In Re: A.M.T., Z.T.R. and K.W.T.
M2003-02926-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Betty Adams Green

Two children were placed in the custody of the Department of Children’s Services because of the mother’s inability to provide stable and sanitary housing. The Department established permanency plans whereby the mother would obtain and maintain stable and sanitary housing, pay child support, attend parenting classes, work with Homemaker Services to learn how to keep the home clean, obtain a parenting assessment, and undergo counseling for her mental health issues. A third child was born while the mother’s other two children were in the Department’s custody. This child was born prematurely and required extensive hospitalization and was also placed in the Department’s custody. The Department filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights as to all three children, which the juvenile court granted on the grounds of abandonment due to failure to pay child support, failing to comply with the permanency plans and persistent conditions. We reverse the juvenile court’s finding of abandonment, but affirm the termination of parental rights based on persistent conditions and failure to comply with the permanency plan. We also affirm the juvenile court’s finding that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children.

In Re: A.M.T., Z.T.R. and K.W.T. - Concurring
M2003-02926-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Judge Betty Adams Green

I concur in the judgment that clear and convincing evidence establishes abundant grounds for the termination of the parental rights of the mother in  this case and further establishes that it is in the best interests of the  children to terminate her parental rights.

David Blurton and wife, Virginia Blurton, v. Grange Insurance & Casualty Company
W2003-01177-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor George R. Ellis

This is a declaratory judgment action to establish coverage under an insurance policy. The  plaintiffs’ home was insured by a homeowners policy with the defendant insurance company. The insurance company canceled the policy for nonpayment of the premium and claimed that it mailed a notice of cancellation to the insureds at that time. Six months later, the plaintiffs’ home was damaged by fire, and they filed a claim on their policy. The insurance company denied the claim. The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit to recover on the policy, asserting that they never received the cancellation notice, and that the insurance company did not properly cancel the policy. At trial, the insurance company representative testified about the company’s customary routine of sending cancellation notices, and it was undisputed that the insurance agent and the mortgagees received notices. The trial court held in favor of the plaintiffs based on, among other things, its determination that the insurance company did not prove that it had mailed a cancellation notice to the plaintiffs. The insurance company now appeals. We reverse, finding that the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding that the cancellation notice was mailed to the plaintiffs.
 

State of Tennessee v. Latosha S. Martin, Alias Latosha S. Johnson
E2003-02663-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mary Beth Leibowitz

The appellant appeals from an order revoking her probation. After review, we conclude that the violations of probation conditions were supported by a preponderance of the evidence and affirm the trial court's judgment.

Yasmond Fenderson v. State of Tennessee
E2003-02995-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard R. Baumgartner

The petitioner contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for writ of error coram nobis. We conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the petition is time barred and the petitioner has not advanced any grounds for which the statute of limitations should be tolled. We affirm the dismissal by the trial court.

Estate of Robert Samuel Reed, Deceased, Richard Gossum, Administrator C.T.A., John R. Reed v. R. S. Reed and Sons, Inc.
W2003-00210-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor George R. Ellis

This case arises from the Estate’s suit to recover a debt from defendant Corporation. The parties reached an agreement regarding payment of the debt, and the trial court entered a consent order reflecting the terms of this agreement. Appellant then filed a rule 60.02 motion for relief from the consent order. The lower court denied the motion, finding that Appellant was not a party of record in the suit and, accordingly, had no standing to challenge the judgment. We affirm.
 

Nashville Lodging Co. v. Metric Partners Growth Suite Investors, L.P.
M2002-02356-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

Nashville Lodging Company and G.P. Credit Company, LLC appeal the action of the trial court in which the trial judge having previously granted Appellants' motion for summary judgment as to liability in this breach of contract action decided all issues as to damages in favor of Appellees. We affirm the action of the trial court.

Mary Rachel Brown Williams v. Jeweline R. Crenshaw
CH-01-0197-1
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Walter L. Evans

Plaintiff brought suit on a defectively executed joint will, arguing that, despite its infirmities as a testamentary instrument, it is still enforceable as a contract for the benefit of a third party. In her suit, Plaintiff sought to recover certain property, purportedly covered by the defective joint will, that Decedent had devised to Defendant in a subsequent will. The lower court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the defective joint will does not constitute an enforceable contract. For the following reasons, we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Larry Adams
E2002-03046-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard R. Baumgartner

The appellant, Larry Arnell Adams, was convicted by a jury in the Knox County Criminal Court of one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated spousal rape, one count of assault, and two counts of rape. He received a total effective sentence of thirty-seven years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises numerous issues for our review, including consolidation and sufficiency. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Gregor Nadler v. Mountain Valley Chapel Business Trust
E2003-00848-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Telford E. Forgety, Jr.

Gregor Nadler ("the plaintiff") took a default judgment in the amount of $68,270.98 against Gerald H. Lucas ("Mr. Lucas") in a Florida proceeding. The judgment survived Mr. Lucas's subsequent bankruptcy filing. The plaintiff domesticated his judgment in Tennessee and then filed suit against, inter alia, the Mountain Valley Chapel Business Trust and Mr. Lucas, claiming (1) that Mr. Lucas had engaged in a fraudulent conveyance when he formed the trust and (2) that the trust was his alter ego. Following a bench trial, the court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint. From this judgment, the plaintiff appeals, challenging the trial court's rulings with respect to his fraudulent conveyance and alter ego claims. In addition, the plaintiff raises an evidentiary issue. We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Charles Keith
E2003-01721-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phyllis H. Miller

The appellant, Charles Keith, was convicted by a jury in the Sullivan County Criminal Court of one count of possession of marijuana and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced the appellant to consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days confinement in the county jail, to be served at seventy-five percent. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of an investigatory stop of his vehicle. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Ruby Tuesday, Inc. v. Gerald Largen
E2003-01795-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Retired Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Frank V. Williams, III

This case started out as a dispute over the title to a twenty to thirty-five foot wide strip along a state highway. The Chancery Court of Roane County held that the defendant held the title, but that the plaintiff had an access easement over the property. The defendant asserts on appeal that the Court erred because the plaintiff never claimed an easement in its pleadings and that the Court simply created one. The plaintiff asserts that the Court erred in finding that the defendant held the title to the property. We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Marsha Yates
E2003-01900-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phyllis H. Miller

Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the probation of Defendant, Marsha Karen Yates, and ordered her to spend the remainder of her sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her probation. After a careful review of the record in this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Melanie Sue Gibson v. Ernestine W. Francis
E2003-02226-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard R. Vance

This tort action arises out of a two-vehicle accident. At trial, the defendant Ernestine W. Francis admitted liability. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff Melanie Sue Gibson for property damage in the amount of $6,900; however, the jury declined to award her any damages on her claim for personal injuries. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court did not properly perform its role as thirteenth juror; that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence; and that the trial court erred when it re-instructed the jury in response to a question from that body. We affirm.

Jeffrey Lynn Miller v. Jerry Ellison, et al
E2003-02732-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge H. David Cate
Trial Court Judge: Judge Conrad E. Troutman, Jr.

Plaintiff, a customer who was injured when assaulted on the premises, brought action for damages against the owners-lessors of the premises and others. The Circuit Court, Campbell County, Conrad Troutman, Judge, dismissed the action as to the owners-lessors for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Margaret J. Ballinger v. Decatur County General
W2003-01358-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Allen W. Wallace, Sr.J.
Trial Court Judge: C. Creed McGinley, Circuit Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e) (3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee entered a court-approved settlement of her workers' compensation claim relating to an injury that occurred while she was in the course and scope of her employment. After the settlement, Employee sustained a new injury that arose out of the treatment she received for the injury encompassed by the settlement. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Employer, finding that Employee's injury was not a subsequent or second injury that is compensable under Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-6-28. We affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (2 Supp.) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed Allen W. Wallace, Sr.J., in which Janice M. Holder, J. and E. Riley Anderson, J., joined. James S. Higgins, Nashville, Tennessee, for appellant, Margaret Ballinger. John Dean Burleson, Jackson, Tennessee, for appellees, Decatur County General Hospital and Virginia Insurance Reciprocal. Juan G. Villasenor, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for appellee, Department of Labor, Second Injury Fund. MEMORANDUM OPINION FACTS The facts of this case are not in dispute. On November 16, 1999, Employee entered a joint petition for approval of a settlement of her workers' compensation claim relating to a low back injury that occurred while she was in the course and scope of her employment with Decatur County Hospital. Said settlement provided for compensation based upon a seventy-two percent partial disability to the body as a whole, and also provided future medical treatment. Under the settlement agreement, Employee agreed, as set out in the order of the Court, as follows: IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the agreement reached between the parties that all claims which the employee might have, now or in the future, under the Worker's Compensation law, for temporary and permanent disability, medical expenses, including future medical expenses, or any other benefit whatsoever under the Worker's Compensation Law of Tennessee, resulting from or connected with any injury or injuries arising from an accident which occurred on or about [January 24, 1997] or at any time while employed by the employer, be compromised, settled and satisfied by the payment of $81, to the employee, including $2,48.4 which has previously been paid for permanent partial disability, and the agreement of the insurer to be contingently liable for future medical expenses with the agreement that payments of authorized and approved medical expenses are to be made as set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-24 to Dr. William R. Schooley, or to whomever else he may refer her, for treatment related to the employee's alleged on the job injury and the same is hereby in all respects ratified, confirmed and approved. . . . Subsequent to the above referenced settlement, Employee received further medical treatment for her injuries arising out of her injuries of January 24, 1997, the basis of the above settlement agreement. Due to pain from her injuries, a morphine pump was placed to help her low back pain. This procedure resulted in an allergic reaction to the morphine pump. She became ill and this caused her to have a severe cough and to vomit, resulting in a ruptured disc in her upper back at the C-6 level of the spine. Employee required surgery and other treatment for this injury. ANALYSIS The trial court granted Employer's Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore, appellate review is controlled by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The pleadings and evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Summary Judgment is to be rendered only when it is shown that there is no genuine issue to a material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56; Hilliard v. Tennessee State Home Health Serv., Inc., 95 S.W.2d 344, 345 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. Panel 1997); Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn. 1993). Rarely are such motions an option in workers' compensation cases. Berry v. Consolidated Systems, Inc., 84 S.W.2d 445 (Tenn. 1991). Summary judgment should be granted -2-

