State of Tennessee v. Ronald Eugene Purdy
W2001-02868-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.

The trial court placed the defendant on probation for eight years. As a condition of probation, the defendant was required to complete a one-year drug rehabilitation program. When the defendant violated his probation by failing to complete the program and failing to report to his probation officer upon his discharge from the program, the State filed a probation violation report with the court. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant's probation. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. James Anthony Cline
E2001-02011-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.
The appellant, James Anthony Cline, pled guilty to one count of theft of property and received a probationary sentence. Prior to the entry of the judgment of conviction, the appellant committed another theft offense. Additionally, during the appellant's probationary sentence, the appellant was convicted of several other offenses, including four forgery offenses. As a result of the appellant's continued criminal conduct, the trial court revoked the appellant's probation. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the appellant violated the conditions of his probation; and (2) whether the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Upon a review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand for correction of the judgments on the four forgery offenses.

State of Tennessee v. Robert S. Clark
W2001-00921-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Otis Higgs, Jr.

The defendant, Robert S. Clark, was convicted of two counts of robbery. The trial court imposed concurrent four-year sentences. In this appeal of right, the defendant asserts that there was prosecutorial misconduct during voir dire and that the trial court erred by excluding certain expert testimony. Because there is no reversible error, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Lavaya Demond Lee
E2001-00053-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Douglas A. Meyer

The defendant, Lavaya Demond Lee, appeals from his jury convictions of premeditated first-degree murder, first-degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery in the Hamilton County Criminal Court. He received a life sentence for the merged murder conviction and a consecutive 20-year sentence for especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, he complains of evidentiary errors, jury-instruction errors, and error in imposing consecutive sentences. We affirm the convictions; however, we vacate the order imposing consecutive sentencing and impose the 20-year sentence to run concurrently with the life sentence.

State of Tennessee v. Shawn Martin Holdaway
M2001-02359-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Charles Lee

Defendant appeals denial of Community Corrections sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. John L. Goodwin, III
M2001-00044-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Tom E. Gray

The petitioner, John L. Goodwin, III, was convicted of attempted rape and aggravated burglary. State v. John L. Goodwin, III, No. 01-C01-9108-CR-00242, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 859, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Nov. 12, 1992). The petitioner decided to waive his right to a direct appeal of his verdict and filed a post-conviction petition for review. Id. His petition was denied, and on appeal this Court found that the petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal based on erroneous advice of counsel and thus granted him an opportunity to file a motion for new trial and bring a delayed direct appeal. Id. at **3-4. The petitioner filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied, and the petitioner brought a delayed direct appeal before this Court. State v. Goodwin, 909 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). This Court affirmed the petitioner's conviction, but remanded the petitioner's case for re-sentencing. Id. at 45-46. The petitioner was re-sentenced, and he appealed his new sentence to this Court, as well as the trial court's denial of his writ of habeas corpus. State v. John L. Goodwin, III, No. 01C01-9601-CR-00013, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 679, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, July 23, 1997). We reviewed his sentence and ultimately found that the trial court properly imposed the petitioner's new sentence. Id. While this Court was reviewing the petitioner's appeal of his new sentence, he filed an "application for coram nobis and/or in the alternative to re-open post-conviction petition." John L. Goodwin, III v. State, No. M2000-0757-CCA-R28-CO, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Sept. 19, 1997) (no electronic database citation available). The trial court dismissed this pleading, and we affirmed that ruling. John L. Goodwin, III v. State, No. 01C01-9608-CR-00337 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Sept. 19, 1997) (no electronic database citation available). The petitioner then filed a motion to re-open his post-conviction petition, which was ultimately dismissed without a hearing. Id. Thus, we remanded his case for a hearing to determine the merits of what was, essentially, his post-conviction petition. The petitioner now brings the instant appeal of the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, challenging: the fairness of his post-conviction hearing; his sentence; his notice of the charges against him; the constitutionality of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(a); the alleged conspiracy between various court officers against him; the effectiveness of his counsel; and the jury instructions. After reviewing the petitioner's claims, we find that they are either waived, previously determined, or without merit.

Michael Eugene Sample v. State of Tennessee
W1999-01202-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bernie Weinman

We granted review in this post-conviction capital case to address two issues: (1) whether the
trial court properly ruled that the petitioner’s claim that the prosecution suppressed exculpatory
evidence was barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) whether the trial court properly determined that the jury’s reliance on the felony murder aggravating circumstance in imposing a death sentence for the offense of felony murder in violation of article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief.

Michael Eugene Sample, et al., v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
W1999-01202-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Xhief Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bernie Weinman

I fully concur in the majority decision but feel compelled to write separately to respond to the dissent’s characterization of the majority’s decision in State v. Workman, 41 S.W.3d 100 (Tenn. 2001), as a “hastily considered decision – one brought on by the pressures of extraordinary circumstances – and it cannot be justified as a logical or natural progression of the law.” To the contrary, from even a cursory reading it is clear that the majority decision in Workman resulted from a principled application of established law to the facts of a particular case. The dissent’s claim that the majority opinion in Workman is not founded in logic or prior law is easily dispelled by simply considering the language of the opinion itself, rather than the dissent’s hyperbole. In concluding that consideration of Workman’s petition for a writ of error coram nobis was not foreclosed by the statute of limitations, the majority meticulously applied the due process balancing test outlined in Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204 (Tenn. 1992), Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272 (Tenn. 2000), and Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464 (Tenn. 2001). In so holding, we stated as follows: As in Burford, to determine whether due process requires tolling in this case, we must consider the governmental interests involved and the private interests affected by the official action. In this case, as in Burford, the governmental interest in asserting the statute of limitations is the prevention of stale and groundless claims. The private interest involved here is the petitioner’s opportunity to have a hearing on the grounds of newly discovered evidence which may have resulted in a different verdict if heard by the jury at trial. If the procedural time bar is applied, Workman will be put to death without being given any opportunity to have the merits of his claim evaluated by a court of this State.

Michael Eugene Sample v. State of Tennessee - Concurring/Dissenting
W1999-01202-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bernie Weinman

In the majority’s opinion today, I find much with which to agree. For example, I concur in the majority’s holding that our decision in Wright v.  State, 987 S.W.2d 26 (Tenn. 1999), did not create a per se bar against all later-arising claims alleging suppression of exculpatory evidence. I also agree with the majority that a defendant may bring such a claim, not withstanding the running of the statute of limitations under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, so long as any delay in filing the petition for relief is reasonable under all the circumstances. Finally, I agree that the Middlebrooks error here is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the standard recognized by this Court in State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. 1993). 

However, I write separately to respectfully express my disapproval with the majority’s reliance on Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100 (Tenn. 2001), as authority for finding that the defendant in this case made a timely filing for post-conviction relief. I was one of two members of this Court who dissented from the decision in Workman, and I regret that it  has been used today as authority to toll the post-conviction statute of limitations for a sixteen-month period.

State of Tennessee v. Israel Michua Camacho
E2001-00554-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge James E. Beckner

The defendant, Israel Michua Camacho, appeals his convictions in the Greene County Criminal Court for facilitation of possession of one-half gram or more of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class C felony, and facilitation of possession of not less than ten pounds nor more than seventy pounds of marijuana with intent to deliver, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the facilitation of possession of cocaine conviction and two years for the facilitation of possession of marijuana conviction. The defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that he deserves a new trial because the state failed to provide the defense with a discoverable videotape in a timely manner. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Jenny Bea Huffstetler
E2001-02197-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.

The Defendant, Jenny Bea Huffstetler, pled guilty to three counts of forgery, one count of fraudulent use of a credit card, one count of misdemeanor assault, and one count of theft under $500. For these offenses, the Defendant received an effective sentence of three years as a Range I, standard offender. Her sentence was suspended and she was placed on intensive probation. Following a hearing on allegations that the Defendant had violated the terms of her probation, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve nine months in jail and the balance of her sentence on community corrections. The Defendant now appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Timothy Ken Sexton
E2000-01779-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Douglas A. Meyer

The Hamilton County Grand Jury indicted the fifteen-year-old Defendant, charging him with second degree murder. Following a transfer hearing, the Defendant was tried as an adult. A Hamilton County jury found the Defendant guilty of the indicted charge, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty years in the Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, arguing the following: (1) that there was insufficient evidence to convict the Defendant of second degree murder, (2) that the juvenile court erred by transferring the Defendant to be tried as an adult, (3) that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion to suppress his statement, (4) that the trial court erred by allowing the State to cross-examine two character witnesses for the defense about their knowledge of the Defendant's juvenile record, and (5) that the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant to twenty years in the Department of Correction. Concluding that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce evidence of the Defendant's prior juvenile record during the cross-examination of character witnesses for the Defendant, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

State of Tennessee v. Derrick S. Chaney
M2002-00057-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter

The Defendant pleaded guilty to first offense DUI, for which he was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days incarceration, suspended after service of forty-eight hours; and to driving with a suspended, cancelled, or revoked license, for which he was sentenced to six months incarceration, suspended after service of forty-eight hours. The trial court ordered that the two sentences be served concurrently. The Defendant was subsequently arrested for probation violation, and the trial court conducted a hearing to determine whether the Defendant's probation should be revoked. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ordered that the Defendant serve the remainder of his sentences in custody. The Defendant appeals this decision, arguing that the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he had violated his probation and that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his full sentence in custody. We conclude that sufficient evidence was presented at the hearing to support revocation of the Defendant's probation and that the trial court did not err by ordering the Defendant to serve his sentence in custody. We thus affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. James Alfred Carey
M2001-02003-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jane W. Wheatcraft

The Defendant pled guilty to one count of selling less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, and to three counts of domestic assault. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years incarceration for the drug conviction and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for each of the assault convictions. The trial court ordered that the sentences be served concurrently, but consecutive to a prior sentence. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that he was improperly sentenced. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Blake E. Hallum v. State of Tennessee
M2001-00569-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

A Davidson County jury convicted the petitioner, Blake Edward Hallum, of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced the petitioner to serve consecutive sentences of life imprisonment for his felony murder conviction and 17 years for his especially aggravated robbery conviction. The petitioner appealed his convictions to this Court, and we affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See State v. Richard Bruce Halfacre, No. 01C01-9703-CR-00083, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1117, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Oct. 29, 1998). The petitioner sought post-conviction relief, and the trial court denied his petition after a hearing on the merits. The petitioner now appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because a state's trial witness testified at the post-conviction hearing and contradicted her trial testimony, invoked her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and/or pleaded lack of memory in response to questions about the truthfulness of her trial testimony. After reviewing the record and applicable case law, we find that the petitioner's claim does not merit relief.

Mario Hawkins v. State of Tennessee
M2000-02901-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steve R. Dozier

After a juvenile court transferred the petitioner's case, a Davidson County grand jury indicted the petitioner on one count of first degree murder. Following a jury trial, the petitioner stood convicted of this offense and for this conviction received a life sentence. Thereafter he unsuccessfully sought relief through a direct appeal. See State v. Mario Hawkins, No. 01C01-9701-CR-00014, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 685, at *2, *21 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, July 2, 1998). Subsequently, he filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief and was appointed counsel. Counsel filed an amended petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After conducting a hearing on this matter, the trial court denied the petitioner the relief requested. Through this appeal the petitioner continues to assert that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate the petitioner's mental health and utilize this information as a defense to the first degree murder charge. However, after reviewing this assertion, we find it to lack merit. We, therefore, affirm the trial court's denial of the post-conviction petition.

Quentin Cavnar v. State
M2002-00609-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
This appeal involves the diagnosis and treatment of a person who was briefly hospitalized at Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute. Following his release, the patient filed a claim with the Tennessee Claims Commission asserting that he had been misdiagnosed and that the staff had subjected him to mental abuse and torture. The Commission dismissed the patient's complaint after he failed to file a timely response to the State's Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss, and the patient has appealed. We have determined that the Commission properly dismissed the patient's claim, not only because of his tardy response but also because the response fails to state a claim upon which the Commission may grant relief.

Jeffrey Simmons v. Gath Baptist Church
M2001-02511-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Charles D. Haston, Sr.
A man arrested for child sexual abuse brought an action against the church he once worked for, as well as against the Department of Children's Services and other governmental agencies, claiming that his arrest was procured by illegal or unconstitutional means. The trial court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted, and the passing of the Statute of Limitations. The court further held that the defendant governmental entities were immune from civil liability. We affirm.

Rocky Hitson v. Dept. of Correction
M2001-02903-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
This appeal involves a dispute between a prisoner and the Department of Correction regarding a disciplinary hearing held at the Northeast Correctional Complex in Mountain City. The prisoner filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County alleging that he had been substantially prejudiced by the Department's failure to follow its disciplinary rules. The trial court, relying on Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995), granted the Department's Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion and dismissed the petition. The petitioner has appealed. We have determined that the trial court's order should be vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of Willis v. Tennessee Dep't of Corr., ___ S.W.3d ___, 2003 WL 22019138 (Tenn. Aug. 27, 2003).

Randy Hensley v. Dept of Correction
M2001-02343-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle

Randy Hensley v. Dept of Correction
M2001-02343-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle

Andre Mayfield v. Ricky Bell
M2001-00486-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy
Appellant, a pro se inmate in the Department of Corrections, appeals the dismissal by the chancellor of his case pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-812. We affirm the action of the chancellor.

America Online v. Commissioner of Revenue
M2001-00927-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
The Chancery Court of Davidson County granted summary judgment to America Online, Inc. on the Commissioner of Revenue's claim that AOL's activities in this state gave it a sufficient nexus to subject it to state taxes. Because we find that this question is fact-specific and that the record does not show that AOL is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, we reverse.

Joanne Bishop v. Zurich-American Insurance Company,
E2001-00218-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Howell N. Peoples, Chancellor
The plaintiff appeals the trial judge's decision that she failed to carry her burden of proof with respect to causation regarding an alleged work-related case of pulmonary disease. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

William M. Crisp v. Del-Air Service Company, Inc.
E2001-00378-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Sharon Bell, Chancellor
The trial judge found the plaintiff had failed to show he suffered a compensable work injury. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.