in re Chance D. - DISSENT
I fully concur in the majority's affirmance on the ground of severe abuse as to Chance D. Because I cannot agree that Foster Parents have shown clear and convincing evidence sufficient to forever sever the parent-child relationship at issue in this case, however, I must respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to reverse the trial court and grant Foster Parents' petition to terminate Mother's parental rights |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In re Jude D.
This is a termination of parental rights case involving Jude D., who was age five at the time of trial. The mother, Carla D. ("Mother"), and the father, Julius D. ("Father"), have three children currently involved in termination actions: Chance D., Gabriella D., and Jude D. (collectively, the Children). Mother and Father have an extensive history with child welfare agencies and the courts in both Tennessee and Georgia.1 In March 2012, the Hamilton County Juvenile Court ("juvenile court") granted temporary legal custody of the Children to the Tennessee Department of Children‘s Services ("DCS"). Upon their placement in DCS custody, the Children were placed in the home of Karen P. and Thomas S. (collectively, "Foster Parents").2 DCS did not seek a finding of severe child abuse against Mother in the dependency and neglect action in juvenile court. Foster Parents filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and to adopt Jude D. ("Jude") in the Hamilton County Circuit Court ("trial court") on July 31, 2013. Foster Parents concomitantly filed separate termination of parental rights actions involving Jude‘s two siblings, Gabriella D. ("Gabriella") and Chance D. ("Chance"). Following a bench trial, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had committed severe child abuse against Chance while he was in her custody. The trial court recognized that the determination of severe child abuse against Chance was a ground for termination of Mother‘s parental rights to Jude. The trial court also found, however, that Foster Parents had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions leading to the removal of the Children persisted or that termination of Mother‘s parental rights was in Jude‘s best interest.3 The trial court thereby denied the petition to terminate Mother‘s parental rights to Jude. Foster Parents have appealed. We affirm the trial court‘s finding that the statutory ground of severe child abuse was proven by clear and convincing evidence. However, having determined that Foster Parents also proved by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother‘s parental rights was in the best interest of Jude, we reverse the trial court‘s denial of the termination petition. We therefore grant Foster Parents‘ petition for termination of Mother‘s parental rights to Jude. We remand this matter to the trial court for an adjudication regarding Foster Parents‘ petition for adoption. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In re Jude D. - DISSENT
I fully concur in the majority's affirmance on the ground of severe abuse as to Jude D. Because I cannot agree that Foster Parents have shown clear and convincing evidence sufficient to forever sever the parent-child relationship at issue in this case, however, I must respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to reverse the trial court and grant Foster Parents' petition to terminate Mother's parental rights. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Lamont Johnson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Lamont Johnson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory L. Allen a/k/a Michael Taylor
The defendant, Gregory L. Allen a.k.a. Michael Taylor, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant contends that the trial court erred in concluding that Rule 36.1 relief was not available because the alleged illegal sentence expired prior to the filing of the motion. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s Rule 36.1 motion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bryan R. Hanley v. Turney Center Disciplinary Board, et al.
An inmate was found guilty of possession of a deadly weapon when two knives were found in the door of his cell. After exhausting his administrative remedies, the inmate petitioned for a common law writ of certiorari asserting several issues relating to violations of due process and the Uniform Disciplinary Procedures. The trial court granted his petition, denied his discovery request, and dismissed the writ of certiorari. The inmate now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Cunningham v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Christopher Cunningham, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. The petitioner also asserts his convictions for aggravated robbery violate double jeopardy. Following our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bryan R. Hanley v. Turney Center Disciplinary Board, et al. - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding. As the majority notes, a charge against an inmate be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, defined at TDOC Policy No. 502.01(IV)(I) as “[t]he degree of proof which best accords with reason and probability and is more probable than not.” As the majority also notes, the evidence upon which Mr. Hanley’s conviction rested consisted of the two knives and Corporal Story’s statement, the salient portion of which is quoted in the majority opinion. Corporal Story did not testify and the only live witnesses were Mr. Hanley, who denied that the knives were his, and Duane Brooks, an inmate who testified in support of Mr. Hanley’s contention that the knives were left by a previous occupant of the cell. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
In re Gabriella D.
This is a termination of parental rights case involving Gabriella D., who was age seven at the time of trial. The mother, Carla D. ("Mother"), and the father, Julius D. ("Father"), have three children currently involved in termination actions: Chance D., Gabriella D., and Jude D. (collectively, "the Children"). Mother and Father have an extensive history with child welfare agencies and the courts in both Tennessee and Georgia.1 In March 2012, the Hamilton County Juvenile Court ("juvenile court") granted temporary legal custody of the Children to the Tennessee Department of Children‘s Services ("DCS"). Upon their placement in DCS custody, the Children were placed in the home of Karen P. and Thomas S. (collectively, "Foster Parents").2 DCS did not seek a finding of severe child abuse against Mother in the dependency and neglect action in juvenile court. Foster Parents filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and to adopt Gabriella D. ("Gabriella") in the Hamilton County Circuit Court ("trial court") on July 31, 2013. Foster Parents concomitantly filed separate termination of parental rights actions involving Gabriella‘s two siblings, Chance D. ("Chance") and Jude D. ("Jude"). Following a bench trial, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had committed severe child abuse against Chance while he was in her custody. The trial court recognized that the determination of severe child abuse against Chance was a ground for termination of Mother‘s parental rights to Gabriella. The trial court also found, however, that Foster Parents had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions leading to the removal of the Children persisted or that termination of Mother‘s parental rights was in Gabriella‘s best interest.3 The trial court thereby denied the petition to terminate Mother‘s parental rights to Gabriella. Foster Parents have appealed. We affirm the trial court‘s finding that the statutory ground of severe child abuse was proven by clear and convincing evidence. However, having determined that Foster Parents also proved by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother‘s parental rights was in the best interest of Gabriella, we reverse the trial court‘s denial of the termination petition. We therefore grant Foster Parents‘ petition for termination of Mother‘s parental rights to Gabriella. We remand this matter to the trial court for an adjudication regarding Foster Parents‘ petition for adoption. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In re Gabriella D. DISSENT
I fully concur in the majority's affirmance on the ground of severe abuse as to Gabriella D. Because I cannot agree that Foster Parents have shown clear and convincing evidence sufficient to forever sever the parent-child relationship at issue in this case, however, I must respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to reverse the trial court and grant Foster Parents' petition to terminate Mother's parental rights. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In re Addison B.
This appeal involves the termination of a father's parental rights. The father is currently serving an eight-year sentence after pleading guilty to two counts of attempted child rape, with the victims being the child at issue and her older half-sister. The trial court terminated the father's parental rights upon finding by clear and convincing evidence that six grounds for termination were proven and that termination was in the best interest of the child. We vacate the trial court's findings as to three grounds but affirm the trial court's findings regarding the remaining three grounds and affirm the best interest finding. We accordingly affirm the trial court's order as modified and uphold the termination of the father's parental rights. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Emily M.
This appeal arises from the change in the designation of the primary residential parent and the modification of a residential parenting schedule. Mother appeals, contending that certain factual findings made by the court are unsupported by the record and that the court erred in restricting her parenting time. The court’s findings are supported by the record and did not abuse its discretion in reducing Mother’s parenting time; accordingly, we affirm the judgment. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah Lacy v. Kevin Mitchell, D.C., et al.
This appeal arises from the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint based on her failure to comply with the pre-suit notice and certificate of good faith requirements of the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act (“THCLA”). On appeal, the plaintiff contends that she was not obligated to comply with the THCLA’s procedural requirements because her complaint did not assert a health care liability claim. Having reviewed the complaint, we conclude that it asserts two separate and distinct claims: one health care liability claim and one non-health care liability claim. We therefore affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the health care liability claim, vacate the trial court’s dismissal of the non-health care liability claim, and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Bill Frank Brainerd v. Alisa Rheanne Brainerd
In this appeal arising from the parties’ divorce, the husband challenges the trial court’s valuation of his interest in a limited partnership, division of the marital estate, awards of transitional alimony and alimony in solido, child support order, and adoption of the wife’s proposed permanent parenting plan. The husband also appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for a restraining order. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s valuation of the husband’s interest in the limited partnership. We also conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Husband’s motion for a restraining order. However, because the trial court failed to provide sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, we are unable to effectively review the remainder of the issues raised by the husband on appeal. Therefore, we vacate the judgment of the trial court with regard to these remaining issues and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Joan Stephens, et al. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., et al
This case arises out of a workplace injury. The injured worker and her husband filed this lawsuit asserting various causes of action against numerous defendants. The trial court dismissed one of the defendants upon finding that the defendant was entitled to workers’ compensation immunity. The trial court certified its order of dismissal as final pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. Plaintiffs appeal, claiming that the defendant waived the affirmative defense of workers’ compensation immunity, that the trial court applied the wrong standard for a motion to dismiss, and that the particular claims asserted are not barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the workers’ compensation law. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Donald Crockett, et al. v. Sumner County Board of Education, et al
A thirteen year-old child slipped off bleacher seats at a middle school and injured his leg when he was using the seats as steps in July 2012. The child and his parents sued the school for negligence, and the school asserted the defense of comparative negligence. The trial court applied the Rule of Sevens, concluded the school rebutted the presumption of no capacity for negligence, and determined that the child was solely responsible for his injury. The trial court also determined that the school was not liable for negligent supervision of the child. The parents and child appeal, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
United Parcel Services, Inc. v. James Wyrick, et al.
An employee was injured in the course and scope of his employment and became permanently and totally disabled. The employer filed a petition asking the trial court to determine the workers’ compensation benefits due the employee. The primary disputed issue was the extent of the employee’s disability that was attributable to the employer. The trial court ruled that the employer was responsible for 35 percent of the employee’s disability. After review, we hold the employer is responsible for 100 percent of the employee’s disability. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Knox | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Lisa Patton v. Paris Henry County Medical Clinic
An X-ray technician sought workers’ compensation benefits for disability arising from migraine headaches she alleged were caused by exposure to chemicals at her workplace. Her employer denied the claim, asserting her condition did not arise out of and in the course and scope of her employment. The trial court held that the employee’s claim was compensable and awarded her permanent and total disability benefits. On appeal, the employer argues that the trial court erred in finding the employee’s claim was compensable and in awarding her permanent and total disability benefits. After careful review, we affirm the judgment. |
Carroll | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Willie Lee Hughes, Jr.
The defendant, Willie Lee Hughes, Jr., appeals both his Williamson County Circuit Court jury conviction of aggravated robbery and his guilty-pleaded conviction of failure to appear, claiming that the trial court erred by failing to exclude his statements to law enforcement officers on the basis that the statements were made during the course of plea negotiations and that the trial court erred by classifying him as a persistent offender. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Roosevelt Bigbee, Jr. v. Cherry Lindamood, Warden
The Petitioner, Roosevelt Bigbee, Jr., appeals the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition in which he challenged the legality of his convictions for first degree murder and robbery and his sentences of life for the murder conviction and eleven years for the robbery conviction, to be served consecutively. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the petition was properly dismissed, and we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Darien B. Clay v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Darien B. Clay, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea convictions for aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, two counts of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, aggravated burglary, burglary of a business, and statutory rape, for which he received an effective thirteen-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim and that the court erred in determining that the Petitioner’s guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stanley Creekmore, Administrator For The Estate of Alma B. Long v. Jason S. Hackler, et al.
This is the second appeal of this property dispute concerning a mother's reservation of a life estate in property conveyed to her son pursuant to a warranty deed. The mother initially brought suit against the son to enforce her right to possession. She later sought to amend her complaint in an attempt to attack the validity of the deed. Before ruling upon the motion to amend, the trial court granted summary judgment based upon the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations for ejectment actions. This court reversed in Long v. Creekmore, No. E2012-01453-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 1320515 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2013). Upon remand, the trial court denied the motion to amend the complaint and dismissed the action following the death of the mother and son. The administrator of the mother's estate appeals. We affirm the trial court. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Housewright, et al. v. Dr. Ronald K. McCormack, et al.
This appeal concerns the validity of a warranty deed in which the decedents conveyed a parcel of property for the benefit of a church. The deed contained a reversionary clause requiring the property to revert back if no longer used for the benefit of the church. The same parcel was included in another deed that did not contain a reversionary clause but was recorded before the original deed. The church listed the property for sale approximately 67 years later. The decedents' heirs filed suit. The defendants sought summary judgment, claiming that ownership of the property was established through the deed recorded first. The court granted summary judgment. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nicole Pamblanco
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Nicole Pamblanco, was convicted of aggravated child neglect and criminally negligent homicide. She now appeals as of right, challenging (1) the sufficiency of the evidence by claiming that the State failed to establish the requisite mental state of knowing for her aggravated child neglect conviction and (2) the trial court’s erroneous instruction to the jury during voir dire that, if she were found guilty on both counts, those counts would merge. Following our review, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support her aggravated child neglect conviction and that the jury instruction error was harmless. Therefore, the trial court’s judgments are affirmed. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dorothy Holmes v. Christ Community Health Services, Inc., et al.
The plaintiff filed this action alleging medical malpractice against a physician who examined the plaintiff five days after injury to her shoulder, as well as the facility wherein the physician practiced. The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendant physician failed to properly diagnose a fracture dislocation in her shoulder, causing a delay in appropriate treatment. The plaintiff‘s subsequent treating physician opined in his deposition and via affidavit that if the plaintiff‘s injury had been diagnosed earlier, the plaintiff would likely have avoided an extensive surgical procedure, resultant infection stemming from such surgery, and residual impairment to her shoulder. The trial court excluded this testimony as speculative, granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant physician and hospital. The plaintiff has appealed. We determine that the trial court erred in excluding the causation evidence as speculative. We therefore vacate the court‘s grant of summary judgment in favor of the co-defendants. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |