Stephen Benker V.Williams Telecommunications Service, Inc., et al. E1999-01967-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Thayer, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Ben W. Hooper II, Circuit Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer has appealed from the trial court's ruling the employee is totally disabled raising issues concerning compensability of the claim and the apportionment of the award. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court is Affirmed. THAYER, SP. J., in which ANDERSON, C. J. and BYERS, SR. J., joined. Robert W. Knolton, of Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for the Appellants, William Telecommunications Service, Inc. and Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania. Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, and E. Blaine Sprouse, Assistant Attorney General, of Nashville, Tennessee, for the Appellee, State Second Injury Fund. J. Anthony Farmer, of Knoxville, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Stephen Benker. OPINION The employer, Williams Telecommunications Service, Inc., and the Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania, have appealed from the trial court's ruling finding the employee, Stephen Benker, to be totally disabled. Facts Employee Benker was 51 years of age and was a high school graduate with some vocational training. His prior work history was a laborer, maintenance worker, construction worker and carpenter. He was employed as a telephone computer service system installer on September 23, 1997, when he tripped on some phone cords and fell. When this occurred, he testified he twisted his back, felt sharp pain down his leg and some numbness in his low back. Prior to this accident, he had disc surgery in 1975 or 1976 and returned to work. In 199 he had another disc operation and returned to work. He had complaints from back problems for several years prior to the incident in question and had missed work at different times between 199 and the accident in 1997. He has not worked since the September 23rd incident and states he is not able to work at any of the jobs he has held. His wife, Lisa Benker, testified as to his physical limitations and testified that she does everything both inside and outside their home and that "our entire life has changed, everything is different." Dr. John T. Purvis, a neurosurgeon, performed the second surgery in 199 which involved a ruptured disc. He saw the employee again after the incident in question and stated that he had severe osteoarthritis in his low back and with his prior historyof having disc surgery twice, he would be very sensitive to any type of injury to the back. He concluded that Benker sustained an aggravation and acceleration of his lumbar spondylosis to such an extent that he was unable to work; that there was some anatomical change and he was surprised that he had worked as long as he did. He gave impairments of 1 percent due to the 1976 surgery, 15 percent due to the 199 surgery and 1 percent due to the September 1997 accident. Opposing this medical testimony was the written medical report of Dr. Archer Bishop. He performed an independent medical examination on November 1, 1998 and was of the opinion the accident had only increased his pain and that there was no additional impairment. Witness, Julian Nadolsky, a vocational consultant, testified the employee had "no capacity to earn a living in any occupation" based on the opinion of Dr. Purvis. He admitted that there would be no vocational disability under Dr. Bishop's conclusion. The trial court found the accident of September 23, 1997 rendered the employee totally disabled and apportioned the award of permanent total disability pursuant to subsection (a)(1) of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-28. The court ordered the employer to pay 6 percent of the award and the state second injury fund to pay the remaining 4 percent. Issues on Appeal The employer and insurance company contend: (1) the accident in question did not cause any anatomical change in the employee's pre-existing condition, (2) the employee was not totally disabled as a result of the last accident and (3) the court was in error in apportioning a greater portion -2-
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
Estate of Annie Hamilton et al. v. Walter Morris,et al. W1998-00191-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: J. Steven Stafford
Proponents of 1992 will of testatrix offered the will for probate, and three beneficiaries of testatrix's 1987 will filed a complaint contesting the 1992 will. Proponents of the 1992 will filed a response to the complaint contesting the 1992 will which, inter alia, denies that the 1987 will is the last will and testament of the testatrix. The chancellor granted summary judgment against the proponents of the 1992 will, holding that the will was void by virtue of proponents' undue influence on testatrix. The chancellor also granted summary judgment for residuary beneficiary of the 1987 will and admitted the 1987 will to probate as the last will and testament of the testatrix. Appellants, the proponents of the 1992 will and contestants of the 1987 will, have appealed.
Terry Lynn vs. City of Jackson W1999-01695-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Roy Morgan
Plaintiffs, personal representative of decedent, an adult child of decedent, and a minor child of decedent, filed a wrongful death suit more than one year after decedent's date of death against the City of Jackson pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (TGTLA). Plaintiffs had filed suit within one year of the date of death in federal court, and after federal court dismissed the case, they filed the instant case two days later in circuit court. The circuit court dismissed plaintiffs' case because it was not filed within one year of the accrual of the cause of action as mandated by TGTLA. Plaintiffs have appealed.
Madison
Court of Appeals
Mary Slack vs. Bryan Antwine W2000-00961-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris
Plaintiffs sued to quiet title to property and to establish boundary line. The trial court found that the deed description of plaintiffs' property established their title to the disputed property. Defendant has appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Henderson
Court of Appeals
Jason Kim vs. Nancy Boucher W2000-00427-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown
A minor pedestrian and his father sued automobile driver for personal injury damages sustained by minor when struck by driver's vehicle. The trial court directed a verdict for the automobile driver at the close of plaintiff's proof. Plaintiff has appealed.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Harry Tusant vs. City of Memphis W2000-01431-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.
Petitioners, Memphis police officers, filed a petition in chancery court for writ of mandamus to require the city to promote them to certain civil service ranks after they successfully completed the promotional process and are otherwise eligible and qualified for promotion. The trial court denied the petition, and petitioners have appealed.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
HMC Technologies Corp.vs. Siebe, Inc. E2000-01093-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Sharon J. Bell
In this declaratory judgment action, the plaintiff, HMC Technologies Corp. a/k/a HMC Technologies, Inc. ("HMC"), sued to enforce an indemnification provision contained in a proposal submitted to, and accepted by, the defendant, Siebe, Inc.
State vs. Coley M1997-00116-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Supreme Court
Alvin Vonner vs. State M2000-00566-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Timothy L. Easter
The petitioner, Alvin Vonner, appeals the Hickman County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief and alleges that his 60 year second degree murder sentence has expired. Because the record fails to establish that the sentence has expired, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.
Hickman
Court of Criminal Appeals
Martino vs. Dyer M1999-02397-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: William M. Dender
The trial court granted the motion of an attorney seeking collection of a pro rata share of his fee from a hospital lien against his client's settlement. The effect of the trial court's order is to require the hospital to pay fees to an attorney it did not hire. We reverse the judgment.
Sumner
Court of Appeals
Tinkham vs. Beasley M1999-02809-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Clara W. Byrd
Wilson
Court of Appeals
Tinkham vs. Beasley M1999-02809-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Clara W. Byrd
Wilson
Court of Appeals
State vs. Jason Beeler W1999-01417-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: William B. Acree
The defendant appeals from jury trial convictions for reckless homicide, felony murder, aggravated burglary, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. In this appeal, the defendant alleges insufficient evidence, errors in admitting certain evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, improper instructions, and error in denying his writ of error coram nobis. Concluding that it was reversible error to not instruct on the lesser-included offenses of felony murder, we remand for a new trial on the felony murder count. We affirm the remaining convictions.
Obion
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Danny Harold Ogle E2000-00421-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Defendant entered a best interest plea of guilty to vehicular homicide by recklessness. The plea attempted to reserve a certified question of law relating to the destruction of evidence; namely, the victim's vehicle. Specifically, defendant contends the destruction of the vehicle while it was under state control deprived him of due process, and the trial court should have dismissed the indictment. Upon our review of the record, we conclude that we have no jurisdiction to address the certified question. The appeal is dismissed.
Sevier
Court of Criminal Appeals
Stephen L.Carey vs. State E2000-00847-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Richard R. Baumgartner
This is a post-conviction appeal. The petitioner is currently serving life as an habitual criminal plus a consecutive 105 years for other offenses, all imposed in 1987. The petitioner timely filed three petitions for post-conviction relief challenging his guilty pleas for offenses occurring in 1969, 1981, and 1983, all of which were subsequently used to establish his habitual criminal status. The petitioner attempted to amend his petitions for post-conviction relief by challenging two of his 1987 convictions, but it was denied as untimely. All petitions were dismissed by the trial court after a hearing. In this appeal as a matter of right, the petitioner contends (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel and inadequate advice of his constitutional rights from the trial court, thereby rendering his guilty pleas involuntary and unknowing; and (2) the post-conviction court erroneously dismissed his amendment to the petition for post-conviction relief. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the post-conviction court correctly denied post-conviction relief.
Knox
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Vance Shelton E2000-01632-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: James E. Beckner
Defendant was convicted of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. The defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years for rape of a child and twelve years for aggravated sexual battery, to run consecutively to each other and consecutively to a prior four-year sentence. In this appeal, the defendant makes the following allegations: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial due to a variance between the indictment and the state's proof at trial; (3) the trial court erred in ruling his prior convictions for arson would be admissible if he testified; and (4) his sentences are excessive. Upon our review of the record, we remand for modification of the judgment for aggravated sexual battery to reflect the proper date of the offense, but affirm the judgments in all other respects.
Greene
Court of Criminal Appeals
State s. Ricky Eugene Cofer E2000-00532-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: E. Eugene Eblen
Defendant was indicted for aggravated robbery, and a Roane County jury found him guilty of the lesser offense of simple robbery, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced him to six years as a Range II, multiple offender, to be served consecutively to a prior Anderson County sentence. In this appeal, defendant makes the following allegations: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the jury foreman impermissibly interjected extraneous information into the jury deliberations; and (3) consecutive sentences were not warranted. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
