In Re Billy T.W. et al.
In this parental termination action, we conclude that the trial court properly found clear and convincing evidence to terminate the rights of the mother and father on the grounds of failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, and persistence of conditions. We conclude that the trial court erred in terminating the father’s rights on the ground of willful failure to visit. Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s determination that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the children. |
Loudon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Preston L.
Mother and stepfather filed a parental termination action against the father of a minor child, and the trial court terminated the father’s parental rights on the following grounds: (1) incarceration under a sentence of ten years or more and the child was under the age of eight when the sentence was entered; (2) willful failure to support during the four months prior to incarceration; and (3) wanton disregard. We reverse the trial court’s determination that the petitioners presented clear and convincing evidence to support grounds of willful failure to support and wanton disregard. We affirm as to the ground of incarceration under a sentence of ten years or more and as to the trial court’s best interest determination. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of James Keith Owen
In this case challenging the trial court’s interpretation of the notice requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2-306(d), we find the notice issue moot because the trial court found that the petitioner’s claim was without merit. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Grace N.
This appeal stems from a juvenile court proceeding in Davidson County. Mother challenges the entered parenting schedule and raises a number of issues pertaining to the trial court’s child support calculations. For the reasons expressed herein, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Oliver Wood et al. v. Jefferson County Economic Development Oversight Committee, Inc.
In 2009 and 2010, the legislative bodies of Jefferson County, Jefferson City, and Dandridge enacted resolutions requesting that the Jefferson County Chamber of Commerce create a non-profit corporation to be called the Jefferson County Economic Development Oversight Committee (EDOC). Its purpose was to promote economic development in the county. In 2013, a group of citizens filed this action seeking a declaration that EDOC is subject to the provisions of the Tennessee Public Records Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503 (2012), and the Open Meetings Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 8- 44-101 et seq. (2016). After a bench trial, the court denied the plaintiffs’ requested relief. They appealed. We find and hold that the undisputed facts establish that EDOC performs a governmental function, recieves a substantial amount of taxpayer funding, and is significantly involved with and regulated by the governing city and county legislative bodies. In light of our duty to broadly construe and interpret the Public Records and Open Meetings Acts in favor of governmental transparency and accountability, we hold that the EDOC is subject to these acts. The judgment of the trial court is reversed. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Yuletide Office Supply, Inc. v. Justin Miller, et al.
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Barry Wayne Gossage
The Defendant, Barry Wayne Gossage, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original sentence in confinement. On appeal, he argues that he should have been sentenced to a new term of community corrections or probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Billy Dean Sizemore v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Billy Dean Sizemore, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State concedes that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing the petition. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for an evidentiary hearing. |
Lewis | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William "Bill" Douglas Farr, Sr.
The Defendant, William “Bill” Douglas Farr, Sr., was convicted by a Lawrence County Circuit Court jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and was sentenced to forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument by vouching for the credibility of a witness and repeatedly referring to the Defendant as a “monster”; (2) the trial court erred in failing to give specific unanimity and election of offenses jury instructions; (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (4) the trial court applied the incorrect law in determining his sentence. After review, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction but modify his sentence to twenty-five years and remand for entry of an amended judgment. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Donald Spray
Following a bench trial, the Defendant, Michael Donald Spray, a former dispatcher for the Bedford County Sheriff’s Department, was convicted in the Bedford County Circuit Court of eight counts of sexual exploitation of a minor involving over 100 images, a Class B felony, and two counts of sexual exploitation of a minor involving over 50 images, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to an effective term of sixteen years in the Department of Correction. The sole issue the Defendant raises on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the images on the basis they were discovered as a result of an illegal, warrantless search by a fellow employee of the sheriff’s department. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christian Devon McDuffie
The Defendant, Christian Devon McDuffie, was found guilty by a Montgomery County Circuit Court jury of three counts of aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. §39-15-402 (2014) (amended 2016). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent terms of fifteen years for each conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Angela Evans v. Alliance Healthcare Services
Angela Evans (“Employee”) was employed by Alliance Healthcare Services (“Employer”) as a bus driver. On December 16, 2009, she witnessed the shooting of a coworker by a patient. She received mental health care through workers’ compensation. She did not return to work for Employer or any other entity. After exhausting the Benefit Review process, she filed this action in the Chancery Court for Shelby County, alleging that she was permanently and totally disabled by Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) caused by witnessing the shooting. Employer acknowledged the incident but asserted that Employee’s continuing mental health problems were caused by other events and stressors. Employer further asserted that Employee was not permanently and totally disabled. The trial court held that Employee was permanently and totally disabled and that the December 16, 2009 incident was the cause of her disability. Benefits were awarded accordingly. Employer has timely appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel (“Panel”) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment. |
Shelby | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Glenn Black
A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Joshua Glenn Black, of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in allowing a trial exhibit, the front door from the victim’s apartment, to remain in the courtroom for a period of time during the trial and (2) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sharon Daugherty
The Appellant, Sharon Daugherty, appeals the Macon County Criminal Court’s order denying her motion to recover firearms confiscated during a search of her home. On appeal, the Appellant contends that she is entitled to the return of the property because the State dismissed the criminal charges against her. Because the Appellant has no appeal as of right from the denial of a motion to recover confiscated property, we dismiss the appeal. |
Macon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charlotte Lynn Frazier and Andrea Parks
The Defendants, Charlotte Lynn Frazier and Andrea Parks, along with ninety-five other co-defendants, were charged through a presentment with conspiracy to manufacture, sell, or deliver 300 grams or more of methamphetamine with at least one defendant having committed an overt act within 1,000 feet of a school, park, library, recreation center, or child care facility. The Defendants each filed a motion to suppress evidence seized during the execution of search warrants at their homes. The Defendants alleged that the magistrate, a circuit court judge, lacked the authority to issue the search warrants because the Defendants’ homes were located outside the magistrate’s judicial district. The trial court granted the Defendants’ motions. The State sought and was granted permission to appeal in both cases pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9, and this court consolidated the appeals. We hold that the magistrate did not have the authority to issue search warrants for property located outside his judicial district and that, as a result, the searches of the Defendants’ homes were unconstitutional. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s orders granting the Defendants’ motions to suppress and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dominique Dantwan Simons v. State of Tennessee
Dominique Dantwan Simons (“the Petitioner”) appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief arguing that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in advising him concerning his guilty plea and therefore the plea was not knowing and voluntary. Discerning no error, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.
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Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Hopkins
The Defendant-Appellant, David Hopkins, appeals his conviction for first degree felony murder, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering consecutive sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Lynn Poston v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Michael Lynn Poston, appeals from the White County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for aggravated sexual battery, for which he is serving an eleven-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, that the court applied an erroneous legal standard to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and that the trial judge engaged in improper ex parte communication with the jury during its deliberations. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
White | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Erika Louise Dewald v. Baya Paul Dewald
This is a divorce case involving numerous pleadings. Because the order appealed is not final in that it fails to adjudicate husband’s petition for contempt and motion for sanctions, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Black
The defendant, David Black, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, claiming that the trial court erred by improperly admitting certain evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ferryl Theresita McClain v. Richard Perry McClain
This is a post-divorce child custody action involving two children, who were sixteen and seventeen years of age at the time of the most recent trial. The parties were divorced by order of the Sullivan County Law Court (“divorce court”) in July 2001. Concomitant with the divorce decree, the divorce court entered a permanent parenting plan designating the father as the primary residential parent. Although the permanent parenting plan was modified in 2003 and 2007, the divorce court had most recently modified the permanent parenting plan in February 2009 (“2009 PPP”) upon the parties’ stipulation that a material change in circumstance had occurred. The divorce court maintained the father’s designation as the primary residential parent and awarded to the father 268 days of annual residential co-parenting time as compared to Mother’s 97 days. At some point following entry of the 2009 PPP, the mother relocated to Texas, and the father and the children relocated to Washington County, Tennessee. Upon the mother’s request, the case was transferred to the Washington County Circuit Court (“trial court”) in April 2014. On March 20, 2015, the mother filed a motion in the trial court to modify custody and child support, as well as a motion for civil and criminal contempt against the father, alleging various violations of the 2009 PPP. Following a hearing regarding the contempt allegations, the trial court entered an order on June 30, 2015, finding the father in “technical contempt” and directing him to pay an expert witness fee as a sanction. Following participation in mediation, the parties announced an agreement, which the trial court ratified in a permanent parenting plan order entered on June 30, 2015 (“2015 PPP”). The 2015 PPP maintained the father’s designation as the primary residential parent and provided the mother with 85 days of residential co-parenting time, a great part of which was to be exercised at her residence in Texas. On October 2, 2015, the mother filed an “emergency motion” for modification of the 2015 PPP, as well as for criminal and civil contempt against the father, averring violations of the 2015 PPP. The parties subsequently filed competing “emergency” motions concerning physical custody of the younger child, who under one temporary order entered by the trial court in October 2015, was to reside primarily with the mother. Following a two-day bench trial in October 2015, the trial court maintained the prior designation of Father as the primary residentialparent for both children pending further order, but the court took the custody matter under advisement pending receipt of a court-ordered assessment of the parties and the children by a forensic psychologist. Upon receipt of the psychologist’s report, the trial court conducted a second two-day bench trial in June 2016, ultimately finding that this was a case of severe parental alienation in which the father had actively supported the children’s alienation from the mother without reasonable cause. The court awarded exclusive custody of the children to the mother and directed that the children participate with the mother in a workshop in California that had been recommended by the forensic psychologist as a therapeutic methodology for parental alienation at an estimated cost of approximately $28,000.00. The court directed that the workshop costs, including a mandatory post-workshop vacation for the mother and the children, would be substantially paid by the father. The court further found, inter alia, that the father was in contempt of court for failing to follow certain provisions of the 2015 PPP and sentenced the father to eight days in jail, with the sentence suspended provided no further violations occurred. Also finding that the mother was entitled to attorney’s fees, the court reduced the $38,594.99 fee amount requested by the mother to an award of $20,000.00 to offset the amount paid by the father toward the workshop. The father has appealed. Having determined that the father was not provided with sufficient notice of criminal contempt charges pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b), we vacate the trial court’s order finding the father in contempt. We remand for a determination of whether the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to the mother was appropriate given our vacation of the contempt finding against the father. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. The mother’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal is denied. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Church Of God In Christ, Inc., Et Al. v. L. M. Haley Ministries, Inc., Et Al.
We granted this appeal to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the trial court’s decision dismissing this lawsuit involving a dispute over the right to use and control church property for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. This doctrine derives from the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and prohibits civil courts from resolving church disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice. We conclude that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not apply in this lawsuit. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s dismissal is reversed. Furthermore, we conclude that the undisputed facts establish that the plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment, and we remand this matter to the trial court for any other further proceedings and orders that may be necessary to afford the plaintiffs possession and control of the disputed church real property and to address the plaintiffs’ requests for an accounting and control of the disputed church personal property. |
Fayette | Supreme Court | |
Church Of God In Christ, Inc., Et Al. v. L. M. Haley Ministries, Inc., Et Al. - Concurring
I am pleased to concur in the well-written majority opinion but write separately on the question of whether the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is a bar to subject matter jurisdiction or an affirmative defense. |
Fayette | Supreme Court | |
Mardoche Olivier v. City of Clarksville, et al
The trial court dismissed this action as a matter of law for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John David Altenhoff
John David Altenhoff, the Defendant, pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and agreed to an eight-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After finding that the Defendant had an extensive history of criminal behavior, that society needed to be protected from the Defendant, and that measures less than incarceration had unsuccessfully been applied to the Defendant, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying an alternative sentence. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm. |
Sequatchie | Court of Criminal Appeals |