Thomas David Caldwell v. Davina Kay Duke Caldwell
E2005-00139-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge John B. Hagler

Thomas David Caldwell ("Father") filed a complaint for divorce from his wife of ten years, Davina Kay Duke Caldwell ("Mother"). The trial court, inter alia, awarded the parties a divorce, named Mother primary residential parent of the parties' minor child, and divided the parties' marital property. Father appeals both the custody determination and the division of marital property. We affirm.

Bradley Court of Appeals

Leslie Randolph (Walker) Brown v. Ralph Truman Brown, Jr.
E2005-00464-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge L. Marie Williams

The wife sued for back child support on the basis that the parties' Marital Dissolution Agreement provided for a percentage of the husband's income which had not been paid. The Trial Court refused to award back support. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

Kathryn Headrick v. Bradley County Memorial Hospital, et al.
E2005-00925-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lawrence H. Puckett

In this appeal, the issue presented is whether a party has standing to pursue a personal injury claim in state court that accrued after the filing of the party’s bankruptcy petition and before the closing of the bankruptcy case. Ms. Headrick filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. While the bankruptcy case was pending, Ms. Headrick was involved in a single car accident and was treated for her injuries by Dr. Daniel Johnson at Bradley County Memorial Hospital. Subsequently, she converted her Chapter 13 bankruptcy case to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. While the Chapter 7 case was still pending, she discovered that she suffered a hip fracture in the car accident which she alleges that Dr. Johnson and the Hospital failed to timely diagnose and treat. Thereafter, Ms. Headrick received a discharge in bankruptcy and the bankruptcy case was closed. Ms. Headrick then filed a medical negligence case against Dr. Johnson and Bradley Memorial Hospital. The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that Ms. Headrick did not have standing to bring the case. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case. After review of the record and applicable authorities, we hold that Ms. Headrick’s post-bankruptcy cause of action is not part of the bankruptcy estate and therefore, as a matter of law Ms. Headrick did have standing to bring the lawsuit. The trial court’s decision is reversed.

Bradley Court of Appeals

Rahim Al Zarkani v. David G. Mills, State of Tennessee
W2005-01103-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

The Petitioner, Rahim Al Zarkani, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Lauderdale Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Alfonzo Thomas Peck
E2005-00342-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rebecca J. Stern

A Hamilton County jury convicted the defendant, Alfonzo Thomas Peck, of two counts of aggravated rape (a Class A felony), and the trial court sentenced him as a repeat violent offender to concurrent sentences of life without the possibility of release. On direct appeal, the defendant raises multiple issues for our review, including the sufficiency of the evidence, challenges to the admission of a prior conviction, a limiting instruction, and sentencing. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court erred in allowing the defendant to be cross-examined regarding his prior conviction of aggravated rape. However, given the overwhelming proof of the defendant's guilt notwithstanding the conviction, we further conclude that the error was harmless. Moreover, we find no error in the balance of the issues presented. Therefore, we affirm.

Hamilton Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. William G. Arterburn
E2005-00596-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge James E. Beckner

A Hamblen County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, William G. Arterburn, of driving under the influence, second offense ("DUI"), a Class A misdemeanor, and driving on a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the DUI and six months for the driving on a revoked license, ordering the defendant to serve fifty percent of his sentence in incarceration. The defendant appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient and that a rebuttal witness violated Rule 615 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, thereby denying him a fair trial. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Hamblen Court of Criminal Appeals

Joel T. Shuman v. Sharon Louise Alder Shuman
E2005-00846-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bill Swann

After the divorce where the wife was awarded alimony for two years, the wife petitioned the Court for alimony in futuro, which the Trial Court granted. On appeal, we affirm.

Knox Court of Appeals

Pamela C. Lichtenwalter v. Chris Edward Lichtenwalter
M2003-03115-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Muriel Robinson

This appeal illustrates the problems that befall divorcing parents when they agree, without court approval, to a child support arrangement that is inconsistent with the Child Support Guidelines. Five years after the parents' divorce, the mother filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Davidson County seeking to increase the father's child support obligation. The trial court approved a formula devised by the parties that did not comply with the Child Support Guidelines. The parties later ignored that formula and followed another ad hoc arrangement for approximately ten years. Eventually, the mother filed a petition in the trial court seeking to hold the father in contempt for failing to pay child support and to collect the arrearage. The trial court turned the matter over to a substitute judge who determined that the father was not in contempt because both parties had followed their formula to the best of their abilities even though it was ambiguous. The trial court also set the father's support for the remaining minor child and directed the father to pay $2,375 in additional support for that child. The mother appealed. We have determined that the father owes $64,529 in back child support and that the parties' three children are entitled to this arrearage. Therefore, we vacate the portion of the judgment regarding back child support and remand the case for the entry of an appropriate payment plan.

Davidson Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Al M. Williams
W2004-01679-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph B. Dailey

The defendant was convicted of attempted second degree murder and sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to confinement for nineteen years to be served consecutively to two prior sentences. In his appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in allowing hearsay testimony as to the desire of one of the witnesses, prior to the incident, to leave the house where the offense occurred, and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

Curtis Lee Cantrell v. Jami Lynn Cantrell
M2003-01075-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor J. B. Cox

This appeal arises from a divorce case. After ten years of marriage, the husband filed a divorce complaint in the Chancery Court for Lincoln County. Even though both parties sought to be the primary residential parent prior to the trial, the court placed the children in the husband's custody after the wife attempted suicide. After conducting a bench trial, the court designated the father as the primary residential parent and granted the mother unsupervised visitation. On this appeal, the mother asserts that the trial court erred with regard to the custody of the children and the division of marital assets. She also insists that the trial court erred by holding her in criminal contempt. While we reverse the trial court's finding that the mother was in criminal contempt, we affirm the court's decisions regarding custody and the division of the marital estate.

Lincoln Court of Appeals

Michael Sims v. Brenda Williams
M2004-02532-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Samuel E. Benningfield

The trial court found a divorced father guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced him to ninety days in jail after a hearing on the mother's petition for contempt at which the father failed to appear. We reverse because the father did not receive notice of the contempt proceedings sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 42 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure.

White Court of Appeals

Michael Lynn Younger v. State of Tennessee
W2005-02080-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Commissioner Nancy Miller-Herron

Appellant, an inmate who was housed in a prison operated by a private prison operating company, filed a claim against the State for medical malpractice with the Claims Commission pursuant to T.C.A. § 9-8-307. The Claims Commission dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction because the treating physicians and staff allegedly responsible for the injuries to Appellant were not “state employees,” as defined by T.C.A. § 8-42-101(3)(A). We affirm.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Tim Holt v. State of Tennessee
E2005-00587-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge James E. Beckner

The Appellant, Tim Holt, appeals the judgment of the Hancock County Criminal Court denying post-conviction relief. Holt was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Holt argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. After review, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Hancock Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Norman Kyle Lewis
E2005-00766-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Cupp

The Appellant, Norman Kyle Lewis, was convicted by a Washington County jury of attempted first degree murder and was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Lewis argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. After review of the record, we conclude that the convicting evidence was legally sufficient. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Washington Court of Criminal Appeals

John W. Foster v. Gallagher-Basset Insurance, et al.
M2004-02348-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Donald P. Harris
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor C. K. Smith

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of
findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer asserts that the evidence
preponderates against the trial court’s award to the employee of 50% permanent partial disability to body as a whole. The employer also argues that the trial court erred in requiring it to pay the
employee $1,302.00 for unauthorized chiropractic treatment. We conclude that the medical evidence preponderates against the trial court’s rulings, and in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(2), reverse the judgment of the trial court as to both issues.

Wilson Workers Compensation Panel

XL Sports, LTD. v. $1,060.000 Plus Interest Traceable to Respondent, RES, and Jerry Lawler
W2005-00689-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor D. J. Alissandratos

Following a transaction involving the sale of a business, the plaintiff filed suit against several defendants in federal court alleging causes of action grounded in federal and state law. The federal jury found some of the defendants liable, but they concluded that one of the defendants did not engage in any wrongdoing during the transaction at issue. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed suit in a Tennessee chancery court seeking to impose a constructive trust over funds held by the defendant exonerated by the jury. The defendant removed the case to the federal district court. The district court determined that the claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The plaintiff appealed to the federal court of appeals, which ruled that the case was not properly removable, as it only presented a claim based upon state law. On remand to the chancery court, the defendant asserted the affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The chancery court subsequently granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. The defendant appealed to this Court. We reverse the chancellor’s grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff, and we hold that the plaintiff’s claim for a constructive trust is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Accordingly, we dismiss the case in its entirety.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Gregory Hedges v. David Mills, Warden
W2005-01523-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

The Petitioner Gregory Hedges appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief.  The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

Lauderdale Court of Criminal Appeals

Charles Hall v. David Mills, Warden
W2005-02266-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge J. C. McLin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

The Petitioner, Charles Hall, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief.  The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Lauderdale Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Corey Moten
W2004-02896-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris B. Craft

The defendant, Corey Moten, was convicted of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and sentenced as a violent offender to twenty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in giving a sequential jury instruction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

William Wiley v. State of Tennessee
M2003-00661-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Walter C. Kurtz

We granted the applications for permission to appeal filed by the State of Tennessee and the petitioner to determine 1) whether State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn. 1999), which clarified the analysis for determining lesser-included offenses, created a new constitutional rule that must be applied retroactively to post-conviction cases, 2) whether the petitioner was entitled to post-conviction relief under the DNA Relief Act, and 3) whether the petitioner was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals granted a new trial as to the petitioner's felony murder conviction because the jury had not been charged on the lesser-included offense of second degree murder but denied post-conviction relief as to the petitioner's conviction for especially aggravated robbery. After due consideration, we conclude 1) that State v. Burns did not create a new constitutional rule that must be retroactively applied to post-conviction cases, 2) that the petitioner was not entitled to a new trial or other relief based on DNA results, and 3) that the petitioner was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial on felony murder and especially aggravated robbery.

Davidson Supreme Court

Kenneth B. White v. Dr. William Bacon, et al.
M2004-02110-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Judge Walter C. Kurtz

Inmate filed a medical malpractice and negligence action against Defendants involved in his care following a slip-and-fall injury at the prison and Defendants involved in the maintenance of the prison. The trial court dismissed all named Defendants and inmate appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Wayford Demonbreun, Jr. v. Ricky Bell, Warden
M2005-01741-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

The petitioner, Wayford Demonbreun, Jr., appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. In this appeal, he alleges that his judgment of conviction for aggravated assault is void because the indictment was defective in that it failed to inform him of the essential elements of the offense for which he was convicted. The judgment of the trial court is reversed. The conviction at issue is vacated, habeas corpus relief is warranted as to that offense, and the cause is remanded for appropriate remedial action. Because the petitioner is also imprisoned for second degree murder, he is not entitled to release by virtue of this opinion.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

In Re Adoption of J.A.K. & K.R.K.
M2005-02206-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor James B. Cox

This is the second appeal in this proceeding to terminate a biological mother’s parental rights. On the first appeal, this court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the mother had abandoned the children but remanded the case to the trial court to make specific findings regarding whether the termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. The trial court determined that terminating the mother’s rights would be in her children’s best interests, and the mother appealed. We have determined that the record contains clear and convincing evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion.

Lincoln Court of Appeals

In Re Adoption of J.A.K. & K.R.K. - Concurring
M2005-02206-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor James B. Cox

The court reiterates a statement first appearing in a published opinion in Ray v. Ray, 83 S.W.3d 726, 733 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001). Quoting from In Re M.O.,173 S.W.3d 13, 18-19 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2005, the court says:

Lincoln Court of Appeals

Don Daugherty v. Sony Electronics, Inc., et al. - Concurring
E2004-02627-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Harold Wimberly

I concur in the opinion authored by Judge Swiney to the extent that it affirms the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims based upon breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, unjust enrichment, and money had and received. I also concur that the plaintiff’s Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“the TCPA”) claims are not subject to dismissal at this stage of the proceedings. I write separately to express my opinion that many of the plaintiff’s morespecific allegations pertaining to his general allegation of “unfair and/or deceptive acts or practices” under the TCPA appear to fall within the “loose general praise of wares sold” referred to in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402B. See also Ladd v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 939 S.W.2d 83, 100 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). For example, I believe a reference to one’s product as “superior” in an advertisement or other writing is nothing more than a statement of the seller’s opinion as to the worth of its product. How does one measure whether a product is superior or not? For example, it may be superior in one aspect but not in another. If a company’s DVD player emits a sound that is rated better by independent experts when compared to the products of others; but has a lower rating in the same competition from a mechanical standpoint, should a jury be permitted to speculate as to which quality the company was touting when it referred to its product as “superior”? I think not. “Superior,” like beauty, is in the eyes of the beholder.

Knox Court of Appeals