State of Tennessee v. Latasha Akins
W2003-01178-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Lee Moore Jr.

The Defendant, Latasha Atkins, appeals her jury conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to sell, contending the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Roger V. Alexander
M2002-02185-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Allen W. Wallace

The Defendant, Roger V. Alexander, pled guilty to one count of possession of anhydrous ammonia, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to four years in the Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, alleging that the trial court should have sentenced him to Community Corrections. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Roger Alexander - Concurring
M2002-02185-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Allen W. Wallace

I join with the majority in concurring that the Defendant is not entitled to the alternative sentence of Community Corrections. The Defendant is a Range II multiple offender, possessing a criminal history evincing a clear disregard for the law and whose past efforts at rehabilitation have failed. Thus, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, he is not entitled to the presumption in favor of alternative sentencing. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6). For this reason, I would affirm.

Dejuan J. Scott v. State of Tennessee
M2003-00197-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

The petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his second degree murder conviction, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of trial counsel. Based on our review of the record, we conclude the petitioner failed to meet his burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition.

C.B. Ragland Company v. Maxwell Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc.
M2003-00283-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Marietta M. Shipley

This case arises out of a breach of contract by the Defendant for a roof Defendant installed on Plaintiff's freezer storage facility. The case was tried before a jury, who found the Defendant had materially breached the contract between the parties and awarded Plaintiff damages in the amount of $5,655.00. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment or, in the alternative, a motion for additur or new trial. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend the judgment but suggested an additur increasing the award to $30,655.00, which Defendant appealed. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Deborah Johnson v. Marshall Manufacturing Corp.,
M2003-00921-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: J. B. Cox, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the appellant, Federated Insurance Company, insists the trial court erred in determining, as a matter of law, that it was liable for the payment of workers' compensation benefits and in summarily dismissing the case as to Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. As discussed below, the panel has found no reversible error and concluded that Federated is liable under the successive injury rule. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (22 Supp.) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed JOE C. LOSER, JR, SP. J., in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J., and JAMES L. WEATHERFORD, SR. J., joined. Gordon C. Aulgur, Brewer, Krause & Brooks, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Federated Insurance Company Lee Anne Murray, Feeney & Murray, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Marshall Manufacturing Corporation Emil L. Storey, Jr. and Deborah A. Toon, Donald D. Zuccarello, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Deborah Johnson MEMORANDUM OPINION The employee or claimant, Deborah Johnson, has worked for the employer, Marshall Manufacturing Corporation, since 1979. She gradually developed pain and numbness in both hands and was diagnosed with mild carpal tunnel syndrome. The employer's insurer, Liberty Mutual, accepted the claim and provided medical benefits. The claimant continued working. On April 16, 2, Federated Insurance succeeded Liberty Mutual as the employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier. On August 21, 2, the claimant underwent corrective surgery for her carpal tunnel syndrome and was disabled from working. Liberty Mutual paid for the surgery but has refused to pay medical or disability benefits after that date. So has Federated. Ms. Johnson sued both carriers and the employer for the benefits provided by law. On Liberty Mutual's motion for summary judgment, the trial court dismissed the claim against Liberty Mutual and awarded Liberty Mutual a judgment against Federated for expenditures made by Liberty Mutual on behalf of the claimant. The trial court further concluded from the undisputed facts that Federated was liable to the claimant for benefits. Federated has appealed. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). This tribunal is not bound by the trial court's findings but instead conducts an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance lies. Galloway v. Memphis Drum Serv., 822 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Tenn. 1991). Where the trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses, especially if issues of credibility and weight to be given oral testimony are involved, considerable deference must be accorded those circumstances on review, because it is the trial court which had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and to hear the in- court testimony. Long v. Tri-Con Ind., Ltd., 996 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Tenn. 1999). The appellate tribunal, however, is as well situated to gauge the weight, worth and significance of deposition testimony as the trial judge. Walker v. Saturn Corp., 986 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Tenn. 1998). Conclusions of law are subject to de novo review on appeal without any presumption of correctness. Nutt v. Champion Intern. Corp., 98 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tenn. 1998). Where an employee is permanently disabled as a result of a combination of two or more accidents occurring at different times and while the employee was working for different employers, the employer for whom the employee was working at the time of the most recent accident is generally liable for permanent disability benefits. Baxter v. Smith, 211 Tenn. 347, 364 S.W.2d 936 (1962). The same doctrine applies where the employee's permanent disability results from successive injuries while the employee is working for the same employer, but the employer has changed insurance carriers. Bennett v. Howard Johnson's Motor Lodge, 714 S.W.2d 273 (Tenn. 1986). The carrier which provided coverage at the time of the last injury is liable for the payment of permanent disability benefits. Where a condition develops gradually over a period of time resulting in a definite, work-connected, unexpected, fortuitous injury, it is compensable as an injury by accident. Brown Shoe Co. v. Reed, 29 Tenn. 16, 35 S.W.2d 65 (1961). In such cases, the date of injury has been fixed as of the date on which the claimant was forced to quit work because of severe pain. Lawson v. Lear Seating Corp., 944 S.W.2d 34 (Tenn. 1997); Barker v. Home-Crest Corp., 85 S.W.2d 373, 374 (Tenn. 1991); Central Motor Exp. v. Burney, 214 Tenn. 118, 377 S.W.2d 947 (1964). In Barker, where the claimant also suffered a gradually occurring injury, this court held the insurer which provided coverage on the day the employee last worked was liable for -2-

June Betty Williams v. Saturn Corporation
M2002-02916-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: James L. Weatherford, Sr.J.
Trial Court Judge: Stella L. Hargrove, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer appeals the judgment of the trial court awarding the employee 2% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole for work-related injuries to both shoulders, and denying a set-off for disability payments paid under an employer-funded plan. The employer contends that the trial court erred: 1) in basing the employee's award on an anatomical impairment rating not based entirely on the AMA Guides; and 2) in not granting a set-off for disability payments paid by the employer pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 114(b). We hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings as to anatomical and vocational disability. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed as to this issue. We find that this case should be remanded for further proceedings on the issue of whether a set-off is warranted in this case. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed in Part; and Remanded JAMES L. WEATHERFORD, SR.J., in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J., and JOE C. LOSER, JR.,SP.J., joined. Thomas H. Peebles, IV, Columbia, Tennessee, for the appellant Saturn Corporation. Michael D. Dillon, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee June Betty Williams. MEMORANDUM OPINION Ms. June Williams was 44 years old at the time of trial. She has a 12th grade education and completed a medical assistant course. She began working for General Motors in 1977 and worked as a punch press operator or assembly line worker for 1 to 11 years there. During layoffs from GM, she worked in fast food restaurants and worked one year as a medical office assistant. In 1991, Ms. Williams moved to Tennessee to work for Saturn Corporation. She worked on the assembly line using torque guns and doing other repetitive work with her arms above shoulder level. She gradually developed aching and soreness in her shoulders and shoulder blade area. After being treated for several years at the clinic at Saturn, she was eventually referred to Dr. Jeffery Adams, orthopedic surgeon, for treatment. When conservative treatment did not resolve her symptoms, she had surgery on her right shoulder for tendinitis of the biceps tendon on February 23, 1999. She had 2 surgeries on her left shoulder _ one for a labrum tear on June 22, 1999, and an arthroscopic synovectomy on January 19, 2. Her last day of work prior to surgery was February 8, 1999. On September 19, 2,1 Dr. David Gaw, M.D., evaluated Ms. Williams and found that her injuries were caused by her work activities. He assigned permanent restrictions which included avoiding frequent or continuous overhead or outstretched use of the hands for pushing, pulling or lifting. Dr. Gaw assigned a 4% anatomical impairment to the body as a whole for each shoulder, for a combined 8% anatomical impairment rating. He based this rating on minimal loss of motion and change in anatomy due to the 3 surgical procedures.2 Dr. Gaw acknowledged that the AMA Guides do not specifically cover the surgical procedures undergone by Ms. Williams: Well, this is one of those conditions which is not specifically covered by the Guides. There's nothing in there that says debridement of the labrum or cutting the biceps tendon and moving it around, but it's _ I think it has to do with just experience or understanding the physiology or explaining this lady's loss of function. I think that's, in my opinion, a minimal impairment, but certainly there has been some change in this person's anatomy of the shoulder. On January 8, 21, Ms. Williams returned to work at Saturn test-driving cars, a job that is within her medical restrictions, but she has concerns about low job seniority in this position. The surgical procedures significantly reduced her pain, but she "still has some trouble" when she uses her arms in an overhead position. She can not lift either arm for very long and still has pain when doing certain activities. She now has difficulty in holding the phone with her right arm, putting on clothes, and getting in or out of a bathtub. Ms. Williams is now limited in such activities as painting her house, gardening and bowling. Two vocational experts testified at trial. Ms. Patsy Bramlett assigned a 1% vocational 1He testified at his deposition that she reached maximum medical improvement on this date. 2Dr. Gaw assigned 2% to the right upper extremity and 1% to the left upper extremity for loss of motion based on pp. 43-45 of the AM A Guides. He assigned 5% impairment to each upper extremity for the surgical procedures. -2-

George D. Woodard, Jr., v. The Estate of Martha Almeda Swope Woodard, Deceased, et al.
E2003-00258-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Howell N. Peoples

In 1964, Mr. and Mrs. Woodard executed a Joint Last Will and Testament (the "Joint Will") which provided that the survivor would receive the decedent's entire estate in fee simple. The Joint Will further provided that, upon the death of the survivor, the survivor's estate would be divided in equal one-fourth shares among George D. Woodard ("Plaintiff"), Mr. Woodard's son from a previous marriage, and Mr. and Mrs. Woodard's three daughters. Mrs. Woodard executed a new will in 1998 (the "1998 Will"), approximately twenty years after Mr. Woodard's death. Pursuant to the terms of the 1998 Will, Plaintiff was to receive $10,000, with the remainder of Mrs. Woodard's estate to be divided equally among her three daughters. Mrs. Woodard's three daughters sought to probate the 1998 Will after she passed away. Plaintiff then filed this lawsuit claiming, among other things, that the Joint Will created a contractual obligation on the part of Mrs. Woodard to distribute her estate in accordance with the terms of the Joint Will and, therefore, Plaintiff was entitled to one-fourth of Mrs. Woodard's estate. Plaintiff sued Mrs. Woodard's estate as well as his three half-sisters, Sandra Norton, Martha Scissom, and Barbara Lambert (collectively referred to as "Defendants"). The Trial Court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment. We conclude there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether there existed a contractual obligation on the part of Mrs. Woodard to distribute her estate according to the terms of the Joint Will. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings.

State of Tennessee v. Sedrick Williams
E2003-00659-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mary Beth Leibowitz

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Sedrick Williams, was found guilty of one count of first degree murder and one count of attempt to commit first degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-five years imprisonment for the attempted first degree murder conviction, and ordered his sentence for attempted first degree murder to run concurrently with his sentence for first degree murder. On appeal Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Specifically, Defendant contends that the jury misapplied the law in rejecting his defense of self-defense, and the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with premeditation. Defendant also argues that the trial court's charge to the jury on flight, coupled with prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, denied Defendant a fair trial. Defendant does not appeal his sentences. After a careful review of the record in this matter, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Jonathan M. Light
E2003-00688-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Jerry Beck

Defendant, Jonathan M. Light, pled guilty to two counts of Class D felony burglary, one count of Class D felony theft, and one count of Class E felony theft. Pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement, he received sentences of two years for each of the Class D felonies, and one year for the Class E felony, all to be served concurrently with each other for an effective sentence of two years. Pursuant to the agreement, the manner of service of the sentence was to be determined by the trial court following a sentencing hearing. Defendant requested to serve his sentence in the Community Corrections program, but the trial court ordered the entire sentence to be served by incarceration. Defendant has now appealed this decision by the trial court. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Conley R. Fair v. State of Tennessee
E2003-00807-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lynn W. Brown

The petitioner, Conley R. Fair, filed for post-conviction relief, alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing and without the appointment of counsel, finding that the petition was not timely filed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing.

James K. Robbins v. State of Tennessee
E2003-00868-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge E. Eugene Eblen

The Petitioner, James K. Robbins, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has not established that the challenged judgment is void or that his sentence has expired. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Darcus Williams v. Metropolitan Government of
M2002-03038-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: James L. Weatherford, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer appeals the trial court's judgment that the employee suffered an injury arising out of and in the course and scope of her employment when the employee left her work station to go to a break area on the employer's premises to hand some money to her friend to repair her car and slipped in a puddle of water and injured her back as she was about to re-enter the building. The employee contends that the trial court erred in finding the employee suffered only a 2% anatomical impairment and a 4% vocational disability for this injury. The panel has concluded that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed JAMES L. WEATHERFORD, SR. J., in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J., and JOE C. LOSER, SP.J., joined. Aundreas Wattley-Smith, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee Acting By and Through The Electric Power Board Through Said Government a/k/a Nashville Electric Service. Jerry D. Mayo, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee Darcus Williams. MEMORANDUM OPINION Ms. Darcus Williams was 42 years old at the time of trial. She is a single mother with two children ages 25 and 11. She graduated from high school and has taken college courses. She had worked as a file clerk for a bank and a university before she began working for Nashville Electric Service ("NES") in July 1987 as a clerk typist. She had also worked for 5 years at the Hyatt Regency as a reservations agent and catering coordinator. Ms. Williams also worked a second part-time job during holidays and other times during her employment with NES. The main NES building has a back entrance with a concrete porch and a chain link fence beside it. There is a picnic table in this area and employees take breaks there and use this area to smoke. It is also a poplar area for employees to be dropped off and picked up from work. Employees use this entrance to go to other buildings on the NES property. According to Ms. Williams, it is common practice for employees to stand on the porch and receive items such as lunch, papers, money or clothes from friends or family members who are on the outside of the fence. NES security guards or supervisors had never told her that this activity was prohibited. Mr. Robert Mansolino, NES employee safety and health manager, testified: "I think it's pretty common for employees to go out that back door to carry on business or go to their personal vehicle or whatever." He was not aware of any NES rule prohibiting employee use of this area. On December 28, 2, Ms. Williams had problems with her car and had a friend drop her off at work. During work hours she needed to give some money to her friend to get her car repaired. She arranged to meet him at the chain link fence near the back door of the main NES building so she could hand him the money. At about 1:3 a.m. she left her workstation and went down to deliver the money. After giving the cash to her friend at the fence, she turned and reached for the door to the building when she slipped in a puddle of a slimy, watery substance and fell. Her friend called the security guard and she reported to the nurses' station complaining of low back pain that radiated to her left leg. A January 4, 21, MRI indicated a lumbar disc protrusion. After conservative treatment failed, Dr. Thomas O'Brien, an orthopedic surgeon, performed a 2-level laminectomy and fusion. Her pain and radicular symptoms did not resolve and a second MRI showed scar and granulated tissue surrounding the nerve root. Dr. O'Brien found that she had sustained a 13% anatomical impairment rating.1 He stated that he expected her to "have some ongoing permanent discomfort in her leg as a result of scarring and intrinsic nerve damage present pre-operatively." He imposed permanent restrictions of "no lifting greater that 25 pounds and limited bending and stooping." He felt she could return to her job as a clerk typist. Dr. David Gaw, an orthopedic specialist, performed an independent medical evaluation and assigned a 22% anatomical impairment rating to the body as a whole based on the AMA Guides 5th Edition. He disagreed with Dr. O'Brien's 13% rating because Dr. O'Brien did not utilize the range 1Dr. O'Brien acknowledged that he did not follow the AMA Guides' range of motion protocols because he felt it would not give a valid impairment rating due to M s. W illiams' inconsistent results on her functional capacity evaluation. -2-

In the Matter of Curtis Jason Ely
M2000-01937-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.

This appeal involves a state prisoner who desires to change his name for religious reasons. Even though the prisoner's petition was uncontested, the Davidson County Probate Court declined to permit the prisoner to change his name solely because he had been convicted of a felony. While we have determined that the probate court erred by denying the prisoner's petition solely because he had been convicted of a felony, we have determined that the petition was properly dismissed.

State of Tennessee v. Arthur Buford, III
W2002-02258-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Otis Higgs, Jr.

The appellant, Arthur Buford III, was convicted by a jury of two counts of first degree murder. After being sentenced to two consecutive life sentences, the appellant presents the following issues or our review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the introduction of photographic evidence of the crime scene; (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the convictions; and (3) whether the trial court properly sentenced the appellant. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Cornelius Richmond
W2003-00683-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph B. Dailey

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Cornelius Richmond, of one count of robbery and three counts of forgery. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve an effective sentence of thirtythree years as a career offender. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to the police; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his robbery conviction; and (3) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on facilitation as a lesser-included offense. Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. David G. Housler
M2002-00419-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge John H. Gasaway, III

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Appellant, David G. Housler, of four counts of felony murder. Housler's convictions stem from the robbery of a Clarksville Taco Bell and the execution-style murders of four of its employees. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed four consecutive life sentences. Housler appeals, presenting the following issues for our review: (1) Whether his confessions were properly admitted into evidence when the State and the trial court knew the confessions were false and unreliable; (2) Whether the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by using the recanted testimony of Robert Eastland, Robert Dawson, and Michael Miller and by failing to inform defense counsel or the trial court that Jeremy Thompson had recanted his statement; (3) Whether he is entitled to a new trial based upon the newly recanted testimony of Larry Underhill; (4) Whether the trial court erred in denying a new trial when a juror fell asleep during the trial; (5) Whether the Mathews time-line proves his innocence; (6) Whether the State prosecuted Housler and Courtney Mathews under inconsistent theories; and (7) Whether consecutive sentencing was proper. After review, we find no error of law requiring reversal. Accordingly, we affirm Housler's convictions and the imposition of four consecutive life sentences.

James W. Stephenson v. The Third Company, et al.
M2002-02082-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ross H. Hicks

The plaintiff filed suit for repayment of $25,000 which he purportedly loaned to the defendant. The defendant contended that the money was not a loan, but was placed with him for a specific investment. Since the investment ultimately failed, the defendant claimed that he did not owe anything to the plaintiff. The trial court noted that the documents evidencing the transactions at issue were “replete with ambiguities,” but found that they were nonetheless sufficient to establish an enforceable loan contract. The court accordingly rendered a plaintiff’s judgment for $25,000 plus interest. We reverse.

James Stephenson v. The Third Company - Dissenting
M2002-02082-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ross H. Hicks

I agree on both counts. The “loan agreements” are poorly drafted, and they do not reflect
sound business judgment on Mr. Caldwell’s part. So what? When competent parties have bargained in good faith and have entered into a written contract, it is not the courts’ prerogative to rewrite the contract or to relieve either party from the burdensome effects of their agreement. Vargo v. Lincoln Brass Works, Inc., 115 S.W.3d 487, 492 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). Whether considered by themselves or in conjunction with the parties’ separate “consulting agreements,” the fact of the matter is that Mr. Caldwell’s “loan agreements” are precisely that – loan agreements. I would affirm the trial court.

Overnite Transportation v. Teamsters Local Union No. 480
M2002-02116-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen H. Lyle

This case arose out of a labor dispute. In October 1999, the defendant union began a labor strike at the plaintiff trucking company's Nashville facility. The company filed a petition in the lower court seeking to enjoin the union from engaging in violence and intimidation in connection with the strike. The company later amended its complaint to include a claim against the union for intentional interference with business relations. Between October 1999 and January 2000, the trial court entered five injunctions against the union, each more restrictive than the one before, enjoining the union from engaging in the alleged unlawful violence and intimidation. In August 2000, the trial court issued a show cause order, citing 128 alleged violations of the injunctions, requiring the union to show cause why it should not be held in civil contempt. In March 2002, the trial court determined that the company's petition for civil contempt was moot because, by that time, the contemptuous conduct had ceased. In August 2002, the trial court dismissed the company's claim for intentional interference with business relations for failure to state a claim. The plaintiff trucking company now appeals. We reverse the dismissal of the civil contempt petition, finding that the company may seek damages caused by conduct in violation of the injunctions, and affirm the dismissal of the intentional interference claim.

State of Tennessee v. Thomas Marion Hardin
M2003-01126-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Charles Lee

Defendant, Thomas Marion Hardin, entered "open" pleas of guilty to two counts of sale of cocaine in an amount of 0.5 grams or more, and one count of conspiracy to sell cocaine in an amount of 0.5 grams or more. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve ten years as a Range I standard offender for each Class B felony conviction for sale of cocaine, and to four years to serve as a Range I standard offender to the Class C felony conviction for conspiracy. The sentences for the sale of cocaine convictions were ordered to be served concurrently with each other, and the conspiracy charge was ordered to be served consecutively to the convictions for sale of cocaine. Therefore, the effective sentence was fourteen years of confinement. In his sole issue on appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by not ordering his sentence to be served in the Community Corrections Program, rather than by incarceration. After a review of the briefs of the parties and the entire record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Donald W. Brymer, Jr.
M2003-01712-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter

The Defendant, Donald W. Brymer, Jr., appeals from the Williamson County Circuit Court's revocation of his probation that he received for his guilty plea to one count of statutory rape. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and sentencing him to confinement. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Ricky Hill Krantz v. State of Tennessee
M2002-02978-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

The Appellant, Ricky Hill Krantz, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Davidson County Criminal Court. Krantz is currently incarcerated as a result of his jury convictions for first degree felony murder and aggravated assault. On appeal, Krantz raises the single issue of whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After review of the issue, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Carlos Salvador Angel, Jr.
M2002-02982-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

The Appellant, Carlos Salvador Angel, Jr., was convicted of aggravated sexual battery by a Davidson County jury and sentenced to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Angel argues that: (1) the admission of testimony by his former girlfriend, who was not the victim in this case, was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial and (2) the ten-year sentence imposed was excessive. After review of the record, the judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Brian Goodrich
M2002-03017-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Don R. Ash

The defendant pled guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, a Class E felony, and simple possession of cocaine, a Class A misdemeanor. The Rutherford County trial court imposed an effective one-year sentence with ninety days incarceration followed by probation. On appeal, the defendant raises two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion; and (2) whether the trial court erred in denying full probation. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.