Margaret Henry v. Cedar Creek Home Health Agency 01S01-9707-CV-00150
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. John A. Turnbull,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The trial judge dismissed the plaintiff's case and held there was no evidence that two vaginal prolapses suffered by the plaintiff were caused by her work. We affirm the judgment.
Henry
Workers Compensation Panel
Anthony Johnson v. The Travelers Ins. Co . 01S01-9706-CH-00125
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Anthony Johnson,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue in this case is whether the plaintiff forfeited the right to have the defendant pay for future medical expenses, if any are required, for a compensable injury for failure to have an annual physical examination as provided for in the settlement of the plaintiff's compensation claim against the defendant. Under the circumstances in this case, we find the plaintiff has not forfeited this right. The relevant part of the settlement order, which was entered on December 7, 1993 in the trial court provided: "The defendant has paid all of the plaintiff's medical bills to date, which total $63,298.23. In addition to the medical benefits heretofore provided to the plaintiff, the defendant shall continue to pay all reasonable and necessary medical and hospital expenses for medical care and treatment, which is directly related to the aforesaid work related accidental injury provided such medical treatment is performed by or prescribed by Dr. Thornton Perkins, an orthopaedic specialist in Chattanooga, Tennessee, or another physician mutually selected by the parties under the procedure set forth in the W orkers' Compensation Act. The duty of the defendant to continue to provide the aforesaid medical benefits to the plaintiff shall be contingent upon the plaintiff being examined at least one (1) time annually by Dr. Thornton Perkins or such other mutually selected physician. The failure of the plaintiff to undergo the annual examination by Dr. Perkins or such other physician as the parties may select under the procedure set forth in the W orkers' Compensation Act shall result in the plaintiff forfeiting his rights to receive such future medical treatment and shall terminate the defendant's obligation to provide the same." On December 9, 1995, the plaintiff filed a "petition to enforce settlement agreement" in which he alleged the defendant had refused to pay for medical treatment as required by the order of December 7, 1993. The trial court held a hearing on the petition on September 1, 1996 at which no testimony was taken. The matter was presented to the court on statement of counsel. The record is necessarily sparse on the proceeding and the relevant matters are contained in the pleadings. From this we find the order of settlement was filed December 7, 1993, that the petition to enforce the settlement agreement was filed on December 9, 1995, and that the trial judge held a hearing on the petition on September 1, 1996 and entered an order thereon on February 4, 1997. Further, we 2
Johnson
Workers Compensation Panel
Ralph D. West v. Sonic Drive-In, et al. 01S01-9704-CH-00099
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. C. K. Smith,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This case is here in a different position than most appeals. On October 31, 1995, a judgment awarding the plaintiff compensation was entered in the Chancery Court of Smith County. After review by a Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel and the Supreme Court, the judgment entered in Smith County was modified and affirmed. On December 4, 1996, an order in conformity with previous proceedings was entered in Smith County. Among other things, the final judgment provided that the defendants would furnish medical treatment for the plaintiff, required as a result of the injury subject to the proceedings hereafter had. On December 6, 1996, the plaintiff filed a motion for medical treatment and alleged the defendants had refused to furnish medical treatment as required. The plaintiff asked the trial court to order the defendants to furnish a list of three physicians from which he could select a physician for treatments. The defendants responded to the motion and say they are willing to furnish medical treatment to the plaintiff for treatments necessary to treat the plaintiff for residual problems from the November 27, 1991 accident which is the subject injury in this case. The defendants asked the court to order the plaintiff to produce his medical records and submit to an examination by a specialist to make an initial determination of whether the complaints of the plaintiff are related to the November 27, 1991 injury. In response to the pleadings, the trial judge entered the following order: This cause came on to be heard on this the 21st day of February, 1997, upon the motion of Plaintiff for a panel of three (3) physicians to treat the Plaintiff's injuries received at Sonic Drive-In, to-wit, ruptured disc at L5-S1. And after argument, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff should execute a release for Defendant to obtain any medical related to his back injury since November, 1991, within five (5) days and that Defendant shall furnish the panel of treating physicians to Plaintiff from Smith or contiguous counties. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendant shall furnish to Plaintiff a panel of treating physicians from Smith or contiguous counties and Plaintiff shall furnish to Defendant a release 2
Smith
Workers Compensation Panel
Linda Sue White v. Eaton Corp. 01S01-9709-CH-00203
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Tyrus H. Cobb,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The only issue raised in this case is whether the award of 35 percent permanent disability to the plaintiff's right arm is excessive. We find that it is not and affirm the judgment of the trial court. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). At the time of the trial, the plaintiff was 33 years of age; she had graduated from high school; she had two years of training as a nursing assistant; and she had served four years in the U.S. Navy, where she was trained and worked as a dental assistant. The plaintiff began work for the defendant on June 23, 1993, and on July 19, 1993, she began work on the production line. This work required considerable use of the hands and the use of tools. Soon after commencing this work, the plaintiff began to experience pain in her right wrist. On August 9, 1993, the defendant sent the plaintiff to Dr. Samuel Sells. Dr. Sells diagnosed the plaintiff's problem as carpal tunnel syndrome. The plaintiff was assigned another job and was sent or went again to see Dr. Sells on February 4, 1994 for pain in her left and right arms. Dr. Sells advised the plaintiff to stay off from work until February 27, 1994. On June 26, 1994, the plaintiff left work because, according to the record, she was unable to find a day care facility for her child.1 Dr. Sells referred the plaintiff to Dr. James K. Lanter, a hand surgeon. Dr. Lanter saw the plaintiff on March 17, 1994 and diagnosed her condition as DeQuervain's tenosynovitis in 1 The plaintiff testified she asked for that entry to be made on her discharge sheet rather than discharge for injury in order to help her in future job searches. 2
Teresa M. Mccarley Johnson v. Maury Regional Hospital, M1999-00291-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Loser, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Jim T. Hamilton, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The employee or claimant, Johnson, filed this civil action on April 2, 1998 to recover benefits for injuries which she alleged resulted from an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment by the employer. By its answer, the employer denied the occurrence of a compensable work related injury. Following a trial, the trial judge found that the claimant suffered a ruptured disc arising out of and in the course of employment and awarded, among other things, permanent partial disability benefits based on fifty-four percent to the bodyas a whole. As discussed below, this tribunal has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). This standard requires the panel to examine in depth a trial court's factual findings and conclusions. We are not bound by the trial court's factual findings, but must instead conduct an independent examination to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
