Mark McGehee v. Julie McGehee
In this divorce case, Mark K. McGehee ("Father") appeals the Trial Court's order regarding child support, its award of primary residential parenting responsibility to Julie A. McGehee ("Mother"), the propriety of the Court's decision to amend its final decree of divorce pursuant to Mother's Tenn.R.Civ.P. 60 motion and the granting of Tenn.R.Civ.P. 11 sanctions against Father's attorney. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Debra Lynn Lawson Gorman v. Richard Eugene Gorman
This is a post-divorce custody case wherein the Trial Court denied the Father’s petition for change of custody and denied the Mother’s petition for payment of uncovered medical expenses and attorney fees. Both parties appealed. We have determined that the Trial Court did not err and we affirm its decision. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
David Hodge, et al v. Shelly Renae Cornelison, et al.
In boundary line dispute, owner of southern tract of real property (appellee) brought action against adjacent land owner to the north (appellant) to quiet title and restrain appellant from alleged offending use of disputed piece of property. Appellant filed counter-claim to quiet title and have appellee ejected from property. Trial court decreed appellee lawful owner of disputed property, relying upon evidence of three iron pins referenced in deed to appellee as the proper boundary markers. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Danny Joe Wright
The Defendant, Danny Joe Wright, was convicted of driving under the influence second offense and violating the open container law. He was also found to have violated the implied consent law. In this direct appeal, he argues that the trial court improperly limited his cross-examination of the arresting officer and that the trial court erred by refusing to admit the testimony of an expert witness in field sobriety testing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John C. Walker, III
The Appellant, John C. Walker, III, was convicted of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to twenty-five years of incarceration. In this direct appeal, Walker alleges that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the action due to destruction of evidence; (3) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on certain lesser included offenses and by giving other improper jury instructions, such as instructing on “flight,” giving substantive instruction at the beginning of the trial, and providing papers to the jury unseen by counsel; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing Walker to the maximum sentence of twenty-five years. After review of the record, we find no error and affirm the conviction and resulting sentence. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John C. Walker, III - Concurring/Dissenting
JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part I join with the majority in affirming the appellant’s conviction and resulting sentence. I dissent, however, from that portion of the opinion which holds that aggravated assault and assault are not lesser included offenses of first degree (premeditated) murder. In State v. Paul Graham Manning, No. M2002-00547-CCA-R3-CD, 203 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 117, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Feb. 14, 2003), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2003), a panel of this Court reasoned that: [f]irst degree premeditated murder is the “premeditated and intentional killing of another.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1). An aggravated assault is committed, on the other hand, when the accused intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes serious bodily injury to another. See id. § 39-13-102(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A). Similarly, an assault is committed when one “intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.” Id. § 39-13-101(a)(1). The mens rea of intentional includes the mens rea of knowing and reckless. See id. § 39-11-301(a)(2). A killing certainly includes serious bodily injury (as well as bodily injury). Thus, all of the statutory elements of these forms of aggravated assault and assault are included within the statutory elements of first degree premeditated murder, and they are therefore lesser included within the statutory elements of first degree premeditated murder, and they are therefore lesser included offenses under Part (a) of the Burns test. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Alton Wayne Saddler, Deceased
The niece of a decedent filed a claim against his estate, contending that she was entitled to compensation for allowing her late uncle to live rent-free for more than four years in a house that she inherited from another uncle. The trial court granted her claim. We reverse. |
DeKalb | Court of Appeals | |
Karl P. Birkholz, et ux. v. Davis N. Hardy, et ux.
Appellants/buyers appeal from judgment entered for Appellees/sellers on promissory note given for purchase of real estate. The note contained a condition precedent wherein the principal would not be due until Appellants/buyers sold commercial property they owned. The trial court imposed five years as a reasonable time for performance of the contract and awarded prejudgment interest. Appellants/buyers appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ronnie Simpson v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant, Ronnie Simpson, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Simpson pled guilty to especially aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and received an effective fifteen-year sentence. On appeal, Simpson challenges the validity of his guilty plea upon grounds of: (1) voluntariness and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Lee
The defendant appeals his conviction for attempted first degree murder. The defendant’s sole issue on appeal is a claim that the jury venire was unconstitutionally empaneled by failing to include adequate representation of African-Americans. The defendant failed to prove a prima facie case, and the conviction is affirmed. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenneth Anthony v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant, Kenneth Anthony, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Anthony was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and attempted second degree murder. On appeal, Anthony argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for a new trial. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carl Creason
A jury found the Defendant, Carl Creason, guilty of driving on a revoked driver's license. After conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial judge sentenced the Defendant to six months in the county jail. The Defendant appeals his sentence, arguing that the trial court erred by not allowing him to serve his sentence on probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court, but remand for entry of a uniform judgment document. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeff Willard v. Golden Gallon-TN, L.L.C.
This is a retaliatory discharge case wherein the plaintiff/employee alleged that his employment was terminated, inter alia, in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act and because he obeyed a lawful subpoena. The trial court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment. The employee appealed. We vacate the trial court's grant of summary judgment because we have determined that (1) a claim for retaliatory discharge in violation of Tennessee public policy lies in cases where a substantial factor in an employer's decision to terminate an employee is the fact that the employee honored a lawful subpoena, (2) a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the employee was terminated for honoring a lawful subpoena, and (3) a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the employee was terminated in violation of the Family Medical and Leave Act. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael A. Prechtel
Defendant, Michael A. Prechtel, appeals the trial court's revocation of probation. On September 6, 2001, Defendant pled guilty in the Cumberland County General Sessions Court to possession of drug paraphernalia and was sentenced to serve 11 months and 29 days with all but two days suspended and placed on supervised probation. Following three separate probation revocation proceedings in the general sessions court, defendant's probation was revoked and he was ordered to serve his sentence in the Cumberland County jail. Defendant appealed to the Cumberland County Criminal Court. Following a de novo hearing, the criminal court affirmed the general sessions court's decision to revoke defendant's probation and ordered him to serve 11 months and 29 days in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the Cumberland County Criminal Court. |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
J.E.B. v. J.C.W.
This is a child custody case. After a trial, the trial court designated the Father as primary residential custodian of the parties’ child. Mother appeals, arguing that the trial court should have awarded her primary residential custody. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the child’s best interests are served by awarding Father primary residential custody. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stefanie M. Henson
The defendant, Stefanie M. Henson, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to robbery, a Class C felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant received a sentence of four years for the offense, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's request for an alternative sentence and ordered that she serve her sentence in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering that she serve her sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gary Lynn Vernon, Pro Se v. Jim Dickman, Warden & State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Garry Lynn Vernon, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Phillip Lowell Bledsoe
The appellant, Phillip Lowell Bledsoe, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court of Gibson County of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of first degree murder. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Don Allen Coleman v. Jack Morgan, Warden
Don Allen Coleman petitioned the Hickman County Circuit Court for habeas corpus relief, contending that the two rape of a child judgments against him impose illegal sentences. We agree that the sentences are illegal and we vacate them, thereby reviving the two indictments and pleas for further proceedings. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Leslie E. Raymond
The petitioner, Leslie E. Raymond, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court dismiss the appeal or, in the alternative, affirm the trial court's action pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The motion is without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eric T. Davis v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Eric T. Davis, pled guilty to robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to six years probation. The petitioner subsequently pled guilty to possession of cocaine with the intent to sell, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years probation, to be served consecutively to his prior sentence. The petitioner's probation was revoked in both cases. He appealed the trial court's order revoking his probationary sentences, and this court affirmed the revocation of his probation. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged, among other things, that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at his probation revocation hearing. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, holding the petitioner failed to assert a colorable claim for post-conviction relief. After reviewing the record and applicable law, we conclude that the post-conviction court was correct in summarily dismissing the petition. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tommy Davis Craig v. David Robert Dison
This appeal involves an unsuccessful plaintiff who seeks review of a jury verdict. Plaintiff argues that the trial judge failed to perform his function as a thirteenth juror. We agree and reverse and remand for a new trial. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Gwinn Fayne, et al. v. Teresa Vincent, et al.
Purchasers of real property sued sellers and real estate company seeking rescission for tortious misrepresentation and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court rescinded the transaction and dismissed the real estate company on the basis that the salesperson was an independent contractor. Purchasers appealed asserting: (1) the salesperson was an agent rather than independent contractor; (2) the trial court did not place the purchasers in the position in which they would have been since the transaction was rescinded; and (3) the purchasers should have been awarded their attorney's fees. We agree with the trial court that the salesperson was an independent contractor, but modify and remand for further proceeding (1) relative to placing the parties in the position in which they would have been had there been no transaction and (2) concerning the allowance of purchasers' attorney's fees. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Jon E. Shell v. D. Scott King
Jon and Rebecca Shell ("Plaintiffs") sued D. Scott King ("King") after a limited liability company formed by the three of them went out of business. Plaintiffs sought dissolution of the company known as The Big Red Barn, LLC ("the Company" or "the LLC"). Plaintiffs also claimed King had breached his fiduciary obligations to both them and the LLC. The trial court referred this case to a Special Master and after a trial, the Special Master issued a report concluding King was negligent and had breached his fiduciary obligations and recommending that plaintiffs be awarded a judgment which included some, but not all, of plaintiffs' attorney fees and expert witness fees. The trial court confirmed the report of the Special Master in all respects. We modify the judgment of the trial court and affirm as modified. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donnie Lomax
The defendant, after entry of a plea of guilty, appeals from the imposition of consecutive sentences, the denial of alternative sentencing, and the requiring of restitution to be paid to an entity not named as a victim in the indictment. Upon careful review, we affirm the respective sentences and the denial of alternative sentencing, but reverse the imposition of consecutive sentencing. The cause is remanded for additional hearing for determination of Automotive Financing Corporation’s victim status and if so established, the amount of restitution. We further direct that the recipient of the restitution for sales tax and clerk fees be changed from the State of Tennessee to the individuals named in the indictments who paid the sales tax and clerk fees. |
Houston | Court of Criminal Appeals |