multiple offender to five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's verdict, (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a prior bad act, (3) the defendant was identified from an impermissibly suggestive lineup, and (4) the defendant was never informed of the existence of a possibly exculpatory videotape. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Frank Porter v. Ralph Freedle
M2001-01892-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Walter C. Kurtz
This appeal involves a dispute over a roadway easement and interests in the use of a spring and springhouse. The chancery court determined that appellants abandoned the interest in the roadway easement and access to a spring and springhouse and dismissed appellants' suit for an injunction. Appellants challenge the chancery court's decision that the rights were abandoned. As discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the chancery court that there was clear, unequivocal evidence that appellants abandoned any interest.

James Kelley v. John Cage
M2001-00702-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Jane W. Wheatcraft
Trial Court Judge: Barbara N. Haynes
This appeal involves the granting of a summary judgment motion in a medical malpractice case. The issue is whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the basis that there was never a physician/patient relationship between the decedent, Lillie Donnette Kelley, and Dr. John Cage, a cardiologist, and an employee of Mid-State Cardiology Associates, P.C..

Patrick McGee v. Timothy Best
M2001-01365-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
This case involves the termination of membership and employment of a member of an LLC. The terminated member and employee filed suit against the LLC and the other members thereof alleging breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, unfair competition, fraud, and misrepresentation. The trial court granted defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings as to all claims except the claim for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Thereafter, the trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the remaining two claims. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm, modify, reverse in part, and remand.

State of Tennessee v. Eric B. Blakemore
W2001-01929-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carolyn Wade Blackett

The Appellant, Eric B. Blakemore, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of second degree murder and one count of attempted second degree murder. After a sentencing hearing, Blakemore received concurrent sentences of twenty-two years for the murder conviction and ten years for the attempted murder conviction. On appeal, Blakemore asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder. Specifically, he argues that the evidence presented supports the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter. After review, we find the evidence legally sufficient; accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. David Tyrone Dowell
W2001-02161-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

The defendant, David Tyrone Dowell, appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court on his guilty-plea-based aggravated assault conviction. Because the record supports the trial court's sentencing determination, we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Brenda Lee Hicks
E2001-00990-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Douglas A. Meyer

The defendant, Brenda Lee Hicks, was convicted of vehicular homicide and entered a plea of guilt to one count of driving without a license. The trial court imposed a sentence of six years for the vehicular homicide and ordered service of 11 months and 29 days in jail. The balance of the sentence is to be served on supervised probation. The trial court imposed a concurrent sentence of 30 days incarceration for the charge of driving without a license. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the vehicular homicide conviction and questions the propriety of the sentence for that offense. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

James Hannah v. Yellow Freight System, Inc.
M2001-00617-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Chancellor
In this appeal, the appellant insists the trial court erred in (1) allowing an attorney's fee on 2 percent of the actual recovery, instead of on what the claimant would have recovered if he had lived to age 65, (2) refusing to award bad faith penalties, (3) determining the injured employee's average weekly wage, (4) disallowing unauthorized medical and drug expenses, and (4) disallowing benefits beyond the death of the injured worker. As discussed below, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and the cause remanded for further consideration only of the attorney fee issue.

Freeman Decorating Company v. Joseph W. Bowers
M2001-01750-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr., Chancellor
The trial judge found the plaintiff had suffered no compensable injury. The trial judge made contingent findings that if the injury was compensable the plaintiff would be entitled to ten percent (1%) vocational impairment to the body as a whole and that the defendants average weekly wage was $15.6. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Daniel Keith Lindeman v. Charles Sain,
M2000-01803-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Corlew, Chancellor
The trial court found that plaintiff was injured as a result of a work-related accident, was an employee of defendant Charles Sain d/b/a Sain Drywall [hereafter Sain] at the time of the accident and that Sain was a subcontractor of the defendant Summar Construction, LLC. The court further found that Sain had employed five or more people at one time and was subject to the requirement of the Worker's Compensation Act and that Sain would be responsible to Summar Construction for any payment made by them to the plaintiff for his injuries. We reverse the judgment which makes Sain liable and affirm the judgment as to Summar Construction, LLC.

State of Tennessee v. Frederick Devill Rice
E2000-02389-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stephen M. Bevil

The defendant, Fredrick Devill Rice, was convicted by a Hamilton County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder. The trial court merged the two convictions and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment. The defendant appeals, claiming that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his merged convictions; (2) the trial court erred by admitting a videotaped search of the defendant's residence into evidence; and (3) the state argued outside of the record twice during closing argument. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. David W. Bass
E2001-01146-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge E. Eugene Eblen

The defendant, David W. Bass, was indicted for driving under the influence, violation of the implied consent law, failure to appear, and operating a motor vehicle with an improper taillight. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant entered a plea of guilt to driving under the influence, first offense. After the entry of his plea but before sentencing, the defendant sought to withdraw his plea, arguing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. The trial court denied the motion and imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with all but three days suspended. In this appeal of right, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Richard Lynn Norton v. Ricky Bell, Warden - Order
M2001-02516-CCA-R3-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton

The petitioner appeals pro se from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denying him habeas corpus relief from his three 1999 convictions for the sale or delivery of more than one-half gram of crack cocaine for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-four  years. The petitioner contends that the convictions are void because the presentment “does not charge the overt act, offense of knowingly possession with intent to sell or deliver a Schedule II controlled substance, and nor, does it charge, knowingly possessed a Schedule II controlled substance, exceeding one-half gram.” He also asserts that evidence “seized and manufactured through an informant, after-the-fact, through inducement” is insufficient to show probable cause in Tennessee. The trial court denied relief.

Cumecus R. Cates v. State of Tennessee
E2001-01408-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mary Beth Leibowitz

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner pled guilty to four felony drug offenses and received an effective sentence of sixteen years. After a hearing, the trial court ordered the sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the trial court dismissed without a hearing for failure to state a colorable claim. Concluding that the Petitioner stated a colorable claim, we reverse and remand for a hearing.

Eugene Osborne v. State Industries, Inc.
M2001-01288-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: James L. Weatherford, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Allen W. Wallace, Judge
The plaintiff, who claimed that he injured his back at work while painting traffic lines with a line striker, appeals the judgment of the trial court dismissing the case after finding that the plaintiff failed to prove he suffered an accident or injury arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment. We hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Gregory Dunnorm
E2001-00566-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge James B. Scott, Jr.
The defendant, Gregory Dunnorm, was convicted of Class D felony evading arrest, the simple assault of LaDeana Ellis, vandalism, and second offense driving on a suspended license. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-16-603, 39-13-301, 39-14-408, 55-50-504. He had been charged with the aggravated assault of LaDeana Ellis and was acquitted on charges of simple assault of Sonda Ellis and aggravated assault of Officer Karen Wehenkel. While granting supervised probation, the trial court sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of two years for evading arrest and 11 months, 29 days for each of the misdemeanor convictions. In this appeal of right, the defendant asserts (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions for evading arrest, assault, and vandalism; (2) that the trial court erred by permitting the state to cross-examine the defendant regarding his affidavit of income; (3) that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding the lesser included offenses of Class D felony evading arrest; and (4) that the trial court erred by declining to instruct the jury on the defense of effective consent. Because the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for Class D felony evading arrest and because the trial court erred by failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of Class E felony evading arrest, the conviction is reversed and the cause remanded. Otherwise, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Gregory Dunnorm - Concurring
E2001-00566-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge James B. Scott, Jr.
I concur with the majority opinion, but I believe that neither Rule 613 nor Rule 608, Tenn. R. Evid., allowed use of extrinsic evidence of the defendant’s lying on the affidavit of income. As the majority opinion notes, Rule 608 allows a party to cross-examine a witness about specific instances of conduct for the purpose of attacking the witness’s credibility, but it bars extrinsic evidence of such conduct if the witness denies that it occurred. I also believe, though, that such an exclusion applied to Rule 613 in this case.

Jewel Powers v. Johnson Controls,
W2001-00524-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris, Chancellor
In this appeal, the Second Injury Fund insists (1) the claim is barred by the one-year statute of limitations, (2) the employer is judicially estopped from asserting it had actual notice of the employee's pre-existing disability, when it denied such knowledge in its answer, and (3) the trial court erred in its apportionment of liability between the Fund and the employer. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed

Mary Barnett v. S&R of Tennessee,
W2001-01984-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Dewey Whitenton, Chancellor
In this appeal, the employer insists the evidence preponderates against the trial court's findings (1) that the claimant suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of employment, and (2) the trial court's finding that the injury is permanent. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the award should be modified to one based on 15 percent to both arms, but otherwise affirmed.

Faye Butterfield v. Crawford & Company
W2001-01178-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris, Chancellor
In this appeal, the employer-appellant insists the trial court erred in (1) considering an evaluating physician's opinion of the extent of the employee's medical impairment, as not being based on statutorily approved guidelines, and (2) the award of permanent partial disability benefits based on 42 percent to the body as a whole is excessive under the circumstances. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the award exceeds the maximum prescribed by statute and the judgment should be vacated and the cause remanded with instructions.

Robert Anthony Payne v. State of Tennessee
M2001-01994-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Seth W. Norman

The petitioner appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to timely discover the existence of another individual who was questioned regarding the aggravated assault and for failing to interview or cross-examine the victim of the assault. After review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.