Rita Faye Hurst v. Claiborne County Hospital and Nursing Home et al.
An employee sued for workers’ compensation benefits alleging two distinct injuries on different dates: physical injuries sustained in a work-related motor vehicle collision in 2001 and mental injuries from an incident involving a severely abused infant in 2000. The employee settled her mental injury claim. The trial court’s judgment approving the settlement included future medical benefits for the employee’s mental injuries, but none for physical injuries related to the collision. Nine years later, the employee filed a motion to compel medical benefits for her physical injuries related to the collision. The trial court, in an order referencing this case (#13,393) and a later-filed case (#15,665), ordered the employer to provide medical benefits for the employee’s physical injuries. In a separate order, the trial court awarded the employee her attorney fees and costs. We vacate the trial court’s orders, finding that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to compel medical benefits for the employee’s physical injuries. |
Claiborne | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Randy Louis Roe
A jury convicted the Defendant, Randy Louis Roe, of three counts of rape of a child, one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, two counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, and one count of solicitation to commit rape of a child. He received an effective sentence of thirty-five years in prison. A few days prior to trial, the State alerted the Defendant to the existence of voluminous documents consisting of emails between the Defendant and the victim which had not previously been produced in discovery. The Defendant sought a continuance. The trial court denied the continuance but ruled that the new materials would not be admissible unless the Defendant “opened the door” during his testimony. On appeal, the Defendant seeks a new trial based on the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of the emails. After a thorough review of the record, we discern no error and affirm the judgments. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
City of Church Hill v. Roger Elliott
Roger Elliott (“Elliott”) appeals the January 23, 2018 order of the Circuit Court for Hawkins County (“the Trial Court”) holding that Elliott had violated Church Hill Municipal Ordinance No. 11-101 and assessing a civil penalty of $25.00 against Elliott for the violation. We find and hold that the evidence in the record on appeal does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s finding that Elliott violated Church Hill Municipal Ordinance No. 11-101. We, therefore, affirm |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Christian S.
At issue in this appeal is the custody of an 8-year-old boy. On one side is his maternal grandmother and her husband, who have raised the child since he was one year old, pursuant to a court order placing him in their custody. On the other side is the child’s father, who was incarcerated at the time the child was placed with his grandparents. When the father was released from incarceration, he filed a petition seeking visitation with the child; over the course of proceedings, he sought custody of the child. The juvenile court awarded custody to the father, holding that the he did not forfeit his superior parental rights and that the grandparents did not prove that the child would suffer substantial harm in the father’s care and custody. The grandparents appeal; finding no error, we affirm the judgment. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Linda Anne Dunavant
The Defendant, Linda Anne Dunavant, was convicted of aggravated assault and filing a false police report and sentenced, respectively, to terms of three years and two years, to be served concurrently. On appeal, she argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction for aggravated assault, and that the court erred in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Luis G. Mendoza v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Luis G. Mendoza, appeals the Henderson County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his motion for writ of error coram nobis. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the lower court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken. Accordingly, we affirm the summary dismissal of the motion. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brandon Burks, et al. v. Savannah Industrial Development Corporation of the City of Savannah, Tennessee
Appellants, owners of property near a proposed industrial park site, appeal the trial court’s grant of Appellee Savannah Industrial Development Corporation’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion. Appellants sought a declaratory judgment precluding the City of Savannah and, specifically, its industrial development corporation, from purchasing land outside the city’s corporate limits for development of an industrial park for the benefit of both the city and Hardin County. The trial court applied the Industrial Development Corporations Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-53-101, et seq. and the Industrial Park Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-16-201, et seq. and found that there was no prohibition against the industrial development corporation’s actions. The trial court, therefore, granted the industrial development corporation’s motion to dismiss and awarded the corporation its attorney’s fees under Tennessee Code Annotated section 20- 12-119(c)(1). Because the industrial development corporation is a “governmental entity,” we hold that the trial court was precluded from awarding attorney’s fees under Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-119(c). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald Dana Harper v. Annette Carrol Harper
This is a divorce case. Husband appeals the trial court’s classification of three tracts of land as Wife’s separate property and its valuation of Husband’s bank account. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Steven Blocker v. Powell Valley Electric Cooperative, et al.
Charles Steven Blocker (“Employee”) sustained a compensable injury to his cervical spine while working for Powell Valley Electric Cooperative (“Employer”) in November 2010. After returning to work, Employee suffered a second, gradual injury to his cervical spine in January 2013, which rendered him permanently and totally disabled. Employee filed an action against Employer and the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Second Injury Fund (“the Fund”). The trial court initially found Employee’s 2013 injury caused 9% vocational disability and apportioned 9% of the award to Employer and 91% to the Fund. After the Fund appealed, the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel remanded the case for the trial court “to reassess Employee’s 2013 vocational disability” and “to make the appropriate assignment of the award to Employer and the Fund.” On remand, the trial court found the 2013 injury caused 20% vocational disability and apportioned 20% of the award to Employer and 80% to the Fund. The Fund again appeals, asserting the trial court incorrectly apportioned the award. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Claiborne | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher C. Solomon
The Defendant, Christopher C. Solomon, entered an open guilty plea to aggravated vehicular homicide, aggravated vehicular assault, and leaving the scene of an accident. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty-three years and imposed a restriction banning the Defendant from driving for life. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence and erred in imposing a lifetime ban from driving. We conclude that the Defendant’s sentence is not excessive but that the trial court erred in imposing the lifetime driving ban. Accordingly, we remand for entry of a corrected judgment for the Defendant’s aggravated vehicular homicide conviction to reflect that the Defendant’s license is to be revoked in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-50-501(a)(1). We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nikia Bowens
A jury convicted Defendant, Nikia Bowens, of six counts of theft of property under the value of $500 and burglary in case number 105992, and of theft of property under the value of $500 and burglary in case number 106786. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve a total effective sentence of eighteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction for his convictions in both cases. On appeal, Defendant does not challenge the theft convictions, but asserts that his burglary convictions violate the principles of due process under the Tennessee and United States Constitutions because Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-402(a)(3) is unconstitutionally vague and does not provide defendants fair warning that they can be prosecuted for burglary if they commit or attempt to commit a felony, theft or assault after entering a building open to the public knowing that the property owner has revoked its consent for them to enter. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we conclude that subsection 39-14- 402(a)(3) is not vague, that the word “building” in subsection -402(a)(3) is not ambiguous, and that Defendant’s due process rights were not violated by his burglary convictions. Thus, we affirm Defendant’s convictions, but remand for correction of judgments. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jason Kane Ivey
Jason Kane Ivey, Defendant, was convicted following a jury trial of two counts of misdemeanor theft based on alternative theories and one count of Class D felony burglary. The trial court merged the theft conviction in Count 3 into the theft conviction in Count 2 and then merged the theft conviction in Count 2 into the burglary conviction in Count 1 and sentenced Defendant to serve four years as a Range II multiple offender. Defendant claims that his burglary conviction “violated constitutional due process protections” because Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-402 is unconstitutionally vague and subsection 39-14-402(a)(3) failed to give him fair warning that his conduct was forbidden by the burglary statute. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and applicable law, we hold that Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-402 is not unconstitutionally vague and that subsection 39-14-402(a)(3) provided fair warning to a person of common intelligence that a person could be convicted of burglary for committing theft after entering a building open to the public, knowing the owner had revoked its effective consent for the person to enter. We affirm the judgments of conviction. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Natascha B
A father appeals the termination of parental rights to his daughter. The juvenile court found three statutory grounds for termination: abandonment by willful failure to visit, abandonment by willful failure to support, and substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plans. The court also found that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. On appeal, DCS declines to defend the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit. We conclude that the evidence was less than clear and convincing as to all of the statutory grounds found with respect to the father. Thus, we reverse the termination of the father’s parental rights |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
Bank of America v. Calvin Dee Aycock, et al.
This is a detainer action in which the plaintiff bank was awarded a judgment of possession of the defendant’s property in general sessions court. The defendant refused to vacate the property and appealed to the circuit court. The plaintiff bank sought summary judgment. The circuit court granted the motion for summary judgment and upheld the foreclosure sale. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John D. Henry
The Appellant, John D. Henry, was convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court of driving under the influence (DUI) per se, fifth offense, and driving on a revoked license and received an effective two-year sentence to be served as 150 days in jail with the remainder to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to grant his motions to suppress evidence because his warrantless stop did not fall under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement and because he did not voluntarily consent to his warrantless blood draw. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
KT Group, LLC v. Robert Lowe Et Al.
This case involves a property dispute regarding a fifty-foot strip of land that was historically used for railroad purposes. KT Group, LLC (plaintiff) filed an action to quiet title, naming Robert Lowe and his wife, Velma Lowe, as defendants. Each side claims to own the strip of land in fee simple absolute. The trial court determined that plaintiff owned the land in fee simple. Defendants appealed. We affirm. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: L.U.S.
In this termination of parental rights case, C.J.S. and K.R.S. (petitioners) filed a joint petition for adoption and petition to terminate the rights of C.C.S. (father) and W.J.N.R. (mother) with respect to their only child, L.U.S. Father joined the petition as a copetitioner, consenting to the termination of his rights and to the adoption of the child. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to terminate mother and father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support and abandonment by failure to visit. By the same quantum of proof, the court found that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. Mother appeals the trial court’s order terminating her rights. We vacate the court’s findings with respect to the ground of abandonment by failure to support; nevertheless, we affirm the court’s order terminating mother’s rights because there is clear and convincing evidence that termination is supported by the ground of abandonment by failure to visit and is in the best interest of L.U.S. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel James Finstad v. Jessica Ann Calfee Finstad
In this action for divorce, alimony was the only remaining issue at trial. After the hearing, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce declaring that wife is an economically disadvantaged spouse pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(f) and that husband is able to pay her alimony. The court held that there was no proof that wife was underemployed and no proof she could be rehabilitated; it therefore awarded wife alimony in futuro. We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding wife alimony in futuro. We modify the trial court’s judgment so as to provide wife transitional alimony. As modified, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. We remand this case to the trial court with instructions. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
McArthur Bobo v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, McArthur Bobo, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he was deprived of his right to a full and complete hearing on his motion for new trial because the trial court confused his case with another case, that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, and that his due process rights were violated by the fact that he never received the statement of a key witness. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stephano Lee Weilacker
Following a jury trial in the Montgomery County Circuit Court, Defendant, Stephano Lee Weilacker, was found guilty of especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery for his role in a criminal episode at the Triangle Kwick Stop (Triangle Market) in Montgomery County. He received an effective sentence of twenty years to be served consecutively to a sentence received for another aggravated robbery. This is the fourth time the direct appeal has been before this court. Per the order of the Tennessee Supreme Court granting Defendant’s Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 application, we address three issues in this opinion: (1) plenary review of Defendant’s assertion that his motion to suppress evidence should have been granted by the trial court, (2) plenary review of Defendant’s issue that he is entitled to a new trial because of improper closing arguments by the prosecutor; and (3) plain error review of Defendant’s issue wherein he asserts that the trial court caused a reversible constructive amendment to the especially aggravated kidnapping count, and that there was a fatal variance between the proof and the allegations in the indictment. Following a thorough review, we reverse the judgments and remand for a new trial. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stephano Lee Weilacker - concurring in part and dissenting in part
I agree with majority’s conclusion that after plenary review, Defendant is not entitled to relief on the suppression issues regarding his detention and arrest. I further agree with the majority’s conclusion that Defendant is not entitled to plain error relief on the indictment issue. However, I respectfully disagree that Defendant is entitled to a new trial for statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Rich v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, James Rich, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition. Petitioner argues that his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a review of the briefs of the parties and the entire record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Campbell | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lee A. Beaman v. Kelley Speer Beaman
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, from the denial of a motion for judicial recusal filed by Kelley Speer Beaman (“Wife”) in the parties’ high profile divorce proceedings. Having reviewed the Petition for Recusal Appeal filed by Wife, together with the supplement to the Petition and the response in opposition to the Petition filed by Lee A. Beaman (“Husband”), we conclude that the Trial Judge should have granted the motion. The Trial Judge in this case conducted an independent investigation into the facts surrounding how and when Wife’s Trial Brief came into the possession of the online media outlet known as Scoop: Nashville, and his comments on the record regarding the results of his investigation create an appearance of prejudice against Wife and her counsel that require the Trial Judge’s recusal. We therefore reverse the order of the Trial Court and remand the case for reassignment to a different judge. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Darry Osborne v. Starrun, Inc., et al.
A truck driver, whose employer had no workers’ compensation insurance coverage, was injured after falling from his employer’s truck while tarping a load of goods at a manufacturer’s facility. The truck driver filed a workers’ compensation claim against the manufacturer, asserting that the manufacturer was the truck driver’s statutory employer under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-113 (2014 & Supp. 2017). The Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims granted the manufacturer’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the truck driver failed to establish that the manufacturer undertook work for an entity other than itself, retained the right of control over the conduct of the work, or that the truck driver’s conduct in tarping the load was part of the manufacturer’s regular business or the same type of work usually performed by its employees. After review, we affirm. |
Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Julie Ann Kendle v. Matthew Davis Kendle, Et Al.
This appeal arises from an Order for Conditional Judgment to enforce a routine garnishment of an obligor’s wages. The dispositive issue is whether an employer of an obligor has an affirmative duty to determine whether the aggregate amount of wages to be garnished from an obligor’s multiple employers exceeds the aggregate disposable earnings limits provided in Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-106. An employer of the obligor, Blue Shield EMS (“Blue Shield”), was served with a garnishment while a pre-existing wage assignment of the obligor’s wages from another employer was still in effect. Although none of the obligor’s wages from Blue Shield had been previously garnished, Blue Shield filed an answer to the garnishment stating, “We cannot process any deductions from [the obligor’s] paycheck at this time due to his total income already being garnished greater than 25%.” Upon motion of the obligor’s former wife for a conditional judgment, the trial court found that “Blue Shield did not have a valid legal reason for failing to withhold twenty-five percent (25%) of the employee’s net wages” and ordered Blue Shield to pay into the court the wages that should have been garnished and to honor the garnishment going forward until the judgment was satisfied. Having determined that an employer has no duty to consider the aggregate effect of garnishments served on other employers when answering a garnishment, we affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals |