Terry Holliday v. State of Tennessee
This is an appeal by the State of Tennessee from the Tennessee Claims Commission’s award of a judgment against it. While he was an inmate in the State’s custody, Plaintiff sustained injuries when he fell out of a pickup truck that was being operated by a State employee. Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Claims Commission in which he alleged that the State’s negligence caused his injuries and sought damages for, among other things, the medical expenses that were incurred as a result of the fall. The State argued that it should receive a credit against any award of damages for the medical expenses Plaintiff incurred during his incarceration because it paid those expenses through its contracts with two private medical vendors. The Claims Commission disagreed and held that evidence of payments made by the medical vendors for Plaintiff’s treatment was barred by the collateral source rule. The Claims Commission awarded Plaintiff $125,000 in damages, which included damages for the medical expenses that he allegedly incurred. On appeal, we conclude that because the State was required by law to pay for all medical expenses Plaintiff incurred during his incarceration, the Claims Commission erred in considering the cost of the medical services provided to Plaintiff in calculating his damages. We therefore vacate the Claims Commission’s award of damages and remand this matter for a new trial on the issue of damages. |
Court of Appeals | ||
City of Memphis, et al. v. Tandy J. Gilliland Family LLC, et al.
This is the second appeal of this eminent domain case. In the first appeal, City of Memphis v. Tandy J. Gilliland Family, LLC, et al., 391 S.W.3d 60 (2012), this Court held that Appellee City of Memphis, a municipal corporation for the use and benefit of Memphis Light, Gas, and Water Division, was entitled to condemn a portion of Appellants’ property to erect poles and other facilities to provide utility services to MLGW customers. In addition to the provision of utility services, Appellee also sought co-location rights to allow telecommunications and cable providers to attach to MLGW’s poles. In the first appeal, Appellants argued that the co-location rights transformed the condemnation from public to private use. In our first opinion, we held that the Pole Attachment Act, 47 U.S.C. § 224, mandated that MLGW would allow co-location rights. On remand, the trial court held that it was bound by the law of the case as set out in our first opinion and denied Appellants discovery concerning the co-location rights before granting those rights to Appellee. In the instant appeal, Appellants contend that our previous holding was incorrect because the Pole Attachment Act specifically exempts MLGW from the definition of “utility.” We agree, and reverse our previous holding to the extent that we held that the Pole Attachment Act is mandatory on MLGW. Because of our erroneous holding, the issues of whether MLGW is entitled to co-location rights and the proper compensation, if any, for these rights have not been addressed in the trial court. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order insofar as it grants Appellee co-location rights and remand the case for discovery and hearing on these issues. We affirm the trial court’s order insofar as it allows Appellee to condemn Appellants’ property for utility purposes. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy W. Patrick
The Defendant, Timothy W. Patrick, appeals the DeKalb County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for his convictions for three counts of selling hydromorphone and ordering him to serve the remainder of his effective nine-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
DeKalb | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Janette Ebony Robinson
The Defendant, Janette Ebony Robinson, pleaded guilty in the Criminal Court for Davidson County to two counts of aggravated child abuse and received two concurrent twenty-five-year sentences. See T.C.A. § 39-15-402 (2014). The Defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Beau C. Vaughan
The Appellant, Beau C. Vaughan, appeals as of right from the Maury County Circuit Court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Appellant contends (1) that the trial court erred in ruling that his sentence for a felony conviction which occurred while he was released on bond for another offense was not statutorily required to be served consecutively to the sentence for the underlying offense because the underlying offense was a misdemeanor; and (2) that the trial court erred by ruling, in the alternative, that Rule 36.1 was not applicable because the convictions occurred before Rule 36.1 was enacted in 2013. The State concedes that the trial court erred with respect to both of the Appellant’s issues. However, contrary to the State’s concession, the Appellant’s sentence expired long ago; therefore, his motion failed to state a colorable claim for relief. As such, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the Appellant’s Rule 36.1 motion. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bruce Anton Parks v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Bruce Anton Parks, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, claiming he received ineffective assistance of counsel on several bases. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Noah Keith Tipton
A Monroe County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Noah Keith Tipton, for one count of initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine (“the methamphetamine charge”) and fourteen counts of aggravated cruelty to animals. Pursuant to a negotiated plea, the Defendant pleaded guilty to the methamphetamine charge and two counts of aggravated cruelty to animals and was sentenced to eight years with the manner of service to be determined at a sentencing hearing. Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court found that the Defendant was “not eligible for punishment in the community” under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-36-106(a)(1) but took under advisement the Defendant’s claim that his “special needs” were treatable and could best be served in the community as provided by subsection -106(c). Following a second hearing in which no additional proof was taken, the trial court found that the Defendant’s special needs could be best served in the Department of Correction rather than in the community corrections program for Monroe County. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his placement in the community corrections program. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Noah Keith Tipton - dissenting
I respectfully disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority in this case. For the reasons that follow, I would remand this matter to the trial court for Tipton to be placed in the community corrections program. In this appeal, Tipton contends that the trial court relied upon an erroneous interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-36-106 in finding him statutorily ineligible for placement in the community correction program. He argues that the prior convictions relied upon by the court do not constitute a pattern of prior violent offenses pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-36-102(11).1 Specifically, he contends that (1) reckless endangerment does not meet the definition of a violent offense; (2) aggravated animal cruelty, as codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-212, is classified as a property offense and not a crime of violence; and (3) the trial court improperly relied on Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-113(f)(1)-(3) (2006), rather than section 39-13-113 (2001), in finding that his 2001 charge for violating an order of a protection was a violent offense. Excluding the convictions that the trial court improperly classified as crimes of violence, Tipton claims the sole basis for the trial court‟s denial of his placement in the community correction program was charges reflected in his presentence report that did not result in convictions, which is likewise an improper basis to deny placement. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kim Lewis Neas v. Patricia Erskine Heffernan Neas
This appeal arises from a divorce. After almost 29 years of marriage, Kim Lewis Neas (“Husband”) filed for divorce against Patricia Erskine Heffernan Neas (“Wife”) in the Chancery Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”). After a trial, the Trial Court, among other things, divided the parties’ marital assets and liabilities. Husband appeals to this Court. The central issues in this appeal include the Trial Court’s valuation of business assets awarded to Husband and the Trial Court’s determination of Husband’s income. Because Wife leaves this marriage with more in assets than Husband and in an otherwise comparable financial position, we reverse the Trial Court’s award of attorney’s fees to Wife. We also modify the allocation of marital debt and remand for the Trial Court to effectuate this new allocation. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roderick Quatel Bates and Emmett Jones
In this consolidated case, the defendants, Roderick Quatel Bates and Emmett Jones, appeal their convictions of aggravated burglary and first degree murder. Mr. Jones challenges the trial court's admission of a photograph of him provided by the Department of Correction and the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the out-of-court identification of him as a perpetrator. Both defendants challenge the admission of the audio-recorded statements of two witnesses, the admission of the audio recording of a 9-1-1 call made by a State's witness, and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Benita Renee Yocum v. Jason Richard Yocum
This is a divorce action involving a five-year marriage between a husband who was employed overseas at the time of the parties' separation and a wife who had worked primarily during the marriage as a homemaker and caretaker of the parties' three minor children, including a child with special medical needs. Following a hearing in December 2012, during which the husband testified telephonically, the trial court ordered the husband to pay $3,500.00 per month in temporary support. Following subsequent hearings in April and May 2014, during which the husband also testified telephonically, the court, inter alia, granted the parties a divorce on stipulated grounds, delineated a residential co-parenting schedule, entered a judgment against Husband for support arrearage, and set the husband's child support obligation in the amount of $1,842.00 monthly and spousal support obligation in the amount of $1,000.00 monthly. The court reserved remaining issues for a bench trial, which it set for September 23, 2014, with notice that it would not allow the husband to testify telephonically unless the wife waived any objection to such testimony. At the beginning of trial, the court denied the husband's counsel's motion to allow the husband to testify telephonically upon the wife's objection. Also at the beginning of trial, the court ordered that the $1,000.00 previously ordered be continued as an award to the wife of alimony in futuro. The court also directed that its previous orders as to co-parenting time and child support be incorporated as a permanent parenting plan order. At the close of proof, the trial court distributed the marital estate and awarded to Wife $10,500.00 toward her attorney's fees. The husband appeals. Having determined that no income shares worksheet for child support purposes was attached to the final judgment, we vacate the amount of child support awarded and remand for the limited purpose of child support calculation according to the Child Support Guidelines based upon the trial court's previous findings concerning the parties' respective incomes and co-parenting time. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all other respects. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Shaun Steven Kidd v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Shaun Steven Kidd, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terry Lee Adams
The defendant, Terry Lee Adams, filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, complaining because concurrent, rather than consecutive, sentences were imposed on him in 1996 and 1998. The trial court denied relief, concluding that since he was on probation for the first conviction when the second sentence was imposed, consecutive sentencing was not required. Based upon our review, we affirm the denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. A.D. Smith, III
Defendant, A.D. Smith III, was arrested for driving under the influence (“DUI”) in Shelby County. Based on his prior conviction for DUI, Defendant was informed that he was subject to a mandatory blood draw under Tennessee's implied consent law. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that his consent was not freely and voluntarily given. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, and the State filed for an interlocutory appeal. Upon our review of the record, arguments, and authorities, we conclude that the trial court erred in finding that Defendant's consent was not voluntary. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. A.D. Smith, III - Dissenting
I respectfully disagree with the conclusions of the majority opinion for two reasons. First, the implied consent law does not satisfy the consent exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Second, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings that the defendant did not freely and voluntarily, and without duress or coercion, consent to the blood test. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Quincy Howze
Appellant, Quincy Howze, stands convicted of one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to serve twenty years at 100% release eligibility based on his two prior convictions of the same. Appealing his conviction and sentence, appellant raises three issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in omitting a special jury instruction on identity; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; and (3) whether the trial court erred in sentencing him to the maximum term allowed by law. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the criminal court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carlos Gonzalez
Appellant, Carlos Gonzalez, stands convicted of one count of second degree murder, three counts of attempted second degree murder, one count of misdemeanor reckless endangerment (a lesser-included offense of attempted second degree murder), three counts of aggravated assault, and three counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. He was acquitted of one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of fifty-two years. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in its admission and exclusion of evidence, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder, and that the trial court erred in its sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for correction of the judgment documents. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony H. Dean
The Defendant, Anthony H. Dean, was convicted in 2000 of aggravated rape of a ninety-two-year-old victim and received a forty-year sentence as a violent offender. In 2015, the Defendant allegedly filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting the correction of the judgment. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion for failure to state a colorable claim. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by dismissing the motion. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Karen Alford v. HCA Healthcare Services of Tennessee, Inc., et al.
The plaintiff, a nurse, alleged that she sustained a hip injury in the course of her employment. She further alleged that she sustained an injury to the nerves of her leg as a result of treatment for the hip injury. In addition, she alleged a mental injury. Her employer contended that her hip problems were preexisting and that she failed to sustain her burden of proof as to the nerve and mental injuries. The trial court found that the hip and nerve injuries were compensable but the alleged mental injury was not. It also awarded certain medical expenses from unauthorized physicians. Employer has appealed, asserting that the evidence preponderates against the award of benefits. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse the award of medical expenses but otherwise affirm the judgment. |
Rutherford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Victor McMiller v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Victor McMiller, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2009 Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convictions of the sale and delivery of a Schedule III controlled substance, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Shutes v. Universal Underwriters Service Corporation
The issue presented in this case involves a vehicle services contract Appellant purchased from Appellee. The engine in Appellant's vehicle covered under the contract expired due to a lack of lubrication caused by a combination of engine sludge and low oil. Appellee denied coverage for the repairs under exclusions in the contract. Appellant filed suit alleging breach of contract and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of Appellee. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
David Weatherspoon v. Gayle Minard, MD
Plaintiff filed this health care liability action against the defendant doctor in 2000 and voluntarily non-suited it in 2008. Plaintiff re-filed the action in 2009. The defendant moved to exclude the plaintiff's standard-of-care expert for his failure to produce certain financial documents. The trial court granted the motion and excluded the expert five days before the scheduled trial date. Plaintiff requested leave to employ another standard-of-care expert in the five days before trial, which the trial court denied. The trial court ultimately dismissed the plaintiff's entire case because, without a standard-of-care expert, he was unable to state a health care liability claim. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not permit him to “emergently arrange” for an expert in the five days preceding the scheduled trial date. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
First Community Bank, N. A. v. First Tennessee Bank, N. A., et al
First Community Bank, N.A. (“Plaintiff”), brought suit against multiple defendants for fraud, constructive fraud, negligent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment, and violation of the Tennessee Securities Act, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 48-1-101—126. Three non-resident defendants, The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., and Fitch, Inc. (“Ratings Agencies”), filed motions to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, which the trial court granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal based on lack of personal jurisdiction as to the Ratings Agencies, and the Plaintiff requested permission to appeal. We granted review in this case to determine whether the trial court erred in determining that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Ratings Agencies and thereby dismissing the Plaintiff’s case as against the Ratings Agencies. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction under a theory of general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction. Therefore, we affirm the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals on these issues. With regard to the Plaintiff’s attempt to establish personal jurisdiction under a theory of conspiracy jurisdiction, we likewise conclude that the Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy jurisdiction at this point. However, we vacate the dismissal of the Plaintiff’s action against the Ratings Agencies on this theory and remand this case to the trial court to determine if the Plaintiff should be allowed to conduct jurisdictional discovery on the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction in a manner consistent with the guidelines set forth in this opinion. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronald Bennett
Defendant, Ronald Bennett, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Because Defendant's sentences have long since expired, he has not asserted a colorable claim for relief. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's decision to summarily dismiss the motion. However, we remand the matter to the trial court for the entry of corrected judgments pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Shelby County v. James Crews, et al.
This is the second appeal in this condemnation proceeding in which Shelby County (“the County”) sought to condemn a parcel of real property owned by the Appellees. The original appeal involved our review of the trial court's decision to allow the County to nonsuit its case after a consent order had already been entered granting it ownership in fee simple. We concluded that the entry of voluntary dismissal was inappropriate where (1) the trial court had already granted the County ownership and (2) only the issue of compensation was left to be decided. We accordingly remanded the case for a determination as to the amount of compensation to be paid. Following the remand, the County moved for summary judgment asserting that it was entitled to relief under an adverse possession theory and Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-2-110. The trial court denied this motion. The case was later set for trial to determine the amount of compensation owed as a result of the condemnation. In response to statements made by the County's counsel during trial concerning the County's need for the property, the trial court sustained an oral motion made by the Appellees' counsel to dismiss the condemnation proceeding. A formal order of dismissal was entered in July 2012, pursuant to which the trial court transferred all title to the property from the County back to the Appellees. In the same order, the trial court reserved several issues for later ruling, including the assessment of damages, costs, and credits. After orders were eventually entered resolving these reserved issues, the County filed a timely notice of appeal. Having considered the issues raised on appeal, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of the condemnation action, transfer title to the property at issue back to the County, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |