State of Tennessee v. Stacey Philander Baldon
W2000-00524-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

Defendant was convicted by a Lauderdale County jury of possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class B felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. In addition, defendant entered a guilty plea to felony possession of a firearm, a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender, and received concurrent sentences of twelve years, eleven months and twenty-nine days, and two years respectively. Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying his request for a severance of defendants; (3) whether the trial court erred in excluding the prior recorded testimony of his co-defendant; (4) whether the trial court improperly allowed the arresting officer to testify as to his opinion regarding the veracity of co-defendant's admission; (5) whether the jury pool was tainted by statements of a potential juror; and (6) whether the state improperly exercised its peremptory challenges. Upon our review of the record, we find defendant's allegations to be without merit; thus, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In Re: Sierra Cheyenne Satterwhite
E2000-02107-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: W. Frank Brown, III
The Maternal Grandparents of the Minor Child filed a petition to terminate the biological father's and Mother's parental rights to Minor Child and to adopt her. The Minor Child, who was born out of wedlock, had lived with her Maternal Grandparents all of her life. She viewed her grandparents as her parents. Default judgment was granted against Mother. Father never supported the child and had limited visitation with her. The Trial Court terminated both the biological Father's and Mother's parental right's. Father appealed. We affirm the decision of the Trial Court.

Vesta Mosley vs. Tennessee Water Service & Sales
E2000-01713-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Jr.
In this appeal from the Circuit Court of Anderson County the Defendant/Appellant, Tennessee Water Service and Sales, Inc., appeals the Circuit Court's order which denied Tennessee Water's motion for a new trial and overruled its objection to entry of a final judgment in favor of Plaintiff/ Appellee, Vesta G. Mosley. It is our finding that Tennessee Water did not receive notice of the hearing which resulted in the final judgment against it and, therefore, we vacate such judgment and reverse the Circuit Court's order overruling Tennessee Water's objection to entry of the judgment and its motion for a new trial. We remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Harold Lovelace, D/B/A The Last Chance Club, et al vs. City of Knoxville
E2000-01609-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Sharon J. Bell
In this Declaratory Judgment action the Trial Court held portions of a City Ordinance unconstitutional relative to notice provisions, the term "open for business" and "open display". We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.

Roy Malone vs. Harleysville Mutual In. Co.
E2000-01308-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Howell N. Peoples
This matter involves a dispute concerning a fire and casualty insurance policy ("Policy") which covered an apartment complex, Star Chase Apartments. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company ("Defendant") was the insurance carrier, and the named insured was John L. Oliver, LLC ("Oliver"). A fire in one of the apartment buildings caused substantial damage. Approximately six months later, Oliver sold Star Chase to Roy M. Malone, Sr. ("Plaintiff"), prior to starting any repairs to the burned building. Oliver also assigned to Plaintiff his right to the proceeds under the Policy, and Defendant acknowledged this assignment. The Trial Court found that Plaintiff, as Oliver's assignee, was entitled to recover the replacement cost of the burned building, plus prejudgment interest. The Trial Court denied Plaintiff recovery for business loss. Plaintiff appeals the amount awarded to him as the replacement cost and the Trial Court's denial of any additional recovery for business loss. Defendant argues that the assignment of the "proceeds" to Plaintiff did not entitle Plaintiff to recover any amount as replacement cost for repairs done after the assignment. Defendant also objects to the amount of the replacement cost found by the Trial Court and to the awarding of prejudgment interest. We reverse the Trial Court's award of prejudgment interest and affirm all other aspects of the judgment.

Judy (Kendrick) Shoemake vs. Timothy Lee Kendrick
E2000-01318-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: William M. Dender
In this appeal from the Chancery Court for Hamilton County the Appellant, Judy (Kendrick) Shoemake questions whether the Trial Court erred in granting a petition to modify custody filed by the Appellee, Timothy Lee Kendrick, and whether the Trial Court erred in its determination of the amount due her for child support arrearage and unreimbursed medical expenses paid by her on behalf of the parties' minor children. We reverse in part, modify in part and remand for further proceedings, if any, consistent with this opinion. We adjudge costs of the appeal against Judy (Kendrick) Shoemake and Timothy Lee Kendrick equally.

FTA Enterprises, Inc. vs. Pomeroy Computer Resources, Inc. & Daniel Cole
E2000-01246-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: John S. Mclellan, III
In this action for interference with business relations, interference with contract, breach of fiduciary duty, et., a jury awarded both compensatory and punitive damages in differing amounts against the defendants. The Trial Judge approved the jury verdicts and defendants have appealed. We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Kevin Wayne Brim
M1999-01925-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter

The defendant appeals from the revocation of his probation, contending that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Barbara Jo Heck, et al v. City of Sevierville
E2000-00464-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rex Henry Ogle

In this suit the Plaintiffs seek damages for injuries received by Barbara Jo Heck when she slipped on a patch of ice and fell on property owned by the City of Sevierville. The Trial Court found that the City had no actual or constructive notice of the presence of the ice causing Mrs. Heck to fall and, accordingly, dismissed the complaint. We affirm under Rule 10(a) of the Court of Appeals.

Tommie A. Drumwright v. Anderson Hickey Company and
W1999-00817-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: W. Michael Maloan, Sp. J
Trial Court Judge: Martha B. Brasfield, Chancellor
The plaintiff, Tommie A. Drumwright, appeals the judgment of the trial court which found the plaintiff failed to carry her burden of proving a work-related injury and dismissed her claim. For the reasons stated in this opinion, We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Tiffany R. Weatherspoon
W2000-00971-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley

The defendant, Tiffany R. Weatherspoon, pled guilty in the Hardin County Circuit Court to the Class B felony of unlawful possession of over .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance, to wit: cocaine, with the intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell. She received the agreed-upon sentence of eight years, as a Range I offender, and a $2,000 fine. The trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered that the defendant be incarcerated. She appealed, arguing that the court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Based upon our review, we affirm the order of the trial court.

Jerry Trusty, et al., v. Capri Robinson, et al.
M2000-01590-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Clara W. Byrd

This appeal arises from a landlord-tenant dispute over damage to residential property. After the landlords obtained a $3,600 judgment in the Smith County General Sessions Court, the tenants appealed to the Circuit Court for Smith County. A jury awarded the landlords $4,500. On this appeal, the appellants assert that the trial court erred by (1) permitting the landlords' lawyer to exercise a peremptory challenge in a racially discriminatory manner, (2) permitting the landlords' lawyer to make prejudicial statements to the jury during opening argument, (3) providing a supplemental instruction in response to the jury's question, and (4) failing to enter a detailed order denying their motion for new trial. We find nothing deficient in the trial court's order denying the motion for new trial. In addition, the absence of either a transcript or a statement of the evidence or proceedings prevents us from considering the substance of the tenants' other issues. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and find that the appeal is frivolous.

State of Tennessee v. John E. Parnell
W1999-00562-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph B. Brown

The defendant was convicted by a Shelby County jury of criminally negligent homicide and aggravated child abuse. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of two years for the homicide charge and twenty years for the aggravated child abuse charge. In this appeal as a matter of right, the defendant alleges (1) he was incompetent to stand trial, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the guilty verdict for aggravated child abuse. The defendant was indicted in count one for aggravated child abuse by treating the child in a manner so as to inflict injury; the defendant was indicted in count two for aggravated child abuse by neglecting the child so as to adversely affect his health and welfare; the jury was instructed to consider count two only if the defendant was found not guilty of count one; the jury found guilt only as to count one; the jury never returned a verdict on count two; and the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict under count one. Although the evidence overwhelmingly establishes guilt of aggravated child abuse by neglect as alleged in count two, the jury's failure to return a verdict on this count requires a remand for retrial on count two. We affirm the conviction for criminally negligent homicide.

James Robert Whitworth v. State of Tennessee
W2000-02000-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge James C. Beasley, Jr.

The petitioner, who is currently in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, entered pleas of guilty in 1974 in the Shelby County Criminal Court to the offenses of assault and battery with intent to rape and attempt to commit a felony, to wit: crime against nature. In 2000, he filed a petition to vacate and set aside these sentences, claiming that his pleas of guilty were not voluntary, that his counsel had been ineffective, and that he was innocent of the charges. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely, the statute of limitations having expired before it was filed; and the petitioner timely appealed. Based upon our review, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition as untimely.

John Hapney, et al., v. James Warren, et al.
E2000-00783-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Judge O. Duane Slone

In this case the plaintiffs are seeking damages for personal injuries received in a vehicle accident. The plaintiffs were exiting the interstate and were bumped from the rear by the vehicle driven by Mrs. Warren. While other facts relating to the accident were disputed, it was undisputed that there was no physical injury to either of the vehicles or their contents. The police were not called to the scene and no report was made. The plaintiffs filed suit to collect damages for injuries to Mrs. Hapney's neck which she claimed were received in the accident. The jury found no negligence on the part of the defendants. One of the doctors, who saw Mrs. Hapney, testified for the defendants in the case as to causation of Mrs. Hapney's injuries. In their motion for a new trial and on appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of the doctor. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial. The plaintiffs appeal challenging the jury verdict and the admission of the doctor's testimony. We affirm the trial court.

Kenneth Crotts v. Benchmark Mechanical Contractors,
W1999-00711-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: W. Michael Maloan, Sp. J,
Trial Court Judge: C. Creed Mcginley, Judge
The plaintiff, Kenneth Crotts, appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Hardin County which found the plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proving an injury by accident and dismissed his claim. For the reasons stated in this opinion, We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Ronald L. Davis v. Donal Campbell
M1997-00234-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

This appeal involves a dispute between a prisoner serving a 99-year sentence and the Department of Correction regarding the calculation of the prisoner's release eligibility date. After the Department declined to issue a declaratory order changing his release eligibility date, the prisoner filed an action in the Chancery Court for Davidson County asserting that the Department had incorrectly classified him as a Class X felon because he had not been convicted of a Class X crime, and he had not received credit for jail time served prior to his prison sentence. The Commissioner of Correction moved to dismiss the complaint, and the trial court, after converting the Commissioner's motion to a motion for summary judgment, dismissed the prisoner's complaint. On this appeal, the prisoner essentially reargues the same issues raised in his complaint. We have determined that the trial court correctly concluded that the material facts are not in dispute and that the Commissioner is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment

Bradley J. Brown v. Mickey Joe Rogers
M2000-01277-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Don R. Ash

The biological father appeals the termination of his parental rights which allowed the adoption of his two children by the stepfather after the mother's death. Although the evidence that the father abandoned his children was clear and convincing, the proof, when supplemented with post-judgment facts, was insufficient to determine whether termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the children. We remand for a hearing on the children's best interests.

State of Tennessee, ex Rel. Elisa Crippen, v. Lawrence Johnson
E1999-01855-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carey E. Garrett

This case concerns the modification of a child support award. In addition to the child for whom support was set in the instant case, the obligor father had three other children. At one point in the past, he was required by court order to support these three other children; but, by the time of the hearing below, his obligation had been terminated except for an arrearage on which he was continuing to pay. In determining the proper award in the instant case, the trial court considered the father's other three children and deviated from the Child Support Guidelines due to the father's "hardship." The State, as assignee of the mother's right to child support, appeals. We modify the trial court's award.

State of Tennessee v. Billy J. Coffelt
M1998-00337-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

The petitioner appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for delayed appeal regarding his petition for post-conviction relief. We remand the case to the trial court.

Evelyn Logue, v. Shelbyville Housing Authority, et al.
M1999-02555-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Tyrus H. Cobb

The controlling issues in this appeal are (1) whether under the terms of an employee policy manual the dismissed employee was something other than an employee at will, and (2) whether the action of the Board of the Shelbyville Housing Authority in upholding the dismissal was arbitrary or illegal or lacked material evidence to support it. The Chancery Court of Bedford County reviewed the record and found that the Board’s action was supported by substantial and material evidence and was not arbitrary nor illegal. We affirm.

Katrinka Stalsworth, et al vs. Robert Grummon
M2000-02352-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Arthur E. Mcclellan
This appeal involves the dismissal of a patient's medical malpractice complaint pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02. After the patient voluntarily dismissed her first complaint following opening arguments, the Circuit Court for Sumner County ordered her to pay her surgeon $3,023.85 in discretionary costs. The patient did not pay the discretionary costs she had previously been ordered to pay. After the patient refiled her complaint, the trial court stayed the proceedings on the surgeon's motion and later dismissed the patient's complaint for failure to prosecute and for failure to comply with the court's order directing her to pay the surgeon's discretionary costs. On this appeal, the patient asserts that the trial court erred by dismissing her renewed complaint. We affirm the trial court because the patient had ample warning that her claim was subject to dismissal and had been afforded a reasonable opportunity to comply with the trial court's order directing her to pay the surgeon's discretionary costs.

Orion Pacific, Inc. vs. Exchange Plastics Company
M2000-02345-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Corlew, III
The defendant Ohio company purchased truckloads of plastic from the Tennessee division of a Texas company. When the Ohio company refused to pay for all the plastic, the Texas company filed suit for the balance in a Tennessee court. The defendant argued that it did not have sufficient contact with Tennessee to subject it to personal jurisdiction in this state's courts. The trial court disagreed, and following a hearing, rendered a judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $11,288. We affirm.

Elizabeth Moxham vs. Eric Crafton, et a l
M2000-00803-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
During the trial of a construction dispute, the parties reached a settlement in the hallway of the courthouse, and subsequently announced the terms of their agreement to the trial court. Before the agreed order was entered, however, the plaintiff attempted to withdraw her consent. The plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court erred by signing and entering the agreed order, and by denying her motion to set it aside. We affirm the trial court.

Michael Ray Brenneman vs. Margaret Ann Redd Brenneman
M2000-00890-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Clara W. Byrd
This appeal involves the dissolution of a 31-year marriage by the Circuit Court for Wilson County. Following a bench trial, the trial court declared the parties divorced and divided their marital property but declined to award the wife spousal support. On this appeal, the wife asserts that the trial court erred by declining to grant her spousal support. We have determined that the trial court placed too much emphasis on the value of the wife's share of the marital estate when it declined to grant her spousal support. Accordingly, we have determined that the judgment should be amended to award the wife spousal support in the amount of $200 per month until she reaches sixty-five years of age. We also remand the case to the trial court to calculate a reasonable award for the wife's legal expenses.