State of Tennessee v. Thomas Dee Huskey
E2002-00030-CCA-R10-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard R. Baumgartner

The defendant, Thomas Dee Huskey, brings this extraordinary appeal in which he challenges the order of the Knox County Criminal Court removing his lead counsel of record for his retrial on four counts of first degree murder. The defendant asserts that the trial court’s action is an infringement on his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We conclude that the trial court’s order violated the defendant’s right to counsel and exceeded its discretion. We vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case for further proceedings.

State of Tennessee v. Robin Davis
W2000-03137-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge John P. Colton, Jr.

The defendant was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and theft over $1000, receiving a life sentence for the murder conviction and a consecutive two-year sentence for the theft conviction. Following the denial of his motion for a new trial, he filed a timely notice of appeal to this court. In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as to his murder conviction, he argues that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to misstate law during voir dire; in not allowing defense counsel to question potential jurors about their personal experiences with crime; in allowing hearsay evidence to be presented at trial; in allowing the State to introduce evidence of uncharged crimes; and in allowing the prosecutor to make improper statements during closing argument. Based upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Lue J. Holcomb
W2001-00743-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. C. Mclin

The appellant, Lue J. Holcomb, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of aggravated burglary. The trial court imposed a sentence of three and one-half years and ordered that six months of the sentence be served in confinement with the balance on probation. The appellant timely appealed, arguing that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction. After a review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Tony Walker
W2001-00929-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jon Kerry Blackwood

The Appellant, Tony Walker, appeals the verdict of a Fayette County jury finding him guilty of attempted aggravated robbery. On appeal, Walker raises the single issue of whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction. After a review of the record, we affirm.

Jeffery A. Wright v. Johnston Coca-Cola & Dr. Pepper
E2000-02542-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Jerri S. Bryant, Chancellor
The trial court found the plaintiff suffered a 5 percent permanent medical impairment as a result of an injury sustained while working for the defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jeffery A. Wright v. Johnston Coca-Cola & Dr. Pepper
E2000-02542-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Jerri S. Bryant, Chancellor
The trial court found the plaintiff suffered a 5 percent permanent medical impairment as a result of an injury sustained while working for the defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Heirs of Neil Ellis v. Estate of Virgie Ellis
M1999-00897-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: David Loughry
The issue in this case is whether property held in a tenancy by the entirety is subject to the 120-hour survival rule contained in section 31-3-120 of the Tennessee Uniform Simultaneous Death Act. Three days after her husband's death, Mrs. Ellis died of unrelated natural causes, and her will was admitted to probate. The husband's heirs sought to intervene in the probate proceeding, claiming that because Mrs. Ellis did not survive her husband for 120 hours, section 31-3-120 deems both to have died "simultaneously." Consequently, they argued, Tennessee Code Annotated section 31-3-104 authorized them to seek a one-half interest in the entireties property. The trial court denied the motion to intervene, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. On appeal to this Court, we hold that section 31-3-120 does not require one spouse to survive the other by 120 hours in order to obtain fee simple title to property formerly held by the entirety. We also hold that the General Assembly, in enacting section 31-3-120, did not intend to define the term "simultaneously" in section 31-3-104 as meaning "within 120 hours." Instead, we conclude that the legislature intended that this term should continue to receive its ordinary construction, meaning "at the same time." The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Gregory Scott Allison
E2001-00248-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.

The defendant, Gregory Scott Allison, appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court's revoking his probation that was ordered for his sentences for burglary and theft. The defendant contends that although the trial court may have been justified in finding that he violated the terms of his probation, it erred in sentencing him to confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mario Lambert v. Jack Morgan, Warden
M2002-00172-CCA-RM-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter

The Defendant, Mario Lambert, appealed as of right from the trial court's dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. This Court held that the trial court was without authority to sentence the Defendant as a Range I standard offender with a thirty percent release eligibility for the offense of second degree murder. We therefore concluded that, based on the record before us, the sentence imposed appeared to be an illegal sentence. We therefore reversed the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition and remanded the case for further proceedings. See Mario Lambert v. Jack Morgan, Warden, No. M1999-02321-CCA-R3-PC, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 599 (Nashville, Aug. 7, 2001). On January 23, 2002, our supreme court remanded this case to us, directing us to reconsider our opinion in light of State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871 (Tenn. 1978), and further directed us, on remand, to "clarify the action to be taken by the Criminal Court pursuant to the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals when the case is remanded to the trial court." We again reverse the judgment of the trial court summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Corey L. Malone v. State of Tennessee
M2001-02133-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.
The petitioner originally pled guilty, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, to second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery for an effective sentence of twenty years. The petitioner filed a post-conviction relief petition, which was denied by the post-conviction court. In this appeal, the petitioner contends (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and (2) his guilty pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily entered. After review, we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. James Wesley Strombergh
E2001-00199-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stephen M. Bevil

A Hamilton County jury found the Defendant guilty of third offense driving under the influence and imposed a fine of $10,000. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days' incarceration, ordered him to attend an alcohol rehabilitation program, and revoked his license for a period of five years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contests the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his restricted driver's license. Although we conclude that sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support the Defendant's conviction, we conclude that evidence concerning the Defendant's restricted driver's license was improperly admitted at trial. We therefore reverse the Defendant's conviction and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.

Dawn Larsen Niceley v. James Jacob Niceley, IV
M2001-02182-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Carol A. Catalano
After a sixteen-year marriage and one child, Husband and Wife both filed for divorce. After hearing the evidence, the trial court fashioned a parenting plan which named Husband the primary residential parent during the school year and named Wife the primary residential parent during the summer and most holidays and school breaks; valued and divided the marital property; and awarded Wife attorney's fees as alimony in solido. We affirm the parenting plan and the distribution of marital property but reverse the award of attorney's fees because the trial court found Wife was not economically disadvantaged.

Margarette Adair v. Vincent Scalf d/b/a V & T Topsoil
M2001-00677-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Claudia C. Bonnyman
This is an action to abate a temporary nuisance of dust and noise attributable to the removal, processing and sale of topsoil ostensibly incidental to the development of real property owned by the defendant Scalf adjacent to the residence of the plaintiff, and for damages. A declaratory judgment against the Metro Government that it failed to enforce its zoning regulations was denied. Metro Government cross-claimed for declaratory relief that Mr. Scalf's removal, processing and sale of topsoil on residential property was forbidden by Ordinance. This relief was granted. The judgment, as modified, is affirmed.

Sonya Engstrom v. Todd Engstrom
M2001-01448-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Clara W. Byrd
The trial court divided the marital property of a divorcing couple, awarding the wife the marital home and the husband his leather business. The husband appealed, arguing that the property division was inequitable because the home was worth much more than the business. We affirm the trial court.

Robert Brown v. Dept of Labor and Workforce Development
M2001-01625-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz
The appellant suffered an injury while on the job. The Department of Labor and Workforce Development denied him workers' compensation benefits. Appellant sued the state for monetary damages. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.

Columbia Advertising v. Ralph Isenhour
M2001-01627-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge James L. Weatherford
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy
In this suit to collect payments for advertising services allegedly rendered to defendant pursuant to an oral agreement, the plaintiff failed to file an order setting the case for trial within the time period allowed by an agreed scheduling order. Shortly thereafter, the trial court dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. The plaintiff filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60 motion seeking relief from the order of dismissal on the grounds that by mistake, counsel had failed to calendar the scheduling deadlines. The trial court found that plaintiff failed to offer an adequate basis to grant relief from the order of dismissal under Rule 60 and denied the motion. For the reasons set out in this opinion, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this case for a trial on the merits.

David Ogilvi v. Ronald Ligon
M2001-01686-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge James L. Weatherford
Trial Court Judge: Russell Heldman
In this boundary line dispute case, the appellee, who moved to her property in 1967, used an unopened street and a garage on the unopened street located between her land and the adjacent property, which the appellants acquired in 1987. The appellee stored items in the garage, maintained the unopened street, and made improvements to the garage over the years. Later, a dispute arose between the parties and the appellants filed suit to establish the boundary line between the two properties, their ownership of half the unopened street, the garage and certain land behind the garage. The trial court concluded that the appellee had acquired: 1) a perpetual easement to use the west half of the garage; 2) a perpetual easement by prescription for the use of the entire driveway on the unopened street; 3) fee simple title to all of the land in the unopened street west of the joint driveway; and 4) easement and fee simple title to land to the north or rear of the garage enclosed within and underneath her fence. The trial court found the appellants entitled to an easement for the use of the easterly half of the garage and an easement by prescription for the use of entire driveway located on unopened street. For the reasons set out in this opinion, we affirm, as modified, the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Percy M. Cummings
W2001-01721-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge John P. Colton, Jr.

The Appellant, Percy M. Cummings, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of second degree murder and was sentenced to twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Cummings contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Terrance Perkins v. State of Tennessee
W2000-02910-CCA-MR3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Fred Axley

The Appellant, Terrance Perkins, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Shelby County Criminal Court. In 1998, Perkins pled guilty to two counts of attempted first degree urder, five counts of aggravated assault, one count of felon in possession of a handgun, and one count of felony escape. Perkins, a Range I Standard Offender, received an effective thirty-one year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Perkins, challenges the validity of his guilty plea upon grounds of: (1) voluntariness and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel. After a review of the record, the judgment of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition is affirmed.

Darrel Howard v. State of Tennessee
W2001-00813-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carolyn Wade Blackett

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner pleaded guilty to nine counts of aggravated robbery and five counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, claiming that his plea was constitutionally defective because he was inadequately represented at the time of the plea and because the plea was not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered. The post-conviction court denied relief. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee v. Walter Byers
E2001-00361-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.

The defendant, Walter Byers, appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court's revocation of his community corrections sentence imposed upon his guilty plea to delivery of one-half gram or more of cocaine. The defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his community corrections sentence and sentencing him to confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jeri Vincent v. CNA Insurance
M2001-02213-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Russell Heldman
After being injured in an auto accident, Jeri Vincent entered into negotiations with CNA Insurance Company, the insurer of the driver of the other vehicle, attempting to settle her property damage and personal injury claim. The property damage claim was settled. Ms. Vincent filed a civil action against CNA Insurance to protect her personal injury claim from the statute of limitations. Later, Ms. Vincent filed a motion to substitute a party pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 in order to name the driver of the other vehicle as the defendant. The trial court denied the motion and dismissed the cause of action. We reverse and remand the decision of the trial court because we find that Ms. Vincent complied with the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03.

Charles Watson v. Margaret Ashley
M2001-00668-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Graham
In this action to set aside a deed, the Circuit Court of Franklin County held that the deed had been procured by persons in a confidential relationship with the grantor and that the presumption of undue influence had not been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm the trial court's action in setting aside the deed.

Charles Chapman v. Kathy Kelley
M2001-00928-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Stella L. Hargrove
This is an appeal from the trial court's dismissal of an action filed by Plaintiff against the Maury County Circuit Court Clerk and the Maury County Deputy Circuit Court Clerk. This case concerns the application of the qualified judicial immunity defense and the related question of whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the Plaintiff to amend the original complaint under Rule 15 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The gravamen of Plaintiff's original complaint is that the Plaintiff suffered damages as a result of negligence of the Deputy Court Clerk by her alleged negligent administration of the criminal court docket that ultimately led to the wrongful arrest and incarceration of the Plaintiff based on a capias issued by the judge. The Defendant Maury County Circuit Court Clerk, who was sued for negligent supervision, interposed the defense of qualified judicial immunity and upon a motion to dismiss, the trial judge dismissed the case against the Maury County Circuit Court Clerk. A Maury County Deputy Circuit Court Clerk was originally sued as Jane Doe for negligent administration of the criminal court docket; when the Deputy Clerk's identity was revealed, the Plaintiff amended his complaint to specifically name her. Subsequently, a second motion to dismiss was filed by the Maury County Deputy Circuit Court Clerk, likewise interposing the defense of qualified judicial immunity. The Plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend the original dismissal as to the Maury County Circuit Court Clerk and the Plaintiff also filed a second motion to amend the original complaint to allege reckless conduct on the part of the Clerk and the Deputy Clerk. The trial court overruled the motion to alter or amend the original dismissal of the action against the Maury County Circuit Court Clerk , granted the motion to dismiss as to the Maury County Deputy Circuit Court Clerk, and denied Plaintiff's motion to amend. For reasons stated below, the court affirms the action of the trial court.

Steven Jameson v. Katrina Redmund
M2001-01108-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Robert F. Corlew Iii
This is an appeal from the trial court's final order denying appellant's petition for a change of the sole care, custody and control of the parties' three minor children and the trial court's order denying appellant's alternative petition for an increase in visitation. We hold that the trial court properly denied a change of the sole care, custody and control and properly denied appellant's alternative petition for increased visitation. Counsel for the appellee has petitioned this court for attorney's fees assessed for the hearings in the trial court and for attorney's fees in the immediate appellate case contending that the appeal is frivolous. We decline to award attorney's fees.