Milcrofton Utility District Of Williamson County, Tennessee v. Non Potable Well Water, Inc. Et Al.
Appellant, a public utility, appeals the Davidson County Chancery Court’s dismissal of its complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Appellant argues that it has an exclusive right to provide water service under Tennessee Code Annotated section 7-82-301 and that Appellee is usurping its exclusive right by providing water to residents of a subdivision within Appellant’s service area. Because the gravamen of Appellant’s complaint is to maintain its exclusive franchise by the grant of injunctive relief prohibiting Appellee from providing water service, the case does not fall within the purview of Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-225. As such, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Milcrofton Utility District Of Williamson County, Tennessee v. Non Potable Well Water, Inc. Et Al. - Dissenting In Part
While I agree with the majority’s decision regarding the timeliness of Milcrofton’s action, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Torey Martez Underwood
The defendant, Torey Martez Underwood, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of alternative sentencing for his guilty-pleaded conviction of attempted second degree murder. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Derrick Richardson v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant, Derrick Richardson, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s judgment summarily denying his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The State has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal due to an untimely notice of appeal. Following our review, we conclude that the interest of justice requires a waiver of the timely filing of the notice of appeal and deny the State’s motion to dismiss. We further conclude, however, that an opinion in this case would have no precedential value and affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rocky G. Tanner
After a bench trial in July 2017, the defendant, Rocky G. Tanner, was found guilty of driving on a revoked or suspended license in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-50-504. At trial and in his motion for new trial, the defendant challenged the State’s ability to require drivers to maintain a valid license as unconstitutional. The defendant now challenges, for the first time, the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-24-105(b) “claiming having his license suspended due to failure to pay court costs . . . is not legal under the United States Constitution.” However, because the defendant did not present this challenge to the trial court, he has waived consideration of his claim. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Stewart | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Express Signs Of Cookeville, LLC v. Mary Jane Patterson Lusk, Et Al.
Defendants appeal from the order of the Putnam County Chancery Court denying their Rule 60.02(5) motion to vacate default judgments against them. Because the trial court was correct in denying Appellants’ motion to vacate, we affirm. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Chris Whitney v. First Call Ambulance Service, Et Al.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing a plaintiff-employee’s THRA and TPPA claims against his employer. As to the employee’s THRA claim, the trial court found that the evidence of harassment and discriminatory conduct was not so severe or pervasive so as to establish a hostile work environment. As to the employee’s TPPA claim, the trial court found that the employer had a valid, non-discriminatory reason for termination. Additionally, the trial court found that the employee failed to establish that one of the entities was his employer for purpose of liability under either the THRA or the TPPA. Finding that the employee presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of disputed material fact with regard to his THRA and TPPA claims, we vacate the trial court’s order as to these claims and remand the case to the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry R. Clark, v. James M. Owens, Et Al.
This is an easement case. Appellant, the dominant land owner, appeals the trial court’s order fixing the width of the easement at 15 feet and limiting the use of the easement to residential and emergency ingress, egress, and utilities. The appellate record contains no transcript or statement of the evidence for our review as required by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings. Affirmed and remanded. |
Sequatchie | Court of Appeals | |
Matthew Lange, et al. v. Betty Jo Sullivan, et al.
Appellee’s father, decedent, died testate. Decedent’s will devised real property to Appellee in fee simple but also gave Appellants the right to use the house and curtilage for so long as Appellants’ did not abandon the property for a period of ninety consecutive days. The trial court held that decedent’s will gave Appellants a “license” to use the property—a holding that the parties do not appeal. On Appellee’s complaint for declaratory judgment, the trial court ordered Appellants to pay the mortgage debt, real estate taxes, maintenance, and insurance on the property. Appellants appeal raising the sole question of whether they should be responsible for the mortgage on the property. We hold that, as licensees, Appellants cannot be charged with the mortgage debt. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order as to its holding that Appellants are responsible for the mortgage payments. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed. |
Carroll | Court of Appeals | |
Coffee County Board of Education v. City of Tullahoma
This is one of five cases on appeal to this Court regarding the proper distribution of liquor-by-the-drink tax proceeds between a county and a municipality within the county. In each case, the county had not approved the liquor-by-the-drink sales, but the city had approved such sales. The Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Revenue, who collects taxes on all liquor-by-the-drink sales, distributed tax proceeds to the defendant cities in accordance with the liquor-by-the-drink tax distribution statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 57-4-306. The statute required the recipient cities to then distribute half of their proceeds “in the same manner as the county property tax for schools is expended and distributed.” Tenn. Code. Ann. § 57-4-306(a)(2)(A) (2013). In each case, the recipient city distributed half of its tax proceeds to its own city school system and did not share the proceeds with the county. The counties sued the cities, claiming that the statute required the cities to distribute the tax proceeds as the counties distribute the county property tax for schools, which is pro rata among all schools in the county based on average daily attendance. In the instant case, the trial court granted summary judgment against the county and in favor of the city. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the tax distribution statute plainly required the city to distribute half of its liquor-by-the-drink tax proceeds pro rata among all schools in the county. The city appeals. We agree with the city and hold that the distribution statute directed cities to expend and distribute half of their liquor-by-the-drink tax proceeds for the benefit of the city’s own school system, if any. In this case, because the city has its own school system, it was permitted to use half of its liquor-by-the-drink tax proceeds for its own school system, and it was not required to share those proceeds with the county or the county schools. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the city. |
Coffee | Supreme Court | |
Blount County Board of Education , Et Al. v. City of Maryville, Tennessee, Et Al.
This is one of five cases on appeal to this Court regarding the proper distribution of liquor-by-the-drink tax proceeds between a county and a municipality within the county. In each case, the county had not approved the liquor-by-the-drink sales, but the city had approved such sales. The Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Revenue, who collects taxes on all liquor-by-the-drink sales, distributed tax proceeds to the defendant cities in accordance with the liquor-by-the-drink tax distribution statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 57-4-306. The statute required the recipient cities to then distribute half of their proceeds “in the same manner as the county property tax for schools is expended and distributed.” Tenn. Code. Ann. § 57-4-306(a)(2)(A) (2013). In each case, the recipient city distributed half of its tax proceeds to its own city school system and did not share the proceeds with the county. The counties sued the cities, claiming that the statute required the cities to distribute the tax proceeds as the counties distribute the county property tax for schools, which is pro rata among all schools in the county based on average daily attendance. In the instant case, the trial court granted summary judgment against the county and in favor of the two defendant cities. The county also raised an alternative claim for reimbursement of past liquor-by-the-drink tax proceeds that it had received from private club sales and shared with the cities; the county argued that, if cities were not required to share their tax proceeds, then counties should not be required to do so. The trial court rejected this claim as well and held that the statute required counties to distribute their liquor-by-the-drink tax proceeds pro rata among all schools in the county, even though it did not require the same of cities. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Blount | Supreme Court | |
Bradley County School System, Et Al. v. The City of Cleveland, Tennessee
This is one of five cases on appeal to this Court regarding the proper distribution of liquor-by-the-drink tax proceeds between a county and a municipality within the county. In each case, the county had not approved the liquor-by-the-drink sales, but the city had approved such sales. The Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Revenue, who collects taxes on all liquor-by-the-drink sales, distributed tax proceeds to the defendant cities in accordance with the liquor-by-the-drink tax distribution statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 57-4-306. The statute required the recipient cities to then distribute half of their proceeds “in the same manner as the county property tax for schools is expended and distributed.” Tenn. Code. Ann. § 57-4-306(a)(2)(A) (2013). In each case, the recipient city distributed half of its tax proceeds to its own city school system and did not share the proceeds with the county. The counties sued the cities, claiming that the statute required the cities to distribute the tax proceeds as the counties distribute the county property tax for schools, which is pro rata among all schools in the county based on average daily attendance. In the instant case, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the distribution statute was ambiguous and that the statutory framework, legislative history, and other sources supported the trial court’s interpretation of the statute. We affirm. |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
Sullivan County, Tennessee, Et Al. v. The City of Bristol, Tennessee, Et Al.
This is one of five cases on appeal to this Court regarding the proper distribution of liquor-by-the-drink tax proceeds between a county and a municipality within the county. In each case, the county had not approved the liquor-by-the-drink sales, but the city had approved such sales. The Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Revenue, who collects taxes on all liquor-by-the-drink sales, distributed tax proceeds to the defendant cities in accordance with the liquor-by-the-drink tax distribution statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 57-4-306. The statute required the recipient cities to then distribute half of their proceeds “in the same manner as the county property tax for schools is expended and distributed.” Tenn. Code. Ann. § 57-4-306(a)(2)(A) (2013). In each case, the recipient city distributed half of its tax proceeds to its own city school system and did not share the proceeds with the county. The counties sued the cities, claiming that the statute required the cities to distribute the tax proceeds as the counties distribute the county property tax for schools, which is pro rata among all schools in the county based on average daily attendance. In the instant case, the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant cities. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the distribution statute was ambiguous and that the statutory framework, legislative history, and other sources supported the trial court’s interpretation of the statute. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Supreme Court | |
Washington County School System, Et Al. v. The City of Johnson City, Tennessee
This is one of five cases on appeal to this Court regarding the proper distribution of liquor-by-the-drink tax proceeds between a county and a municipality within the county. In each case, the county had not approved the liquor-by-the-drink sales, but the city had approved such sales. The Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Revenue, who collects taxes on all liquor-by-the-drink sales, distributed tax proceeds to the defendant cities in accordance with the liquor-by-the-drink tax distribution statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 57-4-306. The statute required the recipient cities to then distribute half of their proceeds “in the same manner as the county property tax for schools is expended and distributed.” Tenn. Code. Ann. § 57-4-306(a)(2)(A) (2013). In each case, the recipient city distributed half of its tax proceeds to its own city school system and did not share the proceeds with the county. The counties sued the cities, claiming that the statute required the cities to distribute the tax proceeds as the counties distribute the county property tax for schools, which is pro rata among all schools in the county based on average daily attendance. In the instant case, the trial court held in favor of the county, concluding that the distribution statute was ambiguous and that public policy considerations favored the county’s interpretation. Upon interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. After considering the statutory language, the statutory framework, and the legislative history, it adopted the interpretation of the statute advocated by the city. We agree with the Court of Appeals and hold in favor of the city. |
Washington | Supreme Court | |
Jakeil Malik Waller v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jakeil Malik Waller, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and reckless endangerment and received an effective sentence of twenty-seven years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lashun Gray v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Lashun Gray, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for attempted first degree murder and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received an effective sentence of thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based on: (1) trial counsel’s advice on whether Petitioner should testify at trial; (2) trial and appellate counsels’ failure to object to and appeal the jury instructions pertaining to criminal responsibility for the acts of another; and (3) trial counsel’s failure to properly advise Petitioner regarding the State’s plea offer of twenty-five years with a thirty-percent release eligibility. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jared Worthington
The Defendant, Jared Worthington, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of DUI per se, a Class A misdemeanor, and reckless driving, a Class B misdemeanor, after the State dismissed his DUI by impairment charge. He was sentenced by the trial court to concurrent terms of one day for the reckless driving conviction and 11 months, 29 days for the DUI conviction, suspended to probation after service of ten days in the county jail. On appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues: (1) Whether the trial court erred in its rulings regarding the admission and publication of the dashboard camera video of the Defendant’s arrest; (2) Whether the trial court violated the Tennessee constitution by disparaging the evidence, which took the form of instructing the jury that much of the video was irrelevant; (3) Whether the trial court erred by not allowing defense counsel to question officers about the potential bias created by the fact that the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”) blood alcohol or drug concentration test fee (“BADT”) was collected only in those cases in which a defendant is convicted; and (4) Whether the trial court “shifted the burden of proof,” thereby violating the Defendant’s constitutional due process rights, by asking defense counsel in the presence of the jury whether the Defendant intended to put on any proof. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marvin J. Butler v. First South Financial Credit Union
The plaintiff appeals the summary judgment dismissal of his claims against the defendant bank for discrimination and breach of fiduciary duty. We affirm the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Nathan E.Brooks v. Board of Professional Responsibility
In 1998, the appellant attorney agreed to entry of a consent order suspending his law license for two years. In 2017, the appellant filed this petition for reinstatement of his suspended law license. Instead of the advance cost deposit required by Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 30.4(d)(9), he filed a pauper’s oath and affidavit of indigency. Upon motion of the Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, the hearing panel dismissed the appellant’s petition without prejudice to his ability to file a new petition in compliance with Rule 9. On appeal, the chancery court affirmed. The appellant now appeals to this Court, arguing that a Tennessee statute entitles him to file his petition without paying the advance cost deposit, and also that mandating payment of the advance cost deposit deprives him of his constitutional right to due process. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Nathan E.Brooks v. Board of Professional Responsibility - Concurring In Part and Not Joining In Part
Nathan E. Brooks petitioned to have his law license reinstated. Rather than pay an advance cost deposit under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 30.4(d)(9), Mr. Brooks filed a pauper’s oath and indigency affidavit. A Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel dismissed the petition without prejudice, giving Mr. Brooks the opportunity to refile the petition with a cost deposit. The trial court agreed with the hearing panel and, now, so does the Tennessee Supreme Court. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Jennifer Murray Jewell
The Appellant, Jennifer Murray Jewell, entered a best interest guilty plea to theft of property valued over $60,000, a Class B felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Appellant received a sentence of ten years to be served on supervised probation. After a hearing, the trial court ordered the Appellant to pay $100,000 in restitution by monthly payments of $861.80 during her sentence. On direct appeal, this court held that the State failed to adduce sufficient proof of the victim’s loss; therefore, the case was remanded to the trial court to determine the amount of the victim’s loss and restitution. On remand, the Appellant represented herself at the second restitution hearing. The trial court determined that the victim suffered a total loss of $341,122.65 and ordered restitution of $47,000, to be paid in monthly installments of $500 for the remaining ninety-four months of her probationary sentence. On appeal, the Appellant contends that she was denied her right to counsel at the second restitution hearing and that the trial court failed to consider her ability to pay in determining the amount of restitution. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marcus Rhodes v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Marcus Rhodes, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged the validity of his guilty pleas to attempted second degree murder, reckless endangerment, three counts of aggravated assault, and two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective ten-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel and the trial court misinformed him regarding his potential sentencing exposure if convicted at trial. We conclude that the Petitioner has waived this issue, and we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jacob Smith
The Defendant, Jacob Smith, was convicted of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”) and leaving the scene of an accident. He received an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended after five days of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his DUI conviction. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wayne Holloway, Et Al. v. Tanasi Shores Owners Association, Et Al.
Wayne Holloway and Jerry Brewington (“Plaintiffs”) appeal the April 20, 2018 order of the Chancery Court for Sumner County (“the Trial Court”) finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiffs, not Tanasi Shores Owners Association and Timmons Property, Inc. (“Defendants”), are responsible for maintenance and repair of decks connected to their respective condominium units. We find and hold that Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-27-303 applies and that, pursuant to the declaration, decks and porches are part of the condominium unit, not common areas, making Plaintiffs responsible for maintenance and repair of the decks connected to their respective condominium units. We affirm the Trial Court’s April 20, 2018 order. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Chad James Powell v. Tennessee Department of Correction, Et Al.
An inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) filed this action in the Circuit Court for Davidson County seeking monetary damages from the State of Tennessee for injuries caused by “negligent acts or omissions” of TDOC employees acting “within the scope of their employment” in regard to a prison disciplinary hearing. The State filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the Tennessee Claims Commission had exclusive jurisdiction over the inmate’s monetary claims. The inmate responded by filing a motion to transfer the case to the Claims Commission. The trial court denied the motion to transfer and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |