In this appeal the appellant was convicted of theft of property over $500 and sentenced to two (2) years on community corrections. Approximately three (3) months later he was convicted of vandalism of property valued under $500. At the time of his arrest on the vandalism charge the appellant was intoxicated. As a result of his conduct while on community corrections his sentence to this program was revoked. He was re-sentenced to one (1) year of continuous incarceration followed by one (1) year of community corrections.
Henry
Court of Criminal Appeals
Shirley Barlow v. Jarvis Barlow M1999-00749-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Clara W. Byrd
These parties were married for twenty-seven years before the wife abandoned the marriage and sought a divorce which was uncontested. She was awarded one-half of the net marital estate, and rehabilitative alimony. Wife appeals, claiming that because of her illness she is entitled to more than 50 percent of the marital property, is entitled to alimony in futuro rather than rehabilitative alimony, and is entitled to attorney fees. We affirm the trial court's judgment, except as to the period of spousal support, which is extended from three years to five years. We also remand this case to the trial court for a determination of whether the post-judgment facts alleged by the husband warrant a further modification of the alimony award.
The petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to imprisonment for twenty-five years as a Range I offender. Following an evidentiary hearing and the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, the petitioner argues on appeal that prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance at his trial merit a new trial. We affirm the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition.
Wilson
Court of Criminal Appeals
Ethel Carmical v. Mary Jane Kilpatrick M2002-00613-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Timothy L. Easter
This is a challenge to an award of attorney's fees in a partition action. The testatrix left 500 acres of land in Perry County to her then-living heirs. Some of the heirs filed this action to partition and sell the land. After several years, the land finally sold. The trial court awarded 10% of the sale proceeds, approximately $100,000, as attorney's fees for the three attorneys who provided legal services in the partition action. One of the heirs now appeals that award, claiming that it was excessive. The appellant filed neither a transcript of the proceedings nor a statement of the evidence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c). We must affirm the trial court's award, because the issues raised by the appellant would require a review of the proceedings below, and without a transcript of the trial proceedings or a statement of the evidence, we must assume that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in light of the evidence.
Perry
Court of Appeals
Jesse Fitts v. Donald Arms, d/b/a McMinnville Orthopedic Clinic M2002-00655-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Charles D. Haston, Sr.
This appeal arises from a medical malpractice proceeding. The trial court granted summary judgment for both physicians, finding that Aapellants' expert affidavits failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. For the following reasons, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.
Warren
Court of Appeals
Janis Turner v. Andre Yovanovitch M2002-01164-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Muriel Robinson
This is a child support modification case. The father's net monthly income was in excess of $10,000 per month. The trial court, stating that it was in the child's best interest and welfare, included father's income in excess of $10,000 in calculating his child support obligation. On appeal, the father asserts that the mother failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the child support based on income greater than $10,000 per month was reasonably necessary to provide for the needs for the minor child, as contemplated in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-101(e)(1)(B). We affirm.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Scott Hartman v. State M2002-01430-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Student-athlete entered into athletic scholarship with University under which University agreed to furnish medical treatment for any injuries incurred during athletic competition. Student-athlete suffered catastrophic injury during competition. At the time of his injury, student-athlete was an enrolled Eligible Dependent under an insurance plan father purchased through his employer. Pursuant to this plan, and the subrogation provision contained within, employer paid a significant portion of student-athlete's medical expenses for a specific three-year period. Employer ratified original contract action of student-athlete and parents against University and State, and sought to recover medical expenses paid pursuant to the plan's subrogation provision. Claims Commission granted summary judgment in favor of employer, ruling that employer was entitled to recover medical expenses from University. Commission denied claimants' request for prejudgment interest. University appeals Commission's summary judgment ruling, and claimants appeal Commission's denial of prejudgment interest. We affirm.
Court of Appeals
Titan Trucking v. American Home Assurance & Beers Construction M2002-01747-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Corlew, III
This case involves the interpretation of a performance payment bond. The city contracted with a construction company to make improvements to a public project. The construction company entered into a performance payment bond with the surety to protect the city. The public project required excavation of soil, and the contract allowed the construction company to either relocate the dirt or remove it. A third party purchased the dirt. The purchaser's subcontractor hired a trucking company to move the dirt for the purchaser. The trucking company was never paid for its services. The trucking company sued the construction company and the surety under the terms of the performance payment bond. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the construction company and the surety. The trucking company appeals. We affirm, finding that the services provided by the trucking company were not covered under the terms of the performance payment bond because the construction company was not obligated to pay the third party purchaser for removal of the dirt.
On December 6, 1996, the petitioner was convicted of armed robbery, aggravated burglary, and aggravated kidnaping. On direct appeal, those convictions were affirmed. The Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal on May 10, 1999. On June 21, 2001, the petitioner filed, pro se, a document titled "motion for extraordinary relief." The trial court dismissed the motion, characterizing it as a petition for post-conviction relief, and barred by the one-year statute of limitations. We affirm the dismissal from the trial court.
The defendant originally pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to various theft and forgery offenses as a Range II multiple offender for an effective six-year sentence, most of which would be served on community corrections. At the time of the plea, he agreed his sentence would be increased to ten years if he violated the community corrections program. He was subsequently revoked and ordered to serve an effective ten-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends the trial court failed to make sentencing findings and imposed illegal sentences above the authorized Range II punishment. We agree and, therefore, reverse and remand for a new sentencing hearing.
Davidson
Court of Criminal Appeals
Elizabeth A. Mcbroom v. Owens-Corning Corp. W2002-01146-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer questions the trial court's findings with respect to causation, permanency and extent of disability. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the evidence fails to preponderate against the trial court's findings. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (22 Supp.) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed JOE C. LOSER, JR., SP. J., in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J., and JOHN K. BYERS, SR. J., joined. W. Stephen Gardner and Robert Joseph Leibovich, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Owens- Corning Corp. Scott G. Kirk, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellee, Elizabeth A. McBroom MEMORANDUM OPINION The employee or claimant, Ms. McBroom, initiated this civil action to recover workers' compensation benefits for a gradual injury to both arms. At the conclusion of the trial on October 17, 21, the trial court awarded, among other things, permanent partial disability benefits based on 25 percent to both arms. The employer has appealed. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2) (22 Supp.). The reviewing court is required to conduct an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Madison
Workers Compensation Panel
State of Tennessee v. Vickie Swift E2002-01093-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.
The defendant, Vickie Swift, was convicted of one count of theft over $1000. The trial court imposed a sentence of three years to be served on probation. Later, probation was revoked. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by revoking her probation and ordering her incarcerated for the balance of her sentence.
Blount
Court of Criminal Appeals
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey Smith E2002-01147-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Douglas A. Meyer
The defendant, Jeffrey Smith, pled guilty to three counts of aggravated burglary, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of attempted robbery, and one count of theft under $500. The trial court imposed sentences as follows: six years for two of the aggravated burglaries and three years for the remaining aggravated burglary, twelve years for aggravated robbery, two years for attempted robbery, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for theft under $500. The trial court ordered that the twelve-year sentence for aggravated robbery be served consecutively to the sentence for aggravated burglary in Count 1 of case number 238391. The effective sentence is, therefore, eighteen years. In this appeal, the defendant complains that the sentence is excessive. Because consecutive sentences were not warranted, the judgments must be modified to reflect that all the sentences are to be served concurrently.
Hamilton
Court of Criminal Appeals
John Moore vs. Teresa Moore E2001-03028-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Ben K. Wexler
John Paul Moore appeals a judgment in a divorce proceedings, complaining that the Trial Court should have awarded him primary parenting rather than shared parenting with the child's mother, Teresa Ann Moore. He also complains that the Court erred in awarding an attorney fee to Ms. Moore in the amount of $300. Our standard of review as to both issues is whether the Trial Court abused its discretion. We find the Trial Court properly exercised its discretion and affirm.
Greene
Court of Appeals
Dudley Eastbourne vs. Roger Brumitte E2002-00068-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Frank V. Williams, III
In this appeal from the Chancery Court for Loudon County the Appellant, Roger Brumitte d/b/a Roger Brumitte Construction, argues that the Trial Court erred in awarding the Appellees, Dudley C. Eastbourne and wife Barbara A. Eastbourne, damages for defects in the construction of their home. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court as modified and remand for enforcement of the judgment and collection of costs below.
Loudon
Court of Appeals
State of Tennessee v. Colico Walls W2002-00191-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris B. Craft
The defendant, Colico Walls, was convicted of aggravated robbery and aggravated assault. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of 11 years for the aggravated robbery and a Range II sentence of 10 years for the aggravated assault. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. The judgment is affirmed as to the aggravated robbery. The aggravated assault is modified to simple assault, a Class A misdemeanor, having an 11-month, 29-day sentence. The sentences, as modified, shall be served consecutively.
Shelby
Court of Criminal Appeals
Michael Warden v. Thomas Wortham/Jerry Tidwelll v. Michael Warden M2002-00364-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Donald P. Harris
This case involves specific performance of a real estate contract. The first buyer and the seller entered into a contract for the sale of certain land. The contract did not state a time of performance. After the first buyer failed to perform within the time period understood by the seller, the seller sold the property to the second buyer. The first buyer did not discover the sale to the second buyer until approximately ten months after the second contract was signed and seven months after the transfer. The first buyer filed a lawsuit against both the seller and the second buyer, seeking specific performance of the original contract. The trial court found that the first buyer failed to tender performance within a reasonable time, and granted the second buyer's motion for directed verdict. The first buyer appeals. We affirm, in agreement with the reasoning of the trial court.
Hickman
Court of Appeals
In Re: M.L.J. and R.R.J., et al M2002-02213-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
The Juvenile Court for Sequatchie County terminated respondents' parental rights. We affirm.
Sequatchie
Court of Appeals
Jamie Robinson v. Donald Sundquist M2001-01491-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: James E. Walton
The trial court dismissed this action for failure to state a claim. We affirm.
Montgomery
Court of Appeals
Sandra Hensley v. Daniel Scokin, M.D. M2002-00922-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Marietta M. Shipley
This is a medical battery case. The patient was scheduled to undergo a hysterectomy. Because of prior medical problems, she told the anesthesiologist that she needed him to use nasal intubation instead of oral intubation to anesthetize her for the surgery. The anesthesiologist told her that he would use the type of intubation that he thought was best for her. Ultimately, when the hysterectomy was performed, the patient was intubated through an oral pathway. The patient sued the anesthesiologist for medical battery. The anesthesiologist filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court found that the patient knew that the anesthesiologist might use oral intubation, and that she authorized the procedure both by signing a consent form prior to the surgery and by not stopping the procedure when she became aware that the anesthesiologist might use oral intubation. Consequently, summary judgment was granted in favor of the anesthesiologist. We reverse, finding that a question of material fact exists as to whether the patient authorized the use of oral intubation.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Ferguson Harbour v. Flash Market M2002-00750-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: C. L. Rogers
This case involves a dispute over the validity of a contract. Appellant claims that its signature on the contract was obtained through economic duress and that the contract is, therefore, void. The trial court found for Appellee, awarding compensatory damages and attorney's fees. Appellee contends that the award of attorney's fees was unreasonably low. We affirm the trial court's award of compensatory damages. On the issue of attorney's fees, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand this case for a determination of reasonable attorney's fees consistent with this opinion.
Sumner
Court of Appeals
Russell Lipsey vs. Protech Sys. W2001-01785-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Karen R. Williams
This is a negligence case. The owner of a three-story historic building was remodeling it. He called a fire sprinkler company to move a sprinkler pipe. The repairman cut one of the sprinkler pipes and, thinking it was a "dead pipe," pushed it behind some sheetrock without capping it. The sprinkler system was regulated by an air compressor that filled the pipes with pressurized air until the system was triggered to allow water to flow through the pipes. The repairman left before the compressor completely charged the system, that is, before the air pressure reached the required level to hold the water back. Two days later, water began rushing out of a sprinkler pipe, causing extensive damage to the building. The owner sued the fire sprinkler company for damage to the building and its contents as well as for interruption of his business. At the trial, there was conflicting testimony about whether the water came out of the pipe that the repairman cut or whether it came out of another pipe. The jury found that both parties were zero percent responsible; thus, the owner recovered no damages. The owner moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. Both motions were denied. The owner appeals, and we affirm.
The petitioner, Jonathan Thornton, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief, alleging that the sentence imposed by this court on direct appeal is illegal. Because the sentence imposed by this court upon direct appeal is in direct contravention of a statute, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the petitioner's sentence is modified. With regard to the petitioner's felony conviction, we modify the sentence to a term of split confinement, with 7.2 months to be served in the local jail and the balance to be served on probation. The sentence for the misdemeanor sentence remains the same, 11 months and 29 days with thirty percent to be served in confinement.
Greene
Court of Criminal Appeals
21st Mortgage ,formerly 21st Century Mortgage Corp. vs. Capitol Homes, LLC E2002-02670-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: G. Richard Johnson
Ms. Stella Ford ("Ford") purchased a manufactured home from Capitol Homes, LLC ("Capitol Homes") and contractually agreed to make monthly payments. At the same time, Capitol Homes assigned its rights under the contract with Ford to 21st Mortgage Corp. ("Plaintiff") through an Assignment by Seller ("Assignment"). Capitol Homes made twelve express warranties in the Assignment. The Assignment further provided it would be with limited recourse for two months. After the two months expired, Plaintiff sued Capitol Homes and James Hurst ("Hurst")(collectively referred to as "Defendants"). Hurst had personally guaranteed the debt of Capitol Homes. Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that Capitol Homes had breached several of the express warranties. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss claiming the two month limited recourse provision also applied to any claim for breach of express warranty. The trial court agreed, and dismissed the lawsuit. Plaintiff appeals, and we reverse.
The defendant, Joseph B. Thompson, was convicted of aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of twenty years for each offense for an effective sentence of forty years. In this appeal of right, the defendant asserts (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; (2) that his convictions for both aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping violate the rule established in State v. Anthony; (3) that a pretrial photographic array was unduly suggestive; (4) that the trial court erred by the admission of photographs of the victim; (5) that the trial court erred by denying his motion for mistrial; (6) that the offenses should have been severed for trial; (7) that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss the indictment when the state failed to disclose exculpatory information; (8) that the trial court erred by admitting a receipt that was not properly authenticated; (9) that the trial court impermissibly limited closing argument to forty minutes; and (10) that the sentence is excessive. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.
