Richard Crowe vs. First American W2001-00800-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood
Owner of a pickup truck sued the bank that financed the purchase for conversion after the bank repossessed the truck. The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $250,000.00. Bank appeals. We affirm in part reverse in part and remand.
McNairy
Court of Appeals
Scarlett/Patrick Spencer vs. James Aydlotte W2001-00995-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: George R. Ellis
This is a suit for the termination of parental rights. The Appellants filed a petition in the Chancery Court of Gibson County to terminate the Appellee's parental rights to his child. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the Appellants' petition. The Appellants appeal the trial court's order denying the Appellants' petition to terminate the Appellee's parental rights. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court's decision.
Gibson
Court of Appeals
Paul Seaton, et al vs. Richard Rowe, et al E2000-02304-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: John B. Hagler, Jr.
Monroe County -This is an action for specific performance of an option agreement for the sale of some farmland acreage, from which a 60-acre tract was excepted. The trial court dismissed the action, holding that the option agreement did not satisfy the statute of frauds because the description of the excepted property was inadequate and that the deficiency could not be remedied by parol evidence. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a motion to "reopen the proof" to introduce evidence to support reformation of the description of the excepted property. The motion was denied. The plaintiffs appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in (1) finding that the option agreement did not satisfy the statute of frauds; (2) refusing to consider parol evidence of the location of the excepted property; and (3) refusing to "reopen the proof" on the issue of reformation. The defendants argue that the appeal is frivolous. We find that the option agreement is sufficiently definite to satisfy the statute of frauds and that parol evidence should have been admitted to locate the excepted property. We therefore vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Monroe
Court of Appeals
Myron Hubbard vs. Sandi Hubbard E2001-00110-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: W. Dale Young
The Trial Court granted appellee Judgement before the 30 days to answer process provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure had expired. On appeal, we vacate and remand.
Blount
Court of Appeals
Linda Greene vs. Dr. Woody Stinson E2001-00628-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: William M. Dender
Jefferson
Court of Appeals
Linda Greene vs. Dr. Woody Stinson E2001-00628-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: William M. Dender
Rouse Construction Co. vs. Interstate Steel Corp. E2001-00242-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Sharon J. Bell
This is a case wherein the Plaintiff/Appellant, Rouse Construction Company, seeks damages for breach of contract from the Defendant/Appellee, Interstate Steel Corporation. The Chancellor found that there was no meeting of minds between the parties as to essential contract terms and, therefore, ordered that Rouse's claim be denied. The Chancellor further determined that Interstate should be allowed a judgment in the amount of $19,090.00 for materials and plans delivered to Rouse. We concur in the determination of the Chancellor and affirm.
Knox
Court of Appeals
Carl O. Koella, Jr. vs. Fred McHargue, et ux E2001-00544-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: C. K. Smith
Defendants have right of first refusal on tract of real property. The Trial Court held that the giving of a quitclaim deed did not trigger the right of first refusal. Defendants appealed, we affirm.
Jeffrey Miller appeals the Meigs County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petitions for writ of error coram nobis and writ of habeas corpus. Both petitions seek redress for Miller's grievance that he has been required to serve felony sentences in the Department of Correction, although his plea agreements designated the location of confinement to be the Meigs County Jail. Because neither coram nobis nor habeas corpus relief is available to address a concern of this nature and because the petitioner's claims are factually unfounded, we affirm.
Meigs
Court of Criminal Appeals
CH-00-1207-2 CH-00-1207-2
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Denise Frazier vs. Robert Frazier E2000-02929-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Sharon J. Bell
Appellant ask the Court to void portions of the marital settlement agreement incorporated in the parties' Divorce Decree in the State of Illinois. The Trial Court refused and granted appellee summary judgment. We affirm.
Knox
Court of Appeals
New Covenant Baptist Church vs. Panther Sark E2000-02930-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Thomas R. Frierson, II
In this suit New Covenant Baptist Church seeks a declaration that certain restrictions applicable to Technology Park West subdivision do not preclude New Covenant from using one of the lots for driveway purposes to other unrestricted property owned by New Covenant outside the subdivision. Panther Sark, a partnership, and certain other owners of lots in the subdivision were named as Defendants and they filed a counter-complaint seeking a declaration to the contrary. The Trial Court found in favor of New Covenant. We reverse and hold in favor of the partnership and other owners of lots in the subdivision.
Knox
Court of Appeals
Lonnie Wilder vs. Leslie Wilder E2000-03184-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: John D. Mcafee
In this divorce case, the Trial Court awarded husband attorney's fees against wife. On appeal, we reverse.
The Sullivan County grand jury issued presentments against the defendant on one count of operating a motor vehicle without a face shield; two counts of speeding; three counts of driving under the influence; three counts of driving on a revoked license; two counts of driving on revoked license after second or subsequent conviction for driving while intoxicated; one count of driving on revoked license after second or subsequent conviction for driving under the influence; one count of driving while intoxicated, fourth offense; and one count of driving under the influence, fourth offense. The charges resulted from three separate cases. The defendant pled to all of the crimes in two different plea hearings and the defendant was sentenced as a career offender to a total of eighteen years, with a minimum jail time of 585 days, and with his last six years to be served on probation. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a career offender and did not apprise the defendant of the possibility that he could be sentenced as a persistent offender, as opposed to a career offender. He moved to withdraw his guilty pleas on this ground. The trial court denied his motion, and he appeals the denial. Furthermore, the defendant waived his right to request probation or alternative sentencing in one case, and the state agreed to allow the defendant to serve probation in one case. In the third case, the defendant requested probation or alternative sentencing. The trial court denied his request, citing his extensive criminal history in support of its denial. The defendant also appeals this denial. After reviewing the record and applicable case law, we find these issues to be without merit and therefore affirm the lower court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and its denial of probation or alternative sentencing.
Sullivan
Court of Criminal Appeals
David Miller vs. State E1998-00247-SC-R11-PD
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Ray L. Jenkins
We granted petitioner, David Earl Miller's application for permission to appeal to determine whether this Court's decision in State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530 (Tenn. 1992) created a new state constitutional rule regarding the elements of deliberation and premeditation. Petitioner claims that Brown created a new state constitutional rule and that the jury instructions given at his initial trial violated this rule by relieving the prosecution of its burden to prove the elements of premeditation and deliberation beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the petitioner argues that his conviction of first-degree murder was not supported by sufficient proof. After due consideration, we conclude that Brown did not announce a new state constitutional rule, did not implicate any constitutional right, is not retroactive, and may not serve as the basis for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, we conclude that the petitioner's complaint about the jury instructions given at his initial trial has been waived because it was not raised on direct appeal and that his complaint about the sufficiency of the evidence to support premeditation and deliberation was previously determined by this Court on direct appeal. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
The appellant, Marcia Lynn Williams, entered a best interest guilty plea in the Circuit Court of Marshall County to one count of obtaining drugs by false pretense, a class D felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of three years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying the appellant a sentence in the community corrections program. After a review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Marshall
Court of Criminal Appeals
Southwest Williamson County Community Assoc. et al vs. Bruce Saltsman M2001-00943-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: J. Russ Heldman
Being dissatisfied with the State's concept of, and planning for, the extension of State Route 840 through southwest Williamson County, three residents in the County, two nonprofit corporations, and a partnership that owns property in the County, sued J. Bruce Saltsman, Sr. ("the Commissioner"), in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Transportation ("TDOT"). Following a bench trial, the court below entered a final judgment including (1) a writ of mandamus ordering the Commissioner to perform a number of "duties" in connection with Route 840; and (2) a permanent injunction enjoining him from moving forward with the planning and construction of Route 840 through Williamson County until he complies with the trial court's order. The Commissioner appeals. In addition to other bases for reversal, he asserts that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction of this controversy. We agree with the appellant that the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment below in its entirety and dismiss the petition.
Williamson
Court of Appeals
State of Tennessee v. Eddie McNabb M2000-01490-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Graham
The defendant appeals from his maximum sentence of six (6) years for voluntary manslaughter and the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences. After review, we hold that the trial court properly sentenced the defendant to six (6) years for the voluntary manslaughter conviction and correctly ordered the defendant's convictions for voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault be served consecutive to one another. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The defendant, Robert Blanton, Jr., was indicted by the Montgomery County Grand Jury on June 6, 1995, on one count of sale of marijuana and one count of delivery of marijuana, both Class E felonies. The defendant pled guilty to the indictment, and the trial court sentenced the defendant to probation. An affidavit of violation of probation was filed on April 17, 1996, and amended on September 6, 1996.
Montgomery
Court of Criminal Appeals
Natalya Mazor vs. Kenneth Isaacman W2000-01485-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Kay S. Robilio
This is a dental malpractice case. The patient visited the defendant dentist in August 1997 for routine root canal surgery. After the surgery, the patient began experiencing "constant" pain in the tooth in which the root canal was performed. She was told by the defendant dentist that this was pain ordinarily felt after root canal surgery. In February 1999, the patient visited another dentist who discovered that a piece of a drill bit had been left inside patient's tooth during the previous root canal. In December 1999, the patient filed a lawsuit against the defendant dentist for dental malpractice. The defendant dentist filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the patient did not bring the claim within the one year statute of limitations. This motion was granted and the patient now appeals. We reverse, finding that the patient had one year from the time she discovered or should have discovered the foreign object in which to file her lawsuit.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Arthur Anderson vs. Edwin Roberson W2000-01879-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown
This appeal presents the sole issue of in personam jurisdiction of a nonresident corporation and the nonresident individual owning a majority interest in the corporation by virtue of their activities, as described in the Tennessee Long Arm statute, or alternatively, as co-conspirators with defendants, subject to the jurisdiction of the court.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Judy Burroughs vs. Robert Magee W2001-00238-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III
This is a personal injury and wrongful death case. The plaintiff and her husband were involved in an automobile accident. The plaintiff sued the driver of the other vehicle for her husband's wrongful death as well as for injuries she sustained in the accident. The plaintiff named the driver's physician as an additional tortfeasor, alleging that the physician negligently prescribed drugs to a known drug addict, negligently prescribed two contraindicated drugs, and negligently failed to warn his patient of the risks of driving while under the influence of the drugs. The trial court granted the physician's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the physician had no duty to unidentifiable third parties such as the plaintiff. We affirm in part and reverse in part, finding that the physician owed a duty to the plaintiff and the decedent to warn his patient of the risks of driving while under the influence of the prescribed drugs.
Lauderdale
Court of Appeals
Dorothy Owen vs. George Summers W2001-00727-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Dewey C. Whitenton
This is an action to set aside a warranty deed. Plaintiff-Grantor filed suit on February 11, 1997, to set aside a deed executed July 11, 1989, on the grounds of fraud and mental incompetency. The defendant grantee denied fraud and mental incompetency and affirmatively relied upon the seven-year statute of limitations. Following a jury trial, which ended in a mistrial, the parties stipulated that the case be submitted to the chancellor who conducted the trial for a nonjury determination from the trial transcript and trial exhibits. The chancellor found that the seven-year statute of limitations had been tolled by virtue of the grantor's mental incompetence, the deed was procured by fraud, and that the grantor was mentally incompetent on the date of the execution of the deed. The chancellor rescinded the deed. Defendant-Grantee has appealed. We affirm.
