Opinions
In re: Rader Bonding Company - dissenting
I dissent from the majority’s holding that the trial court erred in denying Rader Bonding Company’s motion for exoneration and in denying the motion to alter or amend the judgment of forfeiture. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Paul Brent Baxter v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Paul Brent Baxter, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. Within the context of his post-conviction claims, the petitioner argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State asking the victim to compare her pain level as a result of the petitioner’s assault to the pain she experienced at other points in her life. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Raleigh Commons, Inc. v. SWH, LLC, et al.
This action, which involves payment of a promissory note, was previously appealed to this Court and subsequently remanded to the trial court due to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. Following remand, the trial court conducted a hearing regarding the disputed issue of the reasonableness of attorney’s fees paid. Determining that the amount of fees paid was reasonable, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Dr. Joseph Weinstein, the note holder and the appellee herein. Dr. Stevan Himmelstein, one of the parties found to be liable on the note, has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In re: Rader Bonding Company
In this appeal, we must determine whether the Appellant, Rader Bonding Company (“Rader”), remained obligated as surety for the $7,500 bond set for the Defendant, Saul Aldaba-Arriaga, for a charge of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”), second offense, and his $2,500 bond for a charge of driving on a revoked license when the State later obtained an indictment that increased the severity of the Defendant’s misdemeanor charge of DUI second offense to a felony charge of DUI fourth offense and included additional charges. After the Defendant failed to appear in court on the indicted charges, the trial court initiated forfeiture proceedings and entered a final judgment of forfeiture against the Defendant and Rader following a hearing. We conclude that based on the specific and unique circumstances of this case, Rader’s obligation under the bonding agreement for the $7,500 bond on the Defendant’s DUI second offense charge in general sessions court did not extend to the indicted charge of DUI fourth offense and that as a result, the trial court erred in entering a judgment of final forfeiture against Rader on the $7,500 bond. We further conclude that Rader’s obligation for the $2,500 bond on the Defendant’s charge of driving on a revoked license in general sessions court continued when the Defendant was indicted for the same offense and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rader’s request for exoneration. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and this case is remanded for further proceeding in accordance with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Doe By His Next Friend Jane Doe, Et Al. v. Brentwood Academy Inc., Et Al.
This Tenn. R. App. P. 9 application for permission to appeal concerns whether portions of a trial court order and a transcript, both of which reference Plaintiff Jane Doe’s medical history, should be placed under seal. Pursuant to an October 2, 2018 order of remand from this court in Appeal No. M2018-01611-COA-R10-CV1, the trial court determined that portions of the documents should be redacted but that certain portions of the transcript and order which include references to Jane Doe’s medical history should not be placed under seal. The trial court subsequently granted Jane Doe and John Doe permission to appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We concur with the trial court that this is an appropriate case for an interlocutory appeal. Furthermore, because the application and answer fully set forth the parties’ positions and the material facts, we dispense with further briefing and oral argument and proceed to the merits of the appeal in order to save the parties additional time and expense. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Memphis Light, Gas, and Water
Plaintiff/Appellant Nationwide appeals the trial court’s grant of Defendant/Appellee’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Defendant’s motion was based on the argument that Plaintiff’s claim was time-barred pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, and that Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119 did not allow Plaintiff to timely add Defendant to the suit. Because we conclude that the trial court incorrectly applied Tennessee’s comparative fault statute, we reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carl Allen aka Artie Perkins
The Appellant, Carl Allen, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s granting a motion filed by the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) to intervene in this case and the court’s vacating a portion of a previous order in which the court determined that the Appellant was required to register as a sexual offender as opposed to a violent sexual offender in the TBI’s sexual offender registry (SOR). Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the appeal must be dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
LaFarge North America v. Warren Mills, et al.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee, finding that the guaranty agreement Appellant executed was enforceable. At the time Appellant executed the guaranty, Choctaw II, LLC (“Choctaw”), a company of which Appellant was a member, owed approximately $275,000.00 to Appellee on an open credit line, which was guaranteed by William Carrier, another owner of Choctaw. Mr. Carrier filed bankruptcy, and Appellee closed the open credit line for lack of guaranty. In an effort to continue to purchase materials from Appellee, Appellant signed a guaranty. After Appellant signed the guaranty, Appellee sold an additional $75,000 worth of goods to Choctaw, and Choctaw paid Appellee approximately $79,000 after Appellant signed the guaranty. Appellee applied these payments to the $275,000 balance and then sought payment for the $75,000 in goods from Appellant. The trial court held that Appellee properly applied the payments to the older debt. We hold that the guaranty agreement is enforceable. However, as to the application of the payments, we hold that Appellee was required to apply the $79,000 to the debt guaranteed by Appellant. Because the payments were sufficient to pay off the $75,000 in goods, Appellant owes nothing to Appellee under the guaranty and is entitled to summary judgment. Reversed and remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Appellant. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah Hart v. Memphis Light, Gas, & Water Division
The parties dispute whether, under Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-15-710, the applicable statute of limitations was tolled by service of process when no proof of service was returned to the court as required under Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-15-902(a). Under the holding in Fair v. Cochran, 418 S.W.3d 542 (Tenn. 2013), we conclude, as did the trial court, that Appellee’s failure to make return to the court did not, ipso facto, constitute a lack of service of process such that the statute of limitations expired. Affirmed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Arvester Brown
The Defendant, Arvester Brown, appeals his convictions for felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial due to the behavior of one of the State’s witnesses; (2) the trial court erred in excluding evidence that the victim had agreed to carry out a “hit” on the Defendant; and (3) the State made improper statements during closing arguments. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Proffitt
The Defendant, Joseph Proffitt, was convicted of two counts of attempted second degree murder, three counts of aggravated assault, and two counts of employing a firearm during the attempted murders. He received an effective sentence of fourteen years. On appeal, the Defendant challenges only his convictions for attempted second degree murder, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdicts. Upon reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald Lyndon Madewell
The Defendant, Donald Lyndon Madewell, was convicted by a jury of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine. On appeal, he challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, asserting that he lacked common authority over the hotel room and could not provide valid consent to search. He also alleges that evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bruce Elliott v. State of Tennessee
The pro se Petitioner, Bruce Elliott, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Trousdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jacob Erwin Branch
The Defendant, Jacob Erwin Branch, was convicted by a Marshall County jury of two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of twenty-eight years at 100% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his child rape convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we note the verdict forms indicate the jury found the Defendant not guilty on the charges of rape and aggravated sexual battery, but the judgment forms indicate those charges were dismissed. We therefore remand for entry of corrected judgment forms as to these charges. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joan Elizabeth Hall v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Joan Elizabeth Hall, appeals the denial of her petition for a writ of error coram nobis based upon newly discovered evidence. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the error coram nobis court’s judgment. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Domnick Doria v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Domnick Doria, appeals from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because (1) original counsel forced the Petitioner to participate in a television interview prior to trial that caused the State to “cut off” plea negotiations; and (2) trial counsel failed to call the Petitioner’s mother and his ex-wife to testify at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post conviction court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Westley A. Albright
The Defendant, Westley A. Albright, pled nolo contendere to one count of solicitation of a minor, a Class E felony, and was placed on judicial diversion, with a one-year probationary term. As part of his plea-agreement, the Defendant was required to register as a sex offender and to participate in sex offender treatment. After the Defendant was discharged from his treatment program for noncompliance, the Defendant’s probation officer filed a Diversion Violation Report. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s diversion, adjudicated the Defendant guilty, extended the Defendant’s probation by six months, and ordered the Defendant to attend and complete sex offender therapy. The Defendant appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We granted the Defendant’s application for permission to appeal in order to determine whether the Defendant’s due process rights were violated because he was not specifically informed in conjunction with his nolo contendere plea that his judicial diversion could be revoked if he refused to admit certain facts during his sex offender treatment. We hold that due process does not require a sex offender placed on judicial diversion with a probationary period to be informed specifically in conjunction with his plea that his judicial diversion and probation may be revoked if he is discharged from sex offender treatment due to his refusal to acknowledge that he committed the elements of the offense to which he pled. Accordingly, we affirm the courts below. |
Dickson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Westley A. Albright - Dissenting
Westley Albright, with the trial court’s consent, entered a nolo contendere plea to the charge of solicitation of a minor without being required to admit his guilt. The trial court granted Albright judicial diversion with one year of probation. Albright complied with all the stated conditions of his diversion. He attended and participated in all scheduled treatment group meetings, paid for sex offender treatment, and underwent an assessment. Albright even took a lie-detector test. Yet the trial court revoked Albright’s diversion, convicted him of solicitation of a minor, and extended his probation by six months, because of his noncompliance with an unstated condition of diversion. This unstated condition was that Albright had to admit during treatment that he was guilty of solicitation. Because he would not or could not make this forced admission, Albright’s therapist discharged him from the treatment program, and the trial court revoked his diversion. |
Dickson | Supreme Court | |
Victor Thompson v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Victor Thompson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition. Petitioner argues that he was denied the right to testify at trial, and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a Momon hearing. Following a review of the briefs of the parties and the entire record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Darrell Malone v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Darrell Malone, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2016 conviction for attempt to commit rape and his four-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by determining that his petition was untimely. We reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for consideration of the issues raised in the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rodricus Antwan Johnson
Rodricus Antwan Johnson, Movant, filed a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion seeking correction of what he claimed was an illegal sentence because the trial court applied enhancement factors that were required by Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) to be determined by the jury. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion for failure to state a colorable claim. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dwight Mitchell v. State of Tennessee, Department of Health
Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action in 2017, seeking to have the chancery court invalidate two final orders entered against him by the Tennessee Department of Health, one entered in 2008, revoking his license to operate a residential home for the aged, and the second entered in 2011, placing him on the Tennessee Abuse Registry. Upon the Department’s motion, the chancellor dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, for failure to timely seek review under the Administrative Procedures Act, and on the basis of res judicata. The plaintiff appeals; on our de novo review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for failure to comply with the judicial review provisions set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Gaberiel S. Et Al.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his four children. The juvenile court found five statutory grounds for termination: (1) abandonment by willful failure to support; (2) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; (4) persistence of conditions; and (5) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial responsibility of the children. The court also found that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. We affirm. |
DeKalb | Court of Appeals | |
Johnny McClain, Jr. v. Tennessee Board of Parole, Et Al.
This is an appeal from the dismissal of an inmate’s petition for common law writ of certiorari. The Tennessee Board of Parole denied petitioner parole, citing the seriousness of the offense, the substantial risk that petitioner would not conform to the conditions of his release, the adverse effect his release would have on institutional discipline, and his need to complete therapeutic community. Petitioner appealed the Board’s decision by petition for writ of certiorari. The petition was dismissed by the trial court, which found that the petitioner had failed to present any facts that would support a claim that the Board acted illegally, fraudulently, arbitrarily, or in excess of their jurisdiction. This appeal followed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Windell Middleton v. City of Millington, Tennessee
The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant city on the basis of the expiration of the statute of limitations. Specifically, the trial court ruled that plaintiff’s complaint was ineffective to toll the statute of limitations where service of process on the city clerk did not comply with Rule 4.04(8) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and process was not reissued. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |