David Cody Watkins v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, David Cody Watkins, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Weakley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus Latrail Easley
The defendant, Marcus Latrail Easley, appeals from the Weakley County Circuit Court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Weakley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cleo Henderson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Cleo Henderson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. The petitioner also asserts the trial court erred in finding he waived his right to testify during trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition and conclude the petitioner affirmatively waived his right to testify at trial. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tina Gregg, Et Al. v. Shawn Smoot
Defendant in wrongful death action appeals the judgment entered against him in favor of the mother and personal representative of the decedent’s estate. Over the course of the litigation, the defendant failed to comply with multiple orders to compel discovery, and as a result, the court entered a judgment by default in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 37.02. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Amy Wiseman Bowen v. William S. Wiseman, II
This case involves a post-divorce modification of a parenting plan. Father petitioned the court seeking equal parenting time and major decision-making authority with respect to decisions involving the child’s education, non-emergency healthcare, and extracurricular activities. Mother filed a counter-petition seeking additional parenting time and exclusive major decision-making authority. Mother also asked the trial court to clarify the meaning of several terms in the parties’ parenting plan. The parties’ disagreement concerning the meaning of several terms had prompted ongoing conflict. The trial court found that there had been a material change in circumstances and that modification of the parties’ parenting plan was in the child’s best interest. The trial court modified the parties’ parenting plan, awarding Mother additional parenting time. However, the trial court ordered that major-decision making authority in the areas of non-emergency healthcare, extracurricular activities, and religious upbringing remain joint. The trial court also awarded Mother a portion of her attorney’s fees. Father timely appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and award Mother her attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Pate
The Defendant, Timothy Pate, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, tampering with evidence, and abuse of a corpse. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202, -16-503, -17-312. The trial court merged the two first degree murder convictions and imposed a total effective sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant contends that he was denied his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury because a written juror question demonstrated that one of the jurors had “a decided prejudice and bias” against the Defendant. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Carter | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Jarrett P. Et Al.
In this action, the trial court terminated the appellant mother’s parental rights to her three children upon the court’s finding that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the statutory grounds of (1) abandonment by willful failure to visit, (2) abandonment by willful failure to financially support, and (3) severe child abuse. The court also determined by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the best interest of the children. The mother has timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Apex R.
This appeal arises from the termination of a father’s parental rights. John C. and Kellee C. (“Petitioners”), uncle and aunt respectively of Apex R. (“the Child”), filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate Dustin R. (“Father”)’s parental rights to the Child. After a trial, the Trial Court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights on the grounds of willful failure to visit and support. The Trial Court found also that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest, all by clear and convincing evidence. Father appeals, arguing among other things that the Trial Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide the case under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“the UCCJEA”) because the Juvenile Court for Jefferson County, Alabama (“the Alabama Court”) made the initial custody determination, the Child’s mother remained in Alabama, and the Alabama Court never relinquished its exclusive and continuing jurisdiction. We hold that the Trial Court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the termination petition. We hold further that grounds for termination were proven by clear and convincing evidence and that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Bonnie Harmon, et al. v. Hickman Community Healthcare Services, Inc.
This suit was brought by the children of a woman who died while incarcerated at Hickman County Jail. Defendant is a contractor of the jail that provides medical services at the jail; a nurse in Defendant’s employment treated the decedent for symptoms of drug and alcohol withdrawal. She passed away shortly after. The children brought this suit under the Health Care Liability Act claiming negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. In due course, Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that there was not a genuine issue of material fact as to causation and it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that element of Plaintiffs’ claim; the trial court granted Defendant’s motion and subsequently denied a motion to revise, filed by the Plaintiffs. This appeal followed. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Bonnie Harmon, et al. v. Hickman Community Healthcare Services, Inc. - dissenting
This suit was brought by the children of a woman who died while incarcerated at Hickman County Jail. Defendant is a contractor of the jail that provides medical services at the jail; a nurse in Defendant’s employment treated the decedent for symptoms of drug and alcohol withdrawal. She passed away shortly after. The children brought this suit under the Health Care Liability Act claiming negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. In due course, Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that there was not a genuine issue of material fact as to causation and it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that element of Plaintiffs’ claim; the trial court granted Defendant’s motion and subsequently denied a motion to revise, filed by the Plaintiffs. This appeal followed. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Rashad Dewayne Seay, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
A Wilson County jury convicted Rashad Dewayne Seay, Jr. (“the Petitioner”) of two counts of sale of a Schedule II controlled substance. Following the voluntary dismissal of his direct appeal, the Petitioner filed a pro se post-conviction petition, which the postconviction court dismissed as time-barred. Upon review, we conclude that the petition was timely filed, and therefore, reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Keith Austin
A Shelby County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Keith Austin, for attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The Defendant was sentenced to twenty-six years’ incarceration as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions of attempted second degree murder and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerome Edwin Lockridge
The Appellant, Jerome Edwin Lockridge, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of attempted aggravated burglary, a Class D felony, and misdemeanor vandalism and received an effective four-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his attempted aggravated burglary conviction because the State failed to prove that he entered the habitation with the intent to commit theft. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ramey Michelle Long
The Appellant, Ramey Michelle Long, was convicted by a jury of the Class A misdemeanors driving under the influence (DUI); DUI, second offense; possession of marijuana; and possession of drug paraphernalia. The Appellant was also convicted of the Class C misdemeanors speeding and violating the open container law. The trial court merged the DUI convictions and imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for each Class A misdemeanor and thirty days for each Class C misdemeanor. The court ordered the sentence for the DUI conviction to be served consecutively to the remaining sentences, which were to be served concurrently. The trial court further approved of the fines imposed by the jury, which were the maximum allowable for each offense, for a total of $8,600. On appeal, the Appellant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction of DUI, second offense; (2) the trial court erred by denying her motions to suppress; (3) the trial court erred by preventing her from introducing her pharmaceutical records, medical records, hardware taken from her back during surgery, and a hand-drawn chart concerning the therapeutic levels of her medication; (4) the trial court erred by admitting still photographs taken from a video; (5) the trial court failed to dismiss the speeding charge because it was not included in the indictment; (6) the trial court erred in sentencing; and (7) the trial court erred in revoking her bond pending appeal. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court erred by imposing a thirty-day sentence for violating the open container law; accordingly, the case must be remanded for correction of the judgment of conviction to reflect that the punishment is a $50 fine. Further, on remand the judgment of conviction for speeding must be vacated and dismissed. We affirm the trial court’s judgments in all other respects. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Leigh Ann Urbanavage, et al. v. Capital Bank, et al.
Homeowners in housing development brought suit against their homeowners association, its directors and the bank that assumed management of the development after the developers defaulted on their loans used to finance the development; the homeowners sought damages and other relief arising from the defendants’ alleged failure to fulfill their obligations to properly maintain the subdivision. Plaintiffs asserted claims for tortious interference with their contract rights, breach of fiduciary duties, invalid liens, and slander of title. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the various claims, and plaintiffs appeal. We reverse the grant of summary judgment to the bank on plaintiffs’ claim of tortious interference, and to the homeowners association on its counterclaim for recovery of delinquent assessments; we vacate the award of counsel fees to the association and the order quashing the notice of deposition of a director of the association and the association’s counsel; in all other respects we affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nicholas J. Alberts
The Defendant, Nicholas J. Alberts, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1, Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Justin Daniel Loines v. State of Tennessee
The pro se Petitioner, Justin Daniel Loines, appeals the dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief as time-barred. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court summarily dismissing the petition on the basis that it was filed almost six years after the judgment became final and that the Petitioner failed to show any grounds to warrant that the statute of limitations be tolled. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Chase L.
In this termination of parental rights case, the trial court terminated Mother’s rights on the grounds of (1) abandonment by willful failure to visit; (2) abandonment by wanton disregard; (3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; (4) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; and (5) persistent conditions. In its brief, DCS conceded that it cannot defend the grounds of failure to establish a suitable home and persistent conditions. As such, we reverse as to the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and persistent conditions. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in all other respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Katherine Taylor
The Defendant, Katherine Taylor, was convicted of attempted first-degree murder and sentenced to 18 years as a Range I offender. On appeal, she argues that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the victim’s history of drug use and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
E. Louis Thomas v. Grady Perry, Warden
The pro se Petitioner, E. Louis Thomas, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenneth O. Williams v. Grady Perry, Warden
The pro se Petitioner, Kenneth O. Williams, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
IN RE KEILYN O. ET AL.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to two children. The juvenile court found six statutory grounds for termination and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. We conclude that the evidence was less than clear and convincing as to one of the statutory grounds and that two other statutory grounds did not apply in this instance. But the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support three grounds for termination and that termination is in the children’s best interest. So we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE KEILYN O. ET AL. - concurring
I concur fully in the majority’s opinion in this case. I write separately solely to express my opinion that inasmuch as the majority opinion relies on this Court’s decision in In re Ayden S., No. M2017-01185-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 2447044, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2018), for the standard of proof concerning Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(14) (2017), I believe that this statutory ground allows termination of parental rights if the petitioner proves by clear and convincing evidence that the parent “has failed to meet the requirement of manifesting both a willingness and an ability to assume legal and physical custody of the child or has failed to meet the requirement of manifesting both a willingness and an ability to assume financial responsibility of the child.” See In re Amynn K., No. E2017-01866-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 3058280, at *12-15 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018); see also In re Neamiah R., No. E2017-02000-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 2331868, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2018). |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
LaSonya Robertson v. Clarksville-Montgomery County School System
This is a slip-and-fall case. A middle school teacher injured herself when she fell in the hallway outside her classroom on a wet floor. A custodian had been mopping the hallway prior to her fall, and the teacher alleged that the custodians had negligently and misleadingly placed wet-floor signs on the opposite side of the hallway, which did not warn her of the wet floor on her side of the hallway. Thereafter, the teacher brought suit against the school district pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. Following a bench trial, the trial court found the custodians guilty of negligence and assigned seventy-five percent of the fault to the school district and twenty-five percent of the fault to the teacher. A judgment was entered against the school district in the amount of $180,000.00, after reduction for the teacher’s comparative fault. The school district appeals, contending (1) that it is immune from suit; (2) that it was not negligent; and (3) that any negligence it may have committed is outweighed by that of the teacher’s comparative fault. The teacher argues that the trial court erred in assigning any of the fault to her. We affirm in part and reverse in part |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
LaSonya Robertson v. Clarksville-Montgomery County School System - Dissent
I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion in this case. The evidence presented at trial indicates that the school system’s “mopping policy” was actually part of a larger “Departmental Safety Program” directed toward all Clarksville-Montgomery County School System employees. For the “Custodial Department,” the program provided, “[w]hen mopping floors, cleaning up spills, or anytime the floor becomes wet for whatever reason, always put the wet floor signs out until the area is completely dry.” For “Professional Staff,” the program provided, “[a]lways pay close attention to wet floor signs or wet floor conditions to avoid slips and falls.” |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals |