Vonkrosigk vs. Rankin M1999-02254-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Don Ash
Buyer in real estate sale contract contingent on obtaining the financing sued for return of earnest money after she failed to qualify for a loan to finance to purchase. The trial court found that buyer acted in good faith in attempting to secure financing and entered judgment for buyer. Sellers have appealed.
Rutherford
Court of Appeals
Geldreich vs. Hall M1999-02258-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Leonard W. Martin
This appeal arises from a suit initiated by Geldriech ("Investors") alleging breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and conversion by Hall in his capacity as corporate officer. When Hall failed to answer and appear for hearing, Investors' motion for default judgment was granted. Thereafter, Hall filed a motion to strike the default judgment that was denied by the court below. Hall appeals the trial court's failure to grant him relief from the default judgment.
Dickson
Court of Appeals
Borders vs. Crow M1999-00985-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr.
This is a suit by employee for compensation allegedly due after discharge under oral contract of employment. Upon finding that the discharge was for cause, the jury nevertheless returned a verdict for the employee for post-discharge compensation. On the employer's appeal, we vacate that part of the judgment awarding post-discharge compensation.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
In the Matter of T.S. and M.S. M1999-01286-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Ben Hall Mcfarlin
This case involves the termination of parental rights regarding two children who were removed from the parental home by the Department of Children's Services in 1995 and placed in foster care. The mother was ordered to take steps to remedy the deficiencies in the home and made some efforts to comply. After four years, DCS petitioned to terminate the mother's parental rights. The trial court found that the mother had failed to substantially comply with the Plan of Care and terminated the mother's rights on grounds (1) that the conditions that led to the children's removal continued to persist with little likelihood of remedy and (2) that the mother was incompetent to adequately provide for the children. Because DCS has established grounds for termination and has also established that termination is in the best interest of the children, we affirm.
Rutherford
Court of Appeals
Russo vs. Russo M1999-02380-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Tom E. Gray
This appeal arises from an action for divorce initiated by Donald Joseph Russo ("Husband") against Debra Ann Russo ("Wife"). The trial court granted Wife an absolute divorce and alimony in futuro; awarded custody of the parties' minor children to Wife; ordered Husband to pay child support in the amount of thirty-two hundred dollars per month with additional child support of two thousand dollars per month to be placed in educational trust for parties' minor children; and awarded the majority of marital assets to Wife. Husband appeals.
Sumner
Court of Appeals
Hobbs vs. Hobbs M1999-00715-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Graham
Two years after a divorce, and eight months after the divorce decree was affirmed on appeal, the former husband filed a pro se motion asking the trial court to review new evidence and to find that he had been defrauded and denied his constitutional rights in the divorce proceeding. The trial court treated the pleading as a motion under Rule 60, Tenn. R. Civ. P., and held that the motion was (1) untimely and (2) not supported by the proof submitted by the movant. We affirm the trial court.
Sequatchie
Court of Appeals
In the Matter of the Estate of S.W. Brindley M1999-02224-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Stella L. Hargrove
This is a will contest between two siblings. After the onset of the parties' father's final illness, during which his competence was questioned and eventually a conservator appointed, the father executed a codicil to his will that materially altered the distribution of his estate in favor of his son, the appellant herein. The testator's daughter challenged the validity of the codicil in the underlying action. After the jury found that the codicil was not the testator's "own free act," but was instead the result of undue influence on the son's part, the codicil was declared a nullity. We affirm the jury's verdict.
Giles
Court of Appeals
Penny Pitt Phillips, et al. v. Robinson & Belew, Inc., et al. W1999-02211-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Weatherford, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: William Michael Maloan, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The defendant-employer and its insurance company appeal the judgment of the Weakley Chancery Court insisting that the trial judge erred in commuting the death benefits payable to Donald Leon Pitt, a minor, to a lump sum. As discussed below, the panel has concluded that the part of the trial court's judgment that ordered the award be commuted should be reversed.
Weakley
Workers Compensation Panel
City of Murfreesboro vs. Pierce Hardy Real Estate, Inc. M2000-00562-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Corlew, III
This case involves a dispute between the City of Murfreesboro and a landowner over the value and the acreage of a tract of land taken by the city to be used for a greenway along the Stones River. The city appeals the trial court's denial of a motion in limine that the city filed to exclude testimony of the landowner's appraiser. The motion stated that the expert's testimony relied on an inadmissible method of valuation and should, therefore, be excluded. Additionally, the landowner appeals the trial court's ruling that the landowner did not own a .61 acre portion of the of the land taken because, as it sits at the bottom of a navigable waterway, it is not subject to private ownership.
Rutherford
Court of Appeals
Talmage Crump vs. Kimberly Bell W1999-00673-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown
This is a personal injury case. Plaintiff filed a complaint and issued summons, which was returned "not to be found." Plaintiff issued an alias summons which was also returned "not to be found." Plaintiff issued pluries summons more than one year after the return of the alias summons. The trial court dismissed plaintiff's case for failure to comply Rule 3, Tenn.R.Civ.P. Plaintiff asserts that defendant is equitably estopped from relying upon Tenn.R.Civ.P. 3, because of action of defendant's liability insurance carrier leading him to believe that the defense would not be raised upon which he relied to his detriment. The trial court found no estoppel, and plaintiff has appealed.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Johnna Hayes vs. Jeff Hayes W1999-00445-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: George R. Ellis
This appeal arises from a dispute between Plaintiff Johnna Lea Hayes (Beuerlein) and Defendant Jeff C. Hayes regarding the amount of Mr. Hayes' child support obligation and the enforcement of a promissory note executed by Ms. Beuerlein in conjunction with the parties' divorce. The trial court found (1) that Mr. Hayes has an annual income of $64,139.00, (2) that Mr. Hayes' child support obligation is $1,221.00 per month but that this amount should be reduced to $621.00 per month until Ms. Beuerlein's debt under the promissory note is satisfied, (3) that Mr. Hayes' child support arrearage is equal to $14,940.00, (4) that Ms. Beuerlein's debt under the promissory note is equal to $39,569.85, (5) that, subtracting Mr. Hayes' child support arrearage from Ms. Beuerlein's debt under the promissory note, the net amount that Ms. Beuerlein owes to Mr. Hayes is $24,665.85 plus ten percent (10%) interest, and (6) that each party shall pay his or her own attorney's fees. For the reasons set forth below, the ruling of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
State vs. Michael S. Reid M1999-00305-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: Timothy L. Easter
The Williamson County grand jury indicted the appellant, Michael S. Reid, with one (1) count of driving under the influence, third offense, one (1) count of driving on a revoked license and one (1) count of criminal impersonation. The appellant pled guilty to driving on a revoked license and criminal impersonation and, after a jury trial, was found guilty of driving under the influence, third offense. The trial court sentenced the appellant to concurrent terms of eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days, suspended after service of 180 days, for driving under the influence, third offense and six (6) months, suspended after service of ten (10) days, for driving on a revoked license. In addition, the appellant received a consecutive sentence of six (6) months, suspended after service of five (5) days, for criminal impersonation. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in (1) admitting hearsay evidence over his objection by allowing a Williamson County Sheriff's Deputy to testify as to the contents of a dispatch he received prior to stopping the appellant; and (2) allowing the state to introduce evidence concerning a prior stop of the appellant for which he was not charged. We hold that the officer's testimony concerning the dispatch was nonhearsay and relevant and, as a result, properly admissible. Additionally, we conclude that the appellant has waived the issue regarding the prior stop as a result of his failure to object to this evidence at trial and his failure to include this issue in the motion for new trial. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Williamson
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Joyce Newman M1999-00161-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Graham
The defendant pled guilty in Sequatchie County to two counts of selling a Schedule II substance and was sentenced to confinement for four years and six months. After serving six months, she was placed in community corrections. Subsequently, an affidavit was filed by her probation officer, alleging that she had violated her Community Services Behavioral Contract in several ways, including "breaking house arrest." Following a hearing, the trial court agreed that the defendant had violated the house arrest provision of the contract and ordered that she serve the remainder of her sentence with the Department of Correction. The defendant timely appealed, alleging that the trial court improperly considered certain evidence and that, if she was reconfined, she should have served her sentence at the local jail, rather than with the Department of Correction. Based upon our review, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand for a new revocation hearing.
Sequatchie
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Ronald Wayne Ashby M1999-01247-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: William Charles Lee
The defendant appeals his aggravated burglary conviction. He asserts that insufficient evidence supported the jury verdict, that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of another crime, and that his sentence is excessive. We conclude that sufficient evidence supported the verdict and that the "other crime" evidence was properly admitted. We affirm the sentence.
Lincoln
Court of Criminal Appeals
Eddie Brannon v. Pen Gulf, Inc. 03S01-9906-CH-00053
Authoring Judge: Special Judge Howell N. Peoples
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jerri Bryant
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Travelers Insurance Company (hereafter "Travelers") appeals the granting of summary judgment dismissing Reliance Insurance Company (hereafter "Reliance") as a party defendant before trial. Travelers asserts that the trial court erred in finding that the last injurious exposure rule did not create an issue of whether Reliance, as a subsequent workers' compensation insurance carrier for Pen Gulf, Inc., may be liable for Eddie Brannon's injury. An appeal from a summary judgment in a workers' compensation case is not governed by the de novo standard of review provided by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3), but by Rule 56, T.R.C.P. Downen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 811 S.W.2d 523, 524 (Tenn. 1991). No presumption of correctness attaches to decisions granting summary judgment because they involve only questions of law and the reviewing court must determine whether the requirements of Rule 56 have been met. Gonzales v. Alman Const. Co., 857 S.W.2d 42, 44-45 (Tenn. 1993). Summary judgment is proper when the movant demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56.3, T.R.C.P. In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, allow all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and discard all countervailing evidence. Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 28, 21 (Tenn. 1993). "It is almost never an option in workers' compensation cases. In a summary judgment hearing, even where the parties have no right to a jury trial, the trial judge is not at liberty to weigh the evidence." Hilliard v. Tennessee State Home Health Services, Inc., 95 S.W.2d 344, 345 (Tenn. 1997). Eddie Brannon filed this action on March 23, 1998 to recover workers' compensation benefits for "bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome which was caused by the 2
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
Hudgens vs. Rogers M2000-00239-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Arthur E. Mcclellan
The mother of four minor children appealed the trial court's decision to change custody from Mother to Father based on a material change in circumstances. Prior to the entry of that order, it had been determined that an agreement, originally announced to the court which awarded custody of the children to Mother, had been set aside due to the court's finding that there had been no meeting of the minds of the parties as several critical issues had been left unresolved. We have determined that the court was correct in that decision. Therefore, the standard which the trial court should have applied was one of comparative fitness and best interest of the children rather than a material change of circumstances. This matter is reversed and remanded to the trial court.
Sumner
Court of Appeals
State vs. Seria D. Ward M1998-00128-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Thomas H. Shriver
The defendant was convicted in Davidson County of especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to confinement for seventeen years. He appealed the conviction, alleging that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the offense, that his videotaped confession should have been excluded, and that his trial counsel was ineffective. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Davidson
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Christopher Henderson W1999-00958-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of judicial diversion and full probation following his guilty plea to possession of cocaine under 0.5 grams with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. We affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.
Lauderdale
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Deshawn McClenton W1999-00879-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Joseph B. Dailey
The Defendant, DeShawn McClenton, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of the offenses of aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to thirty years imprisonment for the aggravated robbery conviction and to sixty years imprisonment for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, with the sentences to be served consecutively. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues (1) that the evidence regarding his identity as the perpetrator was insufficient to support the convictions, (2) that the trial court erred in ruling that his prior aggravated robbery conviction and his three prior attempted second degree murder convictions were admissible to impeach his credibility if he chose to testify, and (3) that the movement and confinement of the victim were essentially incidental to the accomplishment of the aggravated robbery and were therefore insufficient to support a separate conviction for kidnapping. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Jeremy Tompkins vs. Mary Rainey W1999-01218-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: A. V. Mcdowell
In this action to establish parentage, Jeremy Earl Tompkins (Father) appeals the trial court's final judgment awarding Mary Helen Rainey (Mother) custody of the parties' infant son. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
State vs. Michael Sample & Larry McKay W1999-01202-CCA-R3-PC
Trial Court Judge: Bernie Weinman
The Defendants were each convicted in 1982 of two counts of felony murder. Each Defendant received two death penalties for the murders. On post-conviction, the Defendants contend that the State withheld exculpatory information and that their death penalties were predicated in part on an invalid aggravating circumstance. The trial court dismissed the petitions without a hearing, finding that the Brady claims were time-barred and finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have imposed the death sentences absent consideration of the invalid aggravating circumstance. The Defendants now appeal the trial court's findings on both claims for relief. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
