State of Tennessee v. Rhonda Rock
E2002-01580-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Jerry Beck

The defendant appeals her sentence of four years for voluntary manslaughter. The defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her any form of alternative sentencing. We conclude that the trial court did not err in sentencing and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Charles W. Cole v. State of Tennessee
E2002-02535-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lynn W. Brown

The petitioner, Charles W. Cole, pled guilty on February 4, 2000, to five sexual offenses and, in January 2001, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner timely appealed. We affirm the dismissal of the petition

Shawn E. McWhorter v. Randall Bare
E2002-02896-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: W. Neil Thomas, III
Professional pilot Shawn E. McWhorter ("Plaintiff") sued Randall Barre ("Defendant") for defamation based upon a letter Defendant wrote to the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") containing allegations that plaintiff was medically unfit to be a pilot. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and awarded $25,000 in compensatory damages and $42,500 in punitive damages. The trial court entered its judgment, as later amended, in favor of plaintiff against defendant for $105,820.01, consisting of compensatory damages of $25,000, punitive damages of $42,500, and attorney fees and expenses in the amount of $38,320.01. The trial court's award of attorney fees and expenses was based upon defendant's refusal to admit liability in response to requests for admission. Defendant appeals. We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part.

TGJ & Co. vs. Michael E. MaGill
E2003-00298-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: John F. Weaver
Margaret E. Bowers ("the Claimant") appeals the judgment of the trial court, which reversed an administrative determination of the Commissioner of the Department of Labor and Workforce Development ("the Commissioner"). The Commissioner had held that the Claimant is eligible for unemployment compensation as a result of the termination of her employment with TGJ & Co., Inc. ("the Employer"). Because we hold that the Claimant voluntarily quit her employment without good cause, we affirm the trial court.

Lindsay Alford vs. Oak Ridge City Schools
E2002-03133-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Jr.
Lindsay E. Alford ("the plaintiff") and her father, David R. Alford, IV, sued The Oak Ridge City Schools ("the high school") under the Governmental Tort Liability Act ("GTLA") for injuries sustained by the plaintiff when she slipped on a hallway floor at Oak Ridge High School, where she was a student. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's proof, the trial court granted the high school's motion for an involuntary dismissal, finding that, while the plaintiff had proven the existence of water on the floor, she had failed to prove that the high school knew or should have known about the water. From this ruling, the plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Adana Carter v. Utica Mutual Insurance Company
E2002-01779-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Thayer, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: W. Frank Brown III, Chancellor
The trial court sustained a motion for summary judgment in favor of the employer and held that the injury did not occur within the course of employment. The employee contends she was required to make the trip in question and was on a special mission and that the usual rule of noncompensability in going to or coming from work did not apply. The judgment is reversed as the injury occurred on the return trip which was a special errand or mission for the benefit of the employer.

State of Tennessee v. Valerie Arlene Bullion
M2002-02370-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Charles Lee

The appellant, Valerie Arlene Bullion, pled guilty in the Marshall County Circuit Court to operating a motor vehicle in violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act, a Class E felony; driving under the influence, tenth offense, a Class E felony; driving on a revoked license, fourth offense, a Class A misdemeanor; and violation of the implied consent law. The trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of eight years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, suspended the appellant's driver's license for ten years, and imposed a three thousand dollar ($3000) fine. On appeal, the appellant complains that the sentences imposed by the trial court are excessive. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Ricky Lynn Littrell
M2002-01298-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lee Russell

The defendant, Ricky Lynn Littrell, was convicted by a Bedford County Circuit Court jury of theft of property valued more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a career offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. In this delayed appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the stolen merchandise into evidence because a chain of custody had not been established; and (3) the trial court erred by allowing a list of the stolen merchandise into evidence because the testifying witness did not properly authenticate the list pursuant to Rule 901, Tenn. R. Evid. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tony Willis v. Dept of Correction
M2000-01397-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
The issue in this case is the proper standard to be applied to motions to dismiss petitions for common-law writ of certiorari in prison disciplinary proceedings. This appeal involves a prisoner who was charged with and convicted of the disciplinary violation of attempted escape. The prisoner filed a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County challenging the action of the disciplinary board arguing that it was illegal, arbitrary, and excessively punitive. The chancery court granted the Department of Correction's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because the process provided to the petitioner was commensurate with the sanctions imposed upon him, and therefore, there was no violation or deprivation of due process. The majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, with Judge Koch dissenting. We granted Petitioner's request for permission to appeal, and after conducting our own de novo review of the record, we hold that the petitioner did state a claim for relief under the common-law writ of certiorari because his petition alleged that the disciplinary board failed to follow its own disciplinary guidelines and that the petitioner was substantially prejudiced thereby. At the same time, we agree with the Department of Correction that the petitioner did not state a claim for relief under the due process clause of the United States Constitution or the Tennessee Constitution. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part, affirmed in part, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Dianna Dawn Mcgahey v. Davis Lee Mcgahgey
W2003-01051-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Ron E. Harmon

State of Tennessee v. Evelyn Holly
W2002-01200-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Arthur T. Bennett

Defendant, Evelyn Holly was convicted of second degree murder following a jury trial. Defendant now challenges her conviction arguing that the trial court erred in not suppressing her statement to the police. Defendant also contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction of second degree murder. Specifically, Defendant argues that the evidence showed that she and the victim, Ronald Kyles, were engaged in mutual combat at the time of the killing and requests this court to reduce her conviction to voluntary manslaughter. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm Defendant's conviction for second degree murder.

W2003-00129-COA-R3-CV
W2003-00129-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood

Mary Guess v. Sharp Manufacturing Co. of America,
W2002-00818-WC-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.

State of Tennessee v. Redonna Hanna
W2002-00821-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge James C. Beasley, Jr.

The petitioner, Redonna Hanna, was convicted of three counts of aggravated robbery, one count of especially aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of first degree murder. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective by not objecting to the trial court's instructions as to criminal responsibility. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appealed. We affirm the dismissal.

State of Tennessee v. Voss Johnson
W2002-01487-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bernie Weinman

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Voss Johnson, was convicted of two counts of especially aggravated robbery, one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter, and one count of second degree murder. Defendant now appeals his convictions arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for second degree murder based on a theory of criminal responsibility. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

William Perry v. Ricki Perry
W2001-01350-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Martha B. Brasfield
We granted this appeal to determine the correct standard to be applied in modifying a temporary, open-ended award of rehabilitative alimony. We hold that a substantial and material change in circumstances must be shown in order to extend, or otherwise modify, such an award. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Ray Edwards v. Hallsdale-Powell Utility District
E2002-00395-SC-S09-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Wheeler A. Rosenbalm
The plaintiffs brought suit against Hallsdale-Powell Utility District for nuisance and inverse condemnation after their homes were flooded with raw sewage on two occasions. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the utility district on the plaintiffs' claim for inverse condemnation, holding that no taking of their properties had occurred. The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment. The intermediate appellate court held that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient facts to overcome summary judgment by showing that the sewage backup into their homes had caused a permanent loss of market value. We hold that a governmental defendant must perform a purposeful or intentional act for a taking to exist. Because such an act was not shown in the present case, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

In Re: The Estate of Lowell Frazier
E2002-01203-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Billy Joe White
This appeal concerns two separate suits filed in the Chancery Court for Campbell County in connection with the administration of the Estate of Lowell Frazier. The first suit was brought by Sam Lough, individually, and also, along with his wife, Debbie Lough, as parents and guardians of Matthew Lough, and Darryl Herron and Elizabeth Herron, as parents and guardians of Chelsea Herron. It sought to establish a lost or spoilated will of Mr. Frazier, which was dated January 30, 1998 ("the first will"). The second suit was brought by Matthew Lough and Chelsea Herron by and through their guardian ad litem, appointed in the first case, contesting a later will dated May 24, 2000 ("the second will"). The cases were consolidated below and the suit seeking to establish the first will was tried first. Under an agreement of the parties, the first case must be decided in favor of the minors before they would have standing to contest the second will. After a plenary trial a jury found as to the first case that the Plaintiffs proved by clear and convincing evidence that Lowell Frazier did not destroy the first will. Thereupon, the second trial was had before the same jury, which found against the second will on the ground that due execution was not proved and that Glenda Faye Smith, who was the sole beneficiary of the second will, and at the time it was executed was attorney-in-fact for Mr. Frazier, did not overcome the presumption of undue influence over Mr. Frazier by clear and convincing evidence. Ms. Smith raises a number of issues, many of which merit a critical examination, but our review of the record persuades us that the issue which contends that she was entitled to a directed verdict in the first case is the dispositive issue in this appeal. We find that the Court was in error in not directing a verdict in her favor in the lost will case and reverse the judgment rendered therein. This results in the Plaintiffs not having standing to pursue the second case, which is reversed and dismissed.

State of Tennessee v. Ricky Thompson
E2002-02631-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge John K. Byers

The Defendant, Ricky Thompson, was convicted by a jury of first degree murder, aggravated assault, and arson. He was sentenced to death for the first degree murder. Upon the Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial court entered an order modifying the jury's verdicts to not guilty by reason of insanity. The State raises one principal issue in this direct appeal, which it states as follows: whether the trial court erred in reversing the jury's determination of guilt and granting the Defendant a judgment of acquittal by reason of insanity on charges of first degree murder, aggravated assault, and arson. Because we find the evidence legally sufficient to support the jury's verdicts, we reverse the trial court's order, reinstate the jury's verdicts, and remand the case to the trial court for consideration of the Defendant's motion for a new trial and sentencing on the aggravated assault and arson convictions.

State of Tennessee v. Johnnie W. Reeves
M2002-02371-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steve R. Dozier

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant, Johnnie W. Reeves, of two counts of aggravated child abuse of a child six years of age or less. The trial court imposed two concurrent twenty-year sentences. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; and (2) the trial court erred in admitting certain photographs of the victim's injuries. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. David D. Harris
M2002-00382-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Seth W. Norman

The Defendant, David D. Harris, pled guilty to seven counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, in the Davidson County Criminal Court on June 16, 1999. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to three eight-year sentences, to be served consecutively. The trial court suspended the sentences and ordered the Defendant to serve three consecutive eight-year terms on supervised probation. The State appealed, and this Court reversed the portion of the sentence that ordered the Defendant to serve twenty-four years of probation on the three consecutive eight-year sentences, holding that a probationary sentence for aggravated robbery is contrary to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-303(a). Accordingly, we reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for re-sentencing. Upon re-sentencing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to three eight-year prison terms and ordered that the sentences run consecutive to each other and consecutive to a sentence that the Defendant is currently serving in Williamson County. The Defendant appealed the trial court's re-sentencing order and raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erroneously denied his request for a new sentencing hearing and; (2) whether the trial court erroneously denied the Defendant's request, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, for a reduced sentence. After a through examination of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied the Defendant's request for a new sentencing hearing; however, because we conclude that the trial court erroneously believed that it was without the authority to impose concurrent sentences, we reverse and remand for it to determine whether the three sentences should run consecutively or concurrently.

John Wilcox v. State of Tennessee - Order
E2002-01600-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the State engaged in a vindictive prosecution and failed to perform testing on evidence which would have supported his claim of self-defense. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the post-conviction court. We affirm the post-conviction court's denial of post-conviction relief.

State of Tennessee v. Vernon Lamar Bryant
E2002-01234-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Douglas A. Meyer

Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of attempted reckless homicide, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. The trial court merged the attempted reckless homicide conviction into the aggravated assault conviction, and the defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender, to ten years for aggravated assault and six years for aggravated burglary, with the sentences to run concurrently. The defendant contends that the trial court improperly merged the attempted reckless homicide conviction into his aggravated assault conviction. Also, the trial court erred in instructing the jury on flight. We conclude, following plain error review, that attempted reckless homicide is not a recognized crime in Tennessee. We reverse and dismiss the defendant's conviction for attempted reckless homicide. Further, we conclude that the jury instruction regarding flight was not error, and the trial court correctly sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender. We affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences for aggravated burglary and aggravated assault.

Janice Darnell v. Royal and Sunalliance,
M2002-00617-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Corlew, Chancellor
In this case of first impression, the employee contends the trial court erred in setting aside a court approved settlement as being contrary to law and grounded on mistake of fact. As discussed below, the panel has concluded there was no mistake as to an existing fact and that Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-241(a)(2) does not authorize an employer or its insurer to obtain reconsideration of a lump sum award of permanent partial disability benefits.

Cora Jean Earls v. Calsonic Yorozu Corporation, Inc.
M2002-01309-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Charles D. Haston, Chancellor
In this appeal, the employer insists (1) the evidence preponderates against the trial court's findings as to notice, permanency, causation and extent of permanency, (2) the trial court erred in the application of Tenn. Code Ann. __ 5-6-27(3) and 5-6-241; (3) the trial court erred by delegating its adjudicatory function to the Clerk and Master, and (4) the trial court erred in assessing discretionary costs against the defendant. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the award of permanent partial disability benefits should be reduced to one based on two and one-half times the employee's medical impairment rating, or 3 percent to the body as a whole.