State of Tennessee v. Clifford Eric Marsh
The Defendant, Clifford Eric Marsh, pleaded guilty to fourth offense driving on a revoked license, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-50-504 (2012). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days’ confinement at 75% service. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentencing. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nolan Excell Pippen
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Nolan Excell Pippen, was convicted of public intoxication, a Class C misdemeanor; and simple possession of marijuana, third or subsequent offense, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-310, -418. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of two years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for public intoxication; and (2) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the marijuana found in his pocket during a search incident to his arrest for public intoxication. Following our review, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction for public intoxication and that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s suppression motion. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and dismiss the charges against the Defendant. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nolan Excell Pippen - concurring and dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for public intoxication as indicted, but I would uphold his conviction for simple possession of marijuana. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Greg Layman v. Aaron Acor et al.
This action was originally filed in general sessions court against three defendants and resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff. Two of the co-defendants appealed to circuit court. The remaining co-defendant successfully sought to have the general sessions judgment set aside for insufficient service of process. Thereafter, the general sessions court transferred the claim against the one remaining co-defendant to circuit court to be consolidated with the pending appeal filed by the other co-defendants. The plaintiff subsequently voluntarily dismissed the action. One co-defendant filed a motion to alter or amend, asserting that the circuit court should not have allowed the plaintiff to voluntarily nonsuit the action. The circuit court denied the motion, and the co-defendant timely appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Mimi Hiatt v. Kevin L. Hiatt
This appeal concerns post-divorce matters. Mimi Hiatt (“Wife”) and Kevin L. Hiatt (“Husband”) divorced. Wife some years later filed a motion to modify the final decree of divorce in the Circuit Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to increase Husband’s child support and alimony obligations. Husband, in turn, filed a motion to recover claimed overpayments he made on the marital residence because Wife had transferred it to a trust. The Trial Court found, among other things, that Wife was voluntarily underemployed and declined to increase her spousal support for that reason. The Trial Court also ruled that Wife’s divestment of the marital residence constituted a “sale” under the Marital Dissolution Agreement (“the MDA”) and awarded a judgment to Husband for payments he made on the mortgage after Wife’s transfer of the marital residence to the trust. Wife appeals to this Court. We hold that Wife’s transfer of the marital residence to a trust constituted a sale per the MDA, and we affirm the Trial Court in its award to Husband for overpayment. However, we find that Wife proved a substantial and material change in circumstances, and we remand for the Trial Court to determine an increase in Wife’s alimony in light of this change and all relevant factors. We find further that the Trial Court erred in declining to award Wife her attorney’s fees relative to alimony. As a final matter, we award Wife her attorney’s fees incurred on appeal related to the alimony issue, and remand for the Trial Court to determine Wife’s reasonable attorney’s fees related to the alimony issue on appeal. The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed, in part, and, reversed, in part. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jimmy Dale Qualls
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the election of offenses doctrine, articulated in Burlison v. State, 501 S.W.2d 801 (Tenn. 1973), and reaffirmed in State v. Shelton, 851 S.W.2d 134 (Tenn. 1993), requires the prosecution to identify a single incident of sexual battery in cases, such as this one, where the child victim testifies to repeated incidents of sexual contact occurring over a substantial period of time but does not furnish any specific details, dates, or distinguishing characteristics as to individual incidents of sexual battery. We hold, as have courts in other jurisdictions, that where a prosecution is based on such nonspecific or “generic” evidence, requiring the prosecution to elect a single specific incident is not possible. However, to prevent infringement upon the defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict, the trial court must give a modified unanimity instruction which informs the jury that it must unanimously agree the defendant committed all the acts described by the victim in order to convict the defendant. Although the trial court did not have the benefit of this decision and therefore did not provide the modified unanimity instruction to the jury in this case, we conclude, based on the record in this appeal, that the omission of this instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment vacating the defendant’s convictions of sexual battery by an authority figure and reinstate the trial court’s judgment approving the jury’s verdict. |
Hardeman | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Chuncy Lesolue Hollis
The defendant, Chuncy Lesolue Hollis, whose original first degree premeditated murder conviction was reversed by this court due to an error in jury instructions, was again convicted by a Gibson County jury in a second trial of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; that the trial court erred by issuing a jury instruction on flight and by not instructing the jury on cause of death, by allowing prior statements of witnesses to be introduced as substantive evidence, by allowing photographic lineups into evidence and by summarily dismissing his motion for judgment of acquittal and/or a new trial without holding a hearing; that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by the manner in which the prosecutor questioned witnesses and by the improper comments he made in opening statement and closing argument; and that the cumulative effect of various trial errors deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Chalmers G. Brown
The defendant, Chalmers G. Brown, appeals the trial court’s order granting his motion to correct an illegal sentence and entering corrected judgments, arguing that his convictions should have been vacated not merely corrected. After review, we reverse the trial court’s correction of the judgments against the defendant and reinstate the original judgments. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Douglas Kincaid
Appellant stands convicted of possession with the intent to sell not less than one-half ounce but not more than ten pounds of marijuana, a Class E felony; possession with intent to sell a schedule IV controlled substance, a Class D felony; possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court imposed partially consecutive sentences, for an effective sentence of five years. On appeal, appellant argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his possession of tramadol conviction and his firearm conviction; (2) the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the photographs and text messages from appellant's cellular telephone; and (3) the trial court erred in allowing witnesses to testify regarding appellant's oral statement to police. Following our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Chauquinn Bernard v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Chauquinn Bernard, pleaded guilty to felony possession of marijuana pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-418(e) and received the agreed-upon sentence of four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, to be served concurrently with a ten-year sentence for aggravated burglary that he was already serving. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and involuntariness of his guilty plea. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal, petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sylvia Folger v. Robert Folger
This appeal arises from a divorce. Sylvia Folger (“Wife”) sued Robert Folger (“Husband”) for divorce in the Chancery Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”). After a trial, the Trial Court, among other things, awarded Wife transitional alimony. On appeal, Wife raises a number of issues. Because of Wife's pronounced economic disadvantage relative to Husband, we modify the judgment of the Trial Court to increase the amount of Wife's transitional alimony, and remand this case for the Trial Court to award Wife attorney's fees as alimony in solido as well as her reasonable attorney's fees incurred on appeal. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Dr. Robin M. Stevenson v. American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania
This appeal involves a lawsuit filed by an insured against his insurer due to the insurer's failure to pay a claim for a theft loss. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer, finding no coverage under the policy. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Spencer
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Robert Spencer, was convicted of one count of possession with intent to sell twenty-six grams or more of a substance containing cocaine and one count of possession with intent to deliver twenty-six grams or more of a substance containing cocaine, both Class B felonies. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a)(4), (c)(1), (i)(5). The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of fourteen years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred by allowing an investigator to testify about statements made by a “cooperating source”; and (3) that the trial court erred by failing to merge his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the Defendant's convictions. However, we merge the Defendant's convictions and remand the case to the trial court for entry of corrected judgment forms reflecting said merger. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Lee Morris
The Defendant-Appellant, Richard Lee Morris, was indicted by a Madison County Grand Jury for attempted rape and misdemeanor assault. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of the lesser included offense of sexual battery and the charged offense of assault. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-505, -101(a)(1) (Supp. 2013). The trial court sentenced Morris as a Range II, multiple offender to four years for the sexual battery conviction and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the assault conviction and ordered the sentences served consecutively. On appeal, Morris argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his assault conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerome Sanders
A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Jerome Sanders, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to eighteen years to be served at eighty-five percent. On appeal, the appellant contends that the the trial court erred by refusing to suppress pretrial identifications of him made by the victim; that the trial court erred by failing to suppress his statement to police; that the trial court improperly questioned the victim, which commented on the evidence and bolstered the victim's credibility; that the trial court should have recused itself because the court's conduct and demeanor created judicial bias; that the trial court admitted evidence in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); that the trial court erred by admitting the co-defendant's statement into evidence; that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments; and that cumulative error warrants a new trial. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties' briefs, we conclude that trial court committed reversible error by potentially allowing the jury to hear improper propensity evidence in violation of Rule 404(b), Tennessee Rules of Evidence. Therefore, the appellant's conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial, at which another judge shall preside. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Juan E. Henderson
The Defendant, Juan E. Henderson, appeals as of right from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's revocation of probation and order that he serve the balance of his seven-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, he asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Makendra E.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The child at issue in this case was placed in foster care at age two. When the child was ten years old, the child‘s foster parents filed a petition in Dyer County Chancery Court seeking to terminate the parental rights of the child‘s parents and to adopt the child. The trial court entered an order terminating the parental rights of the child‘s mother and father and granting the foster parents‘ petition to adopt the child. The mother has appealed the termination of her parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit in the four months prior to the filing of the petition to terminate her parental rights. The mother also appeals the trial court‘s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the child‘s best interest. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Church of God in Christ, Inc., et al v. L.M. Haley Ministries, Inc., et al.
A hierarchical church filed a complaint against one of its local churches, seeking an order establishing the hierarchical church's control over the local church's real and personal property. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the basis of the doctrine of ecclesiastical abstention. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Church of God in Christ, Inc., et al v. L.M. Haley Ministries, Inc., et al. - DISSENT
ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, J., Dissenting. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dondrinkus T. Dickerson
A Robertson County jury convicted the Defendant, Dondrinkus T. Dickerson, of rape, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction to be served consecutively to his prior sentences. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steven Bernard Syndor v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Steven Bernard Sydnor, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his Davidson County Criminal Court convictions for second degree murder and theft of property valued over $1000. Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in that trial counsel failed to discuss trial strategy with him and failed to present assisted suicide to the jury as a defense theory. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Wayne Johnson
Defendant, Timothy Wayne Johnson, sought relief in Warren County under a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The motion was summarily denied, and Defendant timely appealed the ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Saliace P., et al.
This case involves the termination of a mother's parental rights to her three daughters. The children were previously adjudicated dependent and neglected due to physical abuse of the children by the mother's boyfriend. After the children were in foster care for about a year, the Department of Children's Services filed a petition to terminate the mother's parental rights on several grounds. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that three grounds for termination were proven and that termination was in the best interest of the children. The mother appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the termination of the mother's parental rights. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
In re Aaliyah E
This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Aaliyah E., the minor child (“the Child”) of Wanda M. (“Mother”) and Christopher E. (“Father”). The Child was taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on November 19, 2013, upon investigation of the Child’s lack of legal guardianship while the parents were incarcerated. On October 30, 2014, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that statutory grounds existed to terminate the parental rights of both parents upon its finding by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the parents abandoned the Child by failing to provide a suitable home, (2) the parents failed to substantially comply with the reasonable responsibilities and requirements of the permanency plans, and (3) the conditions leading to the Child’s removal from the home persisted. As to Father, the court also found by clear and convincing evidence that prior to incarceration, he had abandoned the Child by showing wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare. The court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Mother and Father have each appealed. Having determined that, as DCS concedes, Mother was incarcerated during the entire applicable four-month statutory period following the Child’s removal into protective custody, we reverse the trial court’s finding regarding the ground of abandonment through failure to provide a suitable home as to Mother only. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Child. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Gary Mosley
The appellant, William Gary Mosley, pled guilty in the Marion County Circuit Court to initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class B felony, and two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and reserved a certified question of law concerning the sufficiency of the affidavit underlying the search warrant issued in this case. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause for the search warrant. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, the appellant’s convictions are vacated, and the charges are dismissed. |
Marion | Court of Criminal Appeals |