State of Tennessee v. Jody Lane Orr - Concurring W2001-02075-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley
I concur with most of the majority opinion. I respectfully disagree with its conclusion that enhancement factor (5), regarding exceptional cruelty, does not apply. I believe that being duct taped, blindfolded, tied up, and made to wear a New Year’s party hat reflect mental abuse and degradation that goes above and beyond that inherently necessary for any aggravated rape. Although I do not believe that the weight of the two enhancement factors applied by the majority opinion should result in a maximum sentence of twenty-five years, I conclude that the sentence is appropriate because of the application of enhancement factor (5), as well.
Carroll
Court of Criminal Appeals
William Davis vs. Reliance Electric Industrial E2002-00973-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: John A. Turnbull
Arbitrator awarded compensatory and punitive damages to plaintiff for retaliatory discharge. On appeal, we affirm.
Cumberland
Court of Appeals
State of Tennessee v. Adrian Lumpkin W2002-00648-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carolyn Wade Blackett
The Defendant, Adrian Lumpkin, was indicted for aggravated assault. He pled guilty and agreed to a sentence of three years with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court granted the Defendant judicial diversion subject to several conditions. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by placing unreasonable conditions on its grant of judicial diversion. We conclude that the trial court had no legal authority to impose a term of incarceration as a condition of judicial diversion. However, with respect to the remaining conditions, we dismiss the Defendant's appeal because a defendant to whom judicial diversion was granted has no appeal as of right.
The defendant, David L. Baker, was convicted of driving under the influence, fourth offense, and sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with 210 days to be served in the county jail and the balance on supervised probation. He was ordered to pay a fine of $1100 and to complete an alcohol education safety program, and his driver's license was suspended for four years. He timely appealed, presenting as the single issue his claim that the evidence presented was insufficient to support the verdict. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of conviction.
Putnam
Court of Criminal Appeals
In Re: The Estate of Martha G. Spencer M2001-02187-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: J. B. Cox
The origin of this appeal was a claim made against the Estate of Martha G. Spencer, by NHC Health Care of Lewisburg, a skilled nursing home, for services rendered her in the amount of $25,934.54. After a plenary trial the Chancellor dismissed the claim upon finding that NHC was estopped from pursuing its claim because of representations made that Ms. Spencer's expenses were covered by Medicare. NHC appeals. We affirm.
Marshall
Court of Appeals
Mary F. Hall. v. Mary Rose Pippin. M2000-01151-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Vernon Neal
The Defendants, Mary Rose Pippin and Dale Delaney appeal the Trial Court's dismissal of a Rule 60 motion, which attacked a previous determination by the Trial Court relative to their right to maintain a fence across a roadway over which the Plaintiffs, Mary F. Hall and Don K. Hall claim a private right-of-way. We affirm.
Putnam
Court of Appeals
Donna Harlow v. Reliance National, M2001-02336-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: James L. Weatherford, Sr.J.
Trial Court Judge: Russ Heldman, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Almost three years prior to his death from injuries sustained in a work accident, the employee and his ex-wife (the plaintiff), had taken part in a "remarriage" ceremony at a church but failed to obtain a marriage license. The trial court found that the plaintiff, was the "lawful wife" of the deceased worker and awarded death benefits. Additionally, upon motion by the plaintiff, the trial court commuted the award to lump sum. We reverse the trial court and remand for dismissal because we find that the plaintiff was not the surviving spouse of the deceased. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed. JAMES L. WEATHERFORD, SR.J., in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J. and JOE C. LOSER, SP.J., joined. Jill A. Hanson, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Reliance National and All Pro Painting. Joseph D. Baugh, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellee, Donna Harlow. MEMORANDUM OPINION Gary Harlow and Donna Barber were married in 1973 and divorced in 1994. In 1995, the Harlows reinitiated their relationship, and Mr. Harlow moved into Ms. Harlow's home. In April 1997, the Harlows participated in a "remarriage" ceremony at a church in which marriage vows were exchanged under the direction of a minister. However, no marriage license was obtained at that time nor thereafter. The Harlows lived together until Mr. Harlow's death. In 1998, the Harlows met with a tax preparer who advised them that they could not file a joint tax return without a marriage license. Until the notification by the tax preparer, Ms. Harlow was unaware that no marriage license existed. After meeting with the tax preparer, Ms. Harlow asked Mr. Harlow several times about obtaining a marriage license, and Mr. Harlow responded that "it was not important" or "you worry about silly things." Ms. Harlow took no affirmative action to obtain the license beyond her questioning of Mr. Harlow. The Harlows filed separate tax returns as "single" or "head of household" for the tax years of 1997, 1998 and 1999. Despite filing separate tax returns, the Harlows filed other documents, including a loan application, indicating their status as husband and wife. Mr. Harlow was sporadically employed during the "remarriage" period, and Ms. Harlow served as the primary breadwinner. On January 11, 2, Gary Harlow, an employee of All Pro Painting, sustained severe head injuries after falling from a work platform, and five days later Mr. Harlow died from those injuries. After Reliance National, the workers' compensation insurer for All Pro Painting, denied death benefits to Ms. Harlow as a surviving spouse, Ms. Harlow filed this action against All Pro Painting and Reliance National ("defendants") seeking payment of statutory death benefits under the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Law. The trial court granted Ms. Harlow's motion for summary judgment and awarded death benefits, finding that she was the "lawful wife" of Mr. Harlow because a "solemnized" relationship existed between the Harlows. The trial court also found that Ms. Harlow was an actual dependent of the deceased and that it would violate Tennessee public policy as set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated _ 36-3-113 to declare that the Harlows' "solemnized" relationship was not a marriage. Upon a motion by Ms. Harlow, the trial judge commuted the award to a lump sum. ANALYSIS Review of findings of fact by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo without any presumption of correctness. Ivey v. Trans Global Gas & Oil, 3 S.W.3d 441, 446 (Tenn. 1999). The workers' compensation statutes are to be given an equitable and liberal construction in favor of workers and their dependents. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-116; Sullivan Electric Co. v. McDonald, 541 S.W.2d 112, 115 (Tenn. 1976). I. Whether Ms. Harlow is the surviving spouse of Mr. Harlow. Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-21(a) provides: For the purposes of the Workers' Compensation Law, the following described persons shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent: -2-
Lewis
Workers Compensation Panel
Stan Ley M Oo Re v. Pay Less Ca Shway S, In C., E W2002-00705-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe H. Walker III , Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Rita L. Stotts, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee appeals the trial court dismissal of his claims by granting summary judgment in favor of employer, holding the action was barred by the statute of limitations. We reverse and remand. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Trial Court Reversed and Remanded. JOE H. WALKER III , SP. J., in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J, and JOE C. LOSER, SP. J. joined. Steve Taylor, Memphis, TN, for the Appellant, Stanley Moore. Lori D. Parrish, Memphis, TN, for the Appellees, Payless Cashways, Inc., et al. MEMORANDUM OPINION Stanley Moore worked for Payless Cashways. During the course of his employment, on June 23, 1999, lumber accidentally fell on Mr. Moore. He was transported to the emergency room and treated by Dr. Bobo. He was paid temporary total benefits until released to return to work in September, 1999. He was followed by Dr. Bobo and Dr. Chen for reflex sympathetic dystrophy until released February 1, 2. The last payment for medical treatment was made March 29, 2, for treatment received February 1, 2. Dr. Bobo was of the opinion that he had no permanent partial impairment. Mr. Moore had obtained counsel at some point, who notified Mr. Moore in April 2, that medical records indicated Mr. Moore had no permanent partial impairment, and the attorney was closing his file, that Mr. Moore could consult with another attorney. Mr. Moore continued to have problems with his left upper and lower extremities. He obtained new counsel and a complaint was filed April 3, 21. Dr. Rizk evaluated the claimant and opined by letter dated June 11, 21, that Mr. Moore has reflex sympathetic dystrophy which Dr. Rizk considers to be a permanent condition, and caused by his work-related accident. Summary judgment was granted for the employer on the ground that the suit is barred by the statute of limitations found at T.C.A. _ 5-6-23, and 224. I. Rule 56.4 provides that summary judgment is appropriate where: (1) there is no genuine issue with regard to the material facts relevant to the claim or defense contained in the motion, and (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the undisputed facts. See Staples v. CBL & Associates, Inc., 15 S.W.3d 83, 88 (Tenn. 2); Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997). "Courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must also draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor." Staples, 15 S.W.3d at 89. "Courts should grant a summary judgment only when both the facts and the inferences to be drawn from the facts permit a reasonable person to reach only one conclusion." Id. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment by order entered July 3, 21, stating: "It is the opinion of this Court that Defendants' Motion is not well- founded and should be and is hereby denied." Defendants filed for permission to appeal or for reconsideration. On March 5, 22, the trial court entered an order granting relief from the prior order, granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissing the complaint. The trial court made no findings of fact, thus the appeal comes with no presumption of correctness. The panel finds that summary judgment was not appropriate in this case. II. A complaint for workers' compensation benefits must be filed within one year after the accident resulting in injury, T.C.A. _ 5-6-23; or within one year after the occurrence of injury, T.C.A. _ 5-6-224. It is well-settled that "the running of the statute of limitations is suspended until by reasonable care and diligence it is discoverable and apparent that an injury compensable under the workmen's compensation laws has been sustained." Livingston v. Shelby Williams Indus., Inc., 811 S.W.2d 511 (Tenn. 1991). It is the date on which the disability manifests itself to a person of reasonable diligence, not the date of the accident which triggers the running of the statute of limitations. Jones v. Home Indem. Ins. Co., 679 S.W.2d 445, 446 (Tenn. 1984). Ordinarily, the limitation period should not begin to run until a physician presents claimant with a diagnosis of his condition. Poore v. Magnavox Co., 666 S.W.2d 48 (Tenn. 1984).
Moore
Workers Compensation Panel
State of Tennessee v. Paul Dennis Reid M1999-00803-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn
In this capital case, the defendant, Paul Dennis Reid, Jr., was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery for killing two Captain D’s employees and robbing one of the employees. As to each conviction of first degree murder, the jury found in the sentencing hearing that the State had proven three aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt – (1) that the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, other than the present charge, the statutory elements of which involve the use of violence to the person; (2) that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another; and (3) that the murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit robbery. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (6), and (7) (1997). Finding that these aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury sentenced the defendant to death on each murder conviction. The trial court subsequently imposed a twenty-five-year sentence for the especially aggravated robbery conviction and ordered this sentence to be served consecutively to the two death sentences. On direct appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, the defendant mounted numerous challenges to both his convictions and sentences. After fully considering the defendant’s claims, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Thereafter, the case was docketed in this Court. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(a)(1) (1997). After carefully and fully reviewing the record and the relevant authority, the defendant’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.
I concur with the majority’s opinion affirming the conviction of the defendant. With regard to the imposition of the death sentences in this case, however, I cannot agree. My concerns, as expressed below, pertain to my continued dismay with the comparative proportionality review protocol imposed by the majority.
Davidson
Supreme Court
Donna Seals vs. Larry Seals E2002-00100-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Howell N. Peoples
Donna Lynn Seals ("Wife") and Larry Clyde Seals ("Husband") were divorced in 2001, after seventeen years of marriage. The parties have one minor child ("Child"). Wife was primarily a stay-at-home mother during the marriage. Husband is employed as a general superintendent by Williams Union Boiler. The Trial Court found Husband's earnings for 2001 to be $117,000 in regular wages plus $16,380 in per diem. The Trial Court awarded Wife the parties' home in Hamilton County as alimony in solido and further ordered Husband to pay rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $1,365 per month for forty-two consecutive months. The Trial Court also ordered Husband to pay $2,063 per month in child support, which is an upward deviation due to Husband's absence of overnight parenting time since December 2000. Husband filed a post-trial Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 motion for findings of fact. The Trial Court addressed this motion and entered its Final Decree of Divorce in November 2001. Husband appeals. We affirm.
Hamilton
Court of Appeals
Linda Sue Hathaway vs. Glenn Hathaway E2002-00659-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Bill Swann
The Trial Court ordered father to pay daughter's tuition to a college of her choice, based upon a provision in the Marriage Dissolution Agreement. On appeal, we modify.
Knox
Court of Appeals
Shirley Daniel vs. James Daniel W2002-01103-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: William Michael Maloan
This is an alimony case. At the time of the divorce, the parties had been married for almost thirty-one years. The husband was fifty-one years old, and the wife was forty-five years old. The husband owned his own backhoe/trackhoe company. The wife was a homemaker and raised the parties' three children. She has a sixth-grade education and earned her GED in 1997. Since the parties' separation, the wife had held five jobs but had not been able to maintain her employment. The parties agreed on the division of personal and real property, but disagreed over the value of the husband's business property. The trial court found that the husband made it difficult to ascertain the parties' financial situation. The trial court also found that the wife was economically disadvantaged and could not be rehabilitated. The wife was awarded alimony in futuro and attorney's fees. On appeal, the husband argues that the trial court erred in awarding the wife alimony in futuro and attorney's fees. We affirm, finding that the trial court did not err in concluding that the wife cannot be rehabilitated and in awarding alimony in futuro and attorney's fees.
Obion
Court of Appeals
W2001-03088-COA-R3-CV W2001-03088-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: James F. Russell
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 23, we accepted certification of a question of law from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee concerning regulations issued by the Tennessee Department of Human Services. The certified question from the district court asks us to determine whether the rationale of statutorily imposed vicarious liability under Gleaves v. Checker Cab Transit Corp., 15 S.W.3d 799 (Tenn. 2000), applies to rules governing licensing and operation of day care centers in Tennessee. For the reasons given herein, we answer that our holding in Gleaves is distinguishable from the present case, and the Tennessee regulations governing day care centers do not, absent fault on the part of the licensee, provide for vicarious liability for the injurious acts of an employee occurring outside the scope of employment.
A Williamson County jury convicted the defendants of DUI, first offense. Defendant Daniel was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, all suspended except for 90 days incarceration. Defendant Echols' eleven-month and twenty-nine day sentence was suspended after 30 days incarceration. The sole issue on appeal is whether their sentences are excessive. We find the defendants failed to file their notices of appeal within 30 days of the trial court's orders overruling their motions for new trial; therefore, their appeal is dismissed.
The Appellants, Lloyd E. Ferrell and Debra L. Ferrell, appeal the denial of post-conviction relief by the Hardin County Circuit Court. On appeal, both contend that the post-conviction court erred by not finding ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition, Debra Ferrell asserts: (1) that she should be granted a new trial because the State failed to provide Brady/Bagley material: (2) that the postconviction court erred by not making written findings of fact on each issue raised in the petition, and (3) that the cumulative effect of all errors at trial, in addition to counsel’s ineffectiveness, deprived her of a meaningful defense. After review, we affirm the dismissal of the petitions.
Hardin
Court of Criminal Appeals
State of Tennessee v. Carla Moten W2001-01922-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Arthur T. Bennett
Defendant, Carla Moten, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for aggravated burglary and intentional aggravated assault. Defendant was convicted by a jury of the lesser-included offense of reckless aggravated assault. The jury also found Defendant guilty of aggravated criminal trespass as a lesser-included offense of aggravated burglary. Defendant was sentenced to two years for her reckless aggravated assault conviction and six months for her aggravated criminal trespass conviction, to be served concurrently. In her appeal as of right, Defendant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support her conviction for reckless aggravated assault. We disagree, and affirm the judgment of the trial court regarding the conviction for reckless aggravated assault. However, we find plain error in the conviction for aggravated criminal trespass as a lesser-included offense of aggravated burglary and therefore reverse and dismiss the conviction for aggravated criminal trespass.
Shelby
Court of Criminal Appeals
State of Tennessee v. Danial R. Willcutt W2001-02743-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley
A Hardin County jury convicted the defendant, Danial R. Willcutt,1 of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I violent offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for aggravated sexual battery; and (2) whether his maximum Range I sentence is excessive. Upon review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Hardin
Court of Criminal Appeals
State of Tennessee v. Danial R. Willcutt - Concurring W2001-02743-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley
I write separately to express my concern over the continuing problem we see in appellate records where the record fails to explain witness demonstrations. Nevertheless, I find the evidence in this case sufficient to support the verdict regardless of this shortcoming. Thus, I do not reach the issue of which party has the burden of proof with regard to witness demonstrations.
Hardin
Court of Criminal Appeals
State of Tennessee v. Keith Goodman E2001-00036-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge James B. Scott, Jr.
The threshold issue presented in this appeal is whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that the defendant’s motion to dismiss was not capable of pretrial determination under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b) because it requires a determination of the general issue of the defendant’s guilt or innocence. In our view, the defendant’s motion presents a legal question – the proper interpretation of a statute – and does not require a determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence. Having decided the threshold issue, we also are of the opinion that the trial court correctly interpreted the statute when it held that a parent is not subject to prosecution for especially aggravated kidnapping under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-305(a)(2) when the indictment fails to allege that the minor child was removed or confined by force, threat, or fraud. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the trial court granting the defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss count one of the indictment is reinstated.
Anderson
Supreme Court
Charles Montague vs. Michael Kellum E2002-01733-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Jean A. Stanley
This legal malpractice claim arises from the filing by attorney Michael D. Kellum ("Defendant") of an unverified post-conviction petition on behalf of Charles Montague ("Plaintiff"). The post-conviction petition was dismissed by the Criminal Court on the merits and because it was not verified. We vacated a previous grant of summary judgment to Defendant to allow Plaintiff time to conduct discovery. While on remand and during discovery, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff's post-conviction proceeding for the sole reason that the petition was unverified. Thereafter, the Trial Court again dismissed this lawsuit after concluding, inter alia, Plaintiff had suffered no damages. We vacate and remand.
Washington
Court of Appeals
Debra Persada vs. Tim Persada E2002-00397-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: G. Richard Johnson
In divorce action the parties reached an agreed property settlement by mediation. Before Judgment, the husband repudiated the agreement, but the Trial Court heard evidence on the validity of the agreement and enforced the agreement by entering Judgment thereon. We affirm on appeal.
The defendant pled guilty to one count of Class D felony theft over $10,000, received an agreed three-year sentence, and agreed to allow the trial court to determine the manner in which her sentence would be served. The trial court ordered the sentence to be served in incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant, Anthony R. Parham, of sexual battery. In this appeal as of right, the defendant raises the issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for sexual battery. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
