Dept. of Human Services vs. Fineout
01A01-9710-JV-00582
Trial Court Judge: Burton D. Glover

Rice vs. Sabir
03S01-9709-CV-00110

Rice vs. Sabir
03S01-9709-CV-00110

State vs. Bolden
02S01-9711-CC-00102
Trial Court Judge: Joe G. Riley. Jr.

Peggy Jean Bradford, v. James William Anderson and Myra Alea, In Re: Rachel Anderson, D/O/B 10/20/1990
01-A-01-9712 -CV-00689
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Gerald L Ewell, Sr.

This is a custody dispute between the child's father and the child's maternal grandmother, who was nominated as the custodian in the will of the child's mother. The Circuit Court of Coffee County awarded custody to the father and his mother. We affirm.

Blick vs. Kent
01A01-9708-CV-00393
Trial Court Judge: James E. Walton

State vs. John Taylor
01C01-9705-CC-00192

Thomas Light vs. State
01C01-9712-CC-00577

Paul Smith vs. State
01C01-9712-CC-00578
Trial Court Judge: William B. Cain

State vs. Sandy Cobb
01C01-9802-CC-00054
Trial Court Judge: Donald P. Harris

Barnett vs. Barnett
01A01-9605-CH-00228
Trial Court Judge: Tyrus H. Cobb

Baltz vs. Knight
01A01-9606-JV-00263
Trial Court Judge: George L. Lovell

State vs. Barton Hawkins
02C01-9711-CR-00430
Trial Court Judge: James C. Beasley, Jr.

02C01-9802-CC-00052Cecil
02C01-9802-CC-00052Cecil
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

State vs. Gabriel Clark
W2000-02595-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Roy B. Morgan, Jr.
The appellant, Gabriel Antonio Clark, was convicted by a Madison County jury for one count of felony murder and one count of aggravated robbery. Clark was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction and, following a sentencing hearing, received a twelve-year sentence for aggravated robbery. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. On appeal, Clark raises the following issues for our review: (1) Whether the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to support his convictions; and (2) whether the trial court erred by failing to exclude or redact a portion of Clark's statement to police which he contends was highly prejudicial and in violation of Tenn. R. Evid. 403. After review, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State vs. Paschal Hyde
01C01-9701-CR-00024

Dorothy Marable v. Key Industries, Inc.
01S01-9709-CH-00209
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Robert E. Burch,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer, Key, and its insurer, Travelers, insist the chancellor erred in (1) awarding benefits as a percentage to the body as a whole, (2) making an award in excess of six times the highest medical impairment rating and (3) awarding benefits based on one hundred percent to the body as a whole. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the award should be modified down to one based on forty-eight percent to the body as a whole. Our review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). Conclusions of law are subject to de novo review on appeal without any presumption of correctness. Spencer v. Towson Moving and Storage, Inc., 922 S.W.2d 58 (Tenn. 1996). The employee or claimant, Marable, was 62 years old at the time of the trial. She has less than a high school education. She worked in Key's shirt factory for 23 years, sewing stays in collars of dress shirts. She has suffered three separate work related injuries, all three of which are the subject of this litigation. (1) The employer and its insurer contend first that because the claimant has three separate injuries to three separate scheduled members, or to two separate scheduled members if the arms are considered together, the claimant's injury should somehow be considered a scheduled injury and recovery limited to a percentage of weeks provided in the statutory schedule. From a consideration of the authorities cited and others, we respectfully disagree. Where a worker's only injury is to a scheduled member, he may receive only the amount of compensation provided by the schedule for his permanent disability. Genesco, Inc. v. Creamer, 584 S.W.2d 191 (Tenn. 1979). This claimant has three separate injuries to three separate members, all of them scheduled separately. If an employee suffers permanent partial disability to two members listed together as a scheduled injury, it is proper to compute the period of disability according to the schedule. Queen v. New York Underwriters Ins. Co., 222 Tenn. 235, 435 S.W.2d 122 (1968). While both arms are listed together as a scheduled injury, we find no listing in the schedule for both arms and a foot. See Tenn Code Ann. section 5-6-27(3)(A)(II). In all other cases of permanent partial disability, benefits are payable according to the percentage of disability to the body as a whole, which is valued at four hundred weeks; Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-27(3)(F); Kerr v. Magic Chef, 793 S.W.2d 927 (Tenn. 199); and an injury to three or more members of the body, whether or not any of the members is included in the schedule, is not a scheduled injury and, in such case, benefits are allowable to the body as 2

Henry A. Sherrill v. Pulaski Rubber Company
01S01-9802-CH-00035
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jim T. Hamilton,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial judge found the plaintiff was permanently disabled and awarded a lump sum judgment of $81,953.2 on November 3, 1997. The defendant says the record does not support the finding that the lump sum award is proper because the record fails to show that the lump sum award is in the plaintiff's best interest or that he can wisely manage the lump sum payment. We remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. The record in this case is sparse on the issue of a lump sum payment. The plaintiff testified he wished to pay off his mortgage and invest any remaining portion of the award. On appeal, the plaintiff's brief presents a mathematical computation showing how much the plaintiff would save if he payed off his mortgage. This was not presented at trial. The trial court made no finding of whether a lump sum award was in the plaintiff's best interest. This brings the case in line with the case of Huddleston v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 858 S.W.2d 315 (Tenn. 1993), where an issue of a lump sum award was raised. The Supreme Court said in that case: "W hat is missing from the trial court's order, as well as from the record, is a determination that full commutation under these circumstances is in the injured worker's best interest, as required by T.C.A. _ 5-6-229(a), as amended (199)." Id. at 318. In Huddleston, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings to determine what amount, if any, should be commuted and to determine if the plaintiff could manage the commuted amount. Further, the Supreme Court noted that the trial judge may well consider, if a finding of a lump sum is made, how to insure that the sum will be applied in the manner the plaintiff asserts it would be used. We remand this case to the trial court for such proceedings as are necessary consistent with this opinion. 2

State vs. Walter Johnson
02C01-9801-CR-00007

State vs. Michael Holmes
02C01-9802-CC-00048

State vs. Robert Goss/Carl Hale
02C01-9610-CC-00367
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III

Deborah H. Steele v. Superior Home Health Care of Chattanooga, Inc., and David Twombley - Concurring
03A01-9709-CH-00395
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor R. Vann Owens

The plaintiff, Deborah H. Steele (“Steele”), brought this action against her former employer, Superior Home Health Care of Chattanooga, Inc. (“Superior”), and her former supervisor, David Twombley (“Twombley”)1, alleging that she was the victim of, among other things, sexual  harassment, outrageous conduct, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. After various other claims were dismissed by the trial court², the case proceeded to trial before a jury on Steele’s claim of sexual harassment against both Superior and Twombley under the Tennessee Human Rights Act, T.C.A. § 4-21-101, et seq. (“THRA”), and her claim of outrageous conduct and intentional infliction of emotional distress, against Twombley alone. The jury found in favor of Steele on all of the remaining theories of recovery and awarded her $1.2 million in compensatory  damages and $60,000 in punitive damages. The trial court also awarded Steele attorney’s fees and costs against both defendants. After Steele  accepted a remittitur that eliminated the punitive damages award and reduced the compensatory damages award to $850,000, both Superior and Twombley appealed, raising in substance the following issues for our consideration:

1. Did the trial court err in allowing inadmissible hearsay testimony from witnesses who did not have first-hand knowledge of the events in question?

2. Did Steele’s counsel make improper and prejudicial statements during closing argument, thus warranting a new trial?

3. Is there material evidence in the record to support the jury’s verdict?

4. Did the trial court err in submitting to the jury Steele’s cause of action against Twombley under the THRA?5. Did the trial court err in giving the jury an inaccurate charge, thereby prejudicing its verdict against Twombley?

6. Did the trial court err in not suggesting a further remittitur of the jury’s verdict?

7. Did the trial court err in awarding attorney’s fees against Twombley under the THRA?

Si J. Williams v. Mary C. Williams
01A01-9709-CV-00522
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.

I concur with the results of this opinion. However, I am filing this separate opinion to clarify my understanding of the significance of the portion of the decision dealing with the need of the parties’ daughter for continuing support past her eighteenth birthday.

Si J. Williams, v. Mary C. Williams
01A01-9709-CV-00522
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Muriel Robinson

In this divorce case, Mary C. Williams, hereafter “wife” has appealed from the judgment of the Trial Court awarding her a divorce from Si J. Williams, hereafter “husband,” custody, child support, alimony, insurance, fees and division of property.