Eva D. Brown v. Purodenso Company
W2003-01181-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: James L. Weatherford, Sr.J.
Trial Court Judge: C Donald H. Allen, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee tripped and fell on both knees while at work. The trial court dismissed the complaint after finding that the employee failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the injuries to both knees resulted in any permanent physical impairment or that her physical condition was caused or aggravated by her fall at work. The employee contends that the trial court erred in finding: 1) that her injuries were not caused by her work injury; 2) that she did not suffer permanent disability; and 3) that the employer complied with workers' compensation law since the employer failed to pay for necessary surgery and for her permanent disability. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed JAMES L. WEATHERFORD, SR.J., in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J., and JOE H. WALKER, III, SP.J., joined. Ruby R. Wharton and Cynthia A. Pensoneau, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Eva D. Brown. John D. Burleson and John D. Stevens, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellee, Purodenso Company. MEMORANDUM OPINION Ms. Eva Brown was 45 years old at the time of trial. She has worked in factories since graduating from high school in 1975. She is divorced and the mother of 2 children over the age of 18. In October of 1996 she began working for Purodenso Company, a manufacturer of automobile air filters. Ms. Brown worked as a "panel pleater" operating a machine that folds the paper product used to make air filters. On January 4, 1999, while working at Purodenso, she tripped over a bin and fell onto the bare concrete floor landing on her hands and knees. After being helped up by another employee, she reported her injury. Later that same day she saw Dr. Gilbert Woodall, the company doctor, complaining of pain and swelling in both knees. He prescribed medication and a knee brace for her right knee. She returned to work and finished her shift. The next day she worked a regular shift doing light duty work. When she continued to complain of knee pain, Dr. Woodall referred her to Dr. Michael Cobb, board certified orthopedic surgeon. On February 3, 1999, Dr. Cobb diagnosed Ms. Brown as having a bruised right knee. He noted that Mrs. Brown reported diffuse tenderness during his exam: "She is tender everywhere." He found no effusion or swelling and no "localized tenderness to the joint lines that would indicate a cartilage problem." He prescribed exercises and released her. On February 24, 1999, Ms. Brown returned to Dr. Cobb complaining of right knee pain. He found "fine crepitance... [a] roughness feeling in her kneecap joint, but that was also present in her left knee." In his opinion, this common condition "had been there before" because it was present in both knees and was not caused by trauma or injury. He diagnosed a bruised knee with kneecap pain and gave her a cortisone injection. On March 1, 1999, Ms. Brown saw Dr. James T. Craig, Jr., board certified orthopedic surgeon, upon referral of her personal physician. She reported pain and grinding in both knees but the most pain in her right knee. He noted that "she did not have any swelling or any fluid in either one of her knees." He found that she did have "crepitation or grinding under the kneecaps on both knees when she flexed or extended her knees." He diagnosed early degenerative arthritis in both knees and chondromalacia of the patellae, a wearing of the cartilage behind the kneecap. He gave her a cortisone injection and recommended anti-inflammatories. On March 18, 1999, she returned to Dr. Cobb's office complaining of "diffuse ill-defined" right knee pain. Dr. Cobb found: "[N]o sign whatsoever of any fluid on the knee. She again was tender wherever I touched, not more so at the joint lines or other important landmarks. She had full range of motion. All ligaments again were stable. I again noted the kneecap crepitance." He reported: "I cannot correlate any of her subjective complaints of pain with any physical findings." He testified: "[W]hen they're tender everywhere [instead of more so at the source of the injury], that affects their credibility to me." Dr. Cobb found no sign of impairment or serious injury and did not assign permanent restrictions. In his opinion, it was possible but unlikely, that chondromalacia could be accelerated by a fall, but in Ms. Brown's case "she had no signs whatsoever that she had an injury in her kneecap area when I saw her on three visits." Ms. Brown then returned to Dr. Craig who found that an MRI did not reveal any cartilage tears, ligament or meniscal injury. Because of her continued complaints of pain, Dr. Craig recommended arthroscopic surgery. On October 12, 2, Dr. Craig performed an arthroscopy and found damage to the cartilage behind the knee cap called chrondromalacia. He performed a chrondoplasty to smooth the area down. He found she reached maximum medical improvement on 2

Ronald Eugene Jones v. Cracker Barrel Old Country
E2002-01681-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: H. David Cate, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Jr., Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer, Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., argues that the trial court erred by: (1) evaluating the permanent total disability claim of the employee, Ronald Eugene Jones, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-242 instead of Tenn. Code Ann _ 5-6-27(4)(B); (2) finding the employee entitled to permanent total disability benefits when the preponderance of the evidence indicated he could return to "an occupation which would produce an income"; (3) holding the employee's claim was not limited to the multipliers established by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-241; and (4) entering the order of judgment without a reapportionment clause compelling the second injury fund to reimburse the employer in the event the employee dies before reaching age sixty-five.1, 2, 3 We agree with the employer that a permanent total disability claim should be evaluated on the basis of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-27(4)(B); the preponderance of the evidence indicates he could return to "an occupation which would produce an income"; and his claim is governed by the Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-241 multipliers. While the last issue concerning a reapportionment clause is pretermitted, we nevertheless disagree with the employer. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court 1 The employer complains about the dismissal of the appeal when the notice of appeal and transcript of the evidence were filed prior to the entry of the final judgment, since Rule 4(d) of the Tenn. R. App. P. permits a prematurely filed notice of appeal to be treated as filed after the entry of judgment and on the day of its entry. The per curiam order of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on February 13, 23, not because the transcript had not been timely filed as thought by the employer, but because the final judgment had not been entered. However, the final judgment had been entered in the trial court on February 6, 23. 2 The employee states the issues in a slightly different manner. They will be inherently discussed as we discuss the employee's complaints. 3 The second injury fund takes the same position as the employer except on the reapportionment clause issue. Reversed in Part, Modified in Part and Remanded H. DAVID CATE, SP. J., in which WILLIAM M. BARKER, J., and ROGER E. THAYER, SP. J., joined. James T. Shea IV, Knoxville, Tennessee, attorney for Appellant, Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. Roger L. Ridenour, Clinton, Tennessee, attorney for Appellee, Ronald Eugene Jones. Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, E. Blaine Sprouse and Richard M. Murrell, Assistant Attorney Generals, for Appellee, Sue Ann Head. MEMORANDUM OPINION I. Factual Background Ronald E. Jones, the employee, was forty-six years old when this cause was tried. He left high school in the eleventh grade, has no general equivalency diploma and has no other formal training or education. After he dropped out of school he took care of his grandfather, who had a heart condition. Years later he took a job as a laborer for a construction company. Next, he worked as a night watchman for approximately five years. Then he took a job with Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., the employer. He worked for the employer for fifteen years, washing dishes, bussing tables and unloading trucks. On December 27, 1992, while in the employ of the employer, the employee sustained a knee injury. He returned to work with restrictions against stooping, bending and squatting. He settled this workers' compensation claim for 15 percent to the body as a whole. On April 23, 1998, the employee, while working for the employer, sustained an injury to his neck, which was diagnosed as a cervical radiculopathy at C7. This workers' compensation claim was settled on January 22, 22, for 19 percent to the body as a whole. He returned to work after the neck injury, but on September 18, 1998, while lifting a case of green beans at work, the employee sustained an injury to his low back. He was treated by Dr. Cletus J. McMahon, Jr., an orthopedic surgeon, who diagnosed the employee's injury as a low back strain, an injury to the soft tissue, the ligaments, muscles and tendons. Dr. McMahon discharged the employee from his care on March 29, 1999, assigning him a 5 percent impairment to the body as a whole. The employee returned to work for the employer with the primary restriction of no lifting over twenty-five pounds. He worked a modified schedule of 18 to 2 hours until he quit because of pain in June, 1999. -2-

State of Tennessee v. Brian French
M2002-02465-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael R. Jones

The defendant, Brian French, appeals the revocation of his probation. We dismiss the appeal due to the untimely filing of the notice of appeal.

State of Tennessee v. Thaddaeus Medford
W2003-01544-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

The Defendant, Thaddeaus Medford, was convicted of three counts involving the delivery and attempted delivery of cocaine. In his first appeal, the Defendant contended, in part, that the State used a peremptory challenge to exclude a potential juror based on race. We remanded the case for the trial court to determine whether the State’s challenge was based upon a racially-neutral reason. On remand, the trial court determined that the State’s challenge was based upon a racially-neutral reason, and the Defendant appeals, contending that this finding by the trial court is in error. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Stephen Keith Frazier
W2003-01612-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley

A Hardin County jury convicted the Defendant, Stephen Keith Frazier, of vehicular homicide and two counts of driving while under the influence of an intoxicant or drug (“DUI”). The trial court merged the two DUI convictions and sentenced the Defendant to ten years for vehicular homicide, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the DUI conviction, with both sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; and (2) the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant by improperly applying enhancement factor (17) to increase the length of the sentence and in not imposing alternative sentencing. Based upon our review, we affirm the conviction for vehicular homicide and vacate the conviction for DUI, this offense being merged into the conviction for vehicular homicide. Additionally, we affirm the Defendant’s sentence for his vehicular homicide conviction, and we vacate the Defendant’s sentence for his DUI conviction. We therefore remand to the trial court for the entry of a single judgment in accordance with this opinion.

State of Tennessee v. Robert Yoreck, III
M2004-01289-CCA-RM-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge John H. Gasaway, III

This case presents an appeal to this court after remand by order of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Appellant, Robert James Yoreck, III, pled guilty to aggravated assault, a class C felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Yoreck, as a Range II multiple offender, to nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Yoreck argues that his sentence was excessive. After a review of the record, we affirm the sentence as imposed by the Montgomery County Circuit Court

State of Tennessee v. Mario Estrada
M2004-01291-CCA-RM-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert L. Jones

This case presents an appeal to this court after remand by order of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Appellant, Mario C. Estrada, appeals the imposition of a sentence of twelve years confinement in the Department of Correction. The sentence arose from a guilty plea entered by Estrada to one count of arson, eight counts of aggravated assault, and one count of possession of a prohibited weapon. In this appeal, Estrada raises the issue of whether the trial court erred by ordering a sentence of total confinement rather than a less restrictive alternative. After review, we find no error. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Renne Arellano
M2004-01292-CCA-RM-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert L. Jones

This case presents an appeal to this court after remand by order of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Appellant, Renne Efren Arellano, appeals from the sentencing decision of the Maury County Circuit Court. In a negotiated plea agreement, Arellano pled guilty to arson, eight counts of aggravated assault, and felony possession of a weapon and received an effective twelve-year sentence as a Range I standard offender. The manner of service was to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied any form of alternative sentencing and imposed total incarceration for the twelve-year sentence. On appeal, Arellano contends that the trial court erred in not sentencing him to any form of alternative incarceration. Finding no error, the sentences of the trial court are affirmed.

Quinton Armstrong v. Michael MaGill, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, and Piccadilly Cafeteria
W2003-00207-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor D. J. Alissandratos

This is a claim for unemployment benefits. The claimant was terminated from her employment at the defendant business. Her separation notice indicated that she was terminated for improper conduct and having a disrespectful attitude. Subsequently, the claimant filed a claim for unemployment benefits. The agency denied benefits. The claimant appealed. The appellate tribunal conducted a telephonic hearing and affirmed the denial of benefits. The claimant filed the instant petition for judicial review, claiming that the administrative proceedings were so fundamentally flawed that her procedural due process rights were violated. The trial court denied the petition and affirmed the denial of benefits. The claimant now appeals. We affirm, finding that the claimant’s due process rights were not violated, and that there is substantial and material  evidence to support the denial of benefits.