In Re Jayden L.
This is an appeal from a termination of parental rights case. While the trial court concluded that two grounds for termination existed in this case, it determined that there was a lack of clear and convincing evidence that the termination of the mother’s rights was in the child’s best interests. For the reasons stated herein, namely the absence of appropriate findings under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(k), we vacate the trial court’s order with respect to the grounds for termination and remand the case for the preparation of appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | ||
Cynthia E.Yebuah, Et Al. v. Center For Urological Treatment, PLC
This is a healthcare liability action involving the application of the statutory cap on noneconomic damages to loss of consortium claims. The issue before the Court is whether the statutory cap on noneconomic damages applies separately to a spouse’s loss of consortium claim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-39-102, thus allowing each plaintiff to receive an award of up to $750,000 in noneconomic damages. Here, the surgery patient filed suit for noneconomic damages resulting from the defendant physicians’ negligence, namely that a portion of a Gelport device was unintentionally left in her body after surgery. In the same suit, the patient’s spouse claimed damages for loss of consortium. The jury awarded the patient $4,000,000 in damages for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life. The jury also awarded her husband $500,000 in damages for loss of consortium. The trial court initially applied the statutory cap on noneconomic damages by entering a judgment in favor of both plaintiffs collectively for a total judgment of $750,000. However, the trial court subsequently granted the plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend and applied the statutory cap to each plaintiff separately, thereby entering a judgment of $750,000 for the patient and $500,000 for her husband. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We hold that the language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-39-102 allows both plaintiffs to recover only $750,000 in the aggregate for noneconomic damages. We therefore reverse the holding of the Court of Appeals and the trial court. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | ||
Cynthia E. Yebuah, Et Al. v. Center For Urological Treatment, PLC - Dissenting
This case illustrates how the damages cap statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-39-102, deprives injured plaintiffs of fair compensation by arbitrarily limiting their awards for noneconomic damages. Cynthia Yebuah and her husband, Eric Yebuah, suffered noneconomic damages because of the carelessness of Mrs. Yebuah’s surgeon. Based on the evidence at trial, a jury awarded Mrs. Yebuah more than $750,000 in noneconomic damages for her pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life and awarded Mr. Yebuah less than $750,000 for his loss of consortium. The issue here is whether the trial court must apply the $750,000 statutory cap on noneconomic damages separately to each of the Yebuahs’ awards or to the combined total of their awards. If the cap is applied separately to each award, the trial court must slash the jury’s verdict to Mrs. Yebuah by 81% and allow Mr. Yebuah to recover all of the damages the jury awarded him. If the cap is applied to the combined total of the awards, then the trial court must cut the total award to the Yebuahs by 83%. Neither application can withstand constitutional scrutiny. I decline to choose between these two alternatives; both are unconstitutional violations of the Yebuahs’ right to trial by jury. See McClay v. Airport Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 596 S.W.3d 686, 701–09 (Tenn. 2020) (Lee, J., dissenting). |
Davidson | Supreme Court | ||
Kwame Leo Lillard v. James Walker, Et Al.
This appeal arises out of a dispute over a mobile home and real property. Because the appealed order awards reasonable attorney’s fees but does not set the amount of those fees, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | ||
Cedra Deanntre Potts (Taylor) v. Starr Anastasia Potts
This appeal arises from the denial of the plaintiff’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion requesting relief from an agreed-upon permanent parenting plan that was approved by the court and incorporated into the final divorce decree. The plaintiff contended that the defendant spouse lacked standing to seek custody and visitation of the minor children, who were conceived by in vitro fertilization;[1] therefore, the permanent parenting plan was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., standing was jurisdictional. The material facts are that the couple entered into a contract with a reproductive clinic in October 2013 to perform an in vitro fertilization procedure, with each party signing the contract as “Prospective Parent.” The reproductive clinic impregnated the plaintiff with embryos created from the plaintiff’s eggs and donated sperm. As a result of the procedure, the plaintiff gave birth to twins in July 2014. The parties, a same-sex couple, married in June 2015, shortly following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). In August 2017, the plaintiff filed for divorce, contending there were no children born of the marriage, and the defendant filed an answer and a counter-complaint alleging there were two children born of the marriage and requesting that the court designate her as the primary residential parent. After the parties resolved all issues, the trial court entered a final divorce decree, incorporating an agreed-upon permanent parenting plan that (1) stated the children were a product of the parties’ marriage, (2) designated the plaintiff as the primary residential parent with 240 days of parenting time per year and designated the defendant as the alternate residential parent with 125 days of parenting time, (3) provided for joint decision-making authority, and (4) ordered the defendant to pay child support. Three months after the divorce decree became a final judgment, the plaintiff filed the Rule 60.02 motion at issue in this appeal. Following briefing and a hearing, the trial court determined that the defendant was able to establish parentage under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-403 because she met the requirements of the statute, in that she was a party to the written contract consenting to the in vitro fertilization procedure, and she accepted full legal rights and responsibilities for the embryos and any children that resulted. The trial court also determined that the defendant was entitled to the presumption that she was the children’s parent in accordance with § 36-2-304(a)(4) because the defendant held the children out as her natural children. For these and other reasons, the trial court denied the plaintiff’s Rule 60.02 motion for relief. This appeal followed. Because the custody and visitation statutes specifically provide that only a parent has standing to seek custody and visitation in a divorce action, “the issue of standing is interwoven with that of subject matter jurisdiction and becomes a jurisdictional prerequisite.”Osborn v. Marr, 127 S.W.3d 737, 740 (Tenn. 2004). Therefore, the defendant must fit the statutory definition of “parent” for the court to have jurisdiction to grant visitation. Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-2-403 provides the single means of establishing the parentage of children born as a result of the in vitro fertilization procedure. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-401. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention that all of the gametes (both the sperm and the egg) must be donated for § 36-2-403 to apply, we read the statute as addressing situations such as this one, where only half of the gametes are donated, as well as situations where all of the gametes are donated. Because the defendant contractually agreed to accept full legal rights and responsibilities for the embryos and any children produced as a result, the defendant is presumed to be the children’s parent under § 36-2-403(d); therefore, the defendant had standing to seek custody and visitation in the underlying divorce action. Accordingly, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy. For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the plaintiff’s Rule 60.02 motion for relief from the judgment.
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | ||
Khalid Almuawi v. Antwan Gregory
The plaintiff and defendant were in a car accident when the defendant’s car rear-ended the plaintiff’s car. The defendant admitted liability, leaving only the issue of damages for trial. The jury awarded the plaintiff some damages, but the plaintiff argued he was entitled to a larger sum than the jury awarded. The plaintiff also argued that the defendant’s attorney misrepresented the evidence in his closing argument and that he was entitled to a new trial. We conclude that the jury’s verdict was supported by material evidence and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Wayne Centers
The Appellant, Bobby Wayne Centers, was convicted by a jury in the White County Criminal Court of the sale of 26 grams or more of methamphetamine, the delivery of 26 grams or more of methamphetamine, the possession of 26 grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to sell; and the possession of 26 grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver. The trial court merged the sale of methamphetamine conviction and the possession with intent to sell methamphetamine conviction into a single conviction and merged the delivery of methamphetamine conviction and the possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine conviction into a single conviction. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of eighteen years as a Range II, multiple offender with release eligibility after service of thirty-five percent of the sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing Agent Eaton to narrate the video of the drug transaction. Upon review, we conclude that the case must be remanded to the trial court for the correction of the judgments to reflect the merger of all of the convictions into the sale of methamphetamine conviction. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed in all other respects. |
White | Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
Rico Huey v. State of Tennessee
Rico Huey, Petitioner, filed a pro se petition seeking post-conviction relief from his 2016 aggravated robbery conviction. Appointed counsel filed an amended petition. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
Calvin Jones v. State of Tennessee
Calvin Jones, Petitioner, filed a pro se petition seeking post-conviction relief from his 2012 convictions for aggravated child abuse and first degree felony murder. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
Diversified Financial Services, LLC v. Jeffrey Wayne Daniels
Defendant appeals the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment to the plaintiff in this breach of contract case. Because Appellant failed to comply with Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, we dismiss this appeal and remand to the trial court for a determination of the plaintiff’s damages incurred in defending a frivolous appeal. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | ||
Ritchie Phillips, Et Al. v. Mark Hatfield
The issue in this case is whether restrictive covenants executed and recorded by the developers of a subdivision after they had sold the parties’ lots apply to the Defendant’s property. The developers platted a subdivision and sold the vast majority of lots with time-limited restrictions against non-residential use expressly stated in the deeds that conveyed the lots. Thereafter, the developers recorded a declaration of more fulsome, non-time-limited restrictive covenants—including a restriction against non-residential use—that purported to apply to all lots in the subdivision. Decades later, well after the expiration of the time-limited deed restrictions, the Defendant purchased lots and proposed to build a structure for the operation of a retail business. The Plaintiffs, who reside in a home on lots adjacent to the Defendant’s property, brought a declaratory judgment action to enforce the non-time-limited restriction against non-residential use contained in the recorded declaration. The trial court enjoined the Defendant’s proposed commercial use, concluding that the Defendant’s property was—through the declaration—subject to an implied negative reciprocal easement that prohibited non-residential use. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We hold that the developers lacked the authority to impose the declaration’s restrictions upon the Defendant’s property because they did not own those lots when they executed and recorded the declaration. We further hold that the developers’ mere re-acquisition and re-sale of some of the Defendant’s lots after the recording of the declaration did not retroactively restrict the Defendant’s property through the declaration. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. |
Sullivan | Supreme Court | ||
State of Tennessee v. Tyrone E. Murphy
The Hamilton County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Tyrone E. Murphy, with one count of first degree premeditated murder and one count of tampering with evidence in the death of Ashley Cates, the victim. The State proceeded solely on the count of first degree premeditated murder. The jury convicted Defendant as charged, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion in limine to exclude post-mortem photographs of the victim and that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Douglas M. Ferguson
The Defendant, Douglas M. Ferguson, was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to five years’ probation. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (2018). Subsequently, the trial court found the Defendant violated conditions of his probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering the Defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
Patrick L. Moore v. Russell Washburn, Warden
Patrick L. Moore, Petitioner, appeals from the dismissal of two petitions for habeas corpus relief which were consolidated by this Court on appeal. After a thorough review, we affirm the dismissal of the petitions. |
Trousdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
In re Ashlynn H.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. The trial court determined that there were statutory grounds for terminating the father’s parental rights and that termination was in the child’s best interest. On appeal, we conclude that the father was given sufficient notice of three statutory grounds: abandonment by failure to visit or support the expectant mother, abandonment by wanton disregard, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of his child. The record contains clear and convincing evidence to support two of the grounds for termination. But, because the trial court’s order lacks sufficient findings regarding the child’s best interest, we vacate and remand. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Cedarius J. Robertson
The Appellant, Cedarius J. Robertson, was convicted in the Madison County Circuit Court of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, a Class B felony; tampering with evidence, a Class C felony; driving under the influence (DUI) and DUI per se, Class A misdemeanors; possessing a handgun while under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor; and failing to maintain his lane of travel, a Class C misdemeanor. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the DUI convictions and ordered that he serve an effective thirteen-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm and possession of a handgun while under the influence. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Lynn Inman
Defendant, Christopher Lynn Inman, was convicted by a jury of introduction of contraband into a penal facility and possession of marijuana. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II multiple offender to an effective sentence of six years’ incarceration. In this direct appeal, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by admitting the marijuana into evidence because the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for introduction of contraband into a penal facility. Following our review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Gregory Gilliam
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Gregory Gilliam, of four counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of forty-two years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Xavier Montelious Riley
Xavier Montelious Riley, Defendant, entered a best interest guilty plea with the length and manner of the service of the sentence to be determined following a sentencing hearing. The trial court denied an alternative sentence and imposed an effective sentence of ten years and six months to be served in confinement. After a review of the record and applicable law and finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Jasper Lee Vick
The petitioner, Jasper Lee Vick, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction DNA analysis. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court summarily dismissing the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Antonio D. Blaylock
The Defendant, Antonio D. Blaylock, entered an open plea to multiple charges resulting from a high-speed chase through Jackson, which culminated in an automobile crash injuring the other driver, a collision with a telephone pole, and damage to the front porch of a house. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of eight years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying him probation. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we reverse the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Antonio D. Blaylock - Dissent
While I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s request for full probation, I write separately to respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred in not imposing some form of alternative sentencing such as split confinement. Additionally, if the trial court had abused its discretion in not imposing some form of alternative sentencing, I disagree with the majority’s decision to impose a sentence of split-confinement and conclude that the appropriate remedy would be to remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing especially in light of the majority’s finding that the trial court abused its discretion in by not considering the Strong R Assessment. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
Penny Brennan v. Randii Goble
This appeal arose from a personal injury action. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, accompanied by a statement of material facts in compliance with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03. The plaintiff responded to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment but failed to respond to the separate statement of material facts. As a result of the plaintiff’s failure to respond to the statement of material facts, the Trial Court deemed those facts as stated by the defendant as admitted and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant upon its determination that the defendant had negated an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | ||
Devin Buckingham v. Tennessee Department of Corrections, Et Al.
An inmate filed a complaint alleging theft against the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction and against the prison Warden. The Commissioner and the Warden moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6). The trial court granted the motion. We have determined that the trial court failed to provide reasons for the dismissal of the complaint. Therefore, we vacate the judgment and remand. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Michael Broyles
The Defendant, Michael Broyles, was convicted by a Greene County Criminal Court jury of four counts of cruelty to animals, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-14-202(a)(2) (2018). The trial court denied judicial diversion and sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days for each conviction and imposed the sentences concurrently. The court ordered split confinement consisting of ninety days’ jail service followed by probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the animal cruelty statute under which he was convicted is unconstitutionally vague, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (3) the court erred in denying judicial diversion, (4) the court erred in imposing a sentence involving confinement, and (5) the court erred in imposing fines and restitution without making the appropriate factual findings. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals |