State of Tennessee v. Michael Andrew Lethco
The defendant, Michael Andrew Lethco, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery for which he received a nine-year sentence. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and asserts the State elicited improper testimony from the victim regarding other instances of abuse which prejudiced the defendant. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Walter Grooms, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, James Walter Grooms, Jr., appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, which petition challenged his conviction for two counts of aggravated assault, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randy Champion
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Randy Champion, of one count of especially aggravated robbery, two counts of attempt to commit second degree murder, two counts of employment of a firearm, one count of attempt to commit especially aggravated robbery, and one count of attempt to commit aggravated robbery. For these convictions, the trial court ordered an effective sentence of twenty-four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to prove his identity as a perpetrator of the offenses, that the trial court improperly denied his motion for severance, and that the State presented inconsistent theories of prosecution at trial. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nathaniel A. Rhodes
The Defendant-Appellant, Nathaniel A. Rhodes, entered guilty pleas to one count of TennCare fraud in case number 15-CR-1060 and to one count of sale of Alprazolam in case number 15-CR-1061, with the trial court to determine the range, length, and manner of service of his sentences following a sentencing hearing. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 71-5-2601(a)(5)(A), 39-17-417. Thereafter, the trial court imposed two consecutive ten-year sentences in confinement. On appeal, Rhodes argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After reviewing the record in this case, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand the case for entry of corrected judgments as specified in this opinion. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Bostic, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, James Bostic, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged the revocation of the community corrections placement for his 2014 guilty-pleaded conviction of the sale of cocaine. In this appeal, the petitioner claims entitlement to post-conviction relief on grounds that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at the community corrections revocation hearing. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Corporate Flight Management, Inc. v. Talaviation, S.A. Et Al.
The issue in this appeal is whether the Tennessee court had personal jurisdiction over the Defendant. A Luxemburg company contracted with a French citizen to provide the citizen with a certain number of flight hours on the company’s private jets; the contract provided that, if the company did not have a jet available, it would procure a private jet from a third party. After providing a jet for the citizen to travel from Luxemburg to Turks and Caicos, the company did not have a jet available to return the citizen to his home, so the company engaged a charter aircraft company based in Tennessee to fly the citizen home in one of the Tennessee company’s jets. When the Luxemburg company did not pay for the flight, the Tennessee company filed this breach of contract action against the Luxemburg company and the French citizen in Rutherford County Chancery Court. The French citizen moved to dismiss the action against him on the ground that the Tennessee court lacked personal jurisdiction over him; the motion was granted. The Tennessee company appeals, contending that the court had personal jurisdiction over the French citizen because the Luxemburg company acted as the citizen’s agent and its contacts with Tennessee were thereby imputed to him for jurisdictional purposes. We conclude that the trial court correctly determined that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the French citizen and accordingly affirm the judgment granting the motion to dismiss. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randy Earl Edwards
The defendant, Randy Earl Edwards, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his 10-year sentence for the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Deborah Russell v. Household Financial Services, Inc., Et Al.
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, filed by Deborah Russell (“Plaintiff”), seeking to recuse the trial judge in this case which involves a foreclosure action. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Plaintiff, and finding no error in the Trial Court’s order denying recusal, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary Lee Bragg
The Defendant, Gary Lee Bragg, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; possession of burglary tools, a Class A misdemeanor; and two counts of drug possession, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39- 14-403 (2018); 39-14-701 (2018), 39-17-418 (2018). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years for each aggravated burglary conviction and to eleven months, twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor conviction. The court ordered consecutive service of the aggravated burglary sentences, for an effective twenty-four-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support one of the aggravated burglary convictions and (2) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Williams
Richard Williams, Defendant, was indicted on two counts of attempted first degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder where the victim suffered serious bodily injury, and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted on all counts as charged and received a total effective sentence of thirty-six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jonathon D. Brown v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Jonathon D. Brown, was convicted by a Robertson County jury of aggravated rape, especially aggravated kidnapping, and theft of property over the value of $1,000, for which he received an effective sentence of sixty years’ incarceration. Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, which was denied following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner appeals, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to adequately meet with Petitioner given the severity of the charges and trial counsel’s failure to secure a land survey to “further buttress his venue argument.” After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lexon Insurance Company v. Windhaven Shores, Inc., Et Al.
In this appeal arising from a suit on an indemnity agreement, the indemnitee plaintiff moved for summary judgment. In response, one of the named indemnitors claimed that she could not determine if the signature on the agreement was hers. Another named indemnitor claimed that he was not sure if the signature on the agreement was his but conceded that it could be. And neither purported indemnitor recalled signing the indemnity agreement. The trial court determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact and granted summary judgment. On appeal, the purported indemnitors claim that, because the authenticity of their signatures was in dispute, summary judgment was improper. Alternatively, if summary judgment was appropriate on the issue of liability, the purported indemnitors claim that the trial court erred in its award of damages by including certain unpaid bond premiums and attorney’s fees. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Trenton Ray Forrester
The defendant, Trenton Ray Forrester, aggrieved of his Henderson County Circuit Court jury convictions of aggravated burglary and theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $2,500, appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the propriety of the fully-incarcerative, six-year effective sentence. We affirm both the conviction and the accompanying sentence. Because, however, the trial court failed to consider the defendant’s ability to pay when setting the amount of restitution, we reverse the restitution order and remand the case for a new restitution hearing. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rickey Driver
A Fayette County jury convicted the defendant, Rickey Driver, of violating the requirements of the sexual offender registry due to his failure to report during 2016. The trial court imposed a six-year sentence which was suspended after 120 days of service. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Following our review of the record and pertinent authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Solomon Menche v. White Eagle Property Group, LLC, et al.
Plaintiff/Appellant brought suit against Defendants/Appellees over various business disputes. During the course of the discovery process, the trial court granted three motions to compel against Plaintiff, twice reserving Defendants’ request for attorney’s fees. Eventually, Defendants moved for discovery sanctions against Plaintiff, asking the trial court to award Defendants the attorney’s fees and expenses related to prosecuting the three motions to compel as well as the motion for sanctions. Shortly after the third motion to compel was granted, however, Plaintiff requested a voluntary nonsuit pursuant to Rule 41.01. Because Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment was pending, the Defendants were required to agree to the nonsuit. The trial court granted the nonsuit based on Defendants’ consent, but later held a hearing on the Defendants’ motion for sanctions and awarded the Defendants their attorney’s fees and expenses. Plaintiff appealed to this Court. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Solomon Menche v. White Eagle Property Group, LLC, et al. - Dissent
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and expenses to the defendants following the entry of an agreed order granting a voluntary nonsuit to the plaintiff. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
C.Bruce Batten v. Community Trust and Banking Company Et Al. - Dissent in Part
I concur in the majority opinion’s result with regard to Batten’s entitlement to the severance package and with regard to the award of attorney’s fees to Bank. However, I must dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to Attorney Edge on Batten’s negligent misrepresentation claim. As discussed by the majority, the alleged representation at issue in this case was that Attorney Edge was unaware of anything that would affect Batten’s ability to receive his negotiated severance benefits if he tendered his resignation in December 2009. According to Batten, Attorney Edge’s representation was false because Attorney Edge was at that time aware of several facts that could undermine Batten’s ability to receive the severance package. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
C.Bruce Batten v. Community Trust and Banking Company Et Al. - Dissent in Part
This appeal arises from the trial court’s reconsideration and granting of summary judgment motions that had initially been denied by another judge. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jayda S.
Mother appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights. Concluding that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s findings of a ground for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Troy Love v. Andre McDowell Et Al.
This appeal involves a suit seeking partition of property owned by multiple individuals. The trial court dismissed the suit for failure to join an indispensable party. For the following reasons, we vacate the trial court’s order of dismissal and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Union | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Khloe B. Et Al.
Kristin B. (“Mother”) appeals the judgment of the Washington County Chancery Court (“Trial Court”) terminating her parental rights to the children, Khloe B. and Madison B. (“the Children”). Upon petition of Matthew B. (“Father”) and Amanda B. (“Stepmother”) (collectively, “Petitioners”), the Trial Court found that Mother had abandoned the Children by her actions exhibiting wanton disregard for the Children’s welfare and that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. The Trial Court, therefore, terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Children. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Carl Short Ex Rel. Allison Hope Short v. Metro Knoxville HMA, LLC, Et Al. - Dissent
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s dismissal of this action. I believe that the trial court properly relied on this Court’s majority opinion in Parks v. Walker, No. E2017-01603-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 6242461 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2018), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 27, 2019), as an analogous case. The trial court found that the plaintiff, Carl Short (“Plaintiff”), had failed to substantially comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) (Supp. 2018), which provides that written pre-suit notice shall include a HIPPA-compliant medical authorization “permitting the provider receiving the notice to obtain complete medical records from each other provider being sent a notice.” Inasmuch as the authorizations in the instant action authorize each defendant to disclose medical records to the other named medical providers but do not authorize each provider to request the other providers’ records, I conclude that, as in Parks, Plaintiff’s authorizations are “not sufficient to enable defendants to obtain plaintiff’s medical records” and are therefore not substantially compliant with the statute. See Parks, 2018 WL 6242461, at *3. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Carl Short Ex Rel. Allison Hope Short v. Metro Knoxville HMA, LLC Et AL.
This appeal concerns healthcare liability. Carl Short (“Plaintiff”), widower of Allison Short (“Decedent”), filed suit in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) alleging negligence in his late wife’s medical treatment against a number of physicians (“Physician Defendants”) and Turkey Creek Medical Center (“the Hospital”) (“Defendants,” collectively). Defendants moved to dismiss on the basis of noncompliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E), which requires that pre-suit notice include a HIPAA compliant medical authorization allowing the healthcare provider receiving the notice to obtain complete medical records from every other provider that is sent a notice.1 Plaintiff’s authorizations allowed each provider to disclose complete medical records to each named provider although it did not state specifically that each provider could request records from the other. The Trial Court held that Plaintiff’s authorizations failed to substantially comply with the statute’s requirements because of this failure to explicitly allow each provider to obtain records. Plaintiff appeals. We hold that Plaintiff’s method of permitting Defendants access to Decedent’s medical records substantially complied with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Carolyn Diane Long v. Steven Lawrence Long
This divorce case involves the trial court’s classification and division of the separate and marital property of the parties. The trial court did not place a valuation on any of the property that was contested, nor did it refer to or make any findings regarding the factors provided by the governing statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121 (2017). We vacate the trial court’s order and remand with instructions to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Petition To Stay The Effectiveness of Formal Ethics Opinion 2017-F-163
The Tennessee District Attorneys General Conference (“TNDAGC”) filed with this Court a petition to vacate Formal Ethics Opinion 2017-F-163 (“Opinion”) issued by the Board of Professional Responsibility (“Board”) regarding ethical considerations for prosecutors under Rule 3.8(d) of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct. The TNDAGC also requested that the Court stay the effectiveness of the Opinion pending review. This Court determined that a full and deliberate review of the issues was necessary and granted a stay of the effectiveness of the Opinion. Based on our review, we decline to interpret a prosecutor’s ethical duty under Rule 3.8(d) as being more expansive than one’s legal obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), and its progeny, or that “timely” disclosure of the material should be interpreted as “as soon as reasonably practicable.” Accordingly, we vacate Formal Ethics Opinion 2017-F-163 of the Board of Professional Responsibility. We also take this opportunity to interpret Rule 3.8(d) as coextensive in scope with a prosecutor’s legal obligations under Brady and its progeny, as explained in this opinion. |
Supreme Court